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Abstract 
Adolescents' ideas about provisional historical explanation were analysed in a sample 
of Portuguese 12 to 20 year-old students, attending the 7th, 9th and 1 1 th grade. In the 
light of a theoretical framework considering three conceptual clusters - explanatory 
structure, explanatory consistency, and objectivity and truth - students' ideas were 
categorised in a model of five levels of progression, functioning as the main working 
hypothesis, and generated through a qualitative analysis. At Level 1 (the story), 
students' ideas appear mainly related to description. At Level 2 (the right explanation), 
there is a focus on the correct explanation, explanations are assessed in everyday terms, 
and the direct observation paradigm tends to be valued. At Level 3 (the more factors the 
better), students' concerns appear linked to an ideal of aggregation of factors, evidence 
is discriminated as sources to the explanation, and the "memory paradigm" tends to be 
valued. At Level 4, (a consensual explanation?), there is a preoccupation about a 
perspectiveless neutrality, valuing verification and interlinked factors (explanations may 
take the narrative form). An objectivist trend defends the search for a consensual 
explanation whilst a relativist view denies its possibility due to existing different 
perspectives. At Level 5 (perspective), neutrality and perspective are recognised as 
genuine features of historical explanation, these appearing in conflict with ideas of 
perspectiveless neutrality. Explanations may take the narrative mode, and an interlink of 
factors is valued. Explanatory assessment may appear as evidential confirmation and 
refutation, and reference may be made to the substantive historical context. A statistical 
analysis of data concerning levels of progression by sex, age and grade, and responses 
to some specific sub-tasks, was carried out. Differences on sex were not found 
statistically significant but differences on age and grade appeared significant at the 5% 
level. 
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Notes 
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2.The words pupil and student are currently undergoing a shift in usage. In this study 
student is applied to all subjects in the Portuguese sample. Pupil is used where English 
work employs that word. 
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Introduction 
The more satisfying the answers to an explanatory 
question appear to be, the more provisional will 
they be also. 
(Hawthorn, 1991, p. 33) 
The idea of provisional explanation has emerged in recent discussions in various fields 
of knowledge. The debates among philosophers concerning the nature of history, the 
different answers about the past given by historians, the controversial history curricula 
proposed by educationalists and politicians, have all contributed to making explicit the 
idea of the provisionality of historical explanation. Hence, at an everyday level one may 
remain at the surface of such an assumption when trying to explain the past. One may 
either take an easy-going attitude ("explanations depend on a point of view, we cannot 
know which one is better") or, rest on a dogmatic position according to personal 
preferences ("only this explanation [which pleases me most] is true"). 
The learning of history may challenge these common-sense views. Criticisms have been 
made of current teaching approaches which are supposed not to foster an informed 
decision by students about historical answers. In Portugal, as once (and perhaps still) in 
the UK, educationalists complain about rote-learning, over-loaded content approaches. 
A critique of a "scientistic" perspective of history might be addressed to history 
teaching in Portugal as well. In the USA, and also in the UK now, some educationalists 
complain about a deconstructionist approach in school history advocated by some 
others, which may lead students to uncritical attitudes. Barth (1992) pointed out when 
referring to this deconstructive approach to history in the social studies curriculum in 
the USA: 
Ask high school juniors and seniors if their opinions are as valid as yours and most will 
respond with an emphatic, "Yes!." The logical conclusion to this divergent inquiry line of 
thinking is: "History is just someone's opinion of what is important ... History is not 
important." (p. 13) 
12 
These thoughts may raise a pertinent question: What views do historically literate 
adolescents actually take about the idea of provisional historical explanation? Do some 
of those students reveal a more critical, balanced attitude than these views expressed 
previously? 
A positive link between provisionality and fruitfulness of knowledge, as suggested by 
Hawthorn, may exist within the history field: the more satisfactory an historical 
explanation appears, the more questions, and of a wider scope, it might raise. A 
theoretical exploration of the concepts involved in this assertion makes us understand 
that provisional historical explanation is not an obvious, single-track idea. There are 
criteria employed in history to permit the assessment of more or less valid conclusions, 
within an informed view, whether objectivist or relativist. What criteria are these? Due 
to the complexity of notions and diversity of perspectives entangled in this issue, it is 
legitimate to ask: 
What theoretical meanings and boundaries encompass the idea of 
provisional historical explanation?  
Therefore, in this study a survey into philosophical approaches to the idea of 
provisional explanation was undertaken in order to gain awareness about some related 
notions, prior to its handling at educational level. A first boundary was posed to the 
meaning of historical explanation: it concerns why-type questions in history. 
In the light of the relevant notions related to the idea of provisional historical 
explanation which has sprung from the theoretical discussion, the analysis of students' 
ideas was then made possible. The initial problem to investigate was: 
To what extent do adolescent students operate with a notion of 
provisionality in historical explanation and, when they employ a notion of 
this kind, what meanings do they assign to it? 
This study aims to contribute to a better understanding about adolescents' thinking in 
history and, specifically, to encourage Portuguese teachers to develop a critical 
approach to history teaching. 
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Chapter 1 discusses some lines of research about pupils' ideas of history relevant to this 
study, namely, about levels of progression in history, historical explanation, and the 
idea of provisionality in history. It also presents some concepts borrowed from the 
personal construct theory. 
Chapter 2 gives an overview about models of explanation in history, as it has been 
discussed in the philosophical field, namely, the nomological-deductive, rational, 
narrative, and structural models, prior to a working definition of historical explanation. 
Two historical answers to the central question used in the empirical study were 
analysed in accordance with the definition proposed. 
Chapter 3 analyses some notions related to the idea of provisionality in historical 
explanation, namely, on truth and objectivity from early debates, to new trends 
concerning criteria for explanatory assessment. In the light of this discussion, it presents 
a set of ideas as a theoretical working hypothesis. The two historical versions analysed 
in the previous chapter were tentatively compared vis-a-vis the criteria for explanatory 
assessment. 
Chapter 4 describes the first empirical explorations of Portuguese adolescent students' 
ideas about provisional historical explanation, and the emergence of a model of 
categorization through levels of progression about such ideas. 
Chapter 5 describes the method of the main empirical study carried out through several 
phases (four piloting phases and a final data collection) to analyse Portuguese 
adolescent students' ideas about provisional historical explanation. 
Chapter 6 analyses the data collected during the several piloting phases and discusses 
the progressive generation of the model of students' ideas about provisional historical 
explanation in the light of the empirical data. 
Chapter 7 synthesizes the theoretical and methodological framework of the model of 
students' ideas about provisional historical explanation, charts its main constructs in a 
conceptual map, and traces the main ideas along five levels of progression. 
Chapter 8 analyses the main data in a qualitative approach, by discussing examples of 
each level of progression in the light of the model proposed. 
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Chapter 9 presents a statistical analysis of the main data and discusses its major 
findings. 
Chapter 10 gives a set of final reflections about the major hypothesis progressively 
generated (the model of adolescent students' ideas about provisional historical 
explanation) and about some partial findings, which have implications for history 
education and for further research on cognition. 
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1 Pupils' ideas related to provisional historical explanation 
An area of research concerned with the exploration of pupils' ideas in history has been 
developed since the late sixties. Some of the resulting work may be seen as relevant to 
the study of adolescent pupils' ideas about provisional historical explanation, and they 
will be briefly discussed within three major topics: (a) progression in pupils' ideas of 
history; (b) historical explanation; and (c) provisionality in historical knowledge. 
Another topic (d), adopting the framework of Kelly's construct theory, will define such 
notions as perspectivism versus literalism, alternative constructivism versus 
accumulative information, and a loose versus a tight attitude. These will also be 
explored, since they have contributed to the clarification of some constructs applied in 
this study. 
Progression in pupils' ideas of history 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, research in education was strongly influenced by 
Piagetian theory, emphasising cognitive development through three main invariant 
sequential stages. This trend was reflected in debates about the place of history in the 
curriculum, for example Hallam (1967, 1970, 1975), and in studies about pupils' 
thinking in history, for example Peel (1967a, b, 1971). 
Hallam's studies aimed to investigate the age at which children could reason 
historically; as history was concerned with alien, abstract issues, only at the formal 
operational stage, he claimed, would children be able to grasp historical ideas. His 
results (1967) suggested that only at the chronological age of 16, and at a mental age 
between 16.5 and 18.2, could adolescents understand history. This finding proved to be 
quite harmful to history teaching during the seventies: it provided a ground for 
withdrawing the teaching of history from the curriculum for early ages, in countries 
such as the USA, France, Portugal, and discouraged many history teachers from 
challenging pupils' naive or inappropriate views in history.1 In 1970 Hallam reflected 
1  In Portugal, a history curriculum starting at sixth grade (11-12-year-olds) was implemented in the 
school reform after 1974 and it flourished until a new school reform started in 1990. The view that many 
historical topics are quite difficult for young adolescents seems popular among Portuguese teachers; for 
example, Pre-history and Medieval topics are commonly cited as demanding too sophisticated concepts 
for sixth and seventh graders. 
16 
on the controversy about whether logical progression was mostly influenced by 
maturation or social interaction: 
Whether it is possible to accelerate children's logical thinking is being strongly debated at 
present. How far does the development of thought depend on maturation and how far on 
interaction with the environment, both social and intellectual? Do we have to accept that certain 
chronological or mental ages are essential before children can reach the concrete or formal 
levels, or is it possible to arrange the learning situation in such a way that the children's thought 
processes are so challenged that they have to adapt to the new, more complex material? The 
evidence is by no means complete or conclusive but a teacher task is obviously to try to develop 
thinking skills as far as is practicable....The suggestion that it may be possible to accelerate 
thought processes has been eagerly adopted in the USA - perhaps over-eagerly as far as Piaget is 
concerned. He has recently explained that while it may be possible to accelerate these stages 
"there is not much to be gained by doing it beyond a certain measure". (p. 171) 
Later in 1975, Hallam argued against this reductionist view and stressed the effect of 
good teaching in the acceleration of each sequential stage. 
Peel (1971), in the light of the Piagetian notion of formal operations, examined the 
nature of adolescent thinking and the process of development from concrete, descriptive 
or content-dominated answers to a formal, explanatory or possibility-invoking pattern. 
He discriminated three major categories in cognitive development: restricted (1), 
circumstantial (2), and imaginative (3), and hypothesized some different factors rather 
than personal variables (subject, topic, previous knowledge, type of questions, among 
others) as interfering in this process. His study of pupils' history thinking (1967a) relied 
on a similar categorization of adolescents' answers to a why-type question. According to 
his categorization, at a first level, those answers might be bizarre, tautological, and a-
historical; at a second level, a single plausible cause is given; at a third level, a 
comprehensive account involving more than one imagined possibility and their joint or 
sequential effect is presented. 
Lammont (1970) advocated the Brunerian mode of enquiry applied to the teaching of 
history. This approach had started in American schools as reported by Fenton (1966) 
and, in England, a line of research into pupils' thinking, with studies carried out by 
Brown (1959) and Hallam (1967) as well as suggestions of enquiry and problem-
solving in the history classroom, had appeared. 
Thompson (1972) gave a summary of the research undertaken at the time in the history 
teaching field, explicitly questioning the overall theoretical framework on which such 
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studies relied: they had assumed a model of categorization according to general patterns 
of thinking and they had not taken into account possible factors relevant to history as a 
specific subject matter and, within it, to particular topics, adequacy of approaches, 
means of assessment; those studies tended to suggest that what had been done in 
practice was more than what was possible for a child to understand. Nonetheless, he 
welcomed a fruitful trend emerging in the work of Hallam and Peel: both authors started 
to explore ideas beyond substantive thinking in history.2 In the light of these pertinent 
comments, Thompson (1972) pointed out: 
The criterion for progression in history should not be how much factual information has been 
imported, but what improvement has been achieved in historical thinking. (p. 34) 
Sharing a similar preoccupation, Dickinson and Lee (1978b, 1984) raised questions 
about the logic of history to be taken as a basis for history teaching. They also 
questioned the Piagetian framework of developmental stages for children's 
understanding of history. A turning point in the investigation of children's thinking in 
history was made with their exploratory study "Understanding and Research" (1978b) 
followed by "Making Sense of History" (1984). In the former a set of logical levels 
related to the nature of history thinking was devised by Lee (1978) for analysis of 
children' s understanding of individual action. As these levels should be empirically 
based, psychological criteria were also apparent in parallel to historical criteria, such as 
the notion of equilibrium inspired by Piaget. A sample of 131 pupils from three schools, 
ranging between 12 and 18 years old, in year 8 of schooling (12+ to 13+ year-olds), 
year 11 (15+ to 16+ year-olds), and year 12 (16+ to 18+ year-olds), was used in this 
cross-sectional study. In the light of data collected, it was hypothesized that equilibrium 
could be attained at different levels, but ideas at higher levels would exhibit "greater 
permanence and stability" than at lower levels (Dickinson and Lee, 1978b, p. 104). 
Children's ideas appeared to move in a pendulum process, since even-number levels of 
progression indicated a state of equilibrium and odd-number levels showed a state of 
disequilibrium, that is, revealed large inconsistency and contradiction. This criterion of 
equilibrium/disequilibrium evolved to the notion of "oscillation" up and down ideas 
typical of each level, observed on empirical grounds in further studies (Booth, 1980; 
Shemilt, 1980; Ashby and Lee, 1987). In "Making Sense of History" Dickinson and Lee 
(1984) suggested some moves children made on empathetic understanding. Pupils from 
two schools, between 8 and 18 years old, constituted the sample surveyed and the data 
were intensively analysed in a qualitative approach. A set of ideas, ranging from a 
"confusion and content" category characterized by astonishment, puzzlement and 
2 Pupils° substantive ideas in history were explored by Coltham (1960) and De Silva (1971). 
18 
cynicism, followed by exploration of concrete details, leading towards an "explanation" 
category when children could use their own experience, beliefs and imagination to give 
meaning to past situations, was traced. The progression was observed as circuitous and 
gradually developed with shifts up and down. 
Booth emphasised the same need for focusing on historical thinking in this area of 
research. Booth (1978) explicitly abandoned Piagetian ideas of invariant developmental 
stages - the progression from the concrete operational stage towards the formal, logico-
deductive stage - as required for the understanding of history by students. Inspired by 
Kelly' s construct theory, he claimed that, in historical thinking, there was "the need for 
'heart' as well as 'head" (p. 106). Divergent thinking and open-mindedness, Booth 
pointed out, were attitudes required for achieving historical synthesis, which involves 
specific principles: 
The credibility and effectiveness of that synthesis will rest on factors stemming from three areas: 
first, the care and accuracy with which the evidence is comprehended and analysed...; second, 
the nature and extent of the thinker's "second record";..and third, the degree of imaginative 
insight he has shown. (Booth, 1978, p. 106) 
According to these criteria, Booth (1978, 1980, 1987) carried out a developmental study 
over a one-and-a-half year period with an "experimental" and a control group of mixed-
ability adolescents (14+ years old) attending a Modern World History course. The aim 
was, mainly, to assess pupils' ability to evaluate documentary evidence and to deduce 
key concepts. Responses were categorized in two sets, at first sight reminiscent of 
Piaget's stages and Peel's categories, bearing in mind the nature of history and in 
particular Fischer's account of the role of "adductive" thinking (Booth, 1980, p. 247): 
1. Concrete, related to immediate content, reasons given in descriptive terms; 
2. Abstract, creative, indicating adductive historical thought. 
Results suggested significant gains by the experimental group through tests during the 
17 month period, in comparison with the control group. In the light of these results, 
Booth emphasised syllabus content and teaching methods as relevant factors to 
children's progression in history. Another study was conducted in a sample of 11 year-
olds in mixed-ability groups following a humanities course, during an academic year. 
Results suggested gains in all tasks except in the written one. Intelligence and teaching 
methods rather than maturation were hypothesized as major factors of progression. 
Shemilt (1980) accepted a logic in history different from science but he did not abandon 
the Piagetian stages completely. In his evaluation study of "The History 13-16 Project" 
he argued that children might show "possibility reasoning" in the field of history 
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without the requirement of a formal operational level, which was related to the natural 
science paradigm. Shemilt concluded that the carrying out of the project constituted a 
positive challenge in order to corroborate that "pupils' understanding of the methods, 
logic and perspectives of history can be significantly enhanced" (p. 10). However, 
criteria for conceptualization of methods, logic and perspective of history by pupils 
were not given in the evaluation study. 
In subsequent studies (1984, 1987), Shemilt discussed some of the relevant data taken 
from the "History 13-16 Project" in the light of a categorization cohering with that 
applied by Dickinson and Lee in "Making sense of history". In "Beauty and the 
Philosopher" (1984), adolescents' ideas on empathy were categorized in five stages: 
from stage 1 (dry bones and a sense of superiority) to stage 5 (empathetic methodology) 
with three intermediate stages (assumptions of shared humanity, everyday empathy 
applied to history, and historical empathy). This categorization appears to broadly 
equate the levels proposed by Ashby and Lee in 1987, who presented a categorization 
on ideas of empathy in a cross-sectional study using a sample between 8 and 18-year-
old pupils. These levels were (1) the "divi" past , (2) generalized stereotypes, (3) 
everyday empathy, (4) restricted historical empathy, (5) contextual historical empathy.3  
This model of analysis suggests a progression of children and adolescents' ideas from a 
syncretic picture about the past towards more or less elaborate historical notions, with 
intermediate levels expressing ideas relying just on a common-sense (firstly, 
stereotyped, then, everyday-based) view. 
The focus of the several studies mentioned above was on how pupils' ideas evolve from 
less coherent to sophisticated patterns in historical thinking, irrespective of the notion of 
developmental stages. It was also hypothesized that teaching methods would be relevant 
factors to foster progression in historical understanding. This line of research has 
received some support from cognitive psychology, particularly in the work of 
Donaldson (1978).4 She contrasted Piaget's studies about children's notions of point of 
view with those conducted by Hughes: the former, by presenting tasks with an abstract 
context to the subjects, concluded that the child up to the age of eight-nine cannot 
achieve decentration, that is, she/he is not able to imagine that her/his own viewpoint is 
one of several possible viewpoints and that all these perspectives are interrelated; the 
latter, by using a task with a more familiar context (two dolls representing a boy trying 
3 As Ashby and Lee (1987) pointed out: "There are clear signs of convergence between the main strands 
of research in this area, and this may justify some degree of confidence in the validity of these interim 
remarks and optimism as to what may be possible in the future" (p. 66). 
4 Ashby and Lee (1987), for example, explicitly referred to Donaldson's work as "the best guide" in 
cognitive and developmental psychology about children's dispositions and strategies ( p. 65). 
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to escape a policeman) showed different results - 90% of the responses from children 
between three-and-a-half and five years were correct. Donaldson suggested that when a 
situation makes human sense to the child, involving motives and intentions, it can be 
instantly apprehended. Donaldson (ibid.) suggested that the degrees of abstractness may 
affect the level of egocentrism not only in the child, but also in the adult: 
What is being claimed is that we are all egocentric through the whole of our lives in some 
situations and very well able to decentre in others [...]. 
I want to argue that the difference between child and adult in this respect is less than he 
[Piaget] supposes. (p. 25) 
Also Johnson-Laird & Wason (1977) suggested that intelligent subjects may perform 
differently in abstract or realistic contexts - adults might successfully perform in a 
"realistic" version of a given task and be unsuccessful in its abstract version. This 
would disconfirm Piaget's prediction that formal operational thinking is likely to be 
unaffected by the type of tasks undertaken. Subsequent studies within this framework, 
also inspired by Vygotsky's concern with social and linguistic influences on cognition, 
have investigated cognitive competence as a function of context and content, that is, 
situated cognition. As Butterworth (1992) stated with regard to the relationship between 
language and cognition, the implicit messages given by adults when proposing a task to 
children may influence the outcomes. Moreover, the child may experience difficulties in 
determining what the adult either means or intends to emphasise. This point draws 
attention to the methods to be applied in the analysis of pupils' ideas and reminds us that 
the meanings to be assigned to children's responses must be taken with caution. 
Other lines of research in children and adolescents' ideas of history have differed from 
this trend, putting emphasis alternatively, on age progression in second-order ideas 
(Knight, 1989), or on logical progression in substantive ideas (Cooper, 1991), or on the 
nature of second-order and substantive ideas irrespective of levels of progression 
(Leinhardt, Beck and Stainton, 1994; Carretero and Voss, 1994). 
Knight (1989), applying a categorization closer to Piaget and Peel, carried out a cross-
sectional study with a sample of 6+ to 14+ year-olds to explore children's understanding 
of others. He investigated this competency through a sequential set of subcompetencies, 
of the kind in terms of which educational objectives used to be traced: (1) to recognise 
another's perspective (through the use of privileged information), (2) to describe 
another's perspective, (3) to explain an action, (4) to make predictions for actions, (5) to 
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tackle equivocal information.5 He devised a five-point scale concerning a distinction 
between non-response, the wrong answer, and the right answer: (1) non response or 
wrong answers not substantiated, (2) wrong or implausible answers substantiated by 
mistaken premises or inferences, (3) right or plausible answers not substantiated, (4) 
wrong or implausible answers coherently substantiated, and (5) right or plausible 
answers suitably substantiated. This scale does not discriminate between more and less 
elaborate "right" or "plausible" answers - its major concern seems to be with the age at 
which children reveal these historical subcompetencies at a satisfactory level. The 
statistical analysis suggested a progression through age in the attainment of scores of 
67% and 80% on the various subcompetencies: privileged information was attained at 
six (67% score) and seven years old (80% score); description of other's perspective and 
explanation of action were attained at nine years old (67% score) and at 10-12 years old 
(80% score); prediction was attained at 12 years old (67% score) and equivocal 
information proved to be harder to attain. The six year-olds showed little competence 
on tasks and a significant difference between six-and-eight year olds was suggested. 
Cooper (1991) carried out a research on children's ideas in history mainly focusing on 
substantive concepts. Her categorization of children's ideas was inspired by notions 
from Piaget and Peel as well as from Ashby and Lee. She investigated the hypotheses 
that young children can become involved in historical problem-solving and that there is 
a sequence in the early stages of their thinking which can be evaluated. She taught two 
"experimental" groups of eight-nine year old children during 16 weeks using careful 
strategies, and results on tests were compared with those from a control group. An 
assessment scheme for a written task about a story was devised using a 10 point scale 
based on Ashby and Lee (1987) and Piaget (1932), and also reminiscent of Peel's 
categories (1971). This scale ranged from an egocentric or illogical level (1) and 
descriptive levels (2 and 3) to increasing abstract levels showing a primitive argument 
(4 and 5), a genuine argument (6 to 8) and integrative thought (9 and 10). She suggested 
that children could be involved in historical thinking, that this involvement was 
sequential and possible to evaluate, and that teaching strategies were relevant to the 
development of historical thinking. 
In other countries, second-order ideas of children in history are starting to be 
investigated. In the USA, Wineburg (1991) began to carry out an enquiry about 
cognitive processes related to the subject of history, using a rationale converging with 
what has been researched in England: in order "to understand the 'historic sense' we 
must study people as they engage in the process of historical enquiry" (p. 1). He 
5 See Coltham and Fines (1971). For a critique of this approach see Gard and Lee (1978). 
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compared a sample of eight historians to a sample of eight 16 year-old llth-graders and 
suggested that historians can interpret historical documents in more sophisticated ways 
than students. As Wineburg himself stated, these results were "predictable but not 
trivial" (ibid., p. 83). Beyond a statistical analysis revealing those differences, the main 
heuristics or criteria applied by the subjects were identified through a qualitative 
exploration of the protocols. Those criteria were three: (a) corroboration, the act of 
comparing documents with one another, (b) sourcing, the act of looking first to the 
source of the document before reading the text, and (c) contextualization, the act of 
situating a document in a given context. Although an intention of giving a 
categorization in logical progression was not explicit in this study, those criteria 
identified permitted establishment of two differentiated degrees of historical thinking: 
historians puzzled about discrepancies, compared, corroborated and refuted evidence, 
and ended with suggestions, whilst students looked for the single correct answer as in a 
multiple-choice task. This line of research investigating how students understand 
second-order - and also substantive - concepts in history, although not related to levels 
of progression, has been extended with works such as those reported in Leinhardt, Beck 
and Stainton (1994), Carretero and Voss (1994) - Beck and McKeown, Britt et al., 
Perfetti et al., Torney-Purta, in the USA; Carretero et al., in Spain; Berti, in Italy; and 
Hallden, in Sweden, among others. 
The scoring of pupils' performance in class usually takes more conventional approaches 
such as marks (analytical, holistic marking, or marking guidelines), ranks and, 
sometimes, grades or levels used on a holistic basis, referred to given goals, such as the 
attainment targets in the National Curriculum (Cresswell and Houston, 1991). A 
categorization by logical levels of ideas might be useful in order to deepen the analysis 
of pupils' data, in a context of research. The paradigm of levels of progression of pupils' 
ideas in history has been recently discussed more thoroughly in Ashby and Lee (1987) 
and Lee (1994). In 1994 Lee discussed and synthesized the main constructs about 
progression in children's understanding of history, as it has been the object of research 
in this field: 
1. Progression is distinct from a notion of aggregation of substantive information 
(although it can be related to substantive concepts) and can be most easily tracked in 
terms of second-order concepts like evidence, change, cause, empathy, account, 
significance and time; 
2. Children reveal tacit ideas about those historical concepts, even when nothing 
explicit is taught about them. These tacit second-order concepts profoundly affect their 
substantive reasoning; 
3. It is possible to trace levels of progression in those historical concepts. Lee 
distinguished between assessment levels and construct levels, the former being related 
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to achievement, sometimes stated on an arbitrary basis, the latter related to purposes and 
standards of research, and empirically grounded. The main assumption for these 
construct levels is "that it is possible to find sets of ideas, tacit or explicit, that allow or 
inhibit certain cognitive moves" (p. 3). Higher levels can resolve problems created by 
limitations of lower levels. 
4. Some overall ideas about levels of progression can be synthesized: levels of 
progression are made up of interlinked ideas, progressively increasing in power from 
level to level; they present a multi-stranded nature, logically related; each level may 
represent a relatively stable set of ideas with which children operate. Levels are 
construct levels in a double sense: "they are children' s ways of making sense of history 
... they are our own way of making sense of the children's world" (p. 5). 
Therefore, a categorization by levels of progression is a working hypothesis subsumed 
in this study. Thus, pupils' ideas about provisional historical explanation will be 
analysed within this framework. 
Pupils' ideas about historical explanation 
A considerable amount of research concerned with pupils' progression in history deals 
with the concept of historical explanation, albeit understood in different ways. 
Peel (1967a), having as a main presupposition the Piagetian developmental stages, 
discussed explanatory thinking in pupils by comparing it with reflective thinking: both 
were made up of chains and groups of associations of ideas or events; the difference lay 
in the criterion controlling the sequence of association. In explanatory thinking, this 
criterion was of a practical kind in that the chain of reasoning would lead to successful 
action or, at least, would reduce the problem to an established principle which made 
action possible. The main features of explanatory thinking were: (a) the control of 
associations by practical criteria; (b) the testing of hypotheses against the facts; (c) the 
acceptance of some event or theory as being reasonably probable; and (d) the formation 
of language that deals with concepts and classes of objects. If the primary school pupil 
could solve problems in the presence of concrete elements of the situation, the 
adolescent could draw possible explanations and hypotheses, and test them; the child 
describes the situation, the adolescent explains it. In a study with 14+ to 17+ year-old 
pupils, Peel analysed problem-solving answers about Stonehenge, reflecting on the 
reasons given by pupils more than on the judgements they made. In another study, Peel 
(1967b) discussed some data from students' Ph.D. research with a sample of 10-15 
year-olds. Pupils were asked about the findings of an archaeological site: "How do you 
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think the town would come to be buried?" and "Why do you think the barley growing 
over the roads and wall foundations was lighter in colour than the barley growing over 
the other areas?" (p. 175). If the answers to the first question were categorized in three 
levels according to the broad model he established for a causal explanation (restricted -
circumstantial - imaginative thinking), in the second question the categorization 
implicitly pointed to some features of historical thinking, namely perspective, evidence 
and imagination. Four levels were constructed: level 1, a-historical and perceptually 
dominated; level 2 , with a sense of time but still largely perceptual and non realistic; 
level 3, with a single primary cause without reference to secondary causes; level 4, 
imaginative, with a connected examination of a sequence of primary and secondary 
causes. With another area of content (Peel, ibid.), the pupils were also asked to judge 
upon the actions and decisions of Henry III in context: "Was King Henry a religious 
man? Why do you think so?"(p. 185) and answers were categorized from perceptual 
reasoning to a sustained deductive argument. This model received criticisms from 
supporters of the rational explanation model, as dismissing the genuine character of 
history. According to his critics, Peel treated historical explanation on grounds of the 
scientific paradigm - the handling of external causes - rather than looking for the 
internal side of the human situation, the agents' reasons and motives.6 Despite these 
criticisms, Peel's work provided an important framework for subsequent research. It 
contributed to the exploration of pupils' ideas in history, according to his main concern 
(1967b): 
We need to know how the ideas are formed, changed, extended and used to lead to more mature 
understanding of the process of history. (p. 182) 
In 1971 Peel discussed whether the difference between merely describing and giving a 
comprehensive explanation represented a change in quality of thought. He related this 
change to age, and argued that it could be observed in history and geography: young 
children revealed little reflection upon the information given, the 12-14 year-olds were 
dominated by concrete pictorial evidence, scarcely imagining other possible factors, 
whilst the 14-15 year-olds began to show a capacity for coordinating several factors and 
of imagining different possibilities. The broad scheme of progression from description 
to explanation devised by Peel has proved to be useful in research on pupils' historical 
understanding since history does not deal with mere factual description. It deals with a 
more elaborate conceptualization, be it highly inductive, when inferring from the 
evidence, or hypothetical-deductive, when involving a set of logical operations to 
arbitrate among different possible conclusions. 
6 See this criticism in Dickinson and Lee (1978b). 
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Hallam (1967), using a sample between 11+ and 16+ students, looked to answers of a 
rational explanation-type, like "Do you think William of Normandy was a cruel man?" 
or, "Why did William destroy Northern England?" (pp. 198-9) but those answers were 
still analysed using a framework related to the Piagetian general patterns of thinking. He 
concluded that a mental age of 16.5 to 18.2 was required for the beginning of the formal 
stage in history and concrete thinking would begin in the twelfth year. 
In order to explore pupils' ideas of a rational explanation-type by using a specific 
framework for data analysis, Dickinson and Lee (1978b, 1984) conducted two 
pioneering studies, already described in so far as levels of progression are concerned. In 
1978b Dickinson and Lee explored rational type answers to questions like: "Why did 
Jellicoe turn the fleet away from the Germans?", and also employed empathy-type 
questions like "Imagine you are Jellicoe talking to a sympathetic listener the day after 
the battle ... Explain ... what the situation was" (p. 115). In the second study (Dickinson 
and Lee, 1984) explanatory questions of rational kind were also made explicit, like 
"Why do you think the Anglo-Saxons used oath-helping and the ordeal to decide if 
someone was guilty of a crime?" (p. 118) The categorization given for analysing 
explanatory thinking in pupils of different ages consequently assumed the model of 
rational explanation in history. 
Shemilt, in "The devil's locomotive" (1983), also relied on the intrinsic nature of 
history, with its logic, methods and perspectives, for the analysis of pupils' ideas about 
narrative and explanation in history, using a sample of 167 pupils taking part in the 
"History 13-16 Project". They were 15 year-olds interviewed for evaluation of the 
Project. Shemilt suggested that "adolescents are perfectly capable of addressing highly 
abstract questions when these can be appropriately presented... even though - given 
present teaching methods - no more than a minority of children can be expected to 
conceptualize in ways teachers and historians would consider legitimate" (ibid., p. 4). 
The evaluation study showed higher levels of progression in the Project group than in 
the control group. The levels categorized pointed to a progression from a descriptive 
pattern towards a contextual narrative pattern, rather than a misconstruction in 
opposition to a construction of ideas. Those levels were, basically: 
Level 1. Historical narrative seen as lacking inner logic, the why being immanent to the 
what; causal links seen as factual as the events. 
Level 2. Narrative seen to embody an austere logic, as a series of events; some 
oscillation between admitting alternative outcomes (stories) and denying their causal 
possibility. 
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Level 3. Narrative seen as a selective commentary upon events; a positivistic view in 
which causation becomes an almost metaphysical concept. 
Level 4. Narrative begins to be contextualized within a given period, although the 
understanding of period might appear rather restrictive; some assumptions beyond a 
positivist pattern of external forces. 
In Shemilt's categories of pupils' ideas about historical explanation, an integrative 
model of rational-causal explanation seemed to be implicit. In considering the idea of 
historical explanation as a contextual narrative beyond a mere selection of external 
causes, Shemilt posited himself as a defender of the rational mode, but he analysed the 
notion of cause as tackled by pupils in its varied degrees, the external meaning 
included. He built his categories taking this notion into account, as historical narratives 
usually do. 
A similar model of causal explanation integrating reasons and causes seems to underlie 
current research on children's ideas in history: Thompson (1984) exemplified children's 
ideas about causal explanation in history, in a study with 150 pupils from two schools, 
with ages between 12 and 17. He asked pupils about the outbreak of the Peasants' revolt 
in 1381 and responses were categorized from anachronistic thinking, ignoring relevant 
information, to the understanding of different possible factors. Medley (1988), 
reflecting on the assessment objective "to make use of and understand the concepts of 
cause and consequence" prescribed for History at G.C.S.E., argued that, since cause is 
not a self-evident concept, the question would be "how are we to help our pupils to 
move from the mere regurgitation of a list of causes to actually doing something 
analytical with cause" (p. 27). Assuming that the use of a comparison-situation is a 
common criterion used by historians in causal weighting, he carried out an enquiry in 
his own school to see how pupils from 13 to 18 years old weigh different causes in 
historical explanation. A sample of 111 pupils was asked about the causes of the 
Russian Revolution of November 1917. The categories for data analysis were 
constructed as they are briefly described below: 
Level 1. Certain causes described as "important" without making comparisons, as if 
they were self-evident or obvious. 
Level 2. One cause compared with another by means of describing a single consequence 
of the absence of a particular factor. This level implies the use of counterfactual 
reasoning. 
Level 3. A number of causes weighted against each other by means of arguments 
concerning the consequences of some causal factors being altered or taken away. 
Compensating factors, timing and interrelating causes are typical of this level. 
Level 4. Causes weighted against each other by reference to an actual comparison-
situation. This highest level was hardly attained even by a few pupils. 
27 
This model brings a useful feature to research, that of which criteria pupils apply when 
weighing different factors. However, the assumption that counterfactual reasoning and 
the recourse to a comparison-situation should be ingredients in assessing the relative 
importance of causes, if taken in absolute terms, might narrow the scope of analysis of 
pupils' responses. Other criteria might be at work when children reason on causes in 
history. 
Cooper (1991), while exploring pupils' ideas about evidence, found arguments of 
explanatory-type which children were able to use between the ages of seven and nine, 
as well as explanations. Children could progress from (a) illogical thought, (b) incipient 
argument, and (c) genuine argument, characterized by the use of conjunctions 
(therefore, because..), to (d) the "explainer stage", implying a synthesis of arguments 
and the use of abstract concepts. The "Chata Project", which has been carried out by 
Lee, Dickinson and Ashby since 1991, is exploring the use of reason and cause in 
historical explanation by children. Thus, an integrative model of rational and causal - in 
the sense of external factors or conditions - explanation emerges nowadays as a focus in 
this field of research. 
This study subsumes the hypothesis that adolescent students may apply notions of 
reasons and motives as well as external causes in the explanations they construe. Since 
the theoretical focus of this enquiry is the concept of provisional historical explanation, 
one question to investigate is: 
What explanatory models underlie adolescent students' explanations? 
The idea of provisionality in history and adolescent thinking 
The idea of provisionality contrasted with definitiveness brings an element of 
uncertainty (in a broad sense) to historical conclusions. It presupposes creative as 
opposed to reproductive thinking and reasoning about different possibilities. Thus, 
some studies carried out in the psychological or history teaching field, and relating to 
these broad ideas in connection with adolescents, were considered. 
Piaget and Inhelder's studies on children's ideas about chance (1975) were specifically 
related to logical arithmetical operations and suggested that the formation of notions of 
chance and probability correlated with the cognitive stages. They traced a 
developmental sequence of that notion across age, as follows: 
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1. Before 6-7 years of age, the child does not distinguish the possible from the 
necessary. 
2. At 7-8 years of age, the child is capable of such a differentiation and can construct a 
notion of multiple possibilities through a concrete disjunction. Chance is seen by 
contrast to necessity. 
3. After 11-12 years of age, the judgement of probability becomes organized: there is a 
synthesis between chance and operations, and a system of probabilities is structured. 
Peel (1967a) pointed out that thinking could progress further from explanatory thinking 
to productive thinking characterized as when known explanations were used in new 
settings or for restating a problem, and to integrative thinking, seen when looking for 
better and more sensitive hypotheses. 
Byrnes and Overton (1986) examined the comprehension of certainty and uncertainty 
across concrete and propositional reasoning tasks by 6 to 10-year-old children. From 
their research they suggested that the comprehension of conclusions of certainty 
emerges earlier than the understanding of uncertain conclusions. The discrimination 
between certain and uncertain conclusions is well-grasped in concrete as in causal 
contexts by the fifth-grade (10-year-olds), but in a propositional context (conditional 
syllogisms) that comprehension seems to emerge in the fifth-grade only. In similar 
situations, namely, within concrete or within propositional contexts, there seems to be a 
high degree of stability across different tasks; across concrete and propositional 
contexts, the relation between certainty and uncertainty is less apparent. This gives 
support to their discrimination between two competencies - propositional uncertainty 
and concrete indeterminacy - correlating with formal and concrete operations. 
Landman and Manis (1992) investigated the imagining of possible alternatives to real 
life in three samples of adults, one of university undergraduate women, one of well-
educated women having contacted the Centre for Continuing Education of Women, the 
third sample being a group of individuals who had lost someone in an auto accident and 
a matching control group. The study suggested that the "might-have-been" or 
counterfactual thought related to real-life issues is a common type of reasoning among 
diverse sets of adults. 
From the studies above, and those of Johnson-Laird and Wason (1977) and Donaldson 
(1978), we might hypothesize that considering different possibilities in concrete 
situations is part of common thinking and that adolescents can already understand 
uncertainty in a propositional context. 
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How can adolescents cope with this element of uncertainty when they are confronted 
with several competing answers to an historical question? 
Hallam (1972), within the Piagetian framework, suggested that pupils develop 
reversibility when information is processed through two viewpoints about an event or 
topic. 
Rees (1976) investigated pupils' notions of probability and inference specifically related 
to the historical domain, along the lines of the Brunerian statement that the learner 
should solve problems at the heart of each discipline. He explored the generation of 
causal inferences and of counterbalancing evidence to support different perspectives in 
boys of 12-13 years old with a median range of ability. A design with an experimental 
and a control group matching for sex and ability was applied to a sample of 60 pupils, 
the "treatment" being the teaching of five weekly follow-up lessons to the initial testing 
in order to see teaching effects on the acceleration of logical thinking. The formal stage 
was seen in the context of history and characterized as when adolescents "could 
conjecture several possibilities and support their case by going beyond the evidence 
given" (pp. 23-4). When exploring the uncertainty structure of history during the 
follow-up teaching lessons, he asked for judgmental answers in questions such as "Did 
William the Conqueror treat the conquered English badly?". Rees tried to make pupils 
substitute more flexible and more qualified judgements for absolutist, unqualified 
judgements. He also tried to foster understanding that in an historical situation more 
than one factor might be seen, and the search for implicit features in data. Rees found 
"substantial advances ... in the capacity of the experimental group to reason more 
purposefully and to make more flexible and elaborated judgements" as well as "a 
greater grasp of conjecture and uncertainty" (ibid., pp. 283-8). This study brought an 
innovative element in that it contextualized within the historical field the provisional 
element inherent in knowledge. It might be controversial, however, whether the 
acceleration of formal operations in pupils in a short period of time could effectively 
occur as a result of teaching methods. Pupils might have learned to give the "right 
answer" in a specific context, which was, to produce apparently flexible responses 
(irrespective of more or less sophistication). 
The categories built by Dickinson and Lee, Ashby and Lee and Shemilt, in order to 
analyse pupils' ideas about different historical concepts, implicitly or explicitly, looked 
for an idea of provisionality built into the concept of historical interpretation and 
explanation. The model given by Lee in 1978 considered a sense of provisionality in the 
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idea of a rational explanation. The one who is explaining reconstructs the past by 
inferring from evidence and using analogy - that reconstruction can be only provisional. 
Recent materials from the "Chata Project" (Lee, Ashby and Dickinson, 1993) pointed to 
the consideration of ideas of alternative valid stories, integrating some awareness of 
methodological objectivity, in the analysis of pupils' thinking about accounts and 
stories. 
Shemilt (1983) implicitly invoked an idea of provisional explanation (as a narrative) in 
the construction of his categories: he looked for the understanding of different 
possibilities (accounts) historically contextualized. In 1987, in his study on adolescents' 
ideas about evidence, Shemilt suggested the same concern: 
It is precisely because primary evidence needs to be indexed by means of secondary sources 
(contextual knowledge amounting to nothing other than witting or unwitting acceptance of 
secondary material) that uncertainty is built into the fabric of an academic enterprise that 
involves accepting a library of published texts in order to rewrite a single volume. (p. 58) 
Cooper (1992b) also considered a sense of provisionality in the interpretation of 
evidence when using the following scheme for pupils' answers about a map where 
Neolithic artefacts had been found: 
What do you know for certain? 
What can you guess? 
What would you like to know? (p. 9) 
In parallel to this research on pupils' ideas of history, the idea of provisionality was 
made explicit in the History National Curriculum (DES, 1991) about historical 
interpretation (Attainment Target 2) and about the use of evidence (Attainment Target 
3). This has stimulated a reflection about ways of handling such requirements in class 
(Nicklin, 1992; Harper, 1993; McAleavy, 1993). Lang (1993) discussed the notion of 
bias usually taught in history class. He noticed that bias is seldom defined for teaching 
or assessment purposes and he distinguished it from distortion, arguing that: 
If we complain that a source is biased, the implication is that we would prefer a source that 
isn't: there is, of course, no such thing. The problem is that our conception of objectivity all too 
often gets confused with the notion of neutrality. This is quite mistaken. (p. 11) 
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Accordingly, this notion of bias involves the notion of point of view. This position 
stresses the need for interpreting evidence in context, but it may contain the danger of 
ignoring a necessary distinction between a more and a less reliable source. 
A postmodernist view of provisionality, emphasising the relativity and contingency of 
historical knowledge, has been the object of debate and controversy in so far as its 
application to history classes is concerned. In 1991, Jenkins, Jenkins and Brickley, 
advocating a postmodern approach, launched the proposal of deconstructing history in 
school and the need to historicize interpretations with certaintist pretensions. Aldrich 
(1991) in reply to this programme, reacted against such a postmodernist view of history, 
giving a set of examples of countries where modernism has not yet emerged: 
Scepticism or, more radically, nihilism, just do provide the dominant underlying presuppositions 
of "our times" But in what sense is that true? 
Can it be universally applied in any meaningful way across the several peoples and cultures...? 
Is it ... true in the 1990s for the people of Botswana, Hungary, Iran and Portugal?7 Is 
postmodernism possible without modernism? (p. 11) 
The debate has continued, with replies from Jenkins (1992, 1994) and Brickley (1992, 
1994). Breuilly (1994), arguing against the postmodern proposal of Jenkins and 
Brickley, stressed that in history validity is assessed by recourse to evidence, concepts 
and logical argument. The postmodernist pressure appears as if "one has to choose 
either between truth as fixed dogma or to brace oneself to live 'a life without truths" 
(Breuilly, 1994, p. 29). 
This controversy has been useful in showing how different meanings of provisionality 
in historical conclusions may be understood and applied in the history class, ranging 
from a relativist and sceptical view emphasising the contingency of knowledge and, 
consequently, the need for its deconstruction, to an objectivist view recognising the 
possibility of valid reconstructions of the past, by recourse to specific historical criteria, 
in which evidence is seen like a bridge to reality. 
7 It might be thought that, if an ante-modernist age subsumes fundamentalism, to include countries as 
Portugal and Iran, in the 1990s, within the same label, might be far from being rigorous. 
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In the light of these debates about uncertainty, objectivity and contingency of 
knowledge to be tackled by students, a major purpose of this study is to investigate: 
To what extent do adolescent students operate with a notion of 
provisionality in historical explanation and, when they employ a notion of 
this kind, what meanings do they assign to it? 
What specific criteria do they use for deciding among different possible 
explanations?  
The idea of personal constructs 
Some ideas borrowed from Kelly's theory of personal constructs helped to illuminate 
the analysis of pupils' data in this study. Kelly (1980) opposed constructive 
alternativism - his central philosophical assumption - to accumulative fragmentalism: 
It is not that we, as scientists, know just so much, and are out to add to the store, but rather that 
our experiences, pressed full cycle, will lead us to question more freely, to be less taken by the 
"obvious" to see fresh possibilities of relationships, to put facts together into more productive 
combinations, and to entertain sweeping alternative constructions of events where once we could 
only "feel" and "perceive" and "learn" what was already "known". (p. 11) 
Humans progress from the known to the unknown and the newest experiences give a 
new perspective to prior experiences. The conception of knowledge as accumulation of 
information as if truth was something to be reached bit by bit was rejected by Kelly. He 
noticed that each step of knowledge challenges what we thought was already settled. 
Conventional assumptions are reconsidered and we realize that we may possess 
approximations to truth, not fragments of it. This idea of constructive alternativism 
contrasted with mere accumulation of information contributed to the building up of the 
model for categorization of students' ideas. 
The idea of constructs was originally given by Kelly as compartments carrying binary 
distinctions - such as the tight versus loose construct. In the present study, some 
constructs were made explicit in terms of polar alternatives, as when contrasting 
perspectiveful versus perspectiveless neutrality, or a tight versus loose attitude in 
decisions about different explanations. A tight attitude is defined as leading to 
unvarying predictions whereas a loose attitude opens diverse possibilities. But 
constructs also allow for a scalar mode, such as the preempted, constellatory, 
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propositional levels of constructs (Bannister and Fransella, 1986). The preempted 
construct exclusively confines the idea enunciated (e.g., "personal opinion is just 
personal opinion"). The constellatory construct fixes its meanings in a stereotyped, 
common-sense definition, not allowing for a revision of ideas. In the empirical study 
this level is termed stereotyped or everyday8. The propositional construct allows for 
considering other possible meanings (hypotheses) than those previously stated. In the 
empirical study this construct is termed elaborate. 
According to the "organization corollary" as discussed by Adams-Webber (1979) each 
person develops a hierarchical network of constructs organized in a system and sub-
systems. A linkage between constructs is characteristic of logical thought and this 
permits that whenever a person interprets an event, she/he construes it in terms of one or 
more of her/his constructs. The more constructs a person can develop on an event, the 
more clear and distinct its meaning will appear. Each construction represents an 
hypothesis chosen for consolidating the personal system, thus reducing inconsistencies -
we decide which pole of a given construct will provide the best answer. It is within the 
framework given above that "perspectivism" (in a psychological approach) has been 
explored. Landfield (1980) defined it as implying "some capacity to step back from a 
problem and to conceptualize it more thoroughly, complexly, and integratively". 
Perspectivism is contrasted with literalism described as "an absolute interpretation of an 
event or a relationship without the implication that it is necessarily 'bad" (p. 289). 
Whereas the literalist tends to give an absolute interpretation of an event, looking upon 
the situation as if there were only one way of viewing it, the perspectivist recognises 
that there may exist several ways - several hypotheses - of regarding the situation. 
This approach offers an integrated view of the person, refusing the cognition/emotion 
binary. As Bannister and Fransella (1986) pointed out: 
So a construct is not a thought or a feeling; it is a discrimination. It is part of the way you stand 
towards your world as a complete person. (p. 21) 
In so far as historical interpretation and explanation focus on the understanding of 
others (some being more familiar, some stranger), it might be related to the "sociality 
corollary" which stresses that understanding the other integrates cognition and emotion. 
At different stages in the process of construction different modes of experience may 
occur; less rational attitudes may appear as strategies to preserve the existing construct 
system and not to be faced with chaos. Along the lines set out by Kelly, Bannister and 
8  Stereotyped and everyday ideas were conflated since the distinction was not germane to the constructs 
employed in the study. 
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Fransella (1986) defined such attitudes as "hostility", operationalized as (a) the refusal 
to see evidence contrary to our expectations by denying the validity of the source of 
evidence which is too crucially disconfirming, or (b) the use of the "conspiracy theory" 
claiming that all evidence is controvertible. Hostility is overcome when we find a way 
of making sense of the situation. This unitary view integrating emotion in different 
degrees might help to analyse some cases of students' responses of moves from 
elaborate ideas about historical criteria, to a tighter argumentation for practical choices 
grounded on emotional preferences. 
Therefore, it was assumed that pupils' attitudes towards different explanations about a 
given past situation - particularly, about the Portuguese maritime empire in the sixteenth 
century - might be interpreted also with the aid of some constructs defined within this 
approach, namely: 
Constructive alternativism/ aggregation of information/fragmentalism 
Perspectivism/literalism 
Tight/loose attitudes 
Preempted/stereotyped/elaborate degrees of constructs 
These constructs are implicitly or explicitly considered in the construction of the model 
for the analysis of students' ideas. 
In the light of these lines of research, the major purpose of this study is to 
investigate students' ideas about: 
- the tacit meanings assigned to provisional historical explanation; 
- the specific criteria used for deciding among different possible 
explanations. 
Summary 
This chapter discussed some major concepts applied in the present study, in the light of 
relevant literature in the field of research on pupils' ideas in history and cognitive 
psychology. Those concepts were presented within four major topics which subsume 
the working hypotheses of the empirical study: (a) progression in pupils' ideas of 
history; (b) pupils' ideas about historical explanation; (c) the idea of provisionality in 
history and the adolescent thinking, (d) some constructs developed by Kelly's theory of 
personal constructs. 
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2 The concept of historical explanation 
A working definition of the concept of explanation is required prior to exploring students' 
ideas of provisional historical explanation. This chapter intends (a) to discuss some 
models of historical explanation in the light of debates carried out in the domain of the 
philosophy of history - the nomological-deductive model, the rational model, the narrative 
model, the structural model, (b) to give a working definition of the concept of explanation 
applied in this study and, and (c) to analyse some answers to the central historical 
question used in the empirical study, in the light of the models discussed. 
Models of historical explanation 
Explanation together with objectivity have been among the major issues of debate and 
controversy concerning the nature of history. Before launching a brief discussion on 
some of its ambiguous meanings, a first boundary for the use of the concept in this study 
was established: 
The concept of historical explanation is used in the sense of a tentative 
answer as to why a past event or situation occurred. 
Different models of causal explanation have been used by historians and discussed in the 
field of philosophy of history. Four main approaches are presented here - the 
nomological-deductive model, the rational model, the narrative model and the structural 
model - with an analysis of their key features as stressed by their defenders, in the light of 
concrete pieces of historical work. To emphasise some assumptions seen as relevant to 
the analysis of the empirical data, they are given in italics. 
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The nomological-deductive model 
The nomological-deductive model is based on the assumption that a certain occurrence is 
deduced from a general law, that is, when we assign a cause or a set of causes (C) to a 
given event (E) that means that we are considering a generalization in which when C 
occurs, E will necessarily occur as well. The meaning of causation is drawn from the 
verification of regular repetition of the conjunction of C and E. In a symbolic form, it can 
be expressed by the following: 
If Cl, C2, C3, ..., then E 
In this classical model of causal explanation causes were regarded as necessary and 
sufficient conditions, empirically verifiable. Mill in 1872 (reprinted in 1959) stated that 
derivative laws between coexisting elements of each state of society (laws of coexistence) 
and between different states of society (laws of succession) could be deduced from those 
general laws of causation, and verified a posteriori: 
The empirical laws must be the result of but a few instances, since few nations have ever 
attained at all, and still fewer by their own independent development, a high stage of social 
progress. If, therefore, even one or two of these few instances be insufficiently known, or 
imperfectly analysed into their elements, and therefore not adequately compared with other 
instances, nothing is more probable than that a wrong empirical law will emerge instead of the 
right one. [...] The only check or corrective is, constant verification [italics added] by 
psychological and ethological laws. We may add to this, that no one but a person competently 
skilled in those laws is capable of preparing the materials for historical generalization, by 
analysing the facts of history, or even by observing the social phenomena of his own time. 
(p. 89) 
Recent logicians, such as Hempel and Popper, have brought some fresh ideas to the 
concept of causal explanation, influencing all aspects of the analysis of scientific 
knowledge. It is a realist and empiricist approach, since it is based upon the idea of 
observable and non-observable entities. Causes are abstract links between entities and 
they are deduced from a general theory - or hypothesis - which can be subject to testing. 
Hempel, in his article "The Function of General Laws in History" (1942/1959), defended 
the deductive-nomological model of reasoning as the basis for every science, history 
included. Historians do use that mode of reasoning, even when they only presume to give 
a description of the past. They cannot avoid subsuming work under a general hypothesis 
in order to relate events. Hempel defended the classical model of general law but assigned 
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to it the meaning of a universal hypothesis not only to be empirically confirmed but 
remaining open to disconfirmation: 
By a general law we shall here understand a statement of universal conditional form which is 
capable of being confirmed or disconfirmed by suitable empirical findings. (p.345) 
The paradigm of a complete explanation, in the sense of a set of determining conditions of 
a certain effect, remained. The logic of explanation is the logic of prediction; the former is 
complete when it can function as a prediction. Nonetheless, Hempel conceded that most 
explanations are not of such a type: they rest on probabilistic rather than deterministic 
laws. Within this model, the expression previously enunciated should be substituted by 
the following: 
If C 1, C2, C3, probably E 
For Hempel, history is one of those sciences whose explanations do not rely on general 
laws; some of them can be considered to be probabilistic. Exemplifying, he alluded to the 
explanation on the migration of Dust Bowl farmers to California because continual 
drought and sandstorms made their lives difficult and California promised a better 
standard of living. This explanation presupposed that "populations tend to migrate to 
regions which offer better living conditions". Such an assumption obviously cannot 
function as a general law, but as a universal hypothesis of a statistical kind (populations 
tend to...). Accordingly, Hempel (1959) agreed that: 
Many an explanation offered in history seems to admit of an analysis of this kind: if fully and 
explicitly formulated, it would state certain initial conditions, and certain probability hypotheses, 
such that the occurrence of the event to be explained is made highly probable by the initial 
conditions in view of the probability hypothesis. (pp. 350-1) 
Hempel claimed that explanations in history are usually vaguely asserted and that they 
cannot be subject to a full empirical confirmation and to prediction. In consequence, they 
are only explanation sketches, more vague and incomplete than most of those in other 
sciences. Yet they are considered scientifically acceptable, requiring a filling-out process, 
trying to find out more specific statements in order to confirm or disconfirm the initial 
conditions (factors) stated as relevant. This process relies on some sort of evidential 
confirmation; the assessment of an explanation sketch implies a judgement of their scope 
and empirical foundation. Thus, Hempel selected two main criteria for assessing 
explanatory power: one, implicitly stated, is logical consistency, which makes the 
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difference between a complete explanation and an explanation sketch; another, made 
explicit and emphasised, is evidential confirmation: 
The soundness of the historical explanation must rely on the criterion of assessing exclusively 
whether it rests on empirically well confirmed assumptions concerning initial conditions and 
general laws. (p. 353) 
Popper was another influential logician who concerned himself with the foundations of 
the natural and social sciences. His work "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" (1980), 
first published in German in 1934, prior to Hempel's quoted article, defended similar 
ideas on the deductive-nomological mode of reasoning, as the basis for every science. He 
explicitly refuted the inductive model based on the Humean assumption that in science 
plain observation comes first and that laws are arrived at by a process of induction. 
Popper claimed that the problem arises first whether it be suggested by practical or 
theoretical reasons, and that this is true in every science in the natural or the social field. 
Universal statements are seen as theories, which can be tested by experience through 
falsifiability: theories (T) can be contradicted by means of true singular statements (S), 
that is, as T then S, if not S then not T. Although theories can be refuted, they are never 
empirically verifiable since there cannot be a total and conclusive confirmation. Hence 
theories stand while they are well-corroborated "with respect to some system of basic 
statements" but they must be considered always provisional since they remain open to 
refutation (Popper, 1980, p. 275). Corroboration is not a timeless truth-value but a 
logical relation between a theoretical system and some system of accepted basic 
statements. When reflecting specifically on social and historical knowledge, Popper 
(1961) emphasised a distinction between laws and trends, according to the distinction 
made by Comte and Mill on laws of coexistence and laws of succession. Laws can be 
applied to static phenomena; but in the field of dynamics, when the concept of time 
enters, laws (laws of succession) cannot be precisely determined. Even in the natural 
sciences these laws of succession can only be called "quasi-laws of succession", since the 
changing of the set of specific conditions will influence the outcome (Popper exemplifies 
this with laws about the seasons, or the phases of the moon). Popper therefore asserted 
that there can be neither laws of succession, nor laws of evolution. In the social field, 
there may be trends with a dynamic feature, but predictions cannot be made since the 
specific conditions can always change. Trends depend on initial conditions and it is 
essential to understand their continuing changes in order to look at them as tendencies, 
not predicting laws (this is a direct criticism of what he calls the Marxist historicist 
approach). As was stated above, even laws, according to Popper, are hypotheses with a 
provisional character in the sense that they can and must be corroborated but they can 
never obtain a final proof, they are permanently open to falsification or refutation. 
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Summarizing Popper's general approach, he viewed scientific method as "deductive, 
hypothetical, selective by way of falsification" (1961, p. 137). Like Hempel, he defended 
the unity of scientific method and applied it to history with certain limitations. He 
explicitly asserted that the focus made of historical explanations is on particular facts and 
their initial conditions instead of universal laws. However, he also agreed that there are 
inherent laws in these initial conditions usually taken for granted by historians. These 
laws are tacitly assumed. Even when dealing with notions of governments, wars, or 
nations, historians are implicitly using abstractions provided by scientific or pre-scientific 
analyses. Historical events are typical while belonging to classes of events, and unique 
while historians show interest in describing features of their peculiarity with no explicit 
concern about a causal explanation. Popper (1961) pointed out: 
These two tasks of history, the disentanglement of causal threads and the description of the 
"accidental" manner in which these threads are interwoven, are both necessary, and they 
supplement each other; at one time an event may be considered as typical, i.e., from the 
standpoint of its causal explanation, and at another time as unique. (p. 147) 
If laws are just theories in the scientific field, theories are just interpretations in history, 
since historical approaches cannot be tested. For example, many facts can be interpreted 
in the light of class struggle or the struggle of racial supremacy (two hypotheses which 
Popper overtly aimed to combat), but supporters of either hypotheses often 
misunderstand evidence as confirmation or even as a proof for their own favoured 
explanation; those explanations must only be considered as more or less interesting 
interpretations and not as confirmed theories. For Popper historical explanations are mere 
interpretations, not theories; they are points of view which can be formulated as testable 
hypotheses but they cannot be tested in the sense of being refuted. This characteristic 
makes historical explanations more debatable, more provisional than those constructed in 
the field of natural sciences. In spite of this view, Popper considered that historical 
explanations have the same scientific pattern as those concerning other fields of enquiry. 
The writing of history, 
from a preconceived selective point of view does not mean that we may twist the facts until they 
fit into a framework of preconceived ideas. On the contrary, all available evidence which has a 
bearing on our point of view should be considered carefully and objectively (in the sense of 
scientific objectivity). (Popper, 1961, p. 150) 
Popper therefore valued historical interpretation provided it was well-grounded on 
evidence logically related to the focus made. 
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Although the nomological-deductive model is assumed in the analysis of constructed 
explanations, historians do not make use of general laws as an explicit methodological 
criterion. Under this criticism, M. White (1965), a follower of that model as applied to 
history, discussed a concrete explanation given by Geyl on the prosperity of Holland, 
when replying to Toynbee, who had asserted that Holland's prosperity was due to the 
challenge of the sea. Unlike Toynbee, Geyl considered that not only that factor (which 
until a certain moment had even functioned as a negative factor to development), but a 
whole set of factors should be taken into account (M. White, 1965): 
If one looks a little more closely, one will observe that within the European and even within the 
Netherlands cultural area the rise of Holland was fairly late, and this no doubt as a result of these 
very conditions created by sea and rivers. If in the end it overcame these conditions, it was not 
without the assistance of the surrounding higher forms of civilization [...]. 
But can, even after that initial stage, the continued struggle with the water be decisive in 
explaining the later prosperity and cultural fecundity of the country? Is it not indispensable to 
mention the excellence of the soil ... and above all the situation, which promoted the rise of 
shipping and of a larger international commerce? Was the case of Holland then wholly due to 
hard conditions after all? Is it right to isolate that factor from among the multifarious complexity 
of reality and to suppress the favouring factors? (p. 112) 
M. White argued that the only way for Geyl to defend his explanation would be to justify 
generalizations implied in each factor by means of comparison with similar situations, in 
the light of evidence of other countries confirming generalizations like: "whenever a 
nation is subjected to the challenge of the sea, has excellent soil, is assisted by its 
neighbours, and has an excellent maritime situation, it will rise to great heights of 
success". This kind of generalization, however, may not be defended, as only one 
example - the example given - is covered by it. Some historical explanations, at least, are 
of this type: they can only be confirmed by the very example stated as "the effect". 
Because of this weakness, White considered that historical explanations are "more 
tenuously constructed, more debatable, more subject to doubt than the explanations of 
natural scientists" (p. 29). 
(a) History as a particular science 
Some authors, such as Gardiner (1961) and McClelland (1975), defended the 
nomological-deductive model in a mitigated way - they maintained that history is an 
empirical science in a broad perspective, in terms of methodological requirements, but 
simultaneously emphasised some features of its uniqueness. 
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Gardiner (1961) defended this approach by analysing similarities and differences between 
common-sense and scientific explanation: both rely on inferring correlations through 
experience, both are selective, in the sense that they isolate a cause or causes as most 
relevant; however, while in everyday explanations contiguous elements leading to laws 
are uncritically subsumed, in science they are subject to analysis, confirmation and 
refutation. The use of language is different in either context. Moreover, the scientist 
makes use of deductive reasoning and tends to express concepts in quantitative terms, 
attempting to get precision and objectivity in his/her search for more and more fruitful 
explanations. These differences can lead to the misunderstanding that common people and 
scientists are speaking of different worlds. Each form of explanation is relative to the 
corresponding conceptual framework. The concept of cause, for example, is a concept 
borrowed from everyday language. Although not used in physics any more, that does not 
imply that it cannot be used in other levels of science. Gardiner asserted that these 
arguments do not mean that explanations are different in nature, neither are there any 
levels superior to others; they are necessary and have different functions. Historical 
explanation has some common points with other forms of explanation. Most of the time it 
is implicitly suggested by expressions like "under these circumstances, it was not 
surprising that ...", but it has characteristic distinct features too. History is mainly 
concerned with particular connections which may never be repeated again, it does not deal 
with general correlations of the kind that scientists usually look for. In history, concepts 
used as generalizations are vague and complex, they provide just indications of factors, 
thus it is inappropriate to consider them under subsumed laws. Moreover, the historian 
cannot submit his explanation to confirmation and refutation. These aspects do not make 
historical explanation weaker than other explanatory forms, Gardiner claimed. It is not the 
half-stage of a scientific explanation, since it aims to be itself, not something else. 
Explanations cannot be confirmed but they can be supported (by evidence) or justified 
(through further specification of the factors involved). 
When analysing the concept of causation in history, Gardiner (ibid.) discussed two 
problems which might be useful to highlight: (a) the role of chance in explanation and, (b) 
different levels of causes: 
(a) The interference of chance in a causal relationship is considered as an occasional 
collision of two sets of independent causal relationships. Thus an occurrence, whose 
logical links within a set of causal relationships can be explained, might appear as a 
chance factor to another set of events. 
(b) The problem of different levels of causes is related to the perspective which most 
interests the historian. The same question can be answered at various levels: at the level of 
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individual reasons, at the level of the immediate context, or at the level of long-run 
conditions. 
McClelland (1975) took a similar mitigated view, stressing that both Collingwood and 
Hempel advocated the impossible: the former denying that historians make use of 
generalizations; the latter ignoring the indeterminacies crucial to history, which make the 
nomological-deductive model difficult to apply in this specific field of enquiry. Relying 
on Gardiner's view, McClelland asserted that historical explanation is beyond a precise 
classification. Every historian regards insight as an important strategy, but she/he knows 
that human behaviour cannot be explained merely by either recreating the agent's 
calculation or by using universal generalizations. What historians usually try is to assume 
a critical position about their own assumptions, to respect evidence, to pursue a coherent 
logic, to expose their premises. This framework highlighted by McClelland allows room 
for a shift in the focus of discussion on historical explanation: it is arguable that what 
matters now is to analyse concrete explanations and those strategies used by historians in 
order to defend their own explanations. Aligning with those who consider history to be a 
science, McClelland found a useful comparison between historical strategies and those 
applied in social sciences. Being himself familiar with economics and economic history, 
he attempted to discuss some common points between causal explanation in history and 
economics. He assumed that factors are selected according to the model: 
If (C1, C2 Cn) then E, ceteris paribus 
The notion of ceteris paribus was emphasised by McClelland and other authors who have 
seen historical explanation under the probability-statistical model. This notion represents 
all other non specified conditions sufficient to the occurrence of E. It means that Cl, C2, 
Cn will be followed by E unless some other unknown factors interfere. This 
explanation can be formalized like this: 
Probably, if (C1, C2, Cn) then E 
Analysing the historian's work, McClelland observed that the historian usually wants to 
assess the relative importance of factors selected. McClelland asserted that counterfactual 
reasoning usually underlies the argumentation for some favoured factors, although 
counterfactual examples in historical explanation have been an issue of controversy 
among historians who often remain sceptical about their use. He examined two kinds of 
questions used by historians in assessing the relative weight of causes where 
counterfactual reasoning is usually implicit: (a) How can each factor affect the probability 
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of the occurrence? (b) can a particular factor be considered a necessary condition or not? 
In both cases, a comparison-situation is implicitly or explicitly applied. 
(a) How can each factor affect the probability of the occurrence? 
If Cl is considered more relevant than C2, that means that there is a greater probability of 
E occurring when  Cl is present than when C2 is present. This analysis implies a 
counterfactual judgement: if not Cl, probably not E. Generally speaking, considering a 
counterfactual possibility in history involves a statement like: if not Cl, what would have 
happened? Statements such as "if Hitler had invaded England", "if the Greeks had 
discovered gunpowder" are frequent in historical speculation and they clearly refer to a 
past situation in which such factors would be present. The level of probability of past 
occurrences is thus calculated in considering the non-existence of each factor - or set of 
factors. But sometimes this relevance is estimated just by adding each real factor 
according to the actual temporal sequence. In this case, the historian will estimate the 
difference in the probability of two causal assertions: 
If (C1, C2) then probably E 
If C 1 + C2, then probably E 
that is, the probability of E will change when C1 and C2 are acting together or in a 
sequence. In this kind of judgement, McClelland asserted, a counterfactual statement is 
not implied. All it requires is to know how the probability of the occurrence changes 
when actual factors are simultaneously present. 
(b) What factor can be considered a necessary condition or not? 
About this second question, McClelland pointed out that the historian might claim that 
what interests him is to compare necessary and non-necessary conditions. But even this 
reasoning, he insisted, conveys a counterfactual possibility about what had happened if 
the indispensable (necessary) factors would not have existed. 
The rational model 
Radically opposed to the general-law paradigm, another approach in the tradition of 
philosophers such as Dilthey and Croce views history as an autonomous field of enquiry. 
Historical knowledge is considered genuinely different in nature from sciences - an 
ideographic as opposed to nomothetic enquiry. This approach is based on the major 
assumption that human events, which constitute the focus of history, are unique and can 
only be recreated through understanding and interpretation. Within this framework, 
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philosophers such as Oakeshott and Collingwood totally rejected the deductive mode of 
reasoning as applicable to historical explanation. 
For Oakeshott (1933), history is a world of ideas, not just facts to be discovered - it is a 
form of experience. He claimed that historical explanation has a completely different 
meaning from the causal model used in scientific experience. We cannot find the single 
cause or the decisive cause in history because that would imply an abstraction which 
isolated events from their relations and interconnections, and that is not history - "no 
event is merely negative, none is non-contributory" (p. 129). The change of history is in 
itself explanatory, thus historical description overlaps explanation: 
The course of events is one, so far integrated, so far filled in and complete, that no external cause 
or reason is looked for or required in order to account for any particular event. (ibid., p. 141) 
This principle of unity or continuity is characteristic of historical experience, a structural 
presupposition in the attempt to explain the historical past. This is distinct from the 
practical past which is a fancied past to extract the inspiration desired by practical 
experience, usually serving politics (as for instance with patriotism, or religion). This 
distinction does not mean that the historical past is fixed. What is known is not what 
really happened but "what evidence obliges us to believe", a world of facts and events 
created by present evidence (ibid., p. 104). 
In the same wavelength Collingwood (1946) viewed history as an autonomous field of 
knowledge, tending to value it as being superior to the natural sciences. The genuine 
nature of the former consists of a tentative grasping of both the internal (the thought) and 
external sides of actions, while science is only concerned with the external side of events. 
The object to be discovered in history is thought expressed in actions, the inside of action 
is the cause in history. Thus the causal model of science does not apply to this kind of 
knowledge. The historian recreates past actions and agents' reasons in his own thought, 
by insight, upon working out the evidence available. This implies an inferential method, 
but such an assumption does not mean that the historian begins with facts, with a blank 
mind. It is asserted that underlying presuppositions implicitly frame the point of view of 
each author who imagines a particular past situation from his own cultural context. 
More recently, Dray and other philosophers influenced by the Collingwoodian approach 
have supported the same view in its essential features and have argued against the 
applicability of the nomological-deductive model to historical explanation. Sciences are 
concerned with abstractions, looking for regular patterns among events. History is 
concerned with the peculiarity of human events and affairs (their rationale) and this aim 
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cannot be accomplished by recourse to universal laws. Dray (1964a) defended the 
position that an explanation of a human action usually involves reconstructing "the 
agent's calculations" through insight. This calculation represents the agent's reasons for 
acting - and this is the essence of rational explanation. Reconstruction of the agent's 
reasons (beliefs, purposes or principles) must be worked out by the historian, who does 
it "using his own, or his own time's conception of rational purposes and principles". This 
feature brings no guarantee of the correctness of the explanation given, though it is 
always open to be improved by evidence. It is upon this basis that evidence gives an 
inductive character to rational explanation: "for we build up to explanatory equilibrium 
from the evidence" (pp. 118-55). 
Dray (1964a) claimed that historical explanations can be logically complete. In spite of 
being a defender of the rational model, he discussed external factors in large-scale 
situations as he was interested in arguing against the general law model on the same 
grounds. He analysed underlying assumptions in concrete historical explanations, for 
example, the French Revolution: although the concept revolution can be a generalization, 
that characteristic is not usually the focus in which the historian is interested - she/he will 
look for the specificity of that revolution, for the uniqueness of the explanandum, rather 
than for similarities among revolutions. The uniqueness of the explanans - since it is hard 
to find other instances of underlying general hypotheses out of the situation under 
scrutiny - and the complexity of various factors stressed, make the case for general laws 
in historical explanation problematic.1 Although conceding that in explaining broad states 
of affairs generalizations can be assumed, otherwise it would be impossible to relate 
events, he claimed that historians may use no laws at all in their explanations. This being 
the case, other grounds are required to support causal selection in history. He suggested 
two tests: the pragmatic and the inductive test. The pragmatic test - the "handle" test, 
according to Collingwood (Dray, 1964a, pp. 95-7) - relies on the criterion of indicating 
those conditions seen as important because they appear under human control in what 
concerns the historical agents.2 This involves attributing praise or blame to someone over 
a situation and the relationship between causal links and the assignment of responsibility 
to some agent is essential in history. This test may be applied to non-occurrences, 
absences or failures of agents too: a causal explanation of what went wrong will focus not 
I M. White (1965) felt a similar problem when he discussed the possible underlying laws in the factors 
emphasising the rise of Holland, given by Geyl; he viewed it, however, as a sign of a logical looseness of 
the historical explanation, while Dray summed it up as evidence against the general law model. 
2Dray discriminated cause and condition in a similar way to Hart and Honoré: conditions are the matrix or 
background within which the causes operate. For this distinction, Hart and Honoré (1966) made two main 
contrasts: between normal and abnormal conditions, and between a free deliberate action or other actions. 
Cause is the abnormal occurrence which makes the difference between the normal course of events and 
what really happened. Also a voluntary action may be sometimes identified as the cause of some 
particular occurrence. 
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only on what could or could not have been done, but on what should or should not have 
been done. As it requires the isolation of some conditions (i.e., it may always be filled in 
with other factors) the explanation can be considered incomplete. The second test - the 
inductive test - is intended to show that without C (the cause), E (the event) could not 
have happened. Although this reasoning may appear similar to the covering law model (if 
C then E), what is done in history is to establish a particular causal connection and then to 
generalize towards a trend from this particular case/cases. 
Two specific types of explanations discussed by Dray (1964a) are worth considering as 
they can be useful for the analysis of students' responses: the model of continuous series 
and "how-possibly" type questions. The model of the continuous series, Dray pointed 
out, lies in between scientific and historical explanation and is applied in everyday affairs. 
It consists of the reference to a series of facts constituting the story of what happened 
since a fact is thought of as a logical condition of the event to be explained. Although 
considered philosophically naive by Russell due to "the infinite divisibility of space and 
time (ibid., p. 68), Dray asserted that in its pragmatic dimension this model may provide 
a logically satisfactory explanation. In the case of a how-possibly type question, the 
explanation seeks to discover how an event, which seemed impossible to occur under the 
known circumstances, could nevertheless occur. To show how E occurred in spite of Cn 
(conditions known) demands a filling in of missing information to remove the 
unlikelihood of E. But simply adding details in a temporal sequence does not provide a 
complete explanation in so far as it stops short of mentioning sufficient conditions. This 
explanation can be a logically satisfactory one if it is transformed into an answer to a 
why-type question.3  
Dray (1980) analysed the Taylor/Trevor-Roper debate on the causes of World War II, in 
order to emphasise the rational framework underlying concrete historical explanations. 
Dray questioned Taylor's criticism of the explanation assigning to "Hitler's will" alone, 
with a plan implemented according to it, the status of "the cause" of war. He agreed with 
Taylor that this cause cannot be seen as a sufficient one, but he defended the proposition 
that it must be a necessary cause in terms of a rational explanation ("people cause those 
consequences of their actions they fully intend"). Dray stressed that, in spite of 
disagreement on a substantive issue, the explanatory paradigm is the same in both 
explanations. Both authors argued about causes under the criterion of a discrimination of 
cause and mere condition: what is controversial is the specific rationality of the agents' 
actions. 
3 Since, according to Dray, a mere temporal sequence does not provide a satisfactory explanation in how-
possible questions, we might infer that the model of continuous series has no explanatory power in 
answers to this type of question. 
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Dray (1964b) made a distinction between rational and dispositional explanation. If a 
dispositional property is attributed to things, as for instance, "the glass broke when the 
stone hit because it is brittle", the fact of the glass being brittle cannot be seen as a cause 
since it does not represent an antecedent event. It has, however, explanatory force and 
thus it can be considered as subsuming a lawlike explanation, containing a hypothesis 
("brittle materials tend to be broken under specific conditions"). The hypothesis can be 
close to predictability when the behavioural pattern is applied to things or human reflexes, 
"single-track behaviours". But when complex behaviour is considered - as in the case of 
tracing the dispositional characteristics of historical agents - they are "many-tracked" and 
thus indeterminable. Behaviour cannot be deduced from motives: such connections 
cannot be seen under the covering-law model. When, for example, it is asserted that 
Disraeli attacked Peel because of his ambition, it does not mean that such a dispositional 
characteristic was determinant of his actual actions. But, although Dray considered 
dispositional explanations as showing explanatory force, he clearly denied an overlap 
between dispositional and rational explanation. Disposition, Dray claimed, is a 
"spectator's word"; it belongs to the language of observing and predicting, rather than of 
deliberating and deciding" (1964b, p. 149). While in the dispositional model it is 
assumed that the agent will tend to behave in a certain way due to certain dispositions, in 
a rational explanation the historian will try to recreate the agent's rational deliberation, by 
insight. Dispositional analysis leads, according to Dray, to observe behaviour from the 
wrong standpoint - as a spectator instead of through empathetic reconstruction. Arguing 
against authors such as Gardiner, who do not view mental states as causes, Dray asserted 
that motives, intentions, purposes, dispositions (these being standing conditions) can 
function as causes - it just depends on the specific context. As an example of his view, he 
quoted an historical piece written by D. Thomson about the different interests shown by 
landowners and manufacturers in nineteenth-century England: underlying causal 
connections, a rational basis for the behaviour of each group can be found. 
The ambiguity of the term cause was discussed by Von Wright (1971), who noticed: 
The "causalist" will perhaps link intentions, motives and reasons to causes, and actions to 
events. The "actionist" groups the concepts differently: motives and reasons with actions, and 
events with causes - and between the two groups he sees a sharp divide. (p. viii) 
Von Wright analysed causation in terms of conditionship relations - the sufficient and 
necessary conditions within a system. He considered different types of causal 
explanation, of the why-necessary kind, and of the how-possible kind. Von Wright 
pointed out that explanations of the why-necessary kind may be only indirectly relevant in 
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history, that is, when the explanans or the explanandum is related to human affairs. 
How-possible type explanations are relevant to history when they explain how the actions 
are possible. As historical explanation does not imply a nomic connection, he preferred to 
call this type a "quasi-causal explanation". In this case, explanans and explanandum are 
linked by a set of statements constituting the premises of practical inferences. 
Ontologically speaking, a given event may provoke (actuate) a practical reasoning leading 
to a given action which creates a new situation. This situation may actuate another 
practical inference leading to another new situation. Von Wright contrasted two kinds of 
factors in history: internal circumstances, in terms of motives and reasons, and external 
circumstances, in terms of natural and technological changes. 
The narrative model 
Another trend sees history as self-explanatory narrative. Walsh (1967) contributed to this 
approach, introducing the concept of colligation in order to solve problems posed by the 
Collingwoodian rejection of generalizations in history. 
Gallie (1964) emphasised the uniqueness of history and opposed the deductive model, 
but he saw causal explanations as an ancillary strategy. History is a narrative and it is in 
itself explanatory: it involves generalizations of different kinds about human behaviour, 
some being classificatory, some causal, and some part of a general theory of human 
actions. Some of them are so familiar, based on everyday experience, that they cannot be 
considered important and characteristic of history. What matters in history is "a 
followable and on the evidence acceptable narrative" (ibid., p.109). There are some 
sequences of events working as necessary conditions of an occurrence. They can 
contribute to a more complete narrative, but often those statements conveying an 
explanatory meaning by the use of expressions such therefore or because can be 
transformed into narrative sentences. Gallie also pointed out that historians can make 
generalizations beyond what the agents had perceived. He can establish long-term trends 
relating to several moments, leading to new questions and generalizations. This feature 
brings to narrative a larger and more complex explanatory scope. Historical explanations 
cannot be tested or confirmed, since they are not a question of facts, but of arranging 
facts. They can not even be preferred in isolation to other possible explanations. For 
Gallie, they can be just an intrinsic part of a narrative, and this narrative will be acceptable 
provided it is consistent, plausible and according to evidence. 
Atkinson (1978) also assumed that narrative is intrinsically explanatory. He rejected the 
causal model but he also discussed the limits of rational explanation. Atkinson admitted 
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that generalizations are embodied in the historical narrative and they are related to 
evidence. He attacked the probabilistic approach asserting that it takes away the attraction 
of the deductive model by assuming the non-sufficiency of causes and thus making it a 
less convincing approach. Probability must be considered either in terms of 
generalizations universal in content but with low probability, or in terms of 
generalizations proportional in content and with high probability. It is the former pattern 
that it is usually applied in history. He discussed Hempel's example of Dust Bowl 
farmers (a population tends to migrate to regions which offer better living conditions) as 
exemplifying the former pattern of low probability under a universal generalization. Since 
the sufficiency of causes cannot be sustained, we can speak only of necessary, 
contributory, or facilitating causes. Each kind of cause will be considered according to a 
specific context. Rational explanation is also criticised at some points. Arguing against 
Dray, Atkinson traces a distinction between explaining behaviour in terms of the agent's 
norms and beliefs and justifying it by the outcomes of those norms and beliefs. This 
distinction thus subsumes a question about the relative scope of historical explanation. If 
in political history, Atkinson asserted, there is room for rational explanation, in social and 
economic history rational explanation is of limited value since the object of enquiry is not 
so much concerned about the individual's role. Like Gallie, he proposed the narrative 
model as self-explanatory. A narrative cannot be constructed without general knowledge, 
causal and rational explanations. Going further, Atkinson discussed causal explanation in 
three concrete pieces of historical work: (a) from Thucydides, on the causes of the 
Peloponesian war, (b) from Thompson, on British participation in World War I, and (c) 
from Taylor, on World War II. In this analysis he emphasised five special features : 
1. The variety of factors selected - states of affairs, events and actions, reasons for 
actions. 
2. A plurality of causes, especially in Taylor's explanation, which implies considerations 
dealing with the concept of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
3. The particularity of some factors, while generalizations are not stressed. 
4. The relative importance of causes, leading to an implicit concern for weighting each 
factor. 
5. A tendency to distinguish between long-term and immediate causes, the latter being 
seen as accidental. 
Atkinson pointed out that, while the two former features are related to the concept of 
cause, the third casts doubt about the law model in history, the fourth gives room for 
discussing objectivity in history and the fifth considers different models of causation. 
There is no sharp distinction between causal and non-causal language, he claimed. Causal 
assumptions are always implicit in every context, the mere descriptive level does not 
occur in history. Atkinson discussed the meaning of sufficient and necessary factors in 
history - causes can be seen as parts of sufficient conditions and partial causes can be 
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cumulative. However, there are different levels of explanation, and there is therefore no 
possibility of completeness. This argument seems to be related to the ontological field of 
history rather than to explanatory logical power. It also fits with notions of relatively 
superficial precipitating causes and long-run conditions, which give room for considering 
different points of view and thus different levels, not necessarily incompatible, of causal 
explanation. Although historians tend to consider an indefinite number of causes, there is 
always some selection according to a given point of view. Different causes, say, of 
World War I or II will be selected by several historians according to their nationalities, 
stressing different aspects and omitting others. Even time-distance influences the causal 
relationship - day by day more and more comparisons and contrasts can be drawn up. 
Thus Atkinson claimed that, in spite of controversies, historical work progresses because 
more reliable data are found in order to make better causal judgements. 
The structural model 
Some historians in France and then in many other countries have developed historical 
enquiry and explanation under an approach quite different from the nomological-
deductive and the intentional models. The structural model envisages the analysis of 
large-scale phenomena under several perspectives (geographical, economic, social, 
political, cultural) thus showing a special concern about long-run conditions other than 
the immediate context and events. Events and their context (short-term conditions) appear 
as the surface (this being the object of histoire evenementielle) of a much more complex 
reality. This movement initially represented by the "Annales school" created by Lucien 
Febvre and Marc Bloch has been largely influential in various countries, and was 
practised to some degree by historians such as Braudel in France, Pirenne in Belgium, 
Godinho in Portugal. Lloyd (1986) summarized the main assumptions of this approach. 
Three main conceptual clusters can be stressed: (a) history as a science, (b) society as a 
real structure, and (c) history as total history. 
(a) History as a science 
History is a science understood in a flexible way, with less precise contours than the 
traditional conceptualization - it takes into account recent scientific approaches in which 
the reductionist deductive model of causation is replaced by a complex concept involving 
theoretical hypotheses, empirical generalizations, particular descriptions, analogies, 
metaphors and models. It presupposes an epistemic access to reality, assuming a critical 
realism such as has been defended by authors like Harre (1985) and Bhaskar (1975). It is 
opposed to naive realism whose assumptions about the real world are tacit, including the 
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notion that experience is unmediated. We do have access to the real world but we 
construe the meaning of it through hypotheses. The social world is viewed as a reality, as 
a structured whole, not as an aggregation of individuals. It follows that a framework is 
required that is different not only from the intentional model of explanation but also 
different from the nomological-deductive one. As structuralism accepts the existence of a 
social structure, the concept of causation reflects this assumption, and the level of 
analysis is concerned with intertwined relationships between long-term, and short-term 
conditions and events. 
(b) History as a structure 
History as enquiry attempts to grasp the deep, structural conditions of the real world -
geographical, economic, demographic, cultural. Society is seen as an organized structure 
and different durations are considered in its analysis. Within this broad approach, social 
interrelationships can be understood differently according to different sub-perspectives: 
(1) The structuralist conception sees society as a very tightly integrated entity conditioning 
individuals, though these can have an active role too (a position defended by Marxists 
such as Hobsbawm and Thompson, and functionalists such as Parsons and Braudel); (2) 
the structurist conception sees society as an organized but loosely integrated entity, with a 
strong potential to be transformed into a different structure by individual actions. Arguing 
for this last view, Lloyd (1993) pointed out: 
A third alternative [opposed to methodological individualism and holism] says that social and 
behavioural explanations both have to be approached from the dual perspectives of action and 
structure. Methodological structurism approaches explanation by developing concepts of the 
separate real existence yet mutual interdependence of individuals and institutional structures 1...] 
Thus methodological structurism is explicitly based on an ontology of the social that recognises 
two nodes of causal power. (p. 46) 
Lloyd presented Ladurie's work as an outstanding example of the structurist approach. 
For example, in 1974 Ladurie wrote: 
In reality, if we restrict ourselves, as in the present chapter, to sixteenth-century data, we are 
bound to emphasise the role of the cogs de village of peasant origin. At Saint-Guilhem-le-Desert 
the consolidation of landholdings was not the work of noble lords, but of three commoners 
without the shadow of a title, either noble or professional [...] 
Was this a regional phenomenon peculiar to Languedoc or the Midi? There is little doubt that the 
land structure of Languedoc, with its alods and its manorial tenancies subject to minimal 
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quitrents, lent itself more readily to peasant progress than the regions of western France, where 
the nobility held the land and the people more firmly in its grip. (p. 94) 
Here, Ladurie tried to intertwine the analysis of the social structure and process 
(consolidation of landholdings and social class relationships), and the narrative of small 
groups and actions (in particular in places such as Saint-Guillem -le-Desert). 
(c) Total history 
History aims to be a total history in the sense of attempting to grasp a multivariate and 
changing reality. As this goal can never be fully achieved, interdisciplinarity and 
teamwork among different social researchers are valued as strategies to get a better 
understanding of the more profound levels of reality. 
This model presents some similarities with narrativism defended by Gallie and Atkinson 
when aiming to produce a descriptive and explanatory full account. Historical 
understanding is built upon answering how and why questions within a web, without 
overvaluing one or another. They are just abstractions of a single narrative and thus they 
cannot be totally isolated. Lloyd (1993) asserted: 
Even supposed non-explanatory descriptions in fact involve some explanatory element, so it is 
not a choice between explanation or understanding or description. These are all parts of one 
enquiry. (p. 50) 
Nonetheless, this approach gives more emphasis to an enquiry into interactions between 
structural conditions, on the one hand, and conjunctural conditions and immediate events 
and actions, on the other. In order to give an account of this complex causal web, 
historical explanation is thought of as a complex reasoning making use of deductions, 
inductions, inferential analogies, models and metaphors.4 
This approach is seen as part of a new trend which is beginning to be called "the 'new' 
new history" integrating different approaches (Olabarri, 1995). For the last twenty years 
the tendency towards specialization and the influence of the philosophy of difference, 
deconstruction and representation proposed by authors such as Foucault, Derrida and 
Barthes, have switched historiography to new approaches. The world is seen as a 
representation - the existence of extratextual reality being questioned - and the analysis of 
4 It is assumed here that this kind of reasoning is not characteristic only of history - it is a general pattern 
in science, such as has been defended by authors like Harris and Bhaskar, among others. 
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mediation between authors and the supposed reality is the focus - a linguistic turn puts an 
emphasis on analysis of language: written and spoken, symbol and gesture, 
representation, language of sources, language of the historian and even language of 
silence. In parallel to these relativist approaches, micro-history (such as practised by 
Ladurie) and cultural history (influenced by Bourdieu and Elias) appear as a realist 
approach. 
Explanatory models: a summary 
The concept of historical explanation has been understood under varied meanings 
according to different approaches concerning the nature of history. 
One view defends the nomological-deductive model. It assumes that scientific explanation 
is essentially deductive, thus ideally predictive, and that historical explanation follows the 
same general pattern. This perspective, taken by Popper and Hempel, brings out the 
problem of a complete explanation whether on logical grounds, that is, concerning 
explanatory power, or in terms of sufficiency of causes concerning a relationship with 
reality. Defenders of D-N model agree that sufficient causes cannot be established either 
in history or in other branches of enquiry. There can be more or less probabilistic 
explanations (Hempel), or as yet non-refuted hypotheses (Popper). Furthermore, as in 
history explanations cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed, they are seen as weak 
(logically speaking) scientific explanations - explanation sketches (Hempel) or mere 
interpretations (Popper). Authors such as Gardiner and McClelland see history as 
integrated in a general scientific level of enquiry, presenting common points with social 
sciences, but these authors also emphasise some specificity in historical explanation. 
Gardiner analysed causation pointing to differences and similarities between common-
sense, scientific and historical explanations. McClelland concentrated his analysis on 
factorial weight in explanations of the historical and social science domain. 
Another view defends the rational model and sees history as an autonomous field of 
knowledge, with different characteristics of enquiry. History deals with the unique, the 
particular, and does not rely in generalizations. Explanation is concerned with reasons for 
actions - motives and goals - and to know how a person acted is to know why a person 
did it. A full explanation can be thus constructed in history, inferred from evidence, 
recreated through insight. Nowadays, authors such as Dray concede that historians do 
use vague or complex generalizations and deal with external factors too - especially when 
broad states of affairs and processes constitute the object of enquiry, using why-type 
questions. Dispositions, usually associated with rational explanation, can have 
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explanatory force too, but Dray considers them to be an external view of human 
behaviour, which is relatively inferior to rational explanation. Historical questions of the 
how-possible type were specifically analysed by Dray and Von Wright: they must be 
treated as a why-type question in order to get a logically satisfactory explanation (Dray) 
and they are relevant in history in the search for the necessary conditions which made a 
state of affairs occur. 
Another, fourth view, the structural model presents a different framework. Authors in the 
tradition of M. Bloch, L. Fdbvre and Braudel defend the existence of conditioning 
structures and conjunctures of immediate events and actions. They are concerned with 
grasping the "more profound levels" of conditionship of superficial actions and events. 
Unlike a structuralist holism, which saw structures as determining individual actions, 
structurists such as Lloyd admit an interaction between the individual and the immediate, 
on the one hand, and short and long-term situations, on the other. This branch of 
structuralism assumes a critical realism about society and rejects the old dichotomy of 
deductive versus inductive reasoning in explaining social/human events. It affirms that 
complex ontological causation is explained by an equally complex reasoning employing 
deductions, inductions, analogies, models and metaphors. The focus on explanation, 
nowadays, tends to move away from summing up arguments towards one or other model 
of causation. It is not very fruitful in terms of contribution to a critical analysis of history 
to keep on discussing whether historical explanation is (a) nomological-deductive or, (b) 
inferential-inductive. In the former approach, a scientific status is assigned to history, this 
area of knowledge appearing as a "poor relative" of other more "complete" sciences under 
the paradigm of sufficient and predictable causes. In the latter approach, the complete 
autonomy of history is assumed. Such a controversy was undertaken - and must be 
understood - within a specific ideological and scientific context, from the 1930s to the 
1960s. 
In each approach, after all, causes in history are seen as necessary, more or less 
determinant, but never taken as factors sufficient on their own. Historians usually do not 
consider a single cause in history. (Marxist historians, for example, emphasise the 
economic factor, but do not consider it as a sufficient cause.) Thus, some consensus 
seems to be found in envisaging different, contributory factors for explaining historical 
situations, events and actions. Those factors can be more necessary or even determinant 
causes or conditions, or merely facilitating conditions. Controversy usually relies on (a) 
whether factors must be seen as causes, conditions or reasons, and (b) what counts as 
more or less relevant factors. 
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In order to analyse these kinds of issues, a shift in debate has taken place towards the 
analysis of concrete explanations produced by historians. (This is discussed in the 
following chapter). Critical philosophy of history is now concerned with questions like: 
What strategies do historians use for weighing the relative importance of factors? 
This question is concerned with the methodological grounds used and argued by 
historians in order to produce and justify their explanations. 
A working definition of historical explanation 
The theoretical background given above highlighted some specific features which were 
selected as grounds for the empirical study. Accordingly, historical explanation in this 
study will have the following working definition: 
Historical explanation is supposed here to be an answer to a why-type question about 
past human actions, events, and states of affairs. It may include questions of a how-
possible type. Each explanation presupposes a selection of factors - reasons, motives, 
dispositions, external conditions, structural, conjunctural conditions, along the lines of 
the different explanatory models. Each author may assign a different relative 
importance to factors selected and, among a range of factors (the standing conditions), 
some might be considered necessary or mere contributory/facilitating conditions to the 
explanandum. Conditions which make the difference to whether a situation occurred or 
not may be considered as the cause. 
Therefore, when analysing concrete explanations emphasis will be put mainly on the 
following constructs concerning explanatory structure: 
1. Explanatory mode (which kind of factors are implicitly or explicitly selected: 
conditions, causes, reasons, motives, dispositions, long/short-term conditions). 
2. Explanatory weight (what weight is attributed to factors selected: sufficient, 
necessary or facilitating conditions). 
It is assumed that competing explanations to the same historical question can be 
examined on evidential and logical grounds and thus, their relative explanatory scope 
and power may be assessed. As this is related to the issue of objectivity in history it 
may be considered to lie at the very heart of ideas about provisionality in historical 
explanation. Therefore it will be analysed more closely in the following chapter, 
concerning "Ideas of provisionality in historical explanation". 
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Analysis of answers to an historical question 
According to the working definition of historical explanation made explicit above, we 
shall now analyse the different answers to a specific historical question used in the main 
empirical study.5 This analysis aims to bring out some features concerning the structure 
of historical explanation already highlighted: underlying explanatory models and factorial 
weight. These features will constitute part of the framework for the analysis of 
adolescents' ideas of historical explanation. Criteria for assessing the relative power and 
scope of valid explanations, also considered in the main data analysis, will be discussed 
in the next chapter, after giving a theoretical framework for the idea of provisionality in 
historical explanation. 
The concrete historical question is concerned with the so-called Portuguese Oriental 
Empire during the sixteenth century. The Portuguese maritime expansion evolved along 
the African coast in the fifteenth century, culminating with the arrival of 
Vasco da Gama' s fleet in India in 1498. After that, the Portuguese quickly took control 
of the maritime trade in the Indian Ocean, by imposing a tax (cartaz) on every commercial 
ship navigating through that sea and maintaining a trade monopoly till 1530. A question 
of how-possible type (if the paradox explicit in parentheses is considered) can be raised 
about this state of affairs: 
How could the Portuguese (from such a small and far-away country) manage 
to establish a maritime empire in the Indian Ocean?  
A traditional explanation from the Portuguese perspective is known, tending to attribute 
those deeds to the outstanding courage of Portuguese people and the capacity of their 
leaders. It can be illustrated from the work of A. Matoso (1946), stated in strong 
nationalistic terms: 
In spite of having a population of no more than 1,300,000 inhabitants Portugal conquered an 
empire of an amazing vastness [...] 
This large domain quickly conquered with small human and financial resources can only be 
explained by the Portuguese colonial vocation, her humanitarian administrative system, the great 
leaders' moral correctness, the sacrifices for the country made by all the people who were living 
under the Portuguese flag. (p. 306) 
5 The historical question and versions of answers selected for the main empirical study are further 
described in chapter 5. 
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Putting aside, for the moment, considerations about distinctions between the practical and 
the historical past, we shall concentrate, first, on the explanatory model underlying this 
version. The "colonial vocation ... the great leaders' moral correctness, the sacrifices 
made by the people" can be seen as dispositional characteristics determining, together 
with an external condition ("administrative system", also conveying a "humanitarian" 
disposition), the outcome - the Portuguese empire. These "natural" dispositions convey 
somehow implicitly the major motive for action: love for one's country. Together, these 
dispositions and motive are given as the single, sufficient cause for the rise of the empire 
(it "can only be explained by..."). Negative, external factors functioning as obstacles to 
that occurrence (small human and financial resources) were overcome by those internal 
dispositions and will power. 
It is true that there might be strong motives and dispositions to get economic and political 
power in the name of "Faith and Empire". Nonetheless, evidence stressing other 
contributing factors, such as navigational expertise and the naval correlation in the Indian 
Ocean, is omitted. Moreover, if negative factors such as "small human and financial 
resources" cannot be refuted (Portugal was a small, not rich country, compared to others 
in Europe or in Asia), naval resources (advanced naval equipment, with canons included) 
must not be ignored either. The authoritative assertion "it can be only explained by" 
suggests an unbalanced conclusion, not open to criticism. It is a clear piece of historical 
propaganda constructed with the obvious nationalistic ingredients of the time in Portugal -
"good" colonialism, great leadership, spirit of sacrifice, love for country, the Portuguese 
flag. The purpose was emotionally involving pupils to make sacrifices for the country and 
persuading them to obey their leaders (the dictator Salazar was in power). The analysis of 
this version permits us to draw some conclusions about its weakness on methodological 
grounds. Dray's statement (1964a) about historical inadequacy when evaluating different 
accounts might fit well here: 
... one [explanation] can be so bad, without containing any false statements, that it will be said 
no longer to give a "true picture" at all. (pp. 37-8) 
Thus, it can be said that the explanation of Matoso represents an example of explanation 
constructed for practical reasons, with lack of objectivity.6 
A second version is given by 0. Marques (1976) following a narrative discourse obeying 
strictly historical concerns: 
6 Oalceshott's idea of a practical past, related to political and religious purposes (see p. 44 in this chapter) 
may be applied to this example of explanation. 
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In 1474 young Prince John (the future John II) was put in charge of overseas expansion. To 
him, rather than to Prince Henry or anyone else, the creation of a comprehensive plan of 
discovery, with its means and goals, should be credited [...] 
Vasco da Gama departed from Lisbon with three vessels and a supply ship, in July 1497 ... After 
having reached the limit of Bartolomeu Dia's navigation, the ships began making their own 
discoveries ... This was already Moslem territory, and pilots became available [...] 
The great number of Portuguese taking the lead in these and other Spanish (as well in French and 
English) voyages shows how skilled in seafare the Portuguese were at the time and how eagerly 
sought after they were as unrivalled experts in navigation ... The economic, political, and 
religious happenings and conditions that had forced the Portuguese out of Europe promoted 
voyages of exploration inland. Gold, spices, and Prester John ... would justify the first travels far 
from the coast[...] 
The Portuguese had arrived in India with the main purpose of getting spices and other profitable 
merchandise. They also posed as crusaders in a permanent fight against the Moslems. They soon 
realised that to secure control of spice sources and trade in the Indian Ocean they had to destroy 
the long-established network of Moslem traders and trading places [...] 
Openly defying the Moslem hegemony and combating the Islamic faith, the Portuguese had to 
meet as their main enemies in Asia the Egyptians and the Turks, allied to the many smaller 
Mohammedan kingdoms. Most of the naval power and land struggle took place in the western 
Indian Ocean, between Arabia and India. It helped the Portuguese considerably that none of the 
major Moslem countries was openly turned towards the sea or based its power upon the sea. 
Kingdoms like Persia and the Mughal Empire were continental rather than maritime. Only the 
Egyptians and the Turks were in a situation that required meeting the Portuguese challenge, yet 
their main strength and interests lay elsewhere, in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and Europe. 
(pp. 217-22) 
This passage is constructed by intertwining structuraLlconjunctural conditions with goals, 
motives and some event steps. 
1. Motives and rational goals convey the idea of a powerful rationale for action: the goal 
of searching for spices, the wish to fight against the Moslems leading to a well-
established plan of discovery. Such purposes, motives and actions of a rational kind 
appear as one of the major conditions for the political success in Asia. 
2. Structural conditions - economic, political and religious - gave rise to the maritime 
expansion. These conditions are stated with strong emphasis ("forced"), suggesting a 
structuralist view which accepts that the long-run situation determines the surface events 
and states of affairs. Nonetheless, another related long-term factor is selected as a 
necessary condition - navigational expertise (which can also be seen as an outcome of 
technological advance as a result of structural conditions stated above). It is implicitly 
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seen as a necessary factor ("how skilled in seafare the Portuguese were ... unrivalled 
experts in navigation"). 
3. Conjunctural conditions - the division of Moslem and Indian countries, the 
concentration of their military resources on land or places other than the Indian Ocean -
appear as facilitating conditions of the Portuguese oriental empire ("it helped the 
Portuguese considerably that none of the Moslem countries ... ".) 
Thus several contributory factors with a different weight are given to explain the 
situation. Some are stated in terms of long-term or short-term conditions, some in terms 
of individual or collective purposes, motives and reasons. Within such a causal 
interrelationship, some facilitating conditions appear as chance factors: Moslem pilots, 
naval weakness of Asian countries. The last factor could imply a counterfactual 
judgement (what would have happened if those countries concentrated their force on the 
Indian Ocean?) but, as it is stated, it seems to represent a mere adding of one factor more 
("It helped the Portuguese considerably").7 The explanatory pattern seems to be close to 
narrative as it involves description and explanation, and close to the structural model as it 
selects different levels of causes. A decisive role for the structural level (the necessary 
standing conditions) seems apparent, but the role of individuals and contiguous factors 
are also recognised. From these considerations we might see this piece of historical work 
as of a structurist-narrative mode. 
Another hypothesis about the Portuguese oriental empire was drawn up by Needham, 
Wang-Ling and Gwei-Djen (1971). It was suggested again by A. Pacey (1990), in his 
explanation concerning the same issue: 
The famous voyages of exploration which were sent out from Portugal by Prince Henry the 
Navigator were cautious and systematic, based on carefully recording and mapping navigational 
data[...] 
It was not until 1488 that the Cape of Good Hope was reached, and not until another decade had 
passed that Vasco da Gama sailed round the Cape to reach Mozambique. There he encountered 
Arab shipping and was able to secure the services of an Arab pilot to guide him along the East 
African coast to Mombasa and Malindi. From the latter port, another pilot helped the Portuguese 
ships across the ocean to South India. The irony is that Chinese fleets had visited these ports 
sixty years before but had now been totally withdrawn, and the Islamic naval challenge to the 
Portuguese, when it came, was ineffective. Western Europe's new route to Asia was thus open. 
(p. 57) 
7 This reasoning might be one example of non-counterfactual reasoning analysed by McClelland (see 
p. 43 in this chapter). 
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The hypothesis emphasised here - the withdrawal of the Chinese fleets - seems to be 
asserted as the necessary condition - the main cause - which brought about the occurrence 
of Portuguese naval power in the Indian Ocean. It strongly suggests a low probability of 
Portuguese success in the Indian Ocean if the Chinese fleet were still there at the time that 
the Portuguese rounded the Cape of Good Hope. It is difficult to deny an underlying, 
obvious generalization in this statement, based on common-sense reasoning: when two 
fleets face each other, the stronger will probably win. It will be important, however, to 
emphasise here the notion of ceteris paribus subsumed in probabilistic generalizations 
(other unknown factors could act against this possibility). The given hypothesis clearly 
involves a counterfactual speculation of the kind "what would have happened if...?", 
overtly expressed, again, in another passage (Pacey, 1990).8  
Had the Chinese still been patrolling the Indian Ocean when the Portuguese arrived, one can only 
speculate what might have happened. The decision to withdraw the Chinese fleet was a 
momentous one, not only for what it portended with regard to China's own development, but 
also for what it meant in world affairs to have the "door left open" into the Indian Ocean. (p.63) 
This narrative suggests that only by chance (a question of timing) did the Portuguese find 
the Indian Ocean free of more powerful naval forces. The whole construction of the 
former piece stresses the slow pace of Portuguese progression through the African coast 
("It was not until 1488"), this contributing as a double factor to the Portuguese empire: 
(a) a careful planning of voyages in order to attain the intended goals, and (b) different 
timings for the Chinese and the Portuguese, in what concerns the control of the Indian 
Ocean. The former factor - well-planned trips - can be seen as an implicit outcome of 
conscious goals of agents such as Prince Henry. The latter, as Gardiner (1961) pointed 
out, can be seen as the accidental conjunction of two independent causal sets: the pace of 
careful Portuguese explorations and the political process in China.9  
This passage might be considered an explanatory narrative. Necessary and facilitating 
conditions are intertwined with antecedent steps, all those features functioning as a 
comprehensive explanation of the Portuguese oriental empire. Thus, conditions like: 
. Systematic planning of maritime voyages 
. Availability of Arab pilots 
. Chinese withdrawal from the Indian Ocean 
. Moslem naval inefficiency 
8 As Von Wright (1971) and McClelland (1975) among others stated, counterfactual hypotheses are used 
in history, as is the case here. 
9 See reference to Gardiner's discussion of the meaning of chance in historical explanation in this chapter, 
p. 41. 
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are simultaneously presented in a descriptive/explanatory form, with a different factorial 
weight. 
It might be of interest to compare the construction of this explanation with that given by 
Marques. With the exception of the Chinese withdrawal factor, emphasised by Pacey, 
both authors presented the same set of antecedent conditions: planned voyages, relevant 
antecedent steps along the African Coast as far as India, help of Arab pilots, Moslem 
naval inefficiency. Nonetheless, while in Marques such conditions were described in an 
affirmative way, in Pacey the low pace of maritime trips was stressed: "It was not until 
1488 that the Cape of Good Hope was reached and not until another decade had passed 
that Vasco da Gama sailed round the Cape...". These step events described in a negative 
form, together with the positive contribution of Arab pilots ("an Arab pilot to guide him", 
"another pilot helped the Portuguese") prepares the impact of Pacey's main hypothesis. 
Unlike Marques' explanation, which provides a rationale for Portuguese actions, Pacey's 
speculation presupposes a noneurocentric point of view about the European expansion 
towards the East. 
Therefore, although two different answers are given in these explanations, it is possible 
to find some common grounds as to their nature. Following the pattern of analysis made 
by Atkinson (1978), some historical features can be seen in both explanations: 
1. A variety of factors selected - states of affairs, events, motives and reasons. 
Conditions are, thus, taken from different explanatory models.10 
2. A plurality of causes - there is not a single cause, but several contributory conditions 
whether necessary or facilitating conditions; 
3. The particularity of some factors, such as the help of Arab pilots or the naval 
correlation in the Indian Ocean;11  
4. A relative factorial weight: some factors are considered as necessary or more powerful 
factors, others have only a facilitating role. 
In the vein of Atkinson, it can be asserted that those features are important in order to 
analyse the implicit explanatory modes applied by historians. The last feature - relative 
factorial weight - may lead to questions about the objectivity versus relativity of historical 
explanations. A different factorial weight reminds us that each historical explanation is 
provisional. In what sense this concept may be used is the issue to be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
10 A distinction between two levels of causation: the structural situation seen as more decisive 
conditions, and contiguous events seen as facilitating conditions, is only explicit in Marques. 
11  Contrary to Atkinson, some generalizations are implicit: in Marques' explanation, the economic, 
political and religious conditions; in Pacey's, the assumption about a hypothetical Chinese and 
Portuguese encounter in the Indian Ocean. 
Summary 
A theoretical framework for the concept of provisional historical explanation applied in 
the empirical study was given. This chapter (a) analysed different explanatory models of 
historical explanation - nomological-deductive, rational, narrative and structural - in the 
light of theoretical debates undertaken by some defenders of each view, (b) gave a 
summary of the main features of these four models thought useful as a theoretical 
background for the analysis of students' ideas about provisional historical explanation, 
(c) formulated a working definition of the concept of historical explanation in the sense 
applied in the empirical study, and (d) examined three historical explanations - three 
diverging answers to a concrete historical question used in the main empirical study - in 
the light of the framework suggested. 
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3 Ideas of provisional historical explanation 
In this study, the main theoretical assumption concerning the nature of history is that 
historical explanation is always provisional. This chapter gives (a) a brief survey, in the 
theoretical field, of different answers to the question "why is historical explanation 
provisional?", (b) an overview of philosophical debates on objectivity and truth in 
history, from early to recent debates about scientific and historical objectivity and 
evidence (the postmodernist approach, broadly speaking, and the critique of 
postmodernism), (c) new trends about historical objectivity, in the light of the critique 
of postmodernism, (d) a set of operational ideas related to provisional historical 
explanation grounded on the new trends previously highlighted, and subsumed in the 
analysis of students' ideas, and (e) an analysis of competing explanations to an 
historical question employed in the empirical study, in the light of the theoretical 
framework. 
Why is historical explanation provisional? 
A ready-made definition for the concept of provisionality as applied to historical 
explanation does not exist. In a first, yet superficial approach it can be said that 
historical explanation is provisional as contrasted with final. It is assumed here that 
there is no final answer in history: different explanations over time, and alternative 
explanations can be found at any given time about the same past events or states of 
affairs. Why does this happen in history? What kind of issues does this entail? 
According to different explanatory frameworks, disparate answers to such questions 
have been given. Some authors surveyed in the previous chapter explicitly discussed 
the issue. 
Hempel (1959) would say that historical explanation is provisional because it is 
statistically probable (in an ontological sense), like most scientific explanations; and 
also, because it must be considered as an explanation sketch only, since it is more 
vaguely construed, logically more incomplete than most of those in other sciences. 
Such a condition is due to its characteristic non-testability, experimentally speaking: 
historical explanation can only be filled out by more specific evidential statements to be 
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confirmed or disconfirmed. Gardiner (1961) and McClelland (1975) followed this 
realist framework subsuming an ontological probability of historical explanation. 
Popper (1980, Chapter I) explicitly asserted that scientific explanation is provisional; it 
is a hypothesis permanently open to refutation. He refuted the idea of probability in 
explanation, which is based upon inductive principles of inference: such principles 
imply an infinite regression, since they must be judged themselves as being only 
probably valid. An anticipation, a hypothesis, comes first through logical deduction, 
being tested then by means of falsifiability. A scientific explanation can be considered 
proximate to the truth provided it is corroborated by past experience and not yet 
falsified by counter-evidence (1972). Thus, corroboration does not mean certainty or 
absolute truth. The search for truth remains the major scientific aim, but it is always 
tentative, since we can never attain truth or even probability - "we do not know: we can 
only guess" (p. 278). Popper opposed the notion of verisimilitude to that of probability, 
the former involving degrees of approximation to truth, open to critical examination. In 
spite of this conceptualization, he assumed an objectivist approach by asserting the 
need for intersubjective criticism. In 1961, Popper claimed that historical explanation is 
much more provisional than explanation in other sciences because it cannot be 
confirmed or refuted, since it is considered just as an interpretation relative to a certain 
point of view (pp. 150-2). It can be said that its verisimilitude is much more arguable 
than that of natural sciences. 
Dray (1964a, 1980, 1991), in the same line as Collingwood, assumed that historical 
explanation is intrinsically evaluative - the object of history itself is value-laden. The 
selection of questions and answers, questions of causal importance, facts themselves, 
imply a moral evaluation. Historical explanation is always relative to a value-
judgement, but it is still objective, because it is a re-construction of a real past. It can be 
said that historical explanation is partial, in the sense that it explains part of the reality; 
it explains from a specific standpoint, and this is a genuine feature in history, not a 
methodological weakness - it is not causally, but logically tied to the very notion of 
historical understanding. 
Lloyd (1993) assumed that historical explanation is partial in the sense that it implies a 
progressive discovery of the total reality with its causal powers. It is a realist position 
in the sense attributed by Bhaskar (1975).1 Lloyd defended a convergence between 
1  About the critical realism defended by followers of the structural model see chapter 2, pp. 50-1. 
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coherence and correspondence ideas of truth, a combination of social knowledge and 
empirical evidence. 
Entangled in these ideas about provisional historical explanation are notions of 
certainty, truth and objectivity in historical explanation and, broadly speaking, in 
historical enquiry. These issues have been largely discussed within general theories of 
knowledge, and within the specific field of philosophy of history. 
Truth and objectivity in history 
A debate on truth and objectivity in historical enquiry has focused especially on two 
problems: (a) the possibility of truth in historical knowledge, namely, whether there is 
an epistemic access to reality or an epistemic gap between the knowing subject and 
reality; and (b) the meaning and criteria for assessing objectivity. As both (a) and (b) 
can be understood as entangled in each other, such a framework will underlie a brief 
survey of debates on historical objectivity, thought to be useful since it might 
contribute to a better understanding of students' ideas about provisional historical 
explanation. 
Early debates 
The issue of objectivity in historical understanding and explanation has been subject to 
debate and controversy not only recently, but since the nineteenth century when the 
method of natural sciences was seen as the paradigm for objectivity. According to this 
paradigm, objectivity implied the control of interferences from the subject so that the 
object - or the knowledge of it - could not be modified by such interferences (Labovitz 
and Hagedon, 1981). 
Concerns about objectivity under a positivist model provoked a major controversy on 
the validity of historical explanation. The author's interpretation inherent in an 
historical conclusion was seen as conflicting with the required impartiality of the 
subject. The crucial question in this debate was: To what extent can an historical 
explanation be valid since it is constructed with a subjective element? In the discussion 
of this issue, it is possible to distinguish two early approaches under the influence of 
positivism. 
1. One, concerned with stating general laws about the social process, contrasted a 
scientific (as corresponding with reality) with a distorted perspective on explanations 
about society. Such an approach was represented by Comte, Marx and Mill. 
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2. Another, with the preoccupation of strictly applying a criterion of neutrality to the 
collection of facts from reliable sources, emphasised the value of plain description over 
interpretation and explanation. Ranke is the most cited representative of this view. 
Thus, objectivity was equated with absolute neutrality as it was believed to be 
characteristic of the scientific method. In spite of this, we may infer that some light was 
shed on the idea of objectivity by both views presented above. The Marxist position 
was probably the first approach to relate objectivity to the notion of social production 
of knowledge - it stressed the importance of cultural context in shaping the author's 
point of view. Such concepts were analysed, however, in terms of right-wrong poles: 
those sharing working class values, which were engendered through contact with the 
real, material forces, were able to develop a scientific analysis and grasp the right 
features in the social world; those sharing bourgeois values, isolated from the real 
conditions of material production, would tend to distort reality. The German school (in 
which Ranke is included), so much preoccupied with objectivity in a narrow sense, 
positively contributed to refining source criticism. Sources were subject to a strict cross 
examination in order to get the "facts" and such a labour contributed to enhancing the 
historical method. 
Opposed to these two positivist trends, another approach to history was developed: 
idealists such as Dilthey and Croce stressed the uniqueness of historical knowledge, 
seen as dealing with particulars, unlike the sciences, and they assumed historical 
interpretation as intrinsic to historical knowledge. Later on, in the same line of thought, 
the historian's autonomy was emphasised by Collingwood. He made the notion of point 
of view more explicit, integrating it in the very idea of historical objectivity. 
Methodological detachment came to be distinguished from a plain notion of neutrality, 
as one of those important claims for objectivity. Historical objectivity should thus be 
observed under three methodological rules: location in space and time, consistency, and 
reliability in dealing with evidence. 
All those approaches referred to above rely on realist assumptions, although 
conceptualized at different levels. 
1. Early positivists assumed that there can be a direct access to past reality by means of 
historical sources, if subject to criticism. They presupposed that certainty of knowledge 
can be attained, provided that neutrality is guaranteed; such an assumption implies that 
sources must be questioned to decide whether they are reliable in terms of conveying 
the truth or not. Concerns about searching for the truth led sometimes to over-valuing 
direct observation and memory, seeing witnesses and agents as the most trustworthy or 
complete sources. Such a stage in historical thinking, the scissors and paste model as 
Collingwood labelled it, represented, however, a progressive move towards a 
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conceptual distinction between the independent past and documents on it. It must be 
seen as a stage beyond the authority model which, in Collingwoodian terms, conveyed 
a still syncretic view of the past and its testimonies: facts existed ready-made to be 
recorded and transmitted. Testimonies were thus supposed to reproduce what really had 
happened and should be followed by historians who, accordingly, would be trusted as 
authorities as well. 
2. Idealist-empiricists assumed that there is some access to reality through evidence, 
but they also recognised and affirmed some subjectivity and historicity as a genuine 
feature of historical knowledge. Ideas of absolute truth were replaced with ideas of 
partial - or proximate - truth. Certainty ceased to be a goal for knowledge. The idea of a 
provisional answer in history gained some refinement by integrating the notion of 
historicity of knowledge. Objectivity was still affirmed, involving notions of specific 
methodological standards such as personal detachment and evidential consistency. 
A different approach seen as a relativist (versus realist) trend was represented by 
authors such as Beard (1970). He mounted an overt attack on the so-called neutrality 
of Ranke and his followers and demonstrated how such an objective truth as equated 
to neutrality involved an oriented-view from specific perspectives. Ranke, for 
example, "successfully avoiding any historical writing that offended the most 
conservative interests in the Europe of his own time ... may be correctly characterized 
as one of the most 'partial' historians produced by the nineteenth century" (ibid., p. 
139). Beard's arguments could have contributed to a more elaborate idea of objectivity, 
but his criticism is rather seen as a sceptical attitude towards history: assuming some 
methodological standards, such as direct observation and neutral selection, as 
objective, he considered that on those (and other) grounds, objective truth in history 
could never be attained. However, that "noble dream" of objective history would be 
always worth pursuing, and it could come nearer to realization through the use of 
rigorous methodological criteria. 
Recent debates on truth and objectivity 
(a) The debate on scientific objectivity 
The debate on objectivity in history has continued into the second-half of this century, 
at a time when even philosophers of natural science question the kind and possibility of 
objective knowledge held in scientific work, generally speaking. Popper (1980) argued 
for scientific objectivity in the sense that theories can be "intersubjectively tested, but 
not fully justifiable or verifiable" (p. 44). Popper presupposed that there is a world out 
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there and that we can have an epistemic access to reality; he and Hempel recognised, 
however, for different reasons already discussed, that a scientific explanation cannot be 
considered as the absolute truth since it cannot achieve certainty. As Kuhn (1970) 
stated, Popper is "sceptical of efforts to produce any neutral observation language" 
(p. 267). Kuhn not only affirmed those traditionally shared criteria of objectivity (such 
as accuracy and consistency) within a scientific community, but also recognised the 
influence of subjective factors such as maxims, norms and values in the choice of a 
theory. Such arguments were developed in order to clarify the meaning of objectivity, 
not to argue for a limitation of it. The debate on the nature of scientific explanation 
gave rise to some relativist - sometimes strongly sceptical - approaches to scientific 
knowledge. Authors such as Feyerabend and Lakatos turned to the study of history of 
science to emphasise notions of change over time, thus assuming that there cannot be 
found any common foundations for science. 
(b) The debate on historical objectivity 
Parallel to the debate on scientific objectivity in the work of Popper and Hempel, a 
discussion related to history was undertaken by philosophers in the tradition of 
Collingwood. The notion of perspective in history has been illuminated from that 
approach: the idea of absolute impartiality in history was definitely rejected. According 
to that view, history only makes sense when we think from one certain point of view. 
As Walsh claimed (1967), if all points of view were taken away, nothing intelligible 
would be left. Walsh discussed objectivity by recognising two factors in historical 
conclusions: point of view (a subjective element) and the evidence which has to be 
accepted. He analysed the notion of point of view in its components, distinguishing 
four types of presuppositions leading to disagreement among historians: (1) personal 
bias, (2) group prejudice, (3) conflicting theories of historical interpretation, and (4) 
philosophical conflicts. While personal likes and dislikes (type 1) can and must be 
overcome by the historian at work, the other assumptions are matters of principle and 
not of prejudice, thus more difficult to detect. Those assumptions shared by groups like 
nation, race, class or religion (type 2) must be justified on rational grounds; 
disagreements about the relative importance of causes (type 3) can rely on conflicting 
philosophical principles (type 4), provided they are not due to mere partisanship and 
thus not empirically well-confirmed. The historian reads the past by necessarily using 
general judgements according to moral conceptions (type 4). It would be useful that 
historians become aware of their own moral preconceptions so that they could not be 
used naively; but asking historians to put them completely aside would be excessively 
sanguine. Thus, Walsh distinguished those personal assumptions to be considered as 
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genuine and accepted as such in an objective explanation from those leading to a biased 
conclusion. In order to get a valid history it is crucial to distinguish general 
presuppositions from propaganda: when the author relies upon personal emotions and 
interests, or practical concerns of an economic, political, or religious kind, she/he will 
tend to deliberately omit or distort that evidence working against her/his practical 
purposes. In such a position, only a disposition to search for evidence confirming what 
is previously expected will be found. 
Following a similar line of thought, some philosophers of history argued for objectivity 
in history, considering that it genuinely integrates the notion of perspective. Dray 
(1964a, 1980) developed the idea of value judgement as a necessary feature of 
historical enquiry. As Rubinoff (1991) pointed out concerning historical explanation: 
According to the Drayvian model, then, causes are not simply objective facts waiting to be 
discovered, such that once discovered they remained unchanged, for all time and eternity in 
that museum of antiquity called history. They are rather as much the products as the 
presuppositions of historical judgement or interpretation, whose construction is guided 
primarily by a value judgement concerning the locus of responsibility (as in the case of the 
historiography of the American Civil War) or some set of quasi-values comprising what might 
be called the historian's "point of view". (pp. 5-6) 
Such objective relativism, as Rubinoff called it, presupposes that there is an epistemic 
access to reality through inferential reasoning upon evidence. As history aims to 
reconstruct a reality which is itself value-laden, it applies a value-judgement in order to 
refer to the past "as it actually was" (Dray, 1980, p. 46). In 1991, Dray viewed 
Collingwood and himself under a perspectivist approach, recognising the existence of 
several points of view and mutual understanding among each other, contrasted with a 
convergence point of view defended by Rubinoff (1991).2 
Thus, the role of historian's presuppositions has been more or less emphasised, 
according to relativist or objectivist views. The problem "To what extent does the 
historian's point of view affect historical validity?" remained open to debate until 
recently. 
2 In relation to this discussion, compare Rubinoff's Introduction and Dray's Comment, in Van der 
Dussen and Rubinoff (1991). 
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1. Sceptics such as Beard assumed that authors' presuppositions necessarily make 
historical conclusions non-objective. This is an approach viewing the concept of 
objectivity under the early-positivist paradigm. 
2. Perspectivists like Walsh and Dray called for objectivity accepting personal 
assumptions. Historical conclusions are not absolutely neutral - conflicting historical 
versions rely on different presuppositions, and within the same perspective only it is 
possible to judge an historical conclusion. 
3. Objectivists maintained the belief in objective history, including the notion of point 
of view as a source of principles for the historical enquiry and its conclusions. Genuine 
versions of the past are open to discussion and judgement under criteria of objectivity, 
integrating the idea of perspective, as other sciences do. Such a view was defended by 
authors such as Danto (1965) and Passmore (1966) (as discussed further.) 
As the approach to evidence affects the view taken about objectivity in history - for the 
non-sceptics, evidence is supposed to be the bridge linking the historian's conclusions 
to an independent reality, even if it implies an interpretative element - it is worthwhile 
examining this concept closer. 
(c) Ideas about evidence 
The notion of evidence related to the idea of mediate knowledge has provoked much 
controversy in the field of philosophy of history. Authors such as Beard, who equated 
scientific knowledge with direct observation, or Oakeshott, who treated evidence as 
something present, gave impetus to several discussions on the nature of evidence, under 
an objectivist-realist view. Danto (1965), like Passmore (1966) and Dray (1980) 
emphasised that evidence is precisely what gives access to the past. As Danto 
metaphorically argued, it cannot be seen like a curtain hiding the object of study but 
instead documents "are just what enable us to find about the past" (1965, p. 89). 
However, we cannot state something as evidence by using a temporally neutral 
language - it would permit us only to describe a document as a present object, without 
recognising it as evidence of some past. Only by means of historical experience (and 
this requires much knowledge) can we move to a stage of temporal perspective. This 
brings up again the problem of the interpretative element in evidence: when dealing 
with evidence historians do not look at it candidly as a blank mind. They have to apply 
a set of theoretical statements for recognising evidence: this recognition means 
establishing a relation between what we see as history-as-record, the documents, and 
history-as-actuality, which cannot be seen. According to Danto (ibid.), this relation 
cannot be established without an a priori theory regulating it. The Baconian paradigm 
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of drawing theories after collecting plain facts is no longer accepted. In historical work, 
we start by using a priori hypotheses grounded on theories for interpreting evidence. 
The notion of past facts replacing an early-positivist view of atomic, outside entities 
was already analysed by Walsh (1967). He assumed that nowadays historians reject the 
common-sense idea of fact as the given element which we must discover to build up 
theories on them. However, according to Walsh, followers of the correspondence 
theory are still inclined to contrast fact with theory: a theory will be a statement or 
judgement built upon hard facts. For him, such an assumption illustrates a conceptual 
confusion between propositions about the past, which we can consider as certain (e.g., 
"Vasco da Gama arrived in India in 1498"), and material evidence for the past (e.g., a 
diary of da Gama's trip). Facts necessarily have a propositional form and imply an 
interpretative element. If they equate with the truth, it will be only partially. Evidence 
also can provide different interpretations about the past. Authors aligning with the 
coherence theory claim that there is no distinction of principle between fact and theory. 
For them, facts are provisionally fixed as well as theories, in each branch of science 
and, much more in history, where criteria for reliability of the kind available in natural 
sciences cannot be strictly applied. Walsh noticed that such an assumption ignores the 
notion of memory knowledge, which is a fundamental basis for history. Like 
Collingwood, Walsh asserted that the remembered past does not exactly equate with 
what happened, and discussed memory knowledge in parallel to sense-perception: we 
cannot directly grasp the past as it was through memory, as much as we cannot grasp 
the present world through sense-perception. Combining notions inherent in both 
correspondence and coherence theories, Walsh concluded that historical facts entail a 
given element which cannot be isolated from the interpreting element. That given 
element relies on evidence, which is present but not arbitrary. Memory knowledge is 
what permits some access to the past by means of evidence. 
The notion of evidence implies a conceptual leap from the present, the observed object, 
to the non-observable past. Van der Dussen (1991) discussed Goldstein's position 
(1976) about the nature of relationship between evidence and the past. Goldstein 
claimed that such a relationship cannot be philosophically justified, therefore an 
epistemic gap exists. The historian cannot grasp the past through inference, since that 
would imply that each body of evidence entailed a specific conception of the past, "on 
the contrary, the historical occurrence is hypothesized in order to make sense of the 
evidence" (Goldstein, 1976, p. 127). Van der Dussen, based on Peirce's theory of 
abduction, made a distinction between inductive and hypothetical inference: while a 
conclusion is drawn from particulars through induction, causes are inferred from effects 
through an hypothesis. When historians try to relate evidence to a specific past, they are 
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practising abduction, a kind of hypothetical reasoning. However, this makes the 
relation between past statements and evidence a rather problematic one. According to 
van der Dussen (1991), 
it cannot provide proofs in the strictly logical sense: only provisional answers to certain 
questions can be given, with various degrees of plausibility (which may reach, though, a level 
of almost certainty). (p. 163) 
In the light of such arguments it might be said that philosophers of history in the 
tradition of Collingwood tend to see evidence as being permissive; historical 
conclusions can be selected from evidence only by means of plausibility. 
d) Postmodernism and human knowledge 
A recent perspective assuming sceptical or subjectivist views of the world can be found 
in the social and human fields of enquiry. A postmodernist approach tends to deny the 
possibility of epistemic access to the real world. The main assumptions of this general 
view, as summarized by Lemert (1992), are: 
1. Reality is discussible - not much more than this. 
2. Language is primary. 
3. Reality is figurative, available only within language. 
4. In language one can say any and everything, including the most general of things. 
5. One can never escape one's language, including all other general statements about things. 
6. All the above is an historical event more than an ideological position or a logical argument. 
7. Hence, post modernism is both the end of modernity and dependent upon modernity for its 
language. (pp. 23-4) 
A social theory of difference is assumed, deriving from a decentering view of the 
world. The idea of a general truth is denied - the world being composed of differences 
can only be understood from diverse perspectives. Each perspective is relative to a 
given cultural context, a given specific language, and only within its own framework 
can it be evaluated. As Lemert (1992) synthesized, French poststructuralists such as 
Foucault and Derrida, concerned about attitudes towards the Other, attacked general 
principles of subjectivity and the idea of centre versus periphery. These ideas of 
subjectivity and centre were thus deconstructed, explained in relation to their own 
specific contexts. History should be rethought in a decentering way . 
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Within such a deconstructionist framework, ideas of subjectivity and centre were 
replaced with the idea of discourse: language takes the place of truth; there are no final 
vocabularies, there are no essences. Terms are subject to change - the contingency of a 
world perceived through contingent languages is stressed. Irony is the postmodernist 
attitude facing this contingent world (Lemert, 1992). Ironists, as Rorty (1989) called 
them, are: 
never quite able to take themselves seriously because always aware that the terms in which they 
describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of the contingency and fragility of their 
final vocabularies, and thus of their selves. (pp. 73-4). 
It is under this paradigm that Jenkins (1991) has proposed to rethink - and to 
deconstruct - history at school. 
e) Critique of postmodernism 
Early deconstructionists like Foucault and Derrida expressed a humanistic concern 
about denouncing dogmatic, ethnocentric attitudes in relation to the Other, to the 
Different, in western culture. They have positively contributed - at least, at the level of 
the "politically correct" discourse - to combating eurocentric, nationalistic or sexist 
ideas. But such a deconstructionist-ironist attitude has also contributed to casting doubt 
on knowledge in diverse fields. Preoccupation with pursuing and improving the 
standard of explanations of the natural and the social world tends to be pushed into the 
shadows since all discourses are equally justified, let them be fiction, science or 
history. As Garfinkel (1981) argued, in connection with social theory, it is necessary to 
go beyond a "thorough-going relativism" and examine the explanatory frames of 
concrete explanations in order to assess their relative validity, on factual grounds 
(p. 156). 
A critical realism - or transcendental realism, as Bhaskar (1975) called it - has emerged 
from the intense debate undertaken between two different views, one defended by 
authors such as Feyerabend and Lakatos, emphasising the social condition of 
knowledge, and especially concerned with the history of science and its change over 
time, another represented by authors such as Scriven and Hesse, criticizing the formal 
scientific models and their roles, and stressing the stratification of science and the 
difference between explanation and prediction. Bhaskar assumed the need for making a 
synthesis of these two approaches under a realist view in such a way, 
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to show in particular why and how the realism presupposed by the first strand must be 
extended to cover the objects of scientific thought postulated by the second strand. (p. 9) 
Thus, critical realism is not a move back to early positivism. While dogmatic 
positivism entails an epistemic fallacy, taking statements about our knowledge of the 
real for statements about the real, Bhaskar claimed that knowledge is a social product 
and the objects about which knowledge is produced have an independent existence. 
Science has to be developed under two criteria: 
1. its capacity to sustain the idea of knowledge as a produced means of production; 
2. its capacity to sustain the idea of the independent existence and activity of the objects of 
scientific thought. (ibid., p. 17) 
With respect to the concept of explanation, Bhaskar asserted that the differentiation of 
the world entails its stratification: a necessary and an accidental sequence of events can 
be distinguished; the former means that when a certain event (E l) occurs, the 
production of another specific event (E2) is stimulated. Bhaskar rejected the Humean 
concept of causation as a conjunction of atomistic events; instead, he assumed the 
existence of generative mechanisms and structures as a basis for causal laws, that is, 
"existing tendencies of things to act in a certain way" (ibid., p. 56). Laws are concerned 
with independent tendencies of things, not with conjunctions of known events. The 
world is viewed as an open system in which different mechanisms operate, as opposed 
to a closed system of science whose aim is to create a constant conjunction of events, 
under experimental conditions. 
Critical realism has been considered by defenders of objective standards of knowledge 
as a relevant ground for building up more fruitful analyses of various fields of enquiry, 
rather than the deconstructionist approach. In accordance with this approach, new 
trends in the analysis of historical objectivity have developed. 
New trends in thinking about historical objectivity 
Reactions to scepticism and relativism have arisen in the field of history, grounded on a 
realist-objectivist approach. The latter involves (a) a critical realism presupposing an 
epistemic access to reality without denying a social production of knowledge; and (b) a 
critical objectivism which recognises specific standards for historical interpretation and 
explanation validated by the scientific community. Such a view has stimulated 
discussion on criteria of justification and evaluation in historical enquiry. With this 
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aim, McCullagh (1984) and Martin (1989) have turned the debate on historical 
explanation towards the critical analysis of concrete historical pieces of research. This 
tendency, which has already emerged in the work of authors such as Dray, Gardiner 
and Atkinson, is gaining now more attention. 
McCullagh (1984) recognised that the general aim for historical work is to describe the 
past, "though in fact it may not do so, or not do so accurately" (p. 1). Thus, consciously 
avoiding the analysis of questions of truth about the past, he prescribed some general 
assumptions: 
1. The existence of a world independent from our beliefs about it. 
2. A reality accurately perceived under certain conditions. 
3. A reality structured according to the concepts we use to describe it. 
4. Reliable rules of inference to get truth about reality. 
McCullagh stated that those assumptions are commonly shared by historians, who are 
especially committed to (a) accuracy of observations of evidence, and (b) adequacy of 
inferences. For the same reason, historians reject those descriptions not sufficiently 
grounded on evidence. It is not enough to get a coherent description - otherwise it could 
not be distinguished from fiction or propaganda - it must be supported by some 
evidence and not contradicted by other. This is a distinctive feature of history: novelists 
look for coherence and go beyond what evidence permits them to assert; propagandists 
produce a misleading portrait of reality, omitting or denying evidence in order to 
pursue some practical ends. Such types of accounts are more readily open to 
falsification when available evidence is exhibited. For McCullagh, a commitment to 
truth is thus a genuine attitude of historians: 
In practice, then, historians do try to discover the truth about the past [...] 
Historians commonly believe that their well-supported descriptions of the past are true, but can 
such faith be rationally justified? (p. 3) 
As McCullagh claimed (ibid.), we can get the truth only if high standards of historical 
justification are followed. However, he recognised that some problems arise concerning 
the nature of evidence: it can give room for different conclusions, thus there is always 
the possibility of a conclusion not being necessarily true. Moreover, the premises of 
historical inference being fallible, conclusions can be fallible too. The same happens 
with implicit generalizations, which cannot be proved. Inductive inferences, which are 
the most common pattern of reasoning in history, imply that even if premises are true 
they do not necessarily entail a true conclusion. Such constraints on historical truth led 
McCullagh to consider that historical conclusions can often be proved probably true, 
given empiricist assumptions. He was aware of the historicity of scientific and 
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historical standards: he grounded his criteria on Popper's proposal of scientific 
demarcation (criteria of falsifiability and corroboration) and on Collingwood's account 
of the history of history (the critical use of evidence by historians today). Yet following 
Popper, McCullagh stated several conditions to be held in order to prefer a singular 
description - a hypothesis - to others: 
1. Evidential consistency (it must be grounded on observation statements) 
2. Greater scope (it must imply more variety of observation statements) 
3. Greater explanatory power (it must make the observation statements more probable 
than any others) 
4. Plausibility (it must be more consistent with other accepted hypotheses) 
5. Less ad hocness (it must contain fewer new suppositions) 
6. Non disconfirmation (it must be not denied by observable statements) 
McCullagh added two criteria more (as Popper did) to those stated above: simplicity 
and a higher degree of falsifiability, the former being related to less ad hocness and the 
latter implying greater scope and power (and sometimes greater simplicity too). Thus, 
broad hypotheses are simple and of a large scope, being narrowed when some 
falsifications are introduced. When hypotheses are confirmed under various conditions 
and not refuted, they can be credible, as Mc Cullagh stated: 
Historians, therefore, prefer hypotheses which imply the very probable existence of more 
available evidence which will either confirm or disconfirm them than is implied by any 
competing hypotheses; but they do not prefer hypotheses which present a long ad hoc story 
accounting for a few observations, such that although the story could conceivably be confirmed 
or disconfirmed by a large number of observation statements, in fact the number of actual 
observations it implies is very small. (ibid., p. 20) 
McCullagh seems to rely on evidential consistency as the basic condition for a simple 
hypothesis (historical description) to be true. Explanatory scope and power is not 
enough for a hypothesis be accepted as true; ad hocness and implausibility does not 
imply that a hypothesis must be false; but, implausibility and disconfirmation give 
grounds to consider it as false. Once more, these arguments show McCullagh's concern 
about evidential confirmation and non-refutation. McCullagh criticised Feyerabend's 
statement about the impossibility of comparing different explanatory theories, if based 
on different observation statements. Against such an argument, he claimed that most 
historical hypotheses are based on the same view of the world and thus they can be 
comparable. McCullagh also replied to conservative conventionalism, defended by 
Lakatos. Hypotheses being more or less approximate to truth, there is no room for 
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preferring well-confirmed, non-refuted hypotheses in terms of truth. Reacting to this 
relativist view, McCullagh claimed that the criteria formerly stated are used to justify 
faith in the truth of a particular conclusion as the best explanation available. That does 
not mean, he stated, contrary to what was asserted by Lakatos, that standing hypotheses 
should be held when new discoveries show another incompatible and superior 
explanation. So far as causal explanation is concerned, McCullagh considered that, 
according to Humean assumptions, historical descriptions can be true or false, but 
interpretations and explanations are only more or less adequate. Arguing for the best 
explanation, McCullagh based his discussion on Popper's arguments about hypothesis 
formation and deduction of testable consequences. When two hypotheses are 
unfalsified, the better will be that with greater scope, but most open to falsification 
(p. 18). 
Martin (1989) also emphasised the need for a more fruitful focus on historical analysis 
oriented towards a critical examination of criteria for justifying actual historical 
explanations. In order to pursue such an aim, Martin raised two questions about the 
logic of explanatory controversy: (a) "How do historians attempt to show that one 
weighted explanation is better than competing weighted explanations?", and (b) "How 
should they attempt to show this?" (p. 54). Accordingly, Martin analysed: (1) Kinds of 
arguments adduced as justification for competing explanations, and (2) the manner in 
which historians assign relative importance to causes of particular occurrences. 
Concerning (1), kinds of arguments adduced as justification for competing 
explanations, Martin discussed different explanations of a concrete issue (the collapse 
of Maya civilization) and found three kinds of arguments about the explanans. These 
arguments can be directed to (a) the truth of the facts entailed in the explanans; (b) the 
explanatory relevance of the explanans; or (c) the sufficiency of the explanans. Each of 
these three kinds of arguments can have a positive and negative pole - positive 
arguments will increase the likelihood and negative arguments will decrease the 
likelihood of a given explanation. Martin found that both positive and negative 
arguments related to (a), the truth of the explanans, are often present as justification of 
the favoured explanation by means of exhibiting some data to support it and some data 
against the other competing ones. Arguments of this kind are thus summed up to show 
that the favoured explanation is either more consistent with data available than others, 
or more plausible than others when grounded on some specific set of evidence. Martin 
clearly emphasised evidential consistency (i.e., confirmation and non-refutation) and 
plausibility (as referred to a higher degree of probability of the occurrence happening) 
as criteria for justifying and assessing explanatory adequacy. Affirmative arguments 
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showing (b), the explanatory relevance of a given partial explanation, are presented by 
recourse to a comparison-situation. Positive arguments of this kind are not frequent and 
negative ones are almost non-existent. Such arguments entail a concern for logical 
consistency (internal logic and plausibility). Usually, Martin asserted, they are assumed 
more than expressed. They only explicitly appear when the explanans is not of a 
familiar type or when controversy about such factors exists. As an example of this, 
Martin examined Sanders' partial explanation of Maya collapse due to subsistence 
failure, by comparing it to what happened in Africa and Indonesia - thus giving support 
to a tendency for population to move from forest to grass as a consequence of the 
pressures of agricultural needs. Concerning arguments on (c), the sufficiency of the 
explanans, Martin found some negative and none positive, which means that historians 
do not attempt to produce sufficient explanation. Negative arguments of this kind, 
when they exist, play a role against the sufficiency of a non-favoured explanation, in 
order to give room to a more relevant explanans. Such negative arguments can be 
presented in terms of showing the implausibility of a given explanans as being 
sufficient to the explanandum or as contradicting evidence. On these grounds for 
justification, which historical explanation can be considered better than others? 
Summing up the discussion so far, Martin stressed that competing explanations must be 
justified not only by support of evidence but also by a critical interpretation of its logic 
and plausibility. 
Concerning (2), the manner in which historians assign relative importance to causes of 
particular occurrences, Martin discussed whether causal weighting is based on 
objective or subjective criteria. He criticised Dray's and M. White's positions when they 
asserted a value-judgement as the ultimate criterion for selecting the relevant factors for 
an explanation. Martin argued for an objective, factual criterion of distinguishing 
causes from conditions, by means of a comparison-situation. Relying on studies by 
Hart and Honoré, M. White and Scriven, he proposed that a situation under scrutiny 
should be compared with another one in which the same conditions are present but the 
effect is different. The factor absent in that comparison-situation will be considered as 
the relevant cause or, at least, as a partial cause. The relevant cause is often constituted 
by a conjunction of factors, not a single factor - here, again, it is possible to rank those 
relevant factors in terms of relative importance to the occurrence. This "is a purely 
factual matter ..., explanations in terms of 'the cause' are relative, but not subjective" 
(Martin, ibid., p. 60). What matters is that it is always possible to distinguish causes 
from conditions on factual grounds by formulating an appropriate explanatory question. 
If an explanatory question is selected according to a specific value-laden framework, 
that is characteristic of all enquiries, not of historical enquiry only. 
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Ideas of provisional historical explanation as a working hypothesis 
This study assumes that, nowadays, explanations are given and accepted as provisional 
answers to an historical question. That assumption does not entail that explanations 
cannot be discussed and assessed: historians usually apply some specific criteria to 
justify their own, or preferred, explanations against other competing ones. Such 
standards can be used to discriminate between an historical explanation produced under 
commitments of a detached perspective as opposed to a propagandist explanation 
produced under practical interests, or they can be used to assess the adequacy, scope 
and power of competing explanations. These criteria for determining the degree of 
acceptability of an explanation can be systematised as referring to principles of 
consistency in its various forms. 
The notion of consistency is ambiguous: it may refer to internal coherence within the 
account, or to the plausibility of the relative causal weighting, or to the probability of 
the historical situation, or to evidential confirmation and non-refutation, to apply the 
Popperian logic of theory assessment. Although notions of consistency with evidence 
and logical consistency may be seen as interrelated, a discrimination between some of 
the different notions involved is useful for purposes of empirical analysis.3 Therefore, 
the operational concept applied in this study discriminates: 
1. Evidential consistency , concerning the extent to which an explanation is accepted in 
the light of - or as consistent with - 'the' evidence, through confirmation and non-
refutation. 
2. Logical consistency in terms of internal and external consistency: internal 
consistency or coherence, concerning the extent to which an explanation does not 
contain internal contradictions, and external consistency or plausibility, concerning the 
extent to which an explanation is consistent with knowledge of real or imagined events 
in the real world.4 
3Kosso (1993), for example, argued for an interrelationship between evidential and logical consistency in 
so far as justification of historical knowledge is concerned: "it is misleading to force a choice between 
justification as based on a kind of coherence or an appeal to evidence ... because an appeal to historical 
evidence is itself an appeal to coherence" Thus, in the same article, he used that word with a focus on 
corroborated evidence: "the degree that ... accounts are consistent and of explanatory relevance to each 
other" (p. 3), or as related to internal logic: "Descriptions of the physically impossible or the logically 
inconsistent ...cannot be accurate" (p. 5). 
4This operational discrimination was also inspired by Pennington and Hastie (1992). Principles of 
acceptability and confidence are applied to story construction implying causal reasoning. Two certainty 
principles were picked out: 1) coverage, "the extent to which the story accounts for evidence presented at 
the trial" and 2) coherence, with three components: consistency, "the extent to which the story does not 
contain internal contradictions", completeness, "the extent to which a story has all its parts", and 
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Concepts of scope and power may be related to ideas about the relative consistency (in 
terms of evidence and logic) of competing explanations. An explanation of a greater 
scope and power, involving a wider range and depth of questions which can be 
answered in the light of existing evidence might bring out new and fruitful perspectives 
on an historical issue.5 In relation to evidential consistency, not only can we try to 
"demonstrate" that a favoured explanation is well-supported, and not yet refuted by 
evidence, but we can also argue for the greater scope of that explanation due to its 
consistency with a greater variety of corroborating evidence. In relation to logical 
consistency, we can assess a favoured explanation as coherent and plausible, but we 
can also argue for a greater logical power of that explanation because (a) it is of a 
greater scope, and (b) the causes emphasised appear more probably to make the 
explanandum happen.6 It must be noticed that notions of evidential and logical 
consistency are interlocked with factorial weighting. Arguments for and against 
competing explanations in the light of criteria of evidential and logical consistency 
(thus, at an epistemological level) imply a discussion about the relative causal 
weighting in those explanations (thus, at a substantive level). 
The notion of a complete explanation can also be tied to explanatory power and scope.? 
When an explanation entails an idea of logical adequacy, the most powerful can be seen 
as a complete explanation. When that explanation entails an idea of consistency with a 
greater variety of evidence (suggesting a larger explanatory scope), it may be seen as 
relatively more complete, although in this sense a genuine incompleteness must be 
recognised. 
plausibility, "the extent to which the story is consistent with knowledge of real or imagined events in the 
real world" (pp. 189-206). 
5 Concepts of explanatory scope and power are often mentioned in philosophical analysis with a loose 
meaning. Those concepts were used by McCullagh in a more precise way but mainly applied to the 
assessment of singular historical descriptions. See in this chapter pp. 76-7. 
6 These two assumptions (a, b) entail two different views about explanatory assessment. McCullagh 
defended that explanatory adequacy can be assessed in terms of logically comparing their relative scope, 
only. Martin claimed that there are factual grounds for explanatory assessment: this is done by recourse 
to a comparison-situation which can show how a given explanans made the explanandum occur. Both 
approaches are kept in the framework for the empirical analysis. 
7Followers of the D-N model defend that historical explanation is always logically incomplete. Followers 
of the rational model assert that historical explanations can be complete in terms of being logically 
satisfactory. 
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Ideas examined above entail the assumption that there are methodological criteria to 
assess objectivity in historical explanation. Objectivity does not mean absolute 
neutrality, in the sense attributed by early positivists. The assumption of absolute 
neutrality in producing any branch of knowledge has been challenged today by 
different philosophical approaches discussing ideas concerning the social production of 
knowledge. These ideas entail the recognition of perspective. A recent relativist view, 
postmodernism, emphasises the context and contingency of knowledge, while 
objectivists claim that it is possible to find some methodological standards inter-
subjectively shared, like those analysed above. The notion of methodological 
detachment - or perspectiveful neutrality - is nowadays distinct from that of 
perspectiveless neutrality, the former entailing the recognition of perspective as a 
genuine feature of human knowledge. Whether it is possible to find a consensual 
perspective about an issue, as Rubinoff claimed, or different perspectives necessarily 
remain, as Dray counter-argued (see p. 69), it is a still an unresolved matter. 
Concerning the possibility of an epistemic access to reality, relativists tend to assume a 
sceptical attitude about it while objectivists tend to assume a realist position 
presupposing that the real world can be known in some way. Synthesizing these views: 
- A position of doubt about the possibility of historical knowledge associated with 
notions of absolute neutrality (in the sense of perspectiveless neutrality) tends to lead to 
a subjectivist approach. 
- A realist position about historical knowledge associated with notions of 
perspectiveless neutrality tends to lead to resembling that of a positivist approach. 
- A position of doubt about historical knowledge associated with notions of perspective 
tends to lead to a relativist approach, knowledge being viewed as always contingent, 
relative to a specific context. 
- A realist position about historical knowledge associated with notions of perspectiveful 
neutrality (contrasted with perspectiveless neutrality) tends to lead to an objectivist 
approach or, critical realism. This view presents several nuances: historical 
explanations can be seen as partially true, proximate to truth or probable.8  
8 These nuances apply to theories of knowledge developed by critical realists such as Bhaskar and 1-larre 
or logical positivists such as Popper and Hempel, and to philosophical approaches to history defended by 
structurists such as Lloyd and objectivists such as Martin. 
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The conceptualization discussed in this chapter constituted the main theoretical 
framework for the analysis of students' ideas about provisional historical explanation. 
Such a framework must be seen as a working hypothesis about the idea of provisional 
historical explanation. It intended to clarify those features related to questions of 
objectivity in the working definition of historical explanation given in the previous 
chapter, which is: 
Historical explanation is supposed here to be an answer to a why-type question about past 
human actions, events, and states of affairs. It may include questions of a how-possible type. 
Each explanation presupposes a selection of factors - reasons, motives, dispositions, external 
conditions, structural, conjunctural conditions, along the lines of the different explanatory 
models. Each author may assign a different relative importance to factors selected and, among a 
range of factors (the standing conditions), some might be considered necessary or mere 
contributory/facilitating conditions to the explanandum. Conditions which make the difference 
to whether a situation occurred or not may be considered as the cause. 
Therefore, when assessing the relative scope and power of competing explanations, the 
following constructs related to explanatory consistency, such as discussed above, will 
be analysed: 
1. Evidential consistency 
2. Logical consistency (coherence and plausibility) 
Ideas about objectivity in historical knowledge will be analysed in terms of 
methodological detachment and access to truth. 
Assessing competing explanations to an historical question 
In the previous chapter, three explanations were given concerning the question: "How 
could the Portuguese (from such a small and far away country) manage to establish a 
maritime empire in the Indian Ocean?". Those explanations were discussed in the light 
of possible explanatory modes underlying each of them (see chapter 2, pp. 56-61). The 
same explanations will be here compared in terms of argumentation about competing 
explanations. 
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Comparing different explanations 
The first version, written by Matoso (1946) for nationalistic purposes, was considered 
as a piece of propaganda more than as an historical answer. In order to exaggerate the 
excellence of the Portuguese people and their leaders' dispositions, it omitted a set of 
factual evidence - such as naval equipment or the naval correlation - which played an 
important role in the establishment of the Portuguese empire in the Indian Ocean, 
according to many other versions. For those reasons, even without considering overt 
expressions of nationalistic exhortation, that explanation cannot be seen as a credible 
historical explanation. It might be considered as an ad hoc explanation since it does not 
take into account some relevant factors consistent with evidence (such as those cited 
above) and leading to a more plausible explanation. 
The other two explanations, namely one written by Marques, and the other written by 
Pacey, might present more powerful answers to the formulated question, as more 
consistent with evidence and as more plausible. 
Analysis of two competing explanations 
Setting aside a non-objective explanation, the version of A. Matoso, the other two can 
be seen as valid competing historical explanations. They stated the following 
conditions: 
Marques' explanation: 	 Pacey's explanation: 
. economic, political, religious situation 	 . naval expertise 
. trade purposes 	 . plan of discovery 
. religious purposes 	 . slow pace of journeys 
. naval expertise 	 . trade purposes 
. plan of discovery 	 . help of Arab pilots 
. information gathering 
	
. Moslem naval inefficiency 
. help of Arab pilots 	 . Chinese withdrawal 
. Moslem naval inefficiency 
Both explanations presented a known list of factors since the work of Godinho (1962) 
and Braudel (1985), who emphasised structural conditions leading to a systematic 
planning of explorations, against the traditional view of Portuguese expansion as 
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adventurous explorations from a small and poor country. Explanations given by 
Marques and Pacey presented some factors in common, namely: 
. naval expertise 	 . trade purposes 
. plan of discovery 
	
. help of Arab pilots 
. Moslem naval inefficiency 
Factors common to both explanations are however given a different causal weighting in 
each. For Marques, conjunctural conditions such as naval planning are intertwined in 
structural conditions (political, economic, religious situation) embedding specific 
purposes and naval expertise; this whole set of conditions (C1) seems to have more 
weight than the contingent help of Arab pilots (C2) or even Moslem naval inefficiency 
(C3). Thus, the former set (long run conditions) seems to work as the most relevant, 
necessary causes to the whole situation, and the latter explicitly appears as merely 
facilitating conditions to the specific occurrence (E). A diagram of Marques' 
explanation might be designed along the lines shown in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1 A diagram of Marques' explanation 
Cl Economic, social, religious situation in Portugal 
Cla Plan of discovery/information gathering 
Clb Naval expertise 
Clc Trade/religious purposes 
C2 Help of Arab pilots 
C3 Moslem naval inefficiency 
E Portuguese empire 
According to this scheme, structure Ci conditioning Cia, Clb and Cic made E occur 
with contribution of C2 and C3. This factorial weight appears to assume a mere addition 
of contributory factors to the necessary conditions without implying counterfactual 
reasoning.9. Nonetheless, it can be challenged by the following counterfactual 
argument implicit in the quoted passage: what would have happened if the Moslems 
(Turks and Egyptians including) turned their power to the Indian Ocean? 
9 See McClelland's argument on this type of causal weight, p. 43. 
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For Pacey, factors seen as relevant conditions in the former explanation (naval 
expertise, trade purposes) assume a minor weight in order to give room to another 
hypothesis, seen as the most probable relevant cause: the Chinese fleet's withdrawal. 
Such an explanation can be illustrated by the diagram in Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2 A diagram of Pacey's explanation 
Cl Plan of discovery/slow pace of journeys 
C2 Naval expertise 
C3 Trade purposes 
C4 Chinese withdrawal 
C5 Moslem naval inefficiency 
C6 Help of Arab pilots 
    
    
    
    
   
E Portuguese empire 
In this conceptual framework, C1 combined with C2 C3 and, especially C4, caused E, 
with contribution of C5 and C6. C4 entails a counterfactual argument which can be 
stated as follows: if C4 did not occur something could probably happen preventing the 
occurrence of E. It is this factor - the Chinese withdrawal - which makes the difference 
between the two explanations. To what extent can this speculative factor be considered 
relevant? Such a question can be analysed by recourse to a comparison-situation, as 
was suggested by Hart and Honore, Scriven, M. White and Martin. It could be argued 
like this: 
1. The Portuguese arrived in India and succeeded in controlling the Indian Ocean by 
means of different kinds of actions - diplomacy, followed by aggression and 
expansion.10 As Arab ships were poorly equipped for warfare, and Turkish interests 
relied on Mediterranean and European countries, it was relatively easy for the 
Portuguese fleet - a well-equipped fleet and with an experienced crew - to dominate the 
other naval forces in the Indian Ocean. 
2. There is evidence that Chinese fleets, composed of much larger ships than the 
Portuguese and well-armed with guns (but not cannons) and soldiers, had stayed in the 
10 For evidence about the Portuguese arrival in China, see for example, Boxer (1969). 
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Indian Ocean, at least for trade and scientific explorations.11 Before the Portuguese 
arrived in India the Chinese had withdrawn, thus allowing them a maritime control in 
that area. If the Chinese were there, other possibilities could occur: we can compare it, 
for example, with a similar real situation, when the Portuguese arrived in China, thirty 
years after their arrival in India, as is confirmed by consistent evidence. Boxer (1969), 
for example, pointed out: 
Where they tried to apply in the South China Sea the strong-arm methods which had served so 
well in the Indian Ocean, they were decisively defeated by the Chinese coast-guard fleets in 
1521 and 1522. Though they subsequently gained admission to the coveted China trade, it was 
on the terms laid down by the Chinese authorities and not on those imposed by themselves. 
(p. 49) 
The evidence confirms that the Portuguese looked at China as a sovereign country, and 
after a first moment of troubled relations, the two people negotiated peacefully with 
each other, the Portuguese obtaining a license to establish a commercial factory in 
Macao, in 1557. Grounded on that comparison - or contrast of actions - it can be said 
that the Portuguese got different trade conditions in India and in China. We might thus 
hypothesize that, if the Chinese junks were still in the Indian Ocean at the end of 
fifteenth century, it is plausible that Portuguese expectations for controlling the spice 
trade would probably be cancelled, giving room perhaps for more peaceful 
relationships and fair trade in the Indian Ocean. 
Arguments for the assessment of competing explanations 
In order to decide which explanation - that of Marques or that of Pacey - is the best, we 
can compare them in the light of the conceptual framework presented by McCullagh 
(see p. 76). 
1. Both explanations are consistent with non-refuted evidence, but Pacey's explanation 
gives more variety of evidence bearing upon the corresponding hypothesis. Pacey went 
further than Marques in stating a range of factors (he added the Chinese factor). That 
factor can contribute to explain why Portuguese control in the East stopped where it 
met China (which can be seen as a comparison-situation). Therefore, it might give a 
wider scope to that explanation. 
11  See evidence about Chinese explorations in Needham et al. (1971). 
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2. Both explanations are plausible, since the empire had to be built within a favouring 
political, cultural and technological structure (suggested by Marques), and it might be 
only made possible thanks to a chance factor - the Chinese withdrawal (according to 
Pacey). So far as explanatory power is concerned, Pacey gave emphasis to a 
counterfactual speculation, which may be rejected by some authors as not representing 
a "real" cause. Marques stressed long-term conditions, but those can be considered as 
the relevant standing conditions to the whole process of Discovery and Expansion, and 
not specifically as a direct explanation of the Portuguese control of the Indian Ocean. 
Pacey's speculative factor might be seen as probably relevant to the occurrence of the 
Portuguese control of the Indian Ocean, given the standing conditions. If the Chinese 
were still in the Indian Ocean by end of the fifteenth century, as the Portuguese 
progressed carefully in their maritime explorations and gathered information about 
India, it is plausible that such an hypothetical situation might have completely changed 
world history. The Chinese withdrawal, together with the other necessary conditions, 
might be considered as a more complete explanation of the Portuguese control of the 
Indian Ocean. 
Summary 
Ideas of provisionality in historical explanation constitute the main theoretical 
assumption for the analysis of students' ideas. This chapter examined those ideas 
through a philosophical approach. It presented (a) a brief summary of views defended 
by authors such as Hempel, Popper, Dray and Lloyd, representing several approaches 
to the concept of historical explanation, and (b) a broad survey of debates about 
objectivity and access to truth, in history and in theory of knowledge (the examination 
of new trends about objectivity in historical explanation, represented by authors such as 
McCullagh and Martin, who mainly inspired the framework for the analysis of 
students' ideas, completed the theoretical survey). According to this framework, (c) 
ideas of provisional historical explanation were given as a working hypothesis, and (d) 
two concrete explanations employed in the empirical study were analysed. 
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4 First explorations of students' ideas about provisional historical 
explanation 
An exploratory study was designed in order to provide the first empirical grounds for 
the progressive building of a categorization for pupils' constructs about provisional 
historical explanation (PHE). Specifically, it was intended to generate some indicators 
of ideas related to the provisionality of historical knowledge on the basis of an a priori 
model treated as a working hypothesis. It must be emphasised that, at this stage of the 
work, the concept of historical explanation was not yet fully defined. Therefore, the 
ideas initially explored were mainly related to provisionality in historical interpretation. 
This chapter describes the research design of these first explorations setting out (a) the 
working hypothesis, (b) early decisions on population and sampling, research 
techniques, instruments and procedures for administration, (c) data analysis of these 
first explorations to highlight some ideas in order to build a model of students' ideas 
about PHE, and (d) a brief discussion of the emerging model as a working hypothesis, 
and of the limitations of this first analysis. 
A working hypothesis: a model of students' ideas 
Taking into account some trends (a) from previous research on children's ideas about 
history, and (b) from work in philosophy of history, a categorization of adolescents' 
ideas about PHE was initially drawn up. Three conceptual levels of ideas about the 
provisional nature of historical explanation were generated in advance as an a priori 
model. Figure 4.1 shows this first model of students' ideas about PHE. 
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Figure 4.1 A priori model of students' ideas about PHE 
Level 1 
Students consider given or constructed explanations as true when they are based on reliable 
evidence. They tend to see historians as apprehending past reality by keeping their 
presuppositions totally separate from their history. Propaganda in explanations can be 
detected. 
Level 2 
Students consider that historical explanations vary according to the different criteria that 
historians use to give meaning to past situations. A balanced explanation, their own 
explanations included, is seen as the explanation if based upon examination of different or 
opposing versions. 
Level 3 
Category 1: Students recognise that several explanations can coexist with regard to whatever 
past situations might be selected for study. Explanations - those constructed by themselves 
included - are perceived as relative to a specific authorship. Specific criteria used in history 
are also recognised. 
Category 2: Students recognise that historical explanations are provisional, understanding 
them as a reconstruction of the past that integrates the historian's point of view. They can 
attribute a given context, in time, place and culture, to that point of view. They can also 
discuss an explanation in the light of procedures used in history. 
This early working hypothesis was progressively reformulated on the basis of the 
empirical data and gave rise to the revised model presented in chapter 7.1  
Population and sampling 
The first step in sampling was to define the population from whom information was to 
be collected. Within a universe of adolescents attending secondary school, the ages of 
14 and 16 years were the first boundaries established for the target population. 
However, drawing a sample based simply on an age criterion would have brought about 
serious difficulties for this study since Portuguese classrooms are organized by year 
grade (from 1st to 12th grade) and not by age. The target population was then defined 
1  The model of students' ideas about PHE, functioning as the main working hypothesis in this study, was 
reformulated through the analysis of data from the main study, which encompassed the pilot studies (see 
chapter 6) and the final study (see chapter 8). 
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so as to permit appropriate access to the sample without provoking serious 
methodological difficulties. 
Criteria for defining the target population 
Bearing in mind the concerns mentioned above, the target population was defined as 
those adolescents attending the last academic year of compulsory education (9th-
graders, with ages ranging between 14 and 17 years old). Such a decision was made not 
only for practical reasons (it would be easier to get access to the sample using class as a 
criterion) but also as a consequence of concerns about controlling the historical 
background of subjects (the same grade implies the same taught content, since a 
compulsory national curriculum has always existed in Portugal). Moreover, the early 
intention was to get an overall picture about the ideas of students who were coming to 
the end of their compulsory schooling. 
Thus at this early stage of work, the target population was defined as the 14 -17 year-
old 9th-graders (N= approximately 800) attending 12 secondary schools in which the 
in-service teacher training is carried out by the University of Minho.2 
Sampling decisions 
From the target population defined above a sample was drawn up taking into account 
some basic sampling criteria. The exploratory study was carried out through two 
phases: a first phase in two secondary schools - one located in Famalicao, an industrial 
(mainly textiles) town; the other located in Braga, the commercial and cultural centre of 
Minho; a second phase, in three secondary schools - in Famalicao and in Braga, again, 
but with other subjects, and in Vila Verde, a rural-centre town. It was assumed that 
subjects would thus be representative of different cultural origins (rural, industrial and 
urban settings, with heterogeneous social status). 
In this early stage, the sample was not yet randomly selected: subjects were volunteer 
participants in the study. Within each school, groups of three students were formed. 
Decisions made about such a design were inspired by Ashby and Lee (1987) taking into 
2 The decision to limit the population to students from schools linked to the University of Minho was due 
to concerns about achieving a representative sample. The intent was to control for some previous 
experience in teaching methods and approaches. This in-service teacher training is addressed to university 
students in their 5th year of graduation in the Teaching of History and Social Sciences. 
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account the potential for stimulating discussion within groups of three students. Thirty-
six subjects were involved in these first explorations, which employed the following 
design: 
First exploratory study: 3 students x 3 groups x 2 schools (N=18) 
Second exploratory study: 3 students x 2 groups x 3 schools (N=18) 
Research techniques 
In order to pursue the intended goals, research techniques had to take into account the 
following: 
(a) the characteristics of the specific population: their experiences within Portuguese 
society, school and their history classes; 
(b) previous research on adolescent thinking about historical concepts carried out in 
different cultural and school settings (see chapter 1). 
It was considered that the enquiry model might foster student thinking in terms of the 
second-order concepts to be explored, according to what is suggested by previous 
research. However, since this kind of reasoning is not usually developed through 
history class work in Portuguese schools, it was hypothesized that such a mode of 
thinking might not be spontaneously apparent in a non-led discussion context. Thus, a 
two-step sequence of work was designed. In the first step, each group would experience 
historical method through the construction of one or more explanations using several 
sources about an issue; in the second step, each group would be interviewed about ideas 
related to what they had previously experienced. 
The technique selected was a combination of (a) videotaped groupwork without 
external interference, suggested by the work of Dickinson and Lee in "Making Sense of 
History" (1984) for the introductory phase of work, followed by (b) an interview with 
each group proposing reflection on the initial non-led discussion and intending to 
provoke students' thinking about the provisional nature of explanation. The latter was 
broadly inspired by the phenomenological interview used by Shemilt (1987). It aimed 
to confront students with the limits of their own reasoning but presupposed that 
sometimes a few clues to assess consistency of ideas could be given by the interviewer. 
In addition, the interview should take place employing a familiar style, as a friendly 
teacher-student conversation so that students could feel themselves free to speak. Such 
a decision derived from the assumption that (a) students would have to cope with an 
unfamiliar field of discussion and interviewer, and that (b) the main focus for these 
explorations was to list the main notions constructed by students, and the possible 
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levels in their conceptualization. 
Instruments 
Designing the instruments to be applied involved decisions on: (a) which historical 
material would be appropriate within the context described above, and (b) which 
leading questions to create for discussion and interviewing. 
The historical content 
It was intended to select historical issues which might appear both challenging and 
familiar to the subjects. A first look over the ninth-grade history curriculum (as the 
sample was drawn up from 9th-graders) showed a focus on such contemporary issues 
like the two World Wars, the Depression, Post-World War II in Europe, the EEC. Units 
selected for the exploratory studies took the taught curriculum into account. 
(a) The first content unit 
It was decided to design a first unit that would be sufficiently familiar to students, but 
not taught in school, about a contemporary issue. As the Gulf War was about to take 
place, it was an issue frequently discussed by the media at that time. So, a problem 
relating the Gulf War to the Israeli-Arab conflict was launched for discussion. A set of 
materials on the Israeli - Arab conflict was organized. It was assumed that students 
would be motivated by discussing an issue closely related to present conflicts. 
However, some difficulties were found in organizing a simultaneously meaningful and 
simple set of data intended to be a first systematic approach to be tackled by students. 
The historical kit was supposed to provide different sources simultaneously 
(primary/secondary, written/visual) as a diversified basis for students construing their 
own explanations, and different explanatory versions (Western, Palestinian and Jewish) 
in order to assess the relative value of each explanation (see Appendix A). 
Students' reactions to this material were observed through videotaping. Such 
observations suggested that the need for varied material had led to the organization of 
too long a kit. A tendency to concentrate attention on graphic (maps) and schematic 
information (such as chronology) was apparent. The Brazilian account appeared to be 
read in full; other written materials seemed to be rapidly scanned. These conclusions 
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were taken into account when planning another unit for the second exploratory study. 
(b) The second content unit 
Since the former unit is not included in the school curriculum, an early decision for this 
second-phase was to use a previously taught unit in order to establish some control over 
taught/non-taught knowledge. The outbreak of World War I was chosen as the problem 
to be discussed and explained in the light of different sources. This unit included 
cartographic, visual and written sources from the textbook used in history classes and 
other materials, organized in two sets, including arguments from the side of the Triple 
Alliance and from the side of the Triple Entente (see Appendix B). This second content 
unit appeared to be easily tackled by students. 
Guidelines for discussion and interviewing 
The main guidelines to support students' work as described above in the previous 
section (a non-led discussion followed by an interview) were constructed. 
(a) Guidelines for discussion 
For the first stage of the work (a non-led discussion), a general topic to be discussed by 
each group was given. In the first unit (around the Israeli-Arab issue) this topic was: 
Discuss the historical materials given and present an explanation on the following issue: 
The West does not want Israel to participate in the Gulf War. This is related to the Israeli-Arab 
conflict. Why does this conflict exist? 
For the second unit (about the outbreak of World War I) the following rubric was drawn 
up: 
The present events in Yugoslavia make us think about the beginnings of World War I. 
Try to answer the following questions with the support of your history textbook and other 
materials available: 
- how did World War I begin? 
- why did this conflict occur? 
(b) Guidelines for interviewing 
The main guidelines for interviewing were designed to create a bridge between the 
students' explanation/s constructed in their groups and a led-discussion focusing on 
ideas related to the provisional nature of historical explanation. The guidelines for 
interviewing each group are shown in Figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.2 Guidelines for the interview (exploratory studies) 
1. On arguments justifying an explanation: 
- Are they acceptable? 
- All? - Why? 
- Some? - Which one and Why? 
2. On validity of explanations: 
- How many explanations to be considered? 
- One - Which one and Why? 
- Several - Only one true? - Which one and Why? 
- All equally valid? - Why? 
- One more valid? - Which one and Why? 
3. On explanations given by primary or secondary sources: 
- What is the relative value? 
- Primary more valued? 
- Secondary more valued? 
- All equally valued? 
- Why? 
4. On the historian's role when explaining: 
- To what extent? 
5. On explanatory assessment: 
- Which criteria to follow? 
- When assessing primary sources? 
- When assessing secondary sources? 
6. On their own explanatory assessment: 
- What is the relative validity compared to the others? 
- More valid? 
- Less valid? 
- Equally valid? 
- Why? 
7. On the limits of explanation: 
- Is it an explanation forever? 
-Why? 
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Procedures 
In the first phase, after a brief conversation with each group about the broad purpose of 
the study (adolescent thinking in history) students were invited to discuss the issue in 
the light of the material given and of previous knowledge they might have about it. 
They were told that each group would carry on their study alone and that their work 
would be videotaped in order to achieve the intended purpose. They could control the 
video camera and pause the filming whenever they needed to. 
Observation of tapes of the first group suggested a tendency to forget the analysis of 
written materials (Portuguese students are not much accustomed to dealing with several 
and complex sources at the same time.) For this reason a brief introduction concerning 
the need to analyse different materials was subsequently made in each group. Once one 
(or several) explanations were reached by each group, a follow-up interview was 
conducted by the researcher, which was also videotaped. The work (tape and interview) 
occurred during a morning or afternoon period (about 3 hours), with a break, for each 
group. 
These exploratory studies were conducted during 1991: the first phase in January and 
February; the second phase in October and November. 
A first data analysis 
Data collected in the two phases of these explorations were analysed to provide a first 
empirical basis for a model to be refined further. As already emphasised at the 
beginning of this chapter (p. 88), in these first explorations students' ideas were 
analysed as relative to provisional historical interpretation as historical explanation was 
still considered in a loose way. It was intended to capture sets of interrelated ideas 
about provisionality with an open brainstorming approach, independent of 
correspondence to tacit and stable individual constructs. As data were gathered in a 
situation of peer-interaction (and, sometimes, with some "pressure" from the 
interviewer - see decisions on research techniques, pp. 91-2), moves in constructs 
suggested by some students and silence and perplexity observed in some others might 
be mainly provoked by the concrete context of the interview. 
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A first categorization grounded on empirical data 
The analysis of responses about the Israeli Conflict issue (first exploratory study) 
suggested an empirically-based recategorization of the a priori model proposed. Four 
conceptual levels of ideas were considered. A first level of ideas relying on substantive 
information prior to the level 1 initially hypothesised (relying on acceptance of reliable 
explanations) was formulated; level 2, hypothesised as relying on ideas of a balanced 
explanation viewed as the explanation, was not considered since data did not provide 
clear indicators; the other two levels were maintained. This early empirical model was 
as shown in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3 Early empirical model of students' ideas about PHE 
LEVEL 1 - AUTHORITY ACCEPTED 
Explanations seen as information to be simply accepted. 
LEVEL 2 - SOURCE CRITICISM 
Historical explanations accepted if based on reliable evidence 
Explanations valued in terms of reliability: primary sources valued 
Neutrality seen as opposed to point of view 
LEVEL 3 - PERSPECTIVE 
Point of view recognised as legitimate in history 
Primary sources valued 
LEVEL 4 - CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE 
Concern for a tentatively perspectiveful neutrality 
Point of view recognised in a social context 
Level 1: Authority accepted 
Students tend simply to accept every explanation as information without raising 
questions about its credibility: 
Susana (17 years old): I think that all of them [different versions] have their points of view, 
they are all linked together, the idea is basically the same ... 
Int.: If they have their points of view, to what extent might some of them reflect propaganda? 
Susana: I think that the Jews' one ... hmm ... I don't think that it can be considered exaggerated 
... I think that for them it must be like that ... I think that with the Jews and with Palestinians 
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it is the same... 
The authority of whatever information is given may be a basic criterion at this level. 
Contradicting information in explanations is not explored, as the perplexity showed by 
Susana and Carla seems to suggest: 
Int.: Do you find any contradictions between the arguments presented by different authors? 
Carla (17 years old): Yes, I do ... 
Int.: Can you give some examples? 
[Carla keeps on looking at the materials, Susana taps her pen and coughs ... Only Paulo, 16 
years old, answers:] 
Paulo: The Jews say that they have the right to be back and the Palestinians say that they 
cannot be taken out of their land ... 
There is a tendency to pass immediate moral judgement on past facts directly rather 
than assessing existing explanations: 
Int.: Considering these three sets of explanations how do you evaluate them? 
Susana: I think that the Palestinians were a bit incorrect to the Jews, I think they want the land 
only for themselves [...] 
Int.: This is part of your own explanation [...] Can you analyse and give your opinion about the 
explanations given here ? 
Susana: I think ... For me the most correct one was that one adopted by the United Nations. 
As Susana's responses suggest, some students focused their argumentation on the 
actions assumed by agents in the past (Jews, Palestinians, UN), discussing their motives 
and producing moral judgements for and against them, rather than considering 
explanations as such. 
Level 2: Source criticism 
Historical explanations are correct if based on reliable evidence. Such a concern often 
leads to a preference for explanations from primary sources as they can suggest the 
emotions and feelings of the real situation. Memory can be overvalued as the following 
excerpt suggests: 
Joao (15 years old): ... They [explanations in primary sources] are testimonies from people 
who live with their religion ... their beliefs are explained here ... they have a basis ... 
Luisa (14 years old): ... This can show the meaning of diverse opinions from both parts ... 
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They are all important ... but these [explanations in primary sources] are more important 
because they are the basis for reconstructing the events ... 
Paula (15 years old): These have an opinion about what people do feel ... 
JoAo: As far as this issue is concerned we have to abstain from the issue ... we don't know how 
they really feel themselves ... we in the West have a general idea, but we cannot reach 
conclusions ... Those who are involved can discuss what is going on there... 
Joao consistently argued for the value of the agents' testimonies for reaching 
conclusions, and Paula seemed to follow his argument. Luisa conceptualized 
explanations as opinions which can be understood in context and also valued primary 
sources more as a basis for a reconstruction of events. For this group, historical 
conclusions appear to have two degrees of reliability, the most reliable being those 
produced by historical agents. 
In another group, comparing different sources (a more elaborate view about historical 
work, although it was suggested by the material given) was viewed as essential for the 
best historical explanation: 
Isabel (14 years old): Here [explanations given by Arabs and Jews] people speak about the 
issue but they are always arguing in favour of their own rights ... First, it is necessary to 
believe in primary sources, afterwards ... 
Rui (14 years old): ... to see the common aspects among them ... to compare them and take 
from them what is not different! 
They can put propaganda in there, to exaggerate ... the person has to ... 
Monica (14 years old): ... to know the situation ... 
Rui: Yes, because ... [we need] evidence ... 
Historians put aside their prejudices and immerse themselves in the sources, compare 
and evaluate them, and this way they can give a correct explanation. Primary sources 
may be wrong or involved in some kind of propaganda - as was recognised by Isabel, 
Rui and agreed by Monica. Two degrees of reliability of historical conclusions 
appeared again, but were attributed in terms of neutrality (to be or not to be neutral). 
Another excerpt shows the same concern: 
Isabel: Here they say Zionists wanted to occupy the land of the Arabs. No ... I don't think so ... 
because [...] 
Rui: ... A state for them ... This author must be Arab, isn't he? ... Ah 
The historian's role seems to be to detect the truth in sources, armed with neutrality, that 
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is, not being influenced by the perspectives of the people involved: 
Rui: The western explanation is more accurate because it is produced by an outsider, as an 
observer ... she/ he is telling the truth ... she/he doesn't directly intervene ... 
Questions of validity concerning the historian's job are thus mainly related to the need 
for reliability of evidence. Explanations are valid if they are accurate. Neutrality 
appears to be treated within its absolute contours. A scissors and paste model seems to 
emerge here: 
Rui: For explaining this [situation] we based ourselves on the others here! So it [our 
explanation] is as reliable as they are ... Well, we are not experts, of course ... 
A comment about propaganda made by Joao, appears more elaborate than a mere 
scissors and paste notion: 
Joao (15 years old): A primary source has more value, but it doesn't take away validity from 
others which have to be taken into account too. Problems of propaganda give us a distorted 
image of reality ... but it shows us that there is a need for propaganda ... it does not invalidate 
the sources. 
This last answer suggests that the historian explains by making inferences from sources 
rather than by pasting the right facts. His sophisticated idea of evidence might reveal an 
attitude that is on the verge of accepting perspective as inherent in historical 
explanation. 
Level 3: Perspective 
Historical explanations are seen as varying according to the different criteria which 
historians use to look at and give meaning to past situations. Explanations are always 
mediated by the historian's presuppositions: 
Elisa ( 14 years old): ... we don't know if it is exactly like that, we have to know the basis 
which they [all explanations] rely on ... 
Gabriela (14 years old): Each historian has sympathy for certain people and this may be 
reflected in his explanation. 
In this group, the notion of author's perspective emerged at the individual level, 
conceptualized as an everyday assumption ("sympathy for certain people"). In another 
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group, Joana tried to analyse the idea of personal opinion, assigning a critical attitude to 
it rather than a mere impressionist sympathy for a specific situation: 
Int.: And what will interfere in historical analysis? 
Patricia (14 years old): Sources ... 
Int.: Sources ... only? 
Patricia and Joana (14 years old): Personal opinion! 
Carlos (14 years old): There are different opinions ... 
Int.: And how is an opinion formed? 
Joana: I think that ... listening to what people say, how we agree with them or not ... and so we 
are forming our opinion. 
However, recognition of perspective may still be tied to an ideal of direct observation: 
Patricia: As we don't have direct observers [...] we must be very careful, we must analyse a 
large variety of information to be compared ... 
Because it is important to compare different points of view! 
The provisional condition of explanation emerges here again, tied to a notion of 
perspective although still in a common-sense approach: 
Int.: And what about the analysis to be done by yourselves? 
Elisa: It will be another secondary source, won't it? It may be not certain, either ... 
Gabriela: [Our explanation] presents our point of view too ... It has to do with the point of view 
of people ... 
Elisa: Each historian will go on making theory ... As about some exotic paintings, we never 
know ... 
Such a conceptualization of perspective appears to be a strong relativist metaphor ("as 
about some exotic paintings") without pointing to any criteria applied in history in 
order to assess different versions. However, it may contain a basis for a more elaborate 
reasoning about provisionality in historical explanation rather than merely a notion of 
perspectiveless neutrality from the author's side. 
Level 4: Contextual perspective 
Historical explanations are seen as provisional while involving a process in which the 
historian always applies her/his own perspective and methodological neutrality. An 
author's perspective can be conceptualized not only in the personal sphere, but in terms 
101 
of the social context in which individual presuppositions are constructed. 
It was hypothesized that adolescents could express understanding of this 
contextualization, although not yet in a clear way. However, no responses in this study 
gave indicators of this level of progression. 
A second categorization grounded on empirical data 
The first categorization was revised through the second phase of these explorations, in 
the light of responses suggesting some sub-patterns within the former categories. Thus, 
level 1 (authority accepted) was divided into two sub-categories (information and 
dogmatism) and level 2 (positivism) was also divided into two subcategories (neutrality 
and consensus), the latter suggesting the second level of the a priori hypothesis; level 3 
(perspective) and level 4 (contextual perspective) were kept in their original form. The 
following scheme presents such a recategorization. 
Level 1: Authority accepted 
History produces true explanations about past facts. It gives the version about a real 
situation. 
It was hypothesized that two sub-levels might fall into this category: 
A: Information 
At this preliminary level students concentrate their reasoning on recalled knowledge 
(like level 1 in the former categorization) or on quoted information. Examining sources 
for an explanation or thinking about how history is made are not questions which they 
seem disposed to think about. They tend to show some perplexity during such a level of 
discussion, their answers being fragmented: 
Int.: What makes you believe in those statements [from the allies side] more than those from 
Germany? 
JoAO (15 years old): The pan-germanism means that they were ... ... nationalists and so they 
were ... [pause] 
Pedro: [intervenes] The Germans were not neutral! 
Joao rarely wanted to intervene in the discussion but he made some comments about the 
historical issue. Information provided by previous knowledge ("pangermanism means 
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nationalism") or by given sources, seems to be the key to such responses and takes the 
place of source critique. 
B: Dogmatism 
There is a right version about the past conveyed by books and teachers. This is viewed 
as the criterion against which different versions are seen and criticized as wrong 
versions coloured by propaganda: 
Int.:... How can you distinguish more and less valid arguments? Which criterion do you use 
to differentiate between them? 
Carla (14 years old): Because we studied it. Germany was a country wanting to give the image 
of country well-prepared for the war ... but here they say they are right, they were a people 
like a family! They used to think themselves as superior ... 
Int.: What makes you to think that? 
Berta (14 years old): Their attitudes ... 
Ana: They wanted to rule all the countries! 
Int.: But here they say that they didn't want to dominate! 
Ana (15 years old) - A person wouldn't accuse himself, of course! 
Berta: [nodding her head] 
Int.: And how do you know that they didn't want to accuse themselves? 
Berta: We learnt that ... The teacher told us ... 
Differences in arguments are identified and propaganda in what is judged as a "wrong" 
source is detected. The "right" version tends to be accepted without being submitted to 
the same critique. The historian must discover the true facts in sources and transmit 
them. Direct sources or recent explanations will give equally valid explanations: 
Int.: How do historians make a valid work? 
Carla: They copy what happened before. 
Berta: It is not exactly that! 
Ana: It is not copying ... because they were going to discover ... 
Berta: A text that can prove ... They have to get something on which to base their conclusions. 
Int.: Are historical explanations more or less valid than those given by ... [direct witnesses]? 
Ana: I think that it is the same! They lived then and historians are living now ... 
103 
Level 2: Positivism 
Historical explanations are valid if based on reliable evidence. Historians putting aside 
their prejudices examine different sources and accept or reject statements in order to 
give the best explanation. The notion of point of view can be hazily expressed or stated 
as a negative feature to be controlled. 
Two sub-levels can be considered: 
A: Sum 
Different arguments are considered in the light of sources given: 
Int.: In what sense do those arguments differ from each other? 
Maria (14 years old): Germany defends herself ... as much as we understood she was 
criticized and she was defending herself. She also accuses Serbia, France and Britain [...] The 
American professor also counterattacks ... 
An explanation may be seen as a sum of evidence previously compared: 
Int.: What is your attitude towards these explanations given here? Is there anything you need 
to be careful about in dealing with these explanations? 
Susana (14 years old): We search out ... we try to know sources more closely ... 
Maria (15 years old): [We search out] In other books ... 
Susana: Other ways ... 
Int.: And what do you do after reaching your conclusions? 
Paula (14 years old): We compare them ... 
Int.: And will your comparison be a summing-up of various materials, sources, or will it be 
something different made up by yourselves? 
Maria: It will be the sum of them. 
Susana: Yes, the sum! 
This idea of summing-up sources is not a construct created by Maria and Susana; it is 
rather their choice about a bipolar construct proposed by the interviewer: an 
explanation as a] sum of sources versus an autonomous conclusion. Early 
methodological decisions allowed for the possibility of offering some clues in order to 
clarify trends to be explored later on (see pp. 91-2). 
A hypothetical tendency to value explanations on the basis of memory since they can 
transmit the emotional climate of the real situation, appears to be exemplified in Ana's 
statements: 
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Ana (16 years old): ... Direct sources lived it. History books come from people who think and 
write on it afterwards, and their opinions on what happened can fail! 
Int.: Do you think that primary sources are more valid than a posteriori explanations? 
Jodo: Yes, they are! 
As the interviewer intended to clarify such a tendency she posed here a leading 
question, for which she should have substituted: "which explanations do you consider 
more valid: those given by direct sources or those given by historians?"3  
The notion of different points of view may be overtly asserted, but still in a common-
sense approach: 
Int.:... Can we consider totally correct, valid or false any historical explanation given by an 
historian, a textbook or a published book? 
Susana: Valid, yes. But, totally valid ... 
Int.: Why do you say that? 
Maria: It depends on his point of view on the issue ... 
It may convey an empirical basis for the historical work, that is, it can be entangled 
with the idea of primary evidence (through "testimonies") for reaching a conclusion, as 
Susana and Paula seemed to consider, or it might represent a subjective element (way of 
thinking), according to Maria: 
Int.: And how does the historian form his own point of view? 
Paula: Basing it on data, testimonies of people living those events, or ... 
Susana: Documents ... 
Paula: They [historians] can interpret in different ways ... 
Int.: And to what is that due? 
Maria: Each way of thinking ... 
B: Consensus 
Historical explanations presuppose a point of view that has to be controlled, by 
assuming a neutral attitude. A consensus on historical conclusions is desirable and 
when such a consensus cannot be reached, explanations tend to be undervalued: 
3  During these first empirical explorations it was intended to explore distinctions between explanations 
from primary and secondary sources. Students' responses provoked an a posteriori distinction, in this 
study, between direct observation and memory. 
105 
Int.: Which are the most valid explanations? Those appearing in history books now or ...? 
Pedro (14 years old): I think that explanations appearing in history books now are more valid 
because they have revised all facts, they have grasped ideas about what happened and on what 
provoked the war. In those past times they didn't tell the truth, they were trying to defend 
themselves, they were creating propaganda for their country! 
Pedro: I think that they [recent explanations] are valid but some facts have been distorted over 
time, some events can be exaggerated and reported now in a completely different way from 
what had happened ... and now historians have to look for evidence ... 
Int.: So in history we always have that dilemma: those who witness the events can give ... 
Pedro: False information ... 
Int.: Or somewhat falsified ... And how can historians solve that, how can they evaluate 
source reliability? 
Pedro: They can see whether information is false or correct through a posteriori or present 
events. For example, what is happening in Yugoslavia now [...]: generally, the problem is 
race. The Aryan race ... they all want to be superior to others ... and these problems happen ... 
Here Pedro relied on the idea of a comparison situation as a strategy to assess 
explanations - although he overlapped explanation (which he seemed to mean with his 
generalization "the problem is race") with information, as he called it. But the idea of a 
correct explanation to be reached by means of research ("now historians have to look 
for evidence") stood up (and in a more elaborate way than in statements produced at 
level 2): 
Int.: Propaganda aside, can historians offer a total neutrality for dealing with the issue without 
any preference for this or that? 
Pedro: Sometimes it can happen ... 
Int.: Sometimes only? How do you see it as possible? 
Pedro: It depends on countries. Historians will never - some will, but surely most of them 
surely won't - defend the argument that they can be guilty. 
Int.: And if he is an anti-militarist? 
Pedro: In that case, they will defend the reality! 
The ideal of a correct explanation seemed to be conflicting with the recognition of a 
point of view: a consensus among historians (in order to get the right explanation) 
appeared to be the way to reach a balanced explanation (this concern for balance 
suggests an ideal of detachment as a genuine criterion): 
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Ana (16 years old): If a group of historians decide to give an opinion and reach a conclusion, 
they must not deepen an issue more than another ... and they must try to make a balance. 
Int.: Why do you speak of a group of historians rather than of a single one? 
Ma: Because one single historian cannot give his own opinion, it cannot be considered valid. 
Int.: And if they don't reach out a consensus, have we history or not? 
[Smiles, perplexity] 
Pedro: No, we don't make history if they don't reach a consensus. 
Ana: History can be made, but it cannot be true history. 
Level 3: Perspective 
Historical explanations vary according to different criteria which historians use to look 
at and give meaning to past situations. Explanations are mediated by the historian's 
presuppositions and that is accepted as a genuine historical feature: 
Luis (14 years old): ... The author always has his personal opinion; even when he doesn't want 
to express it ... anyway, he is expressing it through what he writes. 
Int.: And what will the other authors think about that? 
Francisco (14 years old): Each author has his own ideas. He might want to give a picture of his 
own opinion. The author may not write it, but it's always in there. 
The notion of author's perspective emerges at the individual level, conceptualized as an 
everyday assumption. But it takes into account a distinction between a valid 
explanation and propaganda: 
Int.: And what about your own explanation: does it meet similar criteria? 
Francisco - It is valid too ... 
Luis: Yes, it is! 
Int.- Why? 
Joana (16 years old): For knowing the events which really happened ... 
Luis: We don't reach exactly how the events occurred, but we get an idea ... well, we can get a 
distorted idea, of course, if we see one side only, but ... 
A recognition of perspective may appear along with some awareness of a need to assess 
different versions and for a detached attitude. A group showing responses typical of a 
scissors and paste pattern in the first half of the interview, appeared to move to more 
sophisticated reasoning, maybe fostered by Paula's responses: 
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Susana (14 years old): The author must copy what he sees in sources ... 
Int.: To copy ... how? 
Paula (15 years old): It is not to copy. He must compare and reach conclusions! 
Int.: Is your explanation more or less valid [than all the others given]? 
Paula: Our book makes us think that Germany was guilty of everything. Now, with these 
documents, I think that our explanation is more valid than that of the textbook! 
Int.: And if you compared it to versions given? 
Susana: It is more valid than both we have analysed [versions from one or other side] ... We 
have various ways of seeing the situation ... We must base ourselves not only on a single fact, 
but on several things. And above all, [we must] be neutral, not take a single side. 
Neutrality, in Susana's words, seemed to mean a detached, non-biased attitude (not to 
take a single side) but involving the consideration of several perspectives (versions 
from different sides). Such a conceptualization of perspective may still seem common-
sense based, reflecting a mere personal opinion. However, considering the preceding 
level of Portuguese students' responses assigning a negative attribution to perspective, 
overlapping the concept with bias, it may suggest some criteria (appealing to a 
perspectiveful neutrality) for a more elaborate reasoning about provisionality in 
historical explanation rather than a plain notion of neutrality. 
Level 4: Contextual perspective 
Historical explanations are provisional while involving a process in which historians 
apply specific criteria for validating their hypotheses, always constructed from a given 
perspective. Perspective - or point of view - can be interpreted not only in the personal 
sphere, but also related to the cultural context (beliefs, norms and interests in a society) 
in which the historical work is produced. 
It was hypothesized that adolescents could express understanding of this 
contextualization, although not yet in a clear way. However, the responses given did not 
provide indicators of this level. 
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A first discussion of results 
The model generated on the basis of the early explorations of students' ideas can be 
charted as follows in Figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4 The model after the exploratory studies 
LEVET 1 AUTHORITY 
Historical explanation simply accepted or rejected 
A INFORMATION 
Focus on information 
B DOGMATISM 
Right/wrong explanations 
Wrong explanations criticized 
LEVET 2 POSITIVISM 
Historical explanations accepted if based on reliable evidence 
A SUM 
A good explanation as a sum of evidence 
Personal opinion plainly accepted 
Primary sources sometimes valued 
B CONSENSUS 
Concern for a perspectiveless neutrality 
Point of view recognised as negative 
A consensual explanation valued 
LEVEL 3 PERSPECTIVE 
Point of view recognised as legitimate 
Concern for a tentatively perspectiveful neutrality 
LEVEL 4 CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE 
Concern for a tentatively perspectiveful neutrality 
Point of view recognised in a social context 
Each logical category implies a set of interrelated ideas, all of which may not be 
observed in each student; one may produce responses mainly characteristic of a specific 
level, that is, she/he may reveal a dogmatic position as it was featured in level 1-B 
above, and simultaneously give a few arguments suggesting a more sophisticated level 
conflicting with what seems to be her/his main pattern of thinking. Such an oscillation 
is consistent with previous research about children's ideas in history (Ashby and Lee, 
1987). But it also might be due to the technique (group-interview) applied. 
109 
Contrary to the a priori hypothesis assuming that at a first stage of thinking ideas based 
on the notion of a strictly neutral explanation would be observed, data suggested the 
following: 
1. The idea of an absolutely neutral explanation may be tied to elaborate ideas about 
consistency with evidence and plausibility. Therefore, a preliminary stage focusing on 
substantive information rather than arguing about explanations was substituted. 
2. Prior to ideas linked to a concern with absolute neutrality, common-sense ideas of 
perspective seem to emerge - in terms of personal opinion underlying explanations -
together with a conflicting idea of picking-up or discovering the real facts; such a 
pattern sometimes suggests a fixed attitude of defending one position against another. 
3. There appeared to be a tendency at the first levels to value primary sources as giving 
better explanations than historians (memory and direct observation ideal). 
4. A coherent pattern of ideas around provisionality, an integration of the use of criteria 
for assessing different explanations and a recognition of perspective as a genuine 
feature in historical explanation, was not found among the students. As this might have 
been due to the kind of research design applied, it was kept as an hypothesis about the 
most elaborate level to be explored in further phases. Thus, it was considered in the 
construction of instruments for the main study. 
Limitations of the early analysis 
The exploratory studies were seen as a launch pad for a more rigorous empirical study 
to be designed subsequently. The main study would take into account not only the main 
ideas suggested through these first explorations but also their recognised limitations. 
These were, mainly: 
1. A still vague idea about the kind of historical explanation to be focused on, requiring 
further attention to the concept of explanation. 
2. An approach valuing the notion of perspective and its contingent nature, leaving 
ideas related to criteria for assessing historical explanations less clear. 
Awareness that such limitations could led to a study relying on assumptions at an 
everyday level provoked a process of reflection on notions of provisional explanation. 
Concepts discussed in chapters 2 and 3 are the synthesis of such a process and provided 
the theoretical background to the main empirical study. The theoretical survey lead to a 
systematization of ideas about historical explanation (explanatory structure, explanatory 
consistency and objectivity and truth) as fully described in chapter 7. 
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Summary 
This chapter broadly described the first empirical explorations of students' ideas about 
provisional historical explanation. The intention to devise a model of students' ideas 
based on empirical data led to the implementation of an early research design and 
corresponding analysis of data. It started (a) with an a priori model of ideas about PHE 
in a logical progression, as a working hypothesis, followed by decisions on (b) 
population and sampling (five groups of three students, from five schools, in two 
studies with Portuguese 14-17 year-old 9th-graders), (c) research techniques, (d) 
instruments, and (e) procedures. A first qualitative analysis was given next, in order to 
highlight some major ideas for the building of a model based on empirical data. Finally, 
the emerging model was briefly discussed as a working hypothesis on students' ideas 
about PHE. 
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5 Method of the main study 
Once a set of categories was generated grounded on the exploratory empirical work, the 
design of the main empirical study was undertaken, aiming to gradually deepen a 
theoretical understanding of the students' constructs about PHE. This chapter describes 
the method used in the main study from its several piloting phases to the final study: (a) 
population and samples, (b) research techniques, (c) instruments, and (d) administration. 
The following abbreviations will be used to distinguish each phase of data collection: P1 
means piloting phase 1 (or, for reasons of simplification, pilot 1); P2 means piloting 
phase 2 (or, pilot 2); P3 means piloting phase 3 (or, pilot 3); P4 means piloting phase 4 
(or, pilot 4); F means final study. Figure 5.1 summarizes the objectives, main decisions 
and samples of each phase of the main study. 
Figure 5.1 The main study: phases, objectives, decisions and samples 
PHASE 
P1 
P2 
P3 
P4 
F 	 collecting data for final analysis: qualitative 
and statistical analysis  
90 x 7th-8th-9th grades 
(1 school) 
30 x 7th-8th grades 
(2 schools) 
11 x 11th grade 
(2 schools) 
4 university students 
21 x 7th-9th-11th grades 
(2 schools) 
121 x 7th-9th-11th grades 
(2 schools) 
MAIN OBJECTIVES/DECISIONS 	 SAMPLE SIZF/ORIGIN 
trialling of tasks, revising model: 
task-set and model revised 
simplifying questions: written tasks refined 
testing model's higher levels: raising new hypotheses, 
population redefined, task-set reformulated 
last trial of task-set: written tasks refined 
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The pilot studies 
Population and sampling 
The exploratory studies as described in chapter 4 were developed having in mind a 
population ranging between 14 and 17 years old, attending the 9th school grade. 
However, this first approach was directed to only a very restricted range of the 14-17 
year-olds in "basic school": it was apparent that this early decision had narrowed the 
levels of population under focus as, hypothetically, the brightest adolescents should be 
attending higher grades and those experiencing some learning difficulties might stay at 
lower grades. Besides this, among the 9th graders, a range of ages from 13 to 20 years 
old could be found since retention in each grade has been very common in Portuguese 
schools. Reconsideration of how to define the population was therefore required. 
(a) Defining the population 
Ab initio, the study intended to explore adolescent ideas about provisional explanation. 
From this broad canvas, a concrete population was identified: in order to enlarge the 
scope of the target population, it was decided to include pupils attending the 7th, 8th and 
9th grades, thus focusing on the last stage of basic schooling. The main reason for a 
definition by grade was that classrooms in Portugal are organized on a basis of grade of 
schooling (as mentioned in chapter 4, pp. 89-90); it would cause serious trouble in 
arrangements for the empirical work if this structure was not taken into account. 
Three cycles (stages) constitute basic school in Portugal: the first cycle (stage 1), 
traditionally the primary school, runs from the 1st to the 4th grade, with an age range of 5 
to 16, now that compulsory school is extended to the age of sixteen ; the second cycle 
(stage 2), formerly the preparatory school, includes the 5th and the 6th grade, with ages 
from 9 to 16; the third cycle (stage 3), includes the 7th, 8th and 9th grade, formerly the 
first secondary school stage, with ages ranging from 11 to 20 (but pupils may leave at 16 
years old). Secondary school runs from the 10th to 12th grade with ages ranging from 14 
to 20. History used to be taught as a compulsory subject from 6th to 9th grade and the 
samples studied had experienced this curricular structure (see Figure 5.2). With the 
Curricular Reform, which has been gradually implemented in the 1990s, history is now a 
subject studied from the 5th grade (included in History and Geography of Portugal, in the 
5th and 6th grades). 
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Figure 5.2 History in the school curriculum, prior to the Curricular Reform 
GRADE 
	
COMPULSORY CURRICULUM 	 OPTIONAL 
6 	 Portuguese, History of Portugal, 	 Religious and 
Foreign Language, Natural Sciences 	 Moral Education 
Mathematics, Art, Handicrafts, 
Physical Education, Musical Education 
7-8-9 	 Portuguese, French, English, History, 	 Religious and 
Geography, Physics and Chemistry, 	 Moral Education 
Biology, Mathematics, Art, Craft-work, 
Physical Education 	 Several subjects, 
at 9th grade 
The target population from which the initial sample was drawn was, then: adolescents 
ranging from 12 to 20 year-olds attending the "third cycle" (7th, 8th and 9th grades) at 
schools involved in teacher-training supervised by the University of Minho. These 
restrictive boundaries were decided for practical reasons: 
1. Contacts with schools would be easier thus reducing time in preliminary procedures to 
get permission for data collection. 
2. The geographical area would be of a size that could be easily covered. 
All schools are located in Minho, the northwestern region of Portugal, and all are linked 
to the teacher training programme of the University of Minho. The target population 
appeared to present some homogeneity as far as cultural background and teaching 
methods were concerned. Such a consideration was useful when taking into account 
problems of external validity for possible generalizations from a representative sample of 
this population. 
A classroom approach would also facilitate data collection. Proposing a written task to 
pupils in their natural environment (their classroom), would minimize threats of 
"experimental" effects. Thinking of teacher trainers and trainees (who directly work with 
that population), as the public for whom the conclusions of this study might primarily be 
of interest, in terms of immediate educational action, also strongly contributed to the 
decision of clustering subjects by classroom. 
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(b) Early sampling procedures 
It was assumed that the final study would attempt to ensure a representative sample from 
the target population, drawing it under non-biased procedures (a stratified random 
sample). However, at this early stage, concerned with developing a process of piloting 
through several phases, the sample selection was decided on a deliberate basis (subjects 
would volunteer), although taking into account some theoretical criteria: (a) Schools 
should be characterized as having a heterogeneous population in terms of their socio-
cultural backgrounds, (b) the sample would include classrooms from grades 7, 8, 9 and, 
(c) the sample size would be large enough to permit some reasonable conclusions in order 
to make progress in refining the theory and reformulating the instruments. 
A school located in an industrial town and surrounded by a rural environment was chosen 
for the first piloting phase - a school in Famalicao already selected for the exploratory 
studies, but with other subjects. Within that school, 7th, 8th and 9th grade-classes, with 
ages ranging from 12 to 19 years, were selected for the study (see Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1 P1 sample by age and grade 
GRADE AGE TOTAL 
12 13 14 15 16 17 19 
7 23 3 3 3 32 
8 1 17 1 6 2 27 
9 13 10 5 2 1 31 
TOTAL 24 20 17 19 7 2 1 90 
At the 7th grade, ages range from 12 to 15, at the 8th grade from 12 to 16, at the 9th 
grade from 14 to 19. Age modes are 12 years at the 7th grade, 13 years at the 8th grade, 
14 years at the 9th grade. 
The piloting process was developed through three further phases. The second phase was 
administered to a sample of 30, out of which 12 were 13 year-olds attending the 7th grade 
Although all schools are located in a specific region (Minho), and are thus supposed to share its cultural 
values, some pupils come from villages and small towns where a rural environment still exists, whereas 
others live in the city or in industrial towns. 
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grade and 18 were 13 to 16 year-olds attending the 8th grade. The third phase was 
administered to 15 subjects from a different population: 11 were 11th-graders and 4 were 
undergraduate students attending the 4th year of the course in History and Social 
Sciences, at University of Minho. The fourth phase was applied to a sample (N=21) 
matching in grade that tested in the final study. Table 5.2 shows the whole pilot samples 
by age and grade. 
Table 5.2 Pilot samples by age and grade 
PHASE 
+ 
AGE TOTAL 
GRADE 12 13 14 15 16 17 19 21-24 N 
P1 (gr. 7-8-9) 24 20 17 19 7 2 1 90 
P2 (gr. 7-8) 18 9 1 2 30 
P3 (gr. 11) 5 6 11 
(under grad.) - 4 4 
P4 (gr. 7-9-11) 2 3 4 4 4 4 21 
TOTAL 26 41 30 24 18 12 1 4 156 
Research techniques 
The exploratory studies (chapter 4) indicated some meaningful patterns in pupils' 
thinking, permitting a first empirically-based categorization. They provided indicators on 
pupils' general ideas, in a context of social interaction that can be characterized as 
fostering higher-level responses, as some previous research suggests, namely Dickinson 
and Lee (1984), Ashby and Lee (1987). Nonetheless, specific information on the 
personal constructs of each pupil was still not available. Selecting a research technique to 
accomplish this aim was then of prime importance. The redefinition of the target 
population (12 to 20 year olds attending the 7th, 8th and 9th grade) implied the 
implementation of a cross-sectional study, in the line of previous research such as those 
conducted by Dickinson and Lee (1978b, 1984), Ashby and Lee (1987), already 
described in chapter 1. Therefore, the research technique and the specific instruments to 
be devised had to suit adolescents of different ages and grades. 
116 
A survey of the several techniques used for data collection in the broad area of research in 
question (i.e., on students' ideas about historical concepts) was drawn up in order to 
look for a technique appropriate to this specific study and its explicit aims. Among the 
varied investigation techniques, the most frequently used were: 
1. Observation techniques: these have been applied taking the form of videotaping 
discussion in two different contexts: (a) on specially constructed tasks (Dickinson and 
Lee, 1984, Ashby and Lee, 1987), and (b) on ordinary classroom exercises (Ashby and 
Lee, 1987). In both approaches using this type of observation technique, applied to 
cross-sectional studies, the authors were committed to foster a situation free from adult 
intervention. Their main strength is that, since the constancy of the instruments used 
(video-taping instead of interviewer/interviewee interaction) can be guaranteed, threats to 
internal validity from the instruments employed are reduced (Ashby and Lee, 1987). This 
technique has been shown to provide sensitive data for generating a theoretical 
categorization of pupils' ideas about history. It gives valuable information not only on the 
conclusions that pupils reach, but also on their thinking process. The present study used 
such a technique for its exploratory stage and it is suggested that it contributed to 
providing a first empirical basis for the emerging model of the theoretical categorization. 
Nonetheless, it has limitations, mainly: (a) There is the danger of subjects diverging in 
their discussion from what is under focus, especially when they are dealing with a quite 
new form of reasoning (second-order) and, (b) it does not allow for specifying each 
pupil's personal constructs. 
2. Interviewing techniques have been frequently used to complement other techniques. 
They have been used in a preliminary phase for scanning the main issues to be explored 
during the process of the study or to follow up another task to deepen and clarify the 
observed indicators. This technique is seen as one of the best methods of gathering data 
to produce reliable indicators of pupils' reasoning and their outcome conclusions. It has 
been used in several cross-sectional studies (Hallam, 1967, Shemilt, 1980, Knight, 
1989). The interviewer effect, however, must remain a concern as a possible threat to 
validity. 
3. Written tasks (paper-and-pencil tests) have been frequently used in this field of 
research under different conceptual frameworks (Hallam, 1967; Peel, 1971; De Silva, 
1971; Dickinson and Lee, 1978b; Shemilt, 1980; Booth, 1980). In spite of their largely 
recognised limitations - they are restrictive in terms of the kind of questions which may 
be asked and the kind of answers which may be received, and they allow no control for 
probing writing readiness - they frequently constitute one of the necessary instruments 
for data collection in main designs (cross-sectional studies included). Their merit lies in 
providing extensive data (in the sense of sample size), in permitting data collection in 
which the process of administration is more easily controlled, and in producing data 
which are simpler to code than those which are produced by interviewing techniques. 
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Other techniques requiring longitudinal approaches (subjects' performance is assessed in 
several occasions over a given period of time) or the use of experimental designs (with 
experimental and control groups) for assessing teaching strategies have also been used 
(Booth, 1980; Shemilt, 1980; Cooper, 1991). These techniques are time-consuming and 
aim to involve teachers directly in order to provoke effective changes in teaching 
methods. They are seen as less useful for selecting the most valid instruments for this 
study, which aims to undertake an exploration of second-order historical thinking of a 
population (Portuguese adolescents) who is probably being confronted for the first time 
with this kind of issue.2 
After an overview of the range of techniques capable of providing relevant data on 
second-order historical thinking, decisions were made concerning the techniques and 
instruments to be used in the main empirical study, focused on adolescents' ideas about 
PHE. An individual data gathering approach was now required in order to explore the 
pupils' personal constructs in a more comprehensive and in-depth manner. A written task 
was found to be the most desirable instrument for getting more "objective" indicators 
from a wider sample. However, as stated before, written responses hardly permit the 
researcher to form a sufficiently clear picture of personal ideas, since (a) the questions are 
standardized for the whole sample, not allowing for flexibility; (b) there is the danger of 
not being able to control the misunderstanding of written materials and tasks, to a higher 
degree than in direct interaction; (c) the difficulties in written communication skills 
experienced by some of the students can be another non-controlled variable. Awareness 
of these limitations introduced the possibility of complementing the written task with 
another, more thorough data-production technique. It was decided to use a follow-up 
interview, which would be conducted with a given percentage of the selected sample, 
choosing subjects who had indicated several levels of ideas and, within each level, 
particularly those appearing to be creative or ambiguous. Interviewing was thus intended 
to further explore the responses given by the pupils in the written task, so that more 
illuminating data could be obtained. 
Once decisions on the techniques to be applied were made - a written task and a follow-
up interview - it was then possible to start the construction of the corresponding 
instruments. 
2 This hypothesis comes from the author's observation of a large number of history classes undertaken as 
a supervisor of teacher-training. 
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Early instruments 
Bearing in mind the instruments to be devised, decisions had to focus on solving two 
problems: (a) Which historical material to include that would be simultaneously valid for 
the assumed purposes, and meaningful and challenging for the sample, and (b) which 
tasks to be done by the pupils in order to generate relevant empirical indicators through 
which the theoretical model could be refined. 
(a) Historical materials 
The historical content to be selected and its inherent organization should constitute a valid 
area for eliciting ideas about the provisional nature of explanation in history. 
Furthermore, it should be familiar enough (not too discrepant from personal experiences) 
and challenging (capable of provoking cognitive conflict) to the pupils. 
Having these criteria in mind, an issue related to the Portuguese maritime discoveries and 
expansion was viewed as constituting a potentially interesting topic. This theme was 
studied within the Portuguese National Curriculum for history at several grades: 6th, 8th 
and 10th grade (see Figure 5.3). 
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It was assumed that confronting pupils with a familiar and probably exciting past 
experience might be a stimulating feature for their thinking, provided it could be 
presented through a fresh approach. Attention was focused on an historical question 
which was likely to raise a problem not previously explored by the pupils: 
Why did the Portuguese manage to establish a maritime empire in the Indian 
Ocean during the sixteenth century?  
This assumption derived from the knowledge of usual information discussed in history 
classrooms, which consists of tracing the main characteristics, motives and conditions of 
the Portuguese maritime explorations and expansion, as Figure 5.3. suggests. The 
contextualization offered in history classrooms for this historical process focuses 
especially on Europe (e.g., the European interest in oriental goods, the difficulties posed 
to Europe by the Moslem control of the land routes, the consequent scarcity and high 
price of those goods.) The subject of military problems encountered by the Portuguese in 
Asia is usually reduced to the failure of the Moslems in their competition with Portuguese 
naval power (one example in a textbook is shown in Appendix C). 
The historical question was "detonated" by considering (thanks to Lee's suggestion, 
1992), Needham's perspective (1971) presented by Pacey in 1990, about the Chinese 
role in relation to the Portuguese control of the Indian Ocean. A survey of some historical 
views providing diversified explanations of the question was then undertaken. Two 
versions, besides Pacey's, were selected, bearing in mind that they should present 
different, and in some ways, conflicting explanations about the issue. Thus, the first 
design for the main empirical study came to include three specific historical perspectives 
related to the question posed. Original historical versions were slightly modified to make 
them easier for the students to grasp. These versions were: 
Explanation A, produced by a Portuguese recent historian, Marques (1976, English ed., 
1980, Portuguese ed.), a well-known researcher frequently quoted in textbooks, was 
taken from his account of the "Rise of the empire" under the subtitle "Warfare": 
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EXPLANATION A 
The so-envied spices ... ivory, precious stones, all these were provided by Asia. [...] 
Openly defying the Moslem domain and combating the Islamic faith, the Portuguese had to meet 
as their main enemies in Asia the Egyptians and the Turks ... It helped the Portuguese 
considerably that none of the major Moslem countries was openly turned towards the sea or based 
its power upon the sea.  
This excerpt was intended to convey an implicit rational explanation ("the Portuguese 
wanted spices... openly defying the Moslem domain and combating the Islamic faith") 
tied to an external factor, this one shown in terms of a short-term condition elaborated in 
a negative form ("none of the major Moslem countries...".) 
Explanation B, given by Pacey (1990), a recent English researcher mainly in the field of 
the history of technology, was drawn up from the chapter "Conquest in the Americas, 
and Asian trade", under the subtitle "The Mongols of the seas": 
EXPLANATION B 
The Chinese fleets had visited these ports sixty years before but had now been totally withdrawn, 
and the Islamic naval challenge to the Portuguese, when it came, was ineffective. [...] 
Had the Chinese still been patrolling the Indian Ocean when the Portuguese arrived, one can only 
speculate what might have happened. The decision to withdraw the Chinese fleet (60 years before) 
was a momentous one, not only for what it portended with regard to China's own development, 
but also for what it meant in world affairs to have the "door left open" (to the Europeans) into the 
Indian Ocean. 
This explanation is not a rationale of Portuguese action, or a causal set belonging to the 
Portuguese effort in itself. It implies rather an external factor presented as a 
counterfactual hypothesis ("one can only speculate what might have happened") related to 
the Chinese role in the Portuguese control of the Indian ocean. This factor is intertwined 
with another external factor elicited in the former explanation, now expressed with 
greater clarity ("the Islamic naval challenge to the Portuguese, when it came, was 
ineffective".) 
Explanation C was given by a Portuguese author, Matoso (1946), who oriented the 
historical view of several generations taking the secondary school course in the 1940s, 
1950s and 1960s through his history textbook, which was the only manual authorized in 
grammar schools during those times; the passage quoted was taken from the section "The 
maritime route to India and Vasco da Gama", included in the chapter on "Maritime 
Discoveries": 
124 
EXPLANATION C 
The discovery of the maritime route to India was the most glorious enterprise in this century. 
[...] After verifying the communication between the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean ... concluding 
the task which the Portuguese had been working for so hard was just a matter of tenacity and time.  
This passage consists of two paragraphs not answering the question under discussion, a 
rather nationalistic apologia directing attention towards an antecedent step necessary to the 
arrival of the Portuguese in India; the factors stressed in connection with the arrival in 
India (tenacity and time) omit any mention of the existing material conditions for the 
effective control of the maritime trade, thus showing a less objective approach than 
preceding versions. 
The three versions were isolated from their wider context, aiming to represent 
explanations differing in the factors stressed, explanations A and B being considered 
more objective than explanation C, as was discussed in chapter 3 (p. 83). The 
assumption was made that these versions included some reasons familiar to the pupils, 
such as economic and/or religious motives (in explanation A) and the advanced naval 
techniques developed by the Portuguese (implicit in all the three versions). The 
speculation on the Chinese fleet operating in the Indian Ocean at the beginning of the 
sixteenth century (explanation B) was chosen to present a completely new perspective to 
the pupils and the explicit reference to Moslem land power versus their naval inefficiency 
(conveyed by explanations A and B) was likely to constitute a fresh approach to the 
strengths and weaknesses of the Islamic societies in the region. 
A set of historical sources providing a basis of evidence for evaluating the three versions 
was organized (see Appendix D), including: 
1. A primary source from a contemporary Portuguese chronicler (Joao de Barros, 1552); 
2. Two contemporary maps of Africa, one used by the Portuguese sailors and the other 
taken from a Chinese atlas, following a secondary source (Needham et al, 1971); 
3. A secondary source, composed of a written excerpt and a figure justifying the Chinese 
counterfactual hypothesis (ibid.); 
4. Photographed relics relating to Turkish military power, presented by a secondary 
source (Cipolla, 1965). 
These diversified sources were thought to provide some evidential support for 
explanations A and B, concerning the military correlation in the Indian Ocean and 
Portuguese motivations (which would give some support to version C, too). This 
historical content was introduced by a world map on a transparency showing the 
Portuguese maritime route to and from India and a short chronology situating three main 
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events: the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope, the reaching of India by Vasco da Gama 
and the subsequent Portuguese control of the Indian Ocean. 
The early version of the historical material used in the main study was progressively 
modified during the four piloting phases until the final version was reached (discussed 
later in this chapter, pp. 129-31, and given in Appendix E). 
(b) The questionnaire: searching for sensitive questions 
The creation of valid and accessible written questions involved a difficult process. The 
questionnaire had been improved through several tentative versions progressively 
reconstructed on the basis of data gathered. In the early version, a set of questions based 
on the analysis of the interviewees' responses during the exploratory work was designed 
and included three tasks: 
Task 1 focused on the historical question to be scrutinized: 
Item 1. Why did the Portuguese manage to establish a maritime empire in the Indian Ocean 
during the sixteenth century? 
This item asked for a self-constructed explanation in an open response, based upon the 
analysis of the historical material (explanations A, B and C; sources A to F). This task 
would generate information on the explanatory structure construed by each pupil. 
Task 2 asked for an evaluation of the different versions, including the explanation that 
they themselves had afforded: 
Item 2. Rank in a decreasing order of preference the historical explanations presented on the 
issue (including yours, which will count as Explanation D): 
First   Why? 
Second 	  
Third 	  
Fourth 	  Why? 
This task, with a justification to be given in an unstructured response mode, was intended 
to shed some light on the main criteria used by students when assessing explanations. It 
was hoped that the justification of the first and the last choice would provide the required 
indicators. 
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Task 3 asked for a selection of some statements inspired by the former videotaped 
protocols: 
Item 3. Select one statement (at least) which you most agree with, in each group. 
Group A 
1. The three explanations practically equate because they deal with the same events.. 
2. Each explanation presents a different interpretation of the same events because history is 
always influenced by the author's personal opinion. 
3. The three explanations vary because only one is strictly based on the real facts: in the 
other two their authors interpret the events, according to their own point of view . 
4. The three explanations vary because historical interpretations are always influenced by 
the time, culture and society in which an author lives. 
Group B 
5. All the explanations given are good: they were produced by respectable authors. 
6. Only one of the explanations is good because its author based it on the real facts; the 
others are not so good because they present some distortion of the past. 
7. All the historical explanations given can be accepted as good but we prefer one or 
another according to our own point of view. 
8. One of the explanations is the best because it is more balanced in using and comparing 
different sources. 
Group C 
9. Only one of the explanations is truly historical: it is the sum of the correct information 
contained in texts and documents. 
10. The only truly historical explanation is the one that is similar to what we have learnt 
in history books. 
11. Different historical explanations on the same issue can be accepted; but some can be 
viewed as better when the author revises the facts, including those exaggerated or omitted in 
previous explanations. 
12. A witness from that time would explain the situation better than today's authors. 
Task 3 used a multiple-choice form, to function as a brief survey of some features of 
provisionality, namely on objectivity in historical explanation. Both tasks 2 and 3 
employed ideas produced by students in the exploratory studies (see chapter 4). These 
tasks were intended to allow a first individual approach to a second-order reasoning. 
After the construction of the first written draft, the interviewing was planned: it was 
decided to base it on the questions previously answered, asking pupils to clarify, justify 
or deepen their responses. A loose intervention by the interviewer was seen as most 
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desirable, inspired by the phenomenological interview technique used by Shemilt (1987) 
and discussed by several authors including Seidman (1991); but some intervention from 
the interviewer's side in order to provoke a response was assumed too, as there were 
grounds for thinking that students were probably not used to being asked about this type 
of issue. Guidelines for the interview were designed, closely related to the written 
questions. The following lists the main questions to be posed, each of them followed by 
some sub-questions in order to specify or justify written answers: 
1. About Task 1: State your own explanation. 
2. About Task 2: Explain your ranking further. Clarify [when response is vague or 
contradictory] I justify your ranking [when relevant notions are suggested]. 
3. About Task 3: Justify your choices [when these were made clear]; Clarify your choices 
[when contradictions appear). 
4. About Task 3, again: Explain why you didn't select the other statements given. 
Question 1 was devised to draw the pupil's attention to the explanation given and to 
clarify the underlying Explanatory structure; question 2, to give indicators of ideas about 
explanatory consistency; questions 3 and 4, to give indicators of ideas about explanatory 
consistency, and objectivity and truth. 
Therefore, the written tasks and corresponding interviewing guidelines were intended to 
provide indicators about three main conceptual clusters related to provisional explanation: 
- Explanatory structure 
- Explanatory consistency 
- Objectivity and truth 
These conceptual clusters were progressively clarified and densified as the instruments 
were revised and refined according to the analysis of data in each piloting phase. The 
final version of the task-set is discussed later in this chapter (pp. 136-9) and given in 
Appendix F. 
Administration and decisions during the pilots 
The task-set designed was first applied (P 1) in a school to 90 pupils in three classrooms -
7th, 8th, and 9th grade. The administration period occurred during October and 
November 1992: the written task was administered to each intact classroom in October; 
the follow-up interviews were individually conducted, during October and November. 
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Pilot 2 (P2) was applied to 30 pupils, in two classrooms of two schools - 7th and 8th 
grade. The written task and the follow-up interviews were administered during January 
and February 1993. 
Pilot 3 (P3) was applied to 11 pupils from two classrooms - 11th grade - in two schools, 
and to four undergraduate students - 4th year - in the History and Social Sciences course. 
This phase ran from January to May 1993, and it included a written task only. 
Pilot 4 (P4) was applied in two schools to 21 pupils in the 7th, 9th and 1 1 th grades, 
during May 1993, and it included a written task and individual interviews. 
(a) P1 administration 
It was hypothesized that the written task might appear too distant from the previous 
experience of the pupils, given that it is not usual in the context of a Portuguese history 
classroom to discuss or compare different historical versions of an issue. It was therefore 
decided to plan a unit using an approach that conveyed at least two different accounts of 
the topic which students were dealing with at the time. This was agreed and carried out 
by the teachers in the classes selected for the study, prior to the administration of this 
early written task. It was assumed that such a procedure would provide some 
acquaintance with a new approach to history work, thus aiming to control in some way 
problems raised by a distinct difference between teaching approaches and the research 
task. To reduce these differences further, it was thought to be desirable to begin the 
administration of the task with an introduction in a familiar style, using an oral question-
and-answer approach. Thus, after the general purpose had been stated (to explore pupils' 
ideas on history) the introductory material presented on a transparency constituted a basis 
for a brief conversation. The topic was introduced and pupils were asked to identify or 
locate some of the main places concerned (Portugal, Africa, Indian Ocean, India and 
China.) This continuing for 15 minutes, the written material was then distributed to the 
pupils. It was read aloud to the class and pupils were asked to raise any doubts about 
unknown words. The written task was then individually completed, during a period of 45 
minutes. Twelve pupils were selected for the follow-up interview, lasting from half to 
one hour each. The procedures for the interviewing followed the criteria formerly 
described, and the interviews were carried out in what was intended to be a relaxed, 
friendly manner. 
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(b) Decisions after P1: revising the historical material 
The main preoccupation during the pilot studies was to improve the task-set for the final 
study in order to provide valid and reliable empirical indicators. 
The results obtained from the pilot 1 suggested that the content material had enough 
potential to provoke pupils' thinking about the concept of provisional explanation.3 A 
refinement of the historical material was then undertaken in the light of the theoretical 
aims and taking into account the empirical data obtained. 
The three explanations were revised and a descriptive text was added. The four texts were 
now labelled versions so that students had no clues as to a distinction between description 
and explanation. 
Version A maintained the thesis that the Moslems were powerful on land but not at sea, 
the first paragraph adducing a motive (the search for spices and other goods) being 
eliminated. In this way, it intended to convey one cause for the question, "why did the 
Portuguese manage to establish a maritime empire in the Indian Ocean during the 
sixteenth century?", using a fresh approach from what is usually taught in school.4 The 
final version was the following. 
VERSION A 
Openly defying the Moslem domain and combating the Moslem faith, the Portuguese had to meet 
as their main enemies in Asia the Egyptians and the Turks. It helped the Portuguese considerably 
that none of these major Moslem countries based its power upon the sea.  
Version B kept its original approach, only simplifying the first statement in order to 
concentrate it exclusively on the factor involved (the ineffectiveness of the Moslem fleet). 
The second statement (on the possible consequences if the Chinese had not withdrawn 
from the Indian Ocean) was maintained. This version presented two causal factors, the 
latter probably being completely new information for the pupils, which was stated in a 
counterfactual mode: 
3 The analysis of data collected in the several piloting phases is discussed next in chapter 6. 
4 Appendix C shows an example of how the Moslem factor is normally presented in history class by 
textbooks. 
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VERSION B 
The Islamic naval challenge to the Portuguese, when it came, was ineffective... 
Had the Chinese still been present in the Indian Ocean when the Portuguese arrived, one can only 
speculate what might have happened. The decision to withdraw the Chinese fleet 60 years before 
was a momentous one, leaving the "door left open" [to the Europeans] into the Indian Ocean.  
Version C was replaced by another passage from the same textbook, which answered 
more directly the question under discussion (the control of the Indian Ocean) instead of 
emphasising a different issue (the Portuguese arrival in India). But it conveyed the same 
nationalistic ideology: 
VERSION C 
This large domain quickly conquered with a few human and financial resources can only be 
explained by the moral correctness of the Portuguese great leaders, by the sacrifices for the country 
made by all the people.  
This version was given to be an example of a less valid explanation since it was refuted 
by some of the evidence available (Portuguese superiority in naval equipment and military 
power in the Indian Ocean at the time) and it was rooted in the obvious interest of 
justifying nationalism. 
A fourth version - version D - was intended to be descriptive and longer (conveying 
more information) than the first three. For that purpose, a narrative based on two English 
books written for young people (Kramer and Adams, 1990; Everett and Reid, 1991) was 
constructed. The final version was the following: 
VERSION D 
The sailors of Prince Henry were those who took the first and most difficult steps into the unknown 
lands for the Europeans ... 
The western African coast was progressively explored. The Portuguese caravels brought back gold, 
spices, furs, ivory and slaves from those regions. 
Meanwhile, between 1405 and 1433, the emperors of China sent seven expeditions to explore the Indian 
Ocean, commanded by Cheng Ho, bringing back to China spices and unusual animals, including lions 
and giraffes. 
Upon Bartolomeu Dias having rounded the Cape of Good Hope, a new expedition, commanded by Vasco 
da Gama, arrived in India, in 1498. After that, the Portuguese quickly took control of the lucrative spice 
trade, for almost a century by forbidding other people to trade in the Indian Ocean and seizing the main 
ports through which the spice route passed.  
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The historical sources were also reformulated: 
1. The primary source from a contemporary Portuguese chronicler was maintained; 
2. The two maps of Africa were eliminated as they proved to be difficult to understand by 
pupils - they were replaced by a map showing the Cape route and the goods traded along 
it (this source would convey the information removed from Version A); 
3. The two sources (one written, one pictorial) corroborating the Chinese counterfactual 
hypothesis were kept, but the written source was simplified in its form; 
4. Another pictorial and secondary source was added, suggesting a naval battle between 
European and Arab ships, with a caption taken from Boxer (1969) reinforcing the naval 
superiority of the Portuguese ships. This source would corroborate Version A. 
5. The relics of Turkish power were now presented together with a written source 
(Cipolla, 1965) conveying similar information, for a clear presentation of the intended 
message. This would corroborate Version A in explaining the contradiction between 
Turkish land power and its naval inefficiency. 
It was decided to integrate the introductory information - a short chronology and a world 
map with relevant places marked (Portugal, Cape, India, China), functioning as the initial 
source to be given to the pupils in the material kit. This was intended to be less time-
consuming and easier to use at any moment during the written task than the former 
strategy (a collective activity in class to locate the relevant places on a transparency map). 
c) Decisions after P1: rewriting the questionnaire 
The analysis of the data revealed that the written instrument shed some light on the 
understanding of the concept of provisionality in historical explanation by adolescents, 
but it did not contain enough breadth to generate a clear picture of the target population. It 
was felt to be a priority to improve and extend the number of questions to be included in 
the written task. 
The first question ("Why did the Portuguese manage to establish a maritime empire in the 
Indian Ocean during the sixteenth century?") directly focusing on the issue under 
concern, and appealing for a non-structured response, was kept. Giving valuable 
information on the students' level in terms of explanatory structure, it would function as 
a "launch pad" for second-order reasoning. The second and third set of questions 
(ranking of versions and justification for the first and last rank, and selection of three 
statements about the nature of provisional explanation, in a multiple-choice format) were 
not powerful enough to generate the intended indicators. They provided answers offering 
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what still appeared to be rather vague constructs, only clarified through the individual 
interviews. 
Task 2 was reformulated, and took the following form (not yet the final one): 
Select from the four explanations given (A, B, C and D) the one that you consider: 
a) the best explanation 	  
-what does it explain about the Portuguese domination of the Indian Ocean? 
-what does it not explain about that ? 
b) the worst explanation 	  
-why? 
This reformulation was done because (a) the former task proposing the ranking of 
versions appeared sometimes to produce a tendency to rank versions according to 
personal taste rather than to value them under historical criteria (see analysis of Renato's 
responses, pp. 149, 155), and (b) it intended to make more explicit the criteria of 
explanatory assessment ("What does it explain/what does it not explain".) This task was 
later progressively revised and extended to several items, corresponding to Tasks 3 and 4 
in the final version. 
The responses to the third question (Task 3) constituted one of the sources for extending 
the written questionnaire: the analysis of frequency of responses provided a broad, but 
still hazy picture about some trends in students' ideas; some apparent contradictions in 
responses appeared frequently (e.g., statement 3, "the three explanations vary because 
only one is strictly based on the real facts", was selected together with statement 5, "all 
the explanations read are good: they were produced by respectable authors".) Thus, data 
obtained were not sufficiently illuminating. Open questions encouraging students to 
produce similar ideas in their own words were found to be a more reliable instrument in 
preventing random responses and in allowing fuller answers. A survey of examples of 
questions related to ideas of provisionality used in history teaching books was 
undertaken, as another source of inspiration in the construction of the questionnaire 
(e.g., Mantin and Pulley, 1989; Shuter and Lewis, 1988). Questions for assessing some 
features concerning the provisional nature of historical explanation were then designed 
on the basis of the theoretical framework as systematized in chapter 7. The interviewing 
guidelines from the former approach were maintained: each main question would invite 
the pupil to clarify, justify and explain further each written response given. Once the 
instruments were redesigned, a second-phase (P2) in this process of piloting was 
undertaken. 
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(d) P2 administration and decisions 
The second phase in the piloting process was conducted in two urban schools (in 
Oporto), with a small sample not belonging to the target population (adolescents ranging 
from 12 to 20 years old attending stage 3 (7th-8th-9th grades) at secondary schools 
involved in teacher-training with the University of Minho). The schools selected take 
pupils with a low socio-economic background, although with a quite different 
geographical environment: one school is located in a central, crowded zone in the city; the 
other is in a peripheral, quiet area. 
At this stage of the work, the main goal for the testing was to see how younger, less 
mature adolescents could cope with the restructured task-set. These tasks were given to a 
sample of 30 subjects: 12 young students (13 year-olds selected from two 7th grade 
classes in the peripheral school) and 18 students from a "difficult" class (eighth-graders 
with ages ranging from 13 to 16 years-old, in the central area school). Six follow-up 
interviews selected under the same criteria as in P1 (responses suggesting different levels 
of ideas, or some ambiguous answers) were conducted. This whole second period of 
testing ran during January and February 1993. 
The procedures for administering the written task followed the broad pattern of previous 
testing except for one change concerning the pre-conditions for administration: it was 
decided not to plan a pre-teaching unit intended to facilitate performance in the written 
task. It was supposed that confronting pupils with a quite new task without using a 
facilitating strategy would provide some evidence about how students could handle the 
specific task-set, independently of the pre-teaching unit. The individual interview 
followed broadly the same structure as in the first pilot, that is, pupils were asked to 
explain further, clarify or justify their own answers; it also included some questions 
about the interpretation of items which appeared to have been misunderstood in the light 
of their written responses. Each interview lasted from half to one hour. 
Students appeared to react positively to the latest version of the task-set, in its broad 
lines. The early hypothesis that the proposed tasks would appear too unfamiliar to the 
pupils' previous experience (since they were not much accustomed to discussing or 
comparing different historical versions), which led to the planning of a pre-teaching unit, 
was challenged. Questions about the validity of the pre-teaching unit were then raised, 
since it appeared to be either useless, or to eventually become a source of leading students 
to respond in a given direction - if some teachers were tempted to give specific 
instructions to the pupils beyond what had been planned. In the light of this analysis, the 
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plan to prepare a unit before the written task was abandoned. Also, the content material 
and the questionnaire were reshaped in the light of the developing empirical process to 
enhance clarity and validity. 
(e) P3 administration and decisions 
In order to pursue the goal of getting some information from the extremes of the age-
range to be studied, the enquiry now focused on a sample of more mature students, 
separate from the population formerly defined. Two groups of 11th-graders (aged 16/17, 
and good students, according to their teachers) attending history courses (N=11) 
constituted a volunteer sample to whom the written task was applied. These groups were 
studying in two urban schools in different settings (Oporto, the second Portuguese city; 
Vila Real, a hinterland centre, surrounded by a rural area). The first group (N=5), in 
Oporto, was investigated in January 1993, using the same written task applied in the 
former testing, prior to its revision. The procedures for its administration followed the 
former design. The second group (N=6), in Vila Real, was tested in April, using the 
reformulated written task. It was administered in class by the history teacher. 
As the results suggested some surprising features (see chapter 6, pp.158-61), another 
small sample (N=4) of volunteer undergraduate students attending the History and Social 
Sciences course at University of Minho, in their 4th year of study (prior to the in-service 
teacher training year) was investigated too. The administration of this phase finished in 
May 1993. 
Decisions for administering the final study were then taken. That implied solving 
problems concerning (a) a redefinition of the target population and sampling selection, (b) 
writing up the final draft of the task-set, (c) carrying out a last piloting phase for testing 
the reformulated task-set and, and (d) developing administration procedures prior to the 
final administration. 
(f) Decisions after P3: redefining the population and sampling 
Some difficulty in discriminating perspectiveless from perspectiveful neutrality (see 
chapter 6, pp. 160-1) appeared to be a common feature, even among more mature and 
historically literate students, when thinking about PHE. Such a hypothesis suggested a 
redefinition of the population and the consequent sample to be investigated in the final 
administration. The target population was therefore redefined: 
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Students ranging from 12 to 20 years old, attending the 7th to 11th grades, in 
secondary schools involved in teacher training under supervision of the 
University of Minho.  
It was decided to draw a stratified sample, by grade, from two schools with a 
heterogeneous population as far as socio-economic status was concerned, and with 
different cultural environments: one would be located in the city, one in a town 
functioning mainly as a rural centre. Within each school, three classrooms would be 
selected for reasons of practical availability. In order to get some control over the degree 
of familiarity with the historical topic, 7th, 9th and 11th-graders were selected as most of 
them would have studied the same content during the academic year prior to the testing 
(6th, 8th and 10th grades - see Figure 5.3, pp. 119-21). Only those retained in the same 
grade would have studied the topic less recently. Thus, the sampling design was: 
2 schools X 3 intact classes from grades 7, 9, 11 = 6 classes 
The sample drawn included two classes per grade, one in each school. As was stated 
earlier, Portuguese schools are basically organized by grade and it was convenient to take 
this into account in the sample design. Thus, within each school, one intact classroom 
was randomly selected among classes of each grade (grade representing a stratum). As 
classroom size usually ranges from 20 to 30 students, the sample size was estimated 
between 120 and 150 subjects, which was considered reasonable for the purposes of 
statistical analysis. 
According to the criteria expressed above, two schools were selected: one in Braga 
(Alberto Sampaio School); the other in Vila Verde (Vila Verde School). The sample 
stratified by grade and ages ranging from 12+ to 20+ is summarized in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3 Main sample by age and grades 
GRADE AGE TOTAL 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 N 
7th 23 14 9 2 2 - 50 
9th - 1 17 12 5 5 1 41 
1 lth - - - 6 11 6 1 4 28 
TOTAL 23 15 26 14 13 16 6 1 5 119 
(g) Decisions after P3: revising the task-set 
The presentation of the historical material was refined through the several phases in the 
pilot testing, as well as the written items, which were continuously reshaped, added to or 
excluded, taking into consideration concerns about internal validity and formal clarity. 
Data collected in the final trial were mainly analysed with the specific objective of 
checking the written task adequacy. Some refinements were thus made in the wording of 
the written items. 
The final version of the task-set comprised (a) a set of historical materials to be analysed, 
following versions presented in pp. 129-31, and (b) a set of five written tasks to be 
achieved (see Appendices E and F). 
Task 1 intended to explore ideas about explanatory structure (specifically, explanatory 
modes implicit in the historical explanation) by leading each student to construct her/his 
own explanation through a non-structured response: 
Item 1.1. Explain in your own words why the Portuguese managed to establish a maritime 
empire in the Indian Ocean during the sixteenth century. 
5 Age 12 = 12y. 4m. to 13y.; age 13 = 13y. lm. to 14y.; age 14 = 14y.lm. to 15y.; age 15 = 15y. lm. 
to 16y.; age 16 = 16 y. lm. to 17 y.; age 17 = 17y. lm. to 18y.; age 18 = 18y. lm. to 19y.; 
age 19 = 19y. lm. to 20y.; age 20 = 20y. lm. to 20y. 6 months. 
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This first task also proposed a justification for each personal explanation by using a 
second item in a multiple-choice format. It intended briefly to explore ideas about 
evidential confirmation, which might be stated in terms of positive factors (e.g., 
Portuguese ships were well-armed) or appear as evidence related to potential factors in a 
more complex way (e.g., the Moslem armies were strong or, the Chinese ships were 
bigger and stronger): 
Item 1.2. The statements below are based on the materials you have been given: 
The Portuguese wished to fight the Moslems 
The Moslem armies were strong 
King John had some information about the Indian Ocean 
The Portuguese had moral superiority 
The spice trade was very profitable 
The Chinese ships were bigger and stronger 
The Portuguese ships were well-armed 
Check which of them can justify your own explanation (link the statements chosen and your 
version with an arrow). 
Task 2 intended, firstly, to establish a "bridge" between substantive and second-order 
reasoning: by drawing attention to the different factors elicited by the four versions, 
pupils could more easily think about different explanations for one historical question: 
Item 2.1. Read versions A, B, C and D carefully. What differences do you notice: 
* between versions A and C? 
* between versions B and D? 
Item 2.2. Versions B and C disagree on what? 
These items also provided indicators about ideas on explanatory structure, namely, about 
factorial weight. 
Task 2 intended to elicit reasoning directly dealing with some features of provisionality of 
explanation - questions of objectivity and truth, and explanatory consistency. These items 
used a non-structured format for responses and were inspired by some history textbooks: 
Item 2 3. Why are there different explanations about the Portuguese domination of the Indian 
Ocean? 
Item 2.4. Do you think that one of the explanations can be considered better than any other? 
Justify your answer. 
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Task 3 included items combining structured and non-structured responses to explore 
further criteria of explanatory consistency, especially notions of evidential and logical 
consistency: 
Item 3.1. Rank the four versions given in order of importance as an historical explanation: 
1st: Version 	  
2nd: Version 	  
3rd: Version 	  
4th: Version 	  
Item 3.2. In what respects do you consider the first better than the second in explaining why 
the Portuguese managed to control the Indian Ocean? 
Item 3.3. Do you consider the first version better justified by the sources? 
Why? 
Item 3.4. Justify your last two choices (versions ranked 3 and 4). 
Task 4 focused on the nature of explanatory completeness, yet related to explanatory 
consistency, and objectivity and truth: 
(a) the limits of an explanation: 
Item 4.1. The best historical explanation of the Portuguese domination of the Indian Ocean 
must include the following versions (circle those you choose): 
Versions A - B - C - D - E 
Item 4.2. What does the best historical explanation not manage to explain about the 
Portuguese domination of the Indian Ocean? 
(b) the meaning and possibilities of a complete and a good explanation: 
Item 4.3. It is clear that nowadays a complete explanation about the question discussed here 
already exists: 
I Agree - Maybe - I Disagree 
Justify your choice. 
Item 4.4. A good historical explanation always is ... (underline a word in each line): 
Total - Incomplete 
True - Valid 
Certain - Probable - Possible - Impossible to know 
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Task 5 intended to trace a general picture of the nature of explanation, through: 
a) a structured item (a True, False and Don't know option about general statements): 
Item 5.1. Past events happened only once. However, there are several explanations of them. 
Why? 
Write T (true); DK (don't know); F (false) following each statement: 
1. They only vary in the way of telling 
2. It always depends on the author's personal opinion 
3. It's necessary to discover and sum up the real facts 
4. Only some authors manage to be totally neutral 
5. Each author fmds out different real facts 
6. Each time and place explains in its own way 
7. The author establishes relations among facts and justifies those relations 
8. No one can give the certain explanation 
b) a multiple-choice answer followed by an open-ended justification to generate an 
indicator of the notion of historical objectivity tied to methodological criteria: 
Item 5.2. Who would explain the Portuguese domination in the Indian Ocean better? 
a) A recent author, because she/he can compare different points of view, 
b) An important author, because she/he has a neutral point of view? 
c) A witness at that time because she/he saw what really happened? 
d) A Portuguese participating in those events, because she/he lived them 
Justify your answer. 
A follow-up interview, initially planned for probing, clarifying and deepening the 
meaning of the answers given by some students, was intended to contribute to a clearer 
picture. It was assumed too, as initially decided, that some intervening questions, 
especially to see the consistency of specific ideas, such as neutrality and perspective, 
could be formulated. The interview guide was adapted to the final version of the written 
task. It consisted of some main questions, each of them being followed by some sub-
questions so as to explore responses further (see Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.4 Interview guide 
1. About 1.1.: Restate your own explanation. 
2. About 1.2.: Why didn't you choose the other statements? 
3. About 2.3./4.: Explain your answers further [to explore, in particular, specific words 
suggesting relevant notions or eventual contradictions]. 
4. About 3.2./3.4.: Explain your ideas further. 
5. About 4.1./2.: Explain further. 
6. About 4.3. Explain further. Compare with your answer in 2.4. [to discuss possible 
contradictions]. 
5. About 4.4. Explain further, including some relationships among the different ideas selected. 
6. About 5.1.: Clarify some statements seen as true or false; consider contradictions between 
no 1, no2....no8. 
7. About 5.2.: Explain your answer further. Why not the other options? 
The instruments now appeared capable of providing some useful indicators of students' 
constructs about provisional historical explanation, which would be explored within three 
main conceptual clusters, now densified through the distinction of some subcategories:6 
- Explanatory structure: 
- Explanatory mode 
- Explanatory weight 
- Explanatory consistency: 
- Consistency with evidence 
- Logical consistency 
- Objectivity and truth 
- Methodological detachment 
- Truth 
The correspondence between the several items of the task-set and these constructs, is 
discussed in the light of the theoretical framework, in chapter 7. 
(h) P4 administration 
Once the population was redefined and the sample identified, a final trial of the task-set 
was administered to a small number of students matching those of the sample selected for 
the final study: N=21 students attending the 7th , 9th and 1 1 th grade, in 2 schools similar 
6These three conceptual clusters were generated through a qualitative analysis, and had no relation to the 
cluster analysis used in the statistic field. 
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to those selected for the final administration (one within a rural setting, one in the city, 
both with a heterogeneous population in terms of socio-economic status). The interview 
was conducted with six students, two in each grade. The results were specially analysed, 
to focus on improvement of the task-set, although they contributed to the refinement of 
the theoretical categorization as well. 
The final study 
The time for collecting the final data had arrived. The final administration involved (a) 
previous arrangements prior to implementing the administration, and (b) the 
administration itself. 
Arrangements for the final administration 
Formal contacts with the two schools selected were established through a covering letter 
addressed to the President of each Directing Board. This covering letter was supported by 
the President of the Institute of Education of the University of Minho (see Appendix H). 
This procedure was adopted in order to get permission for collecting data taking into 
account specific requirements derived from methodological concerns: 
- a random selection of classrooms undertaken by the researcher herself; 
- arrangements for special permission for a two-hour period for the written task 
in each classroom (each subject is usually taught for a 45-minute period, followed by a 
break of 5 to 20 minutes). 
Final administration 
Once the required arrangements were completed, a schedule for the administration of the 
written task was established for the first of June 1993. The follow-up interviews were 
individually arranged after a first approach to data analysis. 
The written task was administered in each classroom by the researcher herself. It started 
with a brief presentation of the broad goal of the study: "to explore pupils' ideas on 
history", thus contributing to teachers' better understanding of students and to better 
teaching. The initial instructions were stated as follows: 
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The goal of this study is to investigate students' ideas about historical explanation - constructed 
by historians or even given by yourselves. For that, you will be given a set of historical 
materials about a concrete issue some of which may be familiar to you. You may use your 
previous knowledge, but it is important to read and use the material available too. The topic is: 
"The Portuguese Oriental Empire". 
The written task-set was then given to each student. It was emphasised to the students 
that: 
You are going to work on these four versions: A, B, C and D. The historical sources are 
materials important to help in your answers, but you must concentrate mainly on the four 
versions given. 
The historical material was read aloud by the administrator and pupils were asked to raise 
questions about the meaning of unknown or ambiguous passages. The instructions were 
given in the same way; however, the youngest students - those attending the 7th grade -
had some substantive information about some specific words: "the Moslems are the 
people following the religion of Allah", "India is located here [shown on the map] and 
Calicut is there". After the reading of the historical material, the five tasks to be achieved 
were enunciated. Finally, attention was deliberately drawn to the difference between two 
different questions: 
The main question which you must concentrate on is: "Why did the Portuguese manage to 
control the Indian Ocean?" rather than: "Why did the Portuguese manage to arrive in India?" 
This was done on the assumption (reinforced through the former data analysis) that 
pupils might tend to focus on a more familiar question rather than on a new approach. 
This period of instructions was videotaped in each classroom and observed before 
administration to the next class in order to maintain stability in instruction format. The 
written items were individually completed at the students' own pace, during the two-hour 
period. The interviews were also individually conducted and audio-taped, following the 
guidelines and procedures devised a priori, and lasted between half and one hour. This 
process of interviewing was carried out during the second half of June of 1993, the 
administration period then being concluded. 
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Summary 
This chapter presented the method applied in the Main study. This involved a pilot carried 
out through four phases (P1, P2, P3 and P4) and a final collection of data (F). (pilot 1, 
pilot 2 and pilot 3 provided data for a progressive generation of a model of students' 
ideas, and F provided data for the main analysis). Population and samples, research 
techniques, instruments and administration of the several pilots and F, were described. 
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6 Reflections and decisions during the pilots 
This chapter discusses the main lines of the data analysis carried out during the pilot 
process. It presents the corresponding decisions on the generation of categories of pupils' 
ideas about PHE and on a redefinition of the target population. The methodological 
framework applied in the analysis is given before reflection on data obtained in the several 
piloting phases. 
Framework for data analysis 
Following the administration of the task-set (a written task and some follow-up 
interviews) in each piloting phase, according to the methodological criteria discussed in 
chapter 5, a qualitative analysis was carried out. It intended to make sense of data in terms 
of the concept of provisional historical explanation. It was thought that the model of 
grounded theory, developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967), Strauss (1987), Strauss and 
Corbin (1991) could provide the tools (analytic procedures) for inspiring a set of "rules of 
thumb" so that data could be interpreted in a systematic fashion. The definition of 
grounded theory as a style of qualitative research "that is inductively derived from the 
study of the phenomenon it represents ... it is discovered, developed, and provisionally 
verified through systematic data collection and analysis of data" (Strauss and Corbin, 
1991, p. 23) was considered to fit the aim of this study. 
In grounded theory, the basic operations start with the generation of concepts directing 
data collection, and inspired in previous literature, followed by an open coding of data, 
that is, by the "breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing, and categorizing 
data" (Strauss and Corbin, 1991, p. 61) to validate and develop those concepts identified. 
The a priori categorization presented in Figure 4.1 (see p. 89) assumed a set of levels of 
progression and was revised in the light of data from the exploratory studies by means of 
a holistic approach, giving rise to a reformulated model (see p. 108). Each level integrated 
a set of ideas which were still not fully clarified in terms of the different constructs 
entangled in them. During the piloting phases, data began to be analysed in a more 
systematic fashion. Firstly, they were treated in an open coding approach: pupils' 
statements and options were examined and coded as possible indicators of different 
constructs identified (on the basis of the theoretical survey presented in chapters 2 and 3 
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as related to provisional explanation.) The operation of open coding provided the basic 
information for selecting from the whole sample some subjects to be interviewed, in Pilot 
1, 2, 3 and 4. After the written task, a set of answers which appeared to give indicators of 
different levels or promised to be interesting for analysis (some creative, some ambiguous 
answers) were selected to be explored further in an interview, according to the interview 
guide as shown in Figure 5.4 (p. 140). 
Pupils' ideas were progressively clarified and categorized after the pilot into three main 
conceptual clusters (as enunciated in chapter 5, and analysed in chapter 7): 
1. Explanatory structure (cluster S) in terms of explanatory mode (construct M) and 
factorial weight (W); 
2. Explanatory consistency (cluster C) in terms of evidential consistency (E) and logical 
consistency (L); 
3. Objectivity and truth (cluster 0) in terms of methodological detachment (D) and truth 
(T). 
Each cluster was tentatively analysed in its properties, which were dimensionalized 
according to the responses given by pupils. This operation may be considered an 
application of axial coding, the second type of coding in grounded theory, consisting of 
"a set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open coding, 
by making connections between categories" (Strauss and Corbin, 1991, p. 96). Through 
P1, only cluster 0 was clarified and dimensionalized, constituting at this stage the main 
focus of enquiry; within cluster S, a clear distinction between a descriptive and an 
explanatory mode (construct M) began to be made explicit, but factorial weight (W) was 
only hazily considered; cluster C was clarified during the Pilot in one of its subcategories 
- evidential consistency (E) - but another subcategory - logical consistency (L), in terms 
of internal coherence and plausibility - was only fully considered in the final study.1  
The operation of integrating constructs to form a theory was loosely undertaken ab initio. 
This task may be seen as related to selective coding, that is, "the process of selecting the 
core category, systematically relating it to other categories, validating those relationships, 
and filling in categories that need further refinement and development" (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1991, p. 116). During the piloting phases there was no intention to achieve a 
close core categorization around the three clusters (S, C, 0), but merely to improve the 
conceptual framework as a working hypothesis. Nonetheless, data were coded as 
empirical indicators of ideas implying different levels of thinking to integrate a model 
progressively rearranged according to new data. 
1P1 data are analysed in pp. 146-55. 
Reformulating the categorization 
The initial categorization constructed during the exploratory studies stressed a logical 
progression about ideas of objectivity in historical explanation. This progression ranged 
from an authoritative pattern (acceptance of explanations given, thinking being centred on 
substantive information) towards awareness of methodological neutrality and perspective, 
understood in a context of social production. The former model was given in Figure 4.4, 
p. 108. It was progressively reformulated in the light of the fresh data obtained in an 
individual basis, during the several piloting phases. Its version after the pilots is given in 
Figure 6.3, p. 164. 
Categorization after P1  
The analysis of data collected in P1 permitted some insight into pupils' ideas about the 
three conceptual clusters presented above. 
A restricted explanatory pattern displaying some fragmented information was 
discriminated from a more elaborately constructed explanation. Marisa, for example, 
constructed an account made up of fragments from version B. 
Marisa, 16 years old, 8th grade: 
The Chinese fleet was withdrawn, it was just a very short time before [sic], but it was not only 
in relation to the development [sic], but in terms of world economy, thus leaving the door to 
the Indian Ocean open. The Portuguese followed. 
Marisa's version may implicitly contain some explanatory intention (the Chinese 
permitted the Portuguese to enter the Indian ocean); nonetheless, its construction might be 
seen as predominantly descriptive, integrating excerpts in an apparently meaningless way 
from Pacey's explanation ("in relation to the development ... in terms of world 
economy"). 
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Other responses conveyed clear explanatory patterns with different gradations as it will be 
discussed. Three examples are given below. Explicit explanatory words are underlined 
and substantive factors mentioned are in italics. 
Patricia, 15 years old, 9th grade: 
The Portuguese could establish a maritime empire in the Indian Ocean as a result of the 
discovery of the maritime route to India. With this discovery, the Portuguese began to transport 
large amounts of the famous oriental spices to Europe. 
VItor, 15 years old, 7th grade. 
The Portuguese could establish a maritime empire in the Indian ocean during the sixteenth 
century, because the Chinese visiting the same ports 60 years before withdrew to other places, 
while the Portuguese arrived and did not encounter an efficient challenge from the Moslem 
fleet. If the Chinese were there, the case for the Portuguese exploration of establishing a 
maritime empire would be complicated. 
Renato, 13 years old, 8th grade: 
The Portuguese could establish a maritime empire because the powerful Chinese fleet withdrew, 
because in Asia the equally powerful Egyptians and Turks had no sea power, that is, they were 
not turned to the sea; also, the Moslem fleet was not an efficient challenge. 
Patricia gave an explanation relying on a temporal step (the maritime route to India), as a 
(or the?) necessary condition. The spice factor appeared as a consequence of the 
discovery, without consideration of other factors directly related to the control of the 
Indian Ocean. Vftor presented two interlinked factors - the Chinese and the Moslem 
factors, but stressing the former in a counterfactual statement ("if the Chinese..."). 
Renato mentioned the Chinese and the Egyptians/Turks factors, discriminating this factor 
from that related to Moslem naval inefficiency - the latter appearing as a facilitating 
condition, as the word "also" might suggest. 
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Responses on task 2 ("rank explanations A, B, C, and D - version D being your own 
version") were treated as indicators of evidential consistency (construct E). Explanations 
A, B and C were: 
EXPLANATION A 
The so-envied spices ... ivory, precious stones, all these were provided by Asia ... 
Openly defying the Moslem domain and combating the Islamic faith, the Portuguese had to meet 
as their main enemies in Asia the Egyptians and the Turks ... It helped the Portuguese 
considerably that none of the major Moslem countries was openly turned towards the sea or based 
its power upon the sea.  
EXPLANATION B 
The Chinese fleets had visited these ports sixty years before but had now been totally withdrawn, 
and the Islamic naval challenge to the Portuguese, when it came, was ineffective ... 
Had the Chinese still been patrolling the Indian Ocean when the Portuguese arrived, one can only 
speculate what might have happened. The decision to withdraw the Chinese fleet (60 years before) 
was a momentous one, not only for what it portended with regard to China's own development, but 
also for what it meant in world affairs to have the 'door left open ' (to the Europeans) into the 
Indian Ocean. 
EXPLANATION C 
The discovery of the maritime route to India was the most glorious enterprise in this century... 
After verifying the communication between the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean ..., concluding the 
task which the Portuguese had been working for so hard was just a matter of tenacity and time.  
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Patricia: 
C [version ranked first] because it is the most illuminating for justifying Portuguese 
domination in the Indian Ocean. 
A-B-D [versions ranked second to fourth] - Because following explanation C, this is the 
sequence which pleases me most and is justified [by the question?]. 
Vitor: 
B [version ranked first] because explanation B is more detailed and refers to the Chinese issue 
and the others do not. 
D-A-C [versions ranked second to fourth]- Because D, A, C complete B, which I find the most 
complete. 
Renato: 
A [version ranked first] because we needed spices (or ivory and precious stones, etc.) and we had 
no enemies. 
D [version ranked second] 
C [version ranked third] 
B [version ranked fourth] because the hypothesis of us (Portuguese) meeting the Chinese fleet 
on the maritime route was put. 
Patricia's words "the most illuminating ... pleases me most and justifies" seemed to be 
worthy of clarification (see comments about her interview on p. 154). Vitor seemed to 
give clear indicators of a summing-up pattern, stressing quantity of facts, the notion of 
factor not seeming to be clearly distinguished from mere facts. Renato selected two 
factors - a motive and an external condition - using versions given as evidence ("we had 
no enemies"), but his justification for the last rank (if "we meet the Chinese fleet...") 
seemed to be based on emotional criteria. Renato's interview showed that it was the 
phrasing of the question (rank in a decreasing order of preference) that led him to reason 
in terms of personal interests in the written task; later in the interview (see his responses 
on p. 155), he was able to produce more elaborate ideas than those expressed in this 
excerpt. 
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Task 3, which had been designed on the basis of statements produced by students in the 
exploratory study, was seen as providing indicators of objectivity and truth (cluster 0). It 
was analysed in terms of frequency of responses to the following statements: 
1. The three explanations are practically the same because they deal with the same events. 
2. Each explanation presents a different interpretation of the same events because history is 
always influenced by the author's personal opinion. 
3. The three explanations vary because only one is strictly based on the real facts: in the 
other two their authors interpret the events according to their own point of view . 
4. The three explanations vary because historical interpretations are always influenced by the 
time, culture and society in which an author lives. 
5. All the explanations given are good: they were produced by respectable authors. 
6. Only one of the explanations is good because its author based it on the the real facts; the 
others are not so good because they present some distortion of the past. 
7. All the historical explanations given can be accepted as good but we prefer one or another 
according to our own point of view. 
8. One of the explanations is the best because it is more balanced in using and comparing 
different sources. 
9. Only one of the explanations is truly historical: it is a sum of the correct information 
contained in texts and documents. 
10. The only truly historical explanation is the one that is similar to what we have learnt in 
history books. 
11. Different historical explanations of the same issue can be accepted; but some can be 
viewed as better when the author revises the facts, including those exaggerated or omitted in 
previous explanations. 
12. A witness from that time would explain the situation better than today's authors. 
Table 6.1 shows the frequency of these statements chosen by pupils of different ages. 
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Table 6.1 Frequency of statements chosen in P1, by age 
STATEMENT AGE 
12 13 14 15 16 17 19 TOTAL 
(N24) (N20) (N17) (N19) (N7) (N2) (N1) (N90) 
1 2 1 1 4 
2 10 7 10 9 4 1 1 42 
3 10 5 6 1 1 1 24 
4 6 8 3 8 4 1 30 
5 8 7 3 2 - 20 
6 5 2 4 6 3 1 21 
7 11 8 11 7 4 1 1 43 
8 7 3 2 1 13 
9 4 1 3 1 9 
10 2 2 - 1 5 
11 9 12 10 7 3 1 42 
12 12 9 5 8 5 39 
The most frequent occurrences (42-43 responses) concerned statements dealing with: 
(a) simplistic notions of personal opinion (statements 2 and 7); 
(b) a more elaborate notion of explanatory evaluation (statement 11). 
The statement emphasising the value of the witness as an explanation producer 
(statement 12) was the next most frequent option (N=39). 
The three pupils whose answers on task 2 were quoted above chose the following 
statements (as enunciated on the previous page): 
Patricia: statements 2 (personal opinion), 7 (preference according to a point of view), 11 
(objectivity); 
Vftor: statements 3 (truth), 6 (neutrality), 9 (the correct explanation); 
Renato: statements 2, 4 (contingency), 7, 8 (balance), 11 (objectivity). 
Patricia seemed to enhance personal principles instead of historical criteria, although she 
had also selected statement 11, which was thought a more elaborate choice - or she might 
have reacted to ideas like "exaggeration" or "omission". The selection made by Vitor 
appeared to consistently reinforce the idea of summing-up the right facts. Renato included 
some personal principles in his selection (statements 2, 7) but showed a more elaborate 
choice while pointing to some historical criteria represented by statements 4, 8 and 11. 
After the written task, thirteen pupils were chosen for being interviewed. The analysis of 
this first whole set of data gathered on an individual basis permitted a tentative 
redefinition of the theoretical categories of adolescent thinking about PHE - although the 
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main preoccupation, at this point, was to improve the written task in order to provide 
valid and reliable empirical indicators.2 
A picture of each level was constructed, mainly based on ideas clarified during the 
interviews. After P1, the former categorization drawn up on the basis of the exploratory 
studies was revised and an attempt was made to make more explicit the concepts 
considered to be essential characteristics of each pattern of thinking. 
Level 1, now labelled "Inconsistency", was drawn up focusing on two ideas: explanatory 
structure (S), and a second-order thinking on evidential consistency and objectivity (E 
and 0). Each response, as a whole, would be categorized in level 1 if in construct S its 
mode were predominantly descriptive or an incoherent explanation. Perplexity or logical 
incoherence in second-order reasoning (E and 0) were seen as typical of this level. 
Corresponding to the former "Authority: Information", a distinction between 
predominantly descriptive and explanatory reasoning began to be made explicit , the latter 
being typical of the next levels.3  
The intermediate levels (2 and 3) were seen as already conveying an explanatory mode 
(M) and simultaneously showing both some awareness of evidential consistency (E) and 
of objectivity (0). Giving substance to the interpretation of data, it was felt necessary to 
discriminate between these two patterns (levels 2 and 3). 
Level 2, now labelled "Stereotypes", was seen as tied to a concern for the authority of 
what was previously known (formerly, "Authority: Dogmatism"), tending to ignore or 
undervalue new information, as in the following examples: 
Helena, 16 years old, 9th grade: 
Explanation A is more explanatory, it refers to spices ... Explanation B is very vague, it's 
only about the Chinese ... I don't see any relation to the question ... China had a powerful 
fleet, but they didn't go to know new people, I never learnt it. On discoveries they were very 
poor. 
2The reformulation of the task-set after P1 is discussed in chapter 5, pp. 131-2. 
3 This distinction between descriptive and explanatory reasoning was inspired by Peel's work (1967a, b, 
1971). 
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Patricia: 
The discovery of the maritime route to India, in explanation C] struck me ... It [the question] 
was concerned with that ... I knew that before, I had some ideas on that. I have never heard of 
the others ... or I never developed a great interest in them... 
Int.: Which is the strangest, least familiar explanation for you? 
Patricia: Version B ... if I have ever heard of it, it never struck me... 
At this level, the explanatory mode is grasped, but the use of a tight common sense (an 
emotional rather than an historical criterion) seemed to be the basis for assessing 
competing explanations, no matter what evidence might exist. An authoritative pattern 
centred on tacit knowledge as in the examples above ("I never studied them" or, "If I have 
ever heard of it, it never struck me") or on patriotism, in other cases, might be apparent 
here. The latter was suggested, for example, by Luisa's response. 
Luisa, 13 years old, 7th grade: 
Version B shows that the Chinese had no means for fighting against us, because we were strong (due to 
a better knowledge, friendship and military equipment provided by the discoveries). Version A shows 
that we were so strong that even the Moslems were jealous of us. Version C shows how the colonies 
were useful to us. 
Version A has most in its favour because it shows that the Portuguese were so great that even the 
Moslems were jealous of us. 
Level 3, a more critical level now labelled "Conventional positivism", implied a special 
preoccupation with evidence on which to base the explanation. The real facts conveyed by 
the existing sources should be summed up in order to get the real explanation. Vitor's 
response might serve as an example of this pattern: 
Vftor: 
Authors go to the witnesses to seek explanations, for giving their own explanation, they sum 
up them all and they do their own explanation. 
Within such patterns (levels 2 and 3), a tendency to value direct observation seemed to be 
present, as Vitor stated.4 
...witnesses are better ... watching everything would allow one to explain better. 
4In Pl, the task-set did not yet allow for a distinction between witness and agent. 
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A frequent occurrence of the notion of personal opinion coexisting with notions of real 
facts was observed in the patterns indicated above. Patricia, for example, concentrated her 
attention on familiar factors only. 
Patricia: 
I chose statement 2 [Each explanation presents a different interpretation on the same events 
because history is always influenced by the author's personal opinion] because one has always 
an idea that leads to the development of something more and more. Even when authors want to 
base themselves on facts only - maybe because they have curiosity - they will try to develop 
and give their opinions, they won't base themselves only on what they know, they will develop 
their creativity ... 
... it would be very monotonous if one based oneself on real facts only! 
Patricia produced emerging ideas about the historian's role in historical conclusions: her 
criterion seems to come from everyday assumptions and it can be applied to fiction as 
well as to history if it is a vague criterion of creativity as opposed to monotony - she often 
stressed that she chose version C because she was a person with plenty of curiosity; or, it 
might convey a tentative notion about human perspective in historical interpretation, stated 
at the level of personal opinion added to real facts ("even when authors want to base 
themselves on facts only ... they will try to develop and give their opinions"). 
Concerns about neutrality were expressed more or less explicitly in the most elaborate of 
these two intermediate patterns. 
Hugo, 14 years old, 9th grade: 
I think that some explanations have a neutral point of view, when historians limit themselves 
to show the facts without assuming their own points of view. 
At this intermediate level ideas of neutrality and point of view apparently contradict each 
other: must personal opinion be avoided in a valid explanation (to show facts without 
assuming a point of view) or is it integrated in the idea of methodological neutrality ("a 
neutral point of view")? Since in this phase of the enquiry a major focus was put on 
observing indicators of awareness of perspective in historical production, the idea of 
perspectiveless neutrality was integrated in level 3, named "Conventional positivism".5  
The former distinction within level 2 (positivism) of two sub-levels (sum and consensus), 
such as was categorized in the model after the exploratory studies (p. 108), was 
5A positivist pattern revealing a concern for an "absolute" neutrality, that is, a perspectiveless neutrality, 
was subsequently discriminated from that suggesting a mere notion of concern for quantity of factors. 
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provisionally abandoned, since both sub-patterns were seen as not yet discriminating 
awareness of perspective. 
Level 4, labelled "Restricted perspective" and centred on the development of the idea of 
existing different historical perspectives included in cluster 0, did not register a profound 
shift from the exploratory studies to P1. Some responses seemed to indicate an emerging 
pattern recognising that each historical explanation is more or less consistently 
constructed on the basis of evidence, from a specific point of view. The notion of point of 
view is tentatively discriminated from the notion of bias. 
Renato: 
Well, I think that they all [explanations] were a bit influenced by personal opinion ... but I think 
that only these two explain better ... [Explanation] C practically doesn't say anything about it, it 
only says that it was a question of time and that is nothing ... 
My personal opinion is interfering with the interpretation I have given ... and personal opinion 
influences all historians' interpretations as well. 
Renato recognised perspective as a genuine historical feature ("personal opinion 
influences all historians' interpretations") and he discriminated valid explanations 
(explanations A and B) from a less powerful version (explanation C). 
Level 5, named "Contextual perspective" was hypothesized as revealing awareness of 
such concepts as author's perspective entangled in the notion of methodological 
detachment related to cultural background. It was considered as an elaborate pattern of the 
conceptual cluster objectivity, and of existing historical standards for assessing 
explanations (still a vague conceptualization of explanatory consistency). This level was 
kept as an ideal grounded on theoretical assumptions, not found in the empirical data 
obtained, but which could eventually occur in subsequent data.6  
Summing-up, the recategorization after data analysis of P1 took the form shown in 
Figure 6.1. 
6This level was withdrawn during the analysis of the final study (F) since no indicators of it were 
observed. 
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Figure 6.1 The model after P1 
LEVEL 1 INCONSISTENCY 
Descriptive mode 
Second order reasoning related to information, or perplexity 
LEVEL 2 STEREOTYPES 
Explanatory mode 
Tight common-sense criteria in explanatory assessment 
Personal opinion plainly accepted 
Explanations from primary sources often valued 
LEVEL 3 CONVENTIONAL POSITIVISM 
Explanatory mode 
Historical explanations accepted if based on reliable evidence, to be summed-up 
Personal opinion accepted or rejected 
Perspectiveless neutrality valued 
Explanations from primary sources often valued 
LEVEL 4 RESTRICTED PERSPECTIVE 
Explanatory mode 
Point of view tentatively recognised as legitimate 
Concern for neutrality as a tentative balance 
LEVEL 5 CON TEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE 
Explanatory mode 
Point of view recognised as part of an objective explanation and within its context of production 
Concern for neutrality as a tentative balance 
Thus, the model about pupils' ideas about PHE evolved from the exploratory studies to 
pilot 1 as shown in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2 The model from explorations to P1 
After explorations 	 After P1 
LEVEL 1 Authority 
A Information 
B Dogmatism 
LEVEL 2 Positivism 
A Sum 
B Consensus 
LEVEL 3 Perspective 
    
> LEVEL 1 Inconsistency 
	> LEVEL 2 Stereotypes 
	
> LEVEL 3 Conventional positivism 
    
    
    
   
> LEVEL 4 Restricted perspective 
   
LEVEL 4 Contextual perspective 	 > LEVEL 5 Contextual perspective 
Reflections after P2 
Pilot 2 was carried out in order to see how the youngest subjects of the target population 
could cope with the task-set. The aim was to improve the task-set in the light of the 
performance observed in these young pupils (13-14 year-olds, mainly). Beyond this 
concrete objective, this phase also provided some clarification of pupils' ideas about 
PHE. 
If some of these adolescents showed perplexity or difficulties in reasoning on the issues 
proposed, relying on substantive pieces of information, others revealed a more elaborate 
reasoning about provisional explanation. 
Elisabete, 13 years old, 7th grade: 
I think that each one [explanation] has its own value, but not all of them are right. If someone 
gives her/his opinion, it is because she/he studied, verified and collected data... 
Int.: And how did she/he verify it? 
Elisabete: Through documents, relics 	  
Int.: And can you explain in what sense you said that "each one has its own value"? 
Elisabete: All opinions must be valid 	  if those authors were alive they should discuss the 
issue and see whether it was possible to join the hypotheses, or only one was true... because, 
surely, there must exist not only these hypotheses, but many more... 
Elisabete seemed to look at explanations as hypotheses which might be "verified" 
according to evidence; this might already reveal an idea of provisionality far away from a 
less critical assertion of a mere sum of different versions. The ideal of a consensual 
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explanation - or the right explanation as a solution to the existence of different opinions -
is expressed, suggesting some overlapping between interpretation and explanation, or a 
realist assumption about the existence of the true real factors of the occurrence. 
Thus, data collected in this phase suggested that among the youngest pupils of the target 
population ideas ranging from a descriptive mode to explanatory patterns might be found. 
Some pupils revealed elaborate ideas of methodological neutrality and expressed the need 
for a consensus in historical explanation. 
Reflections during P3 
Pilot 3 was carried out in order to get some information at the highest level of ideas about 
PHE that could be found among adolescents attending school in the Northern regions of 
Portugal.? Among the sample surveyed in P1 and P2, pupils attending the last stage of 
compulsory school (7th to 9th grade) seemed to move from an information-centred, 
descriptive level towards explanatory levels, in which ideas about the provisional nature 
of explanation might begin with contradictory and stereotyped constructs, and progress 
towards an assumed acceptance of an underlying author's perspective entangled in 
historical criteria (see Renato's response, p. 155). The hypothesis of observing possible 
ideas of level 4, contextual perspective, as pictured in the model after P 1 , led to an 
attempt to find indicators of this level in more historically literate pupils. Thus, a sample 
of students beyond the target population (which was, until this phase, 12 to 20-year-olds 
attending the 7th, 8th and 9th grades) was surveyed, as described in chapter 5, p. 134 (11 
eleventh-graders and 4 university students). 
An open coding of the eleventh-graders' data revealed some non-expected features of the 
progression of students' ideas about PHE during the schooling process. This analysis 
suggested the hypothesis that the pattern of ideas about PHE, among the most historically 
literate students, might imply the following four features: 
1. A concern for intertwined factors in a constructed narrative, valuing the quantity of 
information as necessary to the aim of attaining a total explanation. 
Susana, 16 years old, 11th grade (Oporto school): 
It was during the reign of King John that the dream of getting to India (as it was conceived at 
the time, a grandiose and remote dream) began to be prepared with full consciousness of being 
a successful project. For that purpose, information about those distant fortified cities began to 
?This sample was constituted by 11th-graders from two Northern places: Oporto (the second Portuguese 
city) and Vila Real (an hinterland town), and students at the University of Minho 
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be assembled ... what was expected was not strange at all, nor were the expected goals 
(gathering and buying products). This is one of the many important "steps" that contributed to 
the Portuguese control of the Orient [...] 
... [Also] new techniques in the naval area (maps, new types of ships as well as equipment) 
which would take the Portuguese dream further forward, now that it had materialized in action, 
... the former expeditions along the African coast paving the way to a greater knowledge of the 
Atlantic Ocean [...] 
Portuguese reception by oriental people was not very suitable for a long, peaceful stay. That 
was easily dealt with by the Portuguese artillery, which was superior to that of the Moslems. 
But army power was not enough and mental strength was required. And then opinions diverged: 
should the empire be consolidated ... by controlling the sea ... or by conquering the land? [...] 
If unity makes strength we may conclude that another essential cause was the lack of Arabian 
unity, which made their great power weaker. The Portuguese were left alone, after the 
dismantling of the Moslem routes; (for the moment) they could easily establish their empire 
since it brought good profits for all [the Europeans]. 
I chose explanation D [her own explanation] because I think once more that it is fundamental 
to look at the destruction of the Moslems as well as the conquest of fortified cities. 
Susana's explanation traced long-term conditions (a goal, a careful plan, progressive 
naval advance) and short-term conditions (Portuguese military and will power, Arabian 
political division). Some of these conditions appear as necessary, some as facilitating of 
the Portuguese success in the Orient. This might suggest a consonance with the structural 
approach.8  
2. Explanatory consistency, not only in terms of evidential corroboration and refutation 
but also in terms of plausibility, seems to be grasped. It appeared to be a criterion applied 
by Susana to the assessment of explanations A and B, which she distinguished from a 
mere description conveyed by version C (early version, p. 148). 
In my personal opinion those explanations [A, B and C] don't present the fundamental causes 
of the event. Explanation A bases its major point on the sea and war, which for me is only 
part of the events, but not the most important at issue; without absolute control on land 
through the establishment of Portuguese fortresses, the durability of the Portuguese maritime 
empire would be a matter of some fragile years and wouldn't justify the solid monopoly 
installed. Explanation B looks only at the hypothetical side of the question. Explanation C 
8 A structural and a poststructural approach in history, influenced by the Annales school, has been 
common in the teaching of history at secondary and university level, in Portugal. This approach is 
discussed in chapter 2, pp. 50-3. 
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doesn't give causes but, on the contrary, presents what really happened; if we want to list what 
gave the Portuguese consolidation in the East, supposing or telling it is not enough, but we 
must preferably enunciate the factors which contributed to achieve it. 
3. Some tendency to minimize the counterfactual condition (Chinese withdrawal) - just 
because it did not really happen, or as a strategy to undervalue new or not-favoured 
information - might be present. This is a realist approach, on critical grounds.9  
Susana: 
Explanation B [...] focuses on something that could really have happened and that perhaps could 
have changed the course of history, but it did not happen in reality, thus it didn't interfere with 
Portuguese domination. 
4. Some awareness of objectivity in explanations seems apparent. All students in the 
Oporto school (N=5), working on the early version of the task-set, selected statement 11 
("different historical explanations on the same issue can be accepted, but some can be 
viewed as better when the author revises the facts, including those exaggerated or omitted 
in previous explanations"); in the Vila Real school, where a written task already revised in 
the light of preceding responses was given, two in six subjects chose a recent author for 
better explaining the historical issue. 
Sofia, 17 years old (Vila Real school): 
[A recent author would explain the situation better] because obviously she/he would have more 
recent and truer data (at least she/he would have techniques in order to assess impartiality) for 
achieving the best research according to the time in which her/his study is done and according 
to the sources at the time. The chance for getting more historical documents about a true, and 
richer in information, would increase. 
However, data also appear to suggest that: 
4. Together with these critical notions about historical standards, a positivist notion of 
perspectiveless neutrality persists. Susana, for example, who produced an elaborate 
argument about evidential consistency, selected statements 3 and 6, (the three 
explanations vary because only one is strictly based on the real facts; only one of the 
explanations is good because its author based himself on the real facts). Conflicting 
notions on point of view and neutral explanation appears to be a frequent pattern of ideas 
among Portuguese historically literate students. A similar attitude, but coexisting with a 
9A realist approach may assume different levels of ideas - from a naive assumption to a more critical 
position implying awareness of some methodological standards for assessing an historical explanation. A 
discussion of the concept of critical realism is given in chapter 3, pp. 73-4. 
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subjectivist (and, sometimes, overtly nationalistic) trend, was suggested by some 
students' responses in Vila Real. Some examples are given below. 
Luis, 17 years old: 
Maybe [one of the explanations might be considered the best], because although all of them 
had contributed to the maritime domination, I believe that those who exalt the great will 
power, courage, knowledge and, of course, military force, explain the causes of this 
domination better , because above all I believe, and I shall always do, in the great value of our 
ancestors. 
Ana, 16 years old: 
Maybe [one of the explanations might be considered the best]. In my opinion, as a Portuguese, 
version D [the fourth version given], of course, is that which is most identified with my point 
of view, trying to emphasise the heroes, my compatriots. But all the explanations indeed must 
be accepted without distinguishing whether one is better or not than the other. 
As these responses revealed contradictory ideas about objectivity - awareness of 
methodological criteria for assessing explanations, but a practical evaluation not taking 
those criteria into account - another small sample of volunteer undergraduate students 
attending the History and Social Sciences course at University of Minho, in their 4th year 
of study (prior to the in-service teacher training year) was investigated too. This restricted 
sample of university students showed, as main characteristics: 
1. Awareness that a recent author might give a better explanation than agents and 
eyewitnesses (the four students selected such an option, in a multiple-choice format 
question); 
2. The valuing of versions D (more overtly descriptive) and C (nationalistic) over the 
other two versions. Versions D and C were chosen in first and second rank by three 
students, one student ranked version C first, followed by version D; version A 
(emphasising the Turkish interest on land power in detriment to naval power) was ranked 
4th by three students;10 
3. The refusal to value, theoretically, one of the explanations as the best, as students 
stressed some validity in all of them. The four students gave the following justification: 
10This preference for versions D, or C, occurred in the final study too. It is discussed in chapter 9, 
pp. 259-64. 
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Isabel (university student): 
Each explanation given must not be put aside but it must be put into question. All of them 
must be interlinked and we should take into account the reliability of sources. The final 
explanation, if it exists, must be complemented, that is, an interdisciplinarity of sources must 
be made so that facts can reach a greater veracity. 
Diva: 
All of them [explanations] give us facts which are important so as to know the events as a 
whole. All of them have their own importance and the meaning given to them depends on the 
reader's subjectivity. 
Gloria: 
All explanations contain some truth. However, there are more complete explanations than 
others. 
Ma: 
I think that what leads to a more complete vision of a complex phenomenon like the 
Portuguese Oriental empire is the combination of several factors. But from such a combination 
of factors, and according to each kind of research, each author gives more importance to one 
aspect. The several versions will contribute to the construction of a more and more correct 
picture. 
Such responses suggested, again, some ideas typical of a structural pattern, characterized 
by an ideal of a total explanation to be reached through a critical examination of several 
sources and through the assessment of several factors, all of them being considered as 
part of a complex reality. Provisionality seems to be accepted in the sense that 
explanations are progressively construed in a process of trying to grasp the total reality. 
Nonetheless, when subjects were asked to arbitrate concretely among the four versions 
given, they showed a preference for more familiar or longer versions (versions C and D). 
This choice suggested that criteria for discriminating more and less valid explanations 
might not be appropriately applied by subjects when version D (more descriptive) and 
version C (more biased) were preferred. In these cases, a distinction between description 
and explanation and/or between a more corroborated and a more refuted version was not 
apparent. This analysis was useful for subsequent decisions in this study concerning the 
definition of the population, which was extended to higher grades. 
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Decisions and categorization after P3 
Although the early findings during P 1 , P2 and P3 were still very tentative, the whole 
analysis of data gathered suggested a hypothetical trend to explore: 
- Some pupils ranging from 12 to 20 years old, attending the last three grades in 
compulsory school, reveal ideas concerning provisional explanation based on a 
conception of perspective more or less distinct from bias, coexisting together with a 
notion of methodological neutrality; they also may show a concern for evidential 
consistency (see Elisabete's responses, p. 157); 
- Students following postcompulsory history courses may construct elaborate, 
well-grounded ideas about explanatory consistency, (1) usually, within a positivist 
approach, that is, showing concern for a critical interpretation of sources but not 
integrating the concept of author's perspective into genuine historical standards, as 
Susana's responses (see pp. 159-60) may suggest; or, (2) within a subjectivist trend, 
they avoid the application of those historical standards theoretically accepted in order to 
defend a position based on emotional criteria, as appeared to be the case in Luis and 
Ana's responses (see p. 161). Some difficulty in discriminating perspectiveless from 
perspectiveful neutrality when thinking about provisionality of historical explanation 
seems to be a common pattern among these students. 
Such a hypothesis provoked an interest in exploring progression in pupils' ideas about 
PHE through secondary schooling beyond the compulsory stages. This interest led to a 
need to redefine the population to be investigated in the final administration. The target 
population was then defined as the following: 
Students ranging from 12 to 20 years old, attending the 7th to 1 lth grades, in secondary 
schools involved in teacher-training under supervision of the University of Minho. 
Evolution of the early model 
Taking into account and reflecting on the empirical data as a whole, a provisional 
recategorization of pupils' ideas was tried after P3. (In P4, the central preoccupation was 
to refine the task-set to be applied in the final study). Figure 6.3 shows the model 
generated after the pilots. 
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Figure 6.3 The model after P4 
LEVEL 1 	 INCONSIS I ENCY 
Descriptive or restricted explanatory mode 
Second-order reasoning related to information, or perplexity 
LEVEL 2 	 STEREOTYPES 
Explanatory mode 
Common-sense criteria in explanatory assessment 
Right/wrong explanations 
Explanations from primary sources often valued 
LEVEL 3 	 CONVENTIONAL POSITIVISM 
Explanatory mode 
Historical explanations accepted if based on reliable evidence 
Sum of factors 
Personal opinion plainly accepted 
Explanations from primary sources often valued 
LEVEL 4 	 SCIENTIFIC DOGMATISM 
Explanatory mode, often an historical narrative 
Historical explanations accepted if based on reliable evidence 
Aggregationist criteria in explanatory assessment 
Perspectiveless neutrality valued 
LEVEL 5 
	
PERSPECTIVE 
Explanatory mode 
Concern for neutrality as a tentative balance 
Perspective (tentatively) recognised as legitimate 
Thus, the model of categorization evolved from the exploratory studies and through the 
piloting phases as charted in Figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4 Evolution of the model from explorations to P4 
The model 
After explorations 	 After P1 	 After P4 
LEVEL 1 Authority 
A Information 	 > 1 Inconsistency 
B Dogmatism 	 > 2 Stereotypes 	  
LEVEL 2 Positivism 
A Sum 
B Consensus 
LEVEL 4 Contextual perspective -> 5 Contextual perspective 
This model functioned as a working hypothesis for initiating the analysis of the main data 
(F), and this analysis, in turn, generated a reformulation of the model. The model 
presupposed a progression through levels of ideas related to three main conceptual 
clusters. In the final stage of the work, these were divided into the following 
subcategories: 
Explanatory structure (S) 
Explanatory mode (M) 
Factorial weight (W) 
Explanatory consistency (C) 
Evidential consistency (E) 
Logical consistency (L) 
Objectivity and truth (0) 	 Methodological detachment (D) 
Truth (T) 
About each construct, several degrees of sophistication were tentatively discriminated in 
the light of students' responses. At this phase of the empirical work, only constructs M, 
E and D were made distinct." These constructs were as shown in Figure 6.5. 
11A full discrimination of degrees within the several constructs is given in chapter 7. 
	> 1 Inconsistency 
> 2 Stereotypes 
LEVEL 3 Perspective 	 > 4 Restricted perspective 
> 3 Conventional positivism ----> 3 Conventional 
positivism 
> 4 Scientific 
dogmatism 
	> 5 Perspective 
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Figure 6.5 Constructs about PHE after P4 
Explanatory mode (construct M): 
1. description 
2. restricted explanation 
3. explanation - rational/causal 
4.- explanatory narrative 
Evidential consistency (construct E): 
1. information 
2. a few familiar facts/factors 
3. several facts - more factors 
4. more data to total reality 
5. data to select factors 
Methodological detachment (construct D): 
1. perplexity 
2. right/wrong, direct observation 
3. several real facts and opinions; sum, direct observation 
4. absolute neutrality; positivism/subjectivism 
5. perspectiveful neutrality, balance 
Therefore, the model given above implied the following degrees of sophistication of each 
construct: 
Construct M Construct E Construct D 
Level 1 1 - 2 1 1 
Level 2 2 2 2 
Level 3 2-3-4 3 3 
Level 4: 3-4 4 4 
Level 5: 3-4 5 5 
This tentative chart was the first step for a conceptual map devised to trace the several 
levels at which pupils constructed ideas about PHE, to be discussed next chapter. 
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Summary 
This chapter presented the main reflections and decisions on the generation of the model 
of students' ideas about PHE, during the pilot studies. It gave a first approach on the 
methodological framework for data analysis and the progressive reformulation of the 
model, as well as the redefinition of the target population grounded on reflections made 
upon pilot 3. 
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7 A conceptual model of students' ideas about provisional 
historical explanation 
This chapter discusses the model of students' ideas about PHE. It gives (a) a conceptual 
map constituting the theoretical framework for data analysis, as discussed in chapters 2 
and 3, (b) a description of the methodological framework used for the analysis of the 
main data, (c) a conceptual map of students' ideas about PHE through logical levels of 
progression, and (d) a summary and a conceptual map of the main characteristics of each 
level of progression. 
Theoretical framework for data analysis 
In chapter 2, a working definition of the concept of historical explanation was given: 
Historical explanation is supposed here to be an answer to a why-type question about 
past human actions, events, and states of affairs. It may include questions of a how-
possible type. Each explanation presupposes a selection of factors - reasons, motives, 
dispositions, external conditions, structural, conjunctural conditions, along the lines of 
the different explanatory models. Each author may assign a different relative importance 
to factors selected and, among a range of factors (the standing conditions), some might 
be considered necessary or mere contributory/facilitating conditions to the explanandum. 
Conditions which make the difference to whether a situation occurred or not may be 
considered as the cause. 
It is understood that the very sense of provisionality attributed to an explanation is 
entangled with and varies according to each kind of explanation. Each explanatory mode 
is the "natural environment" where the notion of provisional explanation gains some 
specific meaning, which is directly suggested by a variety of factorial weighting among 
competing historical explanations. Therefore, the analysis of students' ideas about 
provisional historical explanation took into account the following constructs related to 
explanatory structure: (a) explanatory mode (which kinds of factors are implicitly or 
explicitly selected: conditions, causes, reasons, motives, dispositions, long/short-term 
conditions), and (b) factorial weight (what weight is attributed to factors selected: 
sufficient, necessary or facilitating conditions). 
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A variety of modes and factorial weighting does not imply a denial of objectivity. It is 
assumed that competing explanations to the same historical question can be examined on 
evidential and logical grounds and thus, their relative explanatory scope and power may 
be assessed. Therefore, the analysis of students' ideas about PHE explored the following 
constructs concerning explanatory consistency: (a) evidential consistency, and (b) logical 
consistency in terms of coherence and plausibility. 
The criteria above give room to consider a critical objectivism in historical explanation. 
Such an assumption is controversial, however: a tension between emphasising the 
contingency of knowledge or some kind of methodological objectivity must be 
considered, as discussed in chapter 3. Concerning the conceptual cluster objectivity and 
truth, the following constructs were explored: (a) methodological detachment, and (b) 
truth. 
The whole conceptualization forming the theoretical framework of the empirical study 
will be charted in a schematic representation similar to systemic networks used to handle 
data. Such systemic networks, as proposed by Bliss, Monk and Ogborn (1983) use three 
main notations to indicate subdivisions from categories: one consists of a Bar [ 
representing mutually exclusive subcategories, one consists of a Bracket { representing 
non-exclusive categories, and one consists of a Reversed Bracket } representing 
restrictive entry conditions to be applied to some subcategories only. The last of these 
notations is entered after the subcategories to which it refers. 
Explanatory structure: explanatory modes and factorial weight 
It is hypothesized that a range of explanatory modes might underlie students' ideas about 
provisional explanation. Those modes can be charted in a conceptual map as in 
Figure 7.1. 
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Figure 7.1 Explanatory modes 
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Explanation 	 causal 
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Explanatory modes were discussed in chapter 2. It is assumed that the narrative mode -
explanatory narrative as defined by Gallie and Atkinson, or a structural narrative in the 
tradition of structuralism - is historically the prevailing practised mode of explanation. 
Rational and causal modes may be implied and intertwined in the narrative. The type of 
historical question will provide the clue for a rational or a causal oriented answer: why 
questions focusing upon the individual will tend to produce an explanation of a rational 
type; why questions - how-possibly type included - concerning broad events or states of 
affairs will tend to include external causes in the explanation.1  
Why questions usually entail a factorial weighting: (a) a selection of conditions 
functioning as contributory (necessary or facilitating) factors of the occurrence, (b) 
among those conditions, a distinction of the decisive cause - that factor which makes the 
difference - by recourse to a comparison-situation (according to Martin's analysis), or 
due to specific value-judgements (according to Dray), and (c) an idea of interlinked 
factors.2 The structural mode, while considering causal relationships through different 
durations of time, tends to consider long-term conditions (the structure) and short-term 
conditions (the conjuncture) as interacting with the surface events and actions.3  
1 For the meaning of external cause, see a definition based on Von Wright's conceptualization, in 
chapter 2, p. 48. The historical question employed in the main study, "why did the Portuguese 
manage to establish an empire in the Indian Ocean?", might be considered a how-possibly question. It 
suggests some perplexity about this occurrence, like the title given by Braudel (1985) in chapter 2, 
"The unexpected rise of Portugal - from Venice to Antwerp", pp. 138-57. For a philosophical 
discussion of a how-possibly question, see Dray and Von Wright's position, chapter 2 of this study, 
pp. 46-8. 
2 Notions of condition/cause will be employed according to Dray and Martin's analysis, as given in 
chapter 2, pp. 45-6, and in chapter 3, p. 78, respectively. 
3 See Lloyd's position in chapter 2, pp. 50-2. Structurists value the concept of social structure as a 
reality and advocate an interaction between structure and events/actions, while structuralists tend to 
view events/actions as conditioned by long-term factors. 
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Counterfactuals are often employed as arguments about the relative importance of causes, 
as McClelland, among others, claimed (see chapter 2, pp. 42-3).4 They will be 
considered here as arguments to the best explanation and, particularly, as a relevant 
absent factor given in Pacey's explanation, and used in the main empirical study (see 
chapter 5, pp. 129-30). 
A conceptual map of factorial weight in historical explanation is charted in Figure 7.2. 
Figure 7.2 Factorial weight 
r decisive 
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negative (counterfactual) 
Conditions 
C
short-term 
L long-term 1 
 structural 
mode 
Assessing competing explanations 
It is hypothesized that, nowadays, explanations are given and accepted as provisional 
answers to an historical question. That assumption does not entail that explanations 
cannot be discussed and assessed: historians usually apply some specific criteria about 
explanatory scope and power to justify their own, or favoured, explanations against other 
competing ones. The proposed conceptual network to chart the corresponding ideas is 
shown in Figure 7.3. 
4 An overt use of counterfactuals in arguments about explanatory power is sometimes criticized as 
being pure speculation. Hawthorn (1991), among others, alluded to this criticism, remembering Carr's 
reference to "parlour-games with might-have-teens" (p. 1). 
172 
Figure 7.3 Explanatory scope and power 
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According to the assumption on ideas of provisionality in historical explanation (see 
chapter 3, pp. 79-81) the operational concept of criteria for assessment of explanatory 
scope and power applied in this study discriminates: 
1. Evidential consistency, concerning the extent to which an explanation is accepted in 
the light of - or as consistent with - the evidence, through confirmation and non-
refutation. 
2. Logical consistency in terms of internal and external consistency: internal consistency 
or coherence, concerning the extent to which an explanation does not contain internal 
contradictions, and external consistency or plausibility, concerning the extent to which an 
explanation is consistent with knowledge of real or imagined events in the real world. 
Concepts of scope and power may be related to ideas about the relative consistency (in 
terms of evidence and logic) of competing explanations. An explanation of a greater 
scope and power, involving a wider range and depth of questions which can be answered 
in the light of existing evidence might bring out new and fruitful perspectives on an 
historical issue. In relation to evidential consistency, not only can we try to 
"demonstrate" that a favoured explanation is well-supported, and not yet refuted by 
evidence, but we can also argue for the greater scope of that explanation due to its 
consistency with a greater variety of corroborating evidence. In relation to logical 
consistency, we can assess that a favoured explanation is coherent and plausible, but we 
can also argue for a greater logical power of that explanation because (a) it is of a greater 
scope; and (b) the causes emphasised appear to make the explanandum more probable.5  
It must be noticed that notions of evidential and logical consistency are interlocked with 
factorial weighting: arguments for and against competing explanations in the light of 
criteria of evidential and logical consistency (thus, at an epistemological level) necessarily 
5 As it was pointed out in chapter 3, these two assumptions (a, b) entail two different views about 
explanatory assessment. McCullagh defended the view that explanatory adequacy can be assessed in terms 
of logically comparing their relative scope, only. Martin claimed that there are factual grounds for 
explanatory assessment: this is done by recourse to a comparison-situation which can show how a given 
explanans made the explanandum occur. Both approaches are kept as grounds for the empirical analysis. 
Partial 
Realism 	
E-  
Probable 
Proximate 
Scepticism [ 
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imply a discussion about the relative causal weighting in those explanations (thus, at a 
substantive level). Also the notion of a complete explanation can be tied to explanatory 
power and scope. When an explanation entails the idea of logical adequacy, the most 
powerful can be seen as a complete explanation. When that explanation entails the idea of 
consistency with a greater variety of evidence (suggesting a larger explanatory scope), it 
may be seen as relatively more complete, although in this sense a genuine incompleteness 
must be recognised. 
On objectivity and truth 
The assumption that there are methodological criteria to assess objectivity in historical 
explanation does not entail a notion of absolute neutrality in the sense attributed by early 
positivists. The notion of methodological detachment - or perspectiveful neutrality - is 
distinguished from that of perspectiveless neutrality, the former entailing the recognition 
of perspective as a genuine feature of human knowledge. Concerning views about truth 
in historical knowledge, subjectivists and relativists tend to assume a sceptical attitude 
about the possibility of an epistemic access to reality; positivists and objectivists tend to 
assume a realist position presupposing that the real world can be known in some way. 
Critical realism presents several nuances: under that view, historical explanations can be 
seen as partial, probable or proximate to truth, according to different authors (see 
chapter 3, pp. 63-5). A system of those notions can be mapped as shown in Figure 7.4. 
Figure 7.4 Objectivity and truth 
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According to the system of ideas traced in chapter 3 and functioning as the theoretical 
framework on provisional historical explanation (see p. 81), connections between ideas 
about neutrality and about historical truth were mapped as shown in Figure 7.5. 
Figure 7.5 Approaches to historical knowledge 
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Methodological framework for data analysis 
About the validity of the questionnaire 
The questionnaire used in the main study - written items as well as the guidelines for the 
interview - was devised in order to map students' ideas about provisional historical 
explanation. Each question was designed to provide indicators of constructs in different 
contexts.6 A range of questions allowed the study to trace students' ideas through: 
1. Substantive constructions concerning: explanation (item 1.1), discrimination among 
versions (items 2.1, 2.2), selection of evidence and explanations (items 1.2, 3.1, 4.1); 
2. Arguments about their substantive constructions: to clarify their own explanation 
(about 1.1, in the interview), to support their concrete choices (items 3.2, 3.3, 3.4), to 
find a limit to their choices (item 4.2); 
3. A second-order reasoning about the production of historical explanations: reasons for 
differences among explanations (items 2.3, 2.4), the notion of completeness in 
explanation (item 4.3), notions of objectivity, truth and knowledge (items 4.4, 5.1, 5.2). 
The use of oral interviews (N=32) also permitted clarification of the meaning of those 
ambiguities which more overtly appeared in the written answers. However, this does not 
justify the assertion that a control of different competencies in written/oral language was 
made. It was assumed that adolescent pupils from their 7th year of schooling would 
show basic competencies in written/oral mother tongue in order broadly to communicate 
their ideas. 
Each written and corresponding oral item was then assumed to provide indicators of 
specific constructs as shown in Figure 7.6. 
6 As was discussed in chapter 1, pp. 19-20, the degree of abstractness of a task may influence the 
performance of both children and adults. As stressed by Donaldson (1978), when a situation makes human 
sense can be easily apprehended by children. 
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Figure 7.6 Written items as indicators of constructs 
ITEM 
 
CONSTRUCT 
Explanatory mode (M) 
Factorial weight (W) 
CONCEPTUAL CLUSTER 
1.1 
2.1 
2.2 
Explanatory structure (S) 
    
1.2 
3.3 
3.1 
3.2 
3.4 
    
Evidential consistency (E) 
  
  
Explanatory consistency (C) 
  
4.1 
4.2 
4.3 
2.3 
2.4 
4.4 
5.1 
5.2 
Logical consistency (L) 
  
   
Objectivity / Truth 
 
Objectivity and truth (0) 
 
  
     
This correspondence was considered in a loose way, as it was observed that a student 
could produce ideas related to different constructs when answering a given item. As an 
example, answers to items 2.4 and 4.3 were in some cases considered as indicators of 
conceptual cluster C, other cases as indicators of conceptual cluster 0. As a qualitative 
approach implying a cross-analysis for the interpretation of data was assumed ab initio, 
such an occurrence was not considered a threat for data analysis. 
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Data coding 
The analysis of the main data began by coding responses following a systematic 
approach inspired in grounded theory, such as was made in the analysis of the pilot data 
(see chapter 6). The three types of coding (open, axial and selective, as defined in 
pp. 144-6) were covered through three main phases in the process of analysis. The 
coding of responses was systematically discussed with an experienced researcher (Peter 
Lee) in the field engaged on a project about pupils' ideas of historical understanding and 
explanation.? 
(a) First-phase: scanning the written responses 
In a first phase of analysis, responses to the written task (N=119) were scanned to look 
for significant passages related to ideas relevant to the study, in an open coding 
approach. Some individuals producing clear or creative answers, appearing to fall into 
different patterns of ideas, or appearing to be intriguing, were selected to be interviewed. 
Examples of those responses which were seen to be of interest to explore in the interview 
are given in the extensive discussion of single cases by level of progression (chapter 8). 
A few subjects among those which were selected could not be interviewed due to their 
absence from school while the interviews were conducted. The interviewed sample was 
N=32. 
(b) Second-phase: in-depth analysis of responses 
After the interviewing process, written and oral responses of the students interviewed 
were closely examined in the light of the conceptual framework in construction which 
was, then: 
Explanatory structure (S): 
Explanatory mode (M) 
Factorial weight (W) 
Explanatory consistency (C): 
Evidential consistency (E) 
Logical consistency (L) 
Objectivity and truth (0): Methodological detachment (D) 
7As these ideas are new in the Portuguese educational setting, training people to do a reliability study 
would have been very arduous and time-consuming. 
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Firstly, for each subject, the 18 items (in the written task and in the corresponding 
passage of the interview) were analysed one by one, and significant ideas were 
transcribed into individual files. Those ideas took into account three kinds of verbal 
construction: 
1. Linking words were registered in terms of indicators of explanatory structure (S) in 
related items. Expressions like because, due to, thanks to linked to facts, as opposed to a 
sequence of facts without those links, or clauses beginning by since, then were 
considered in the assessment of the explanatory structure. 
2. Expressions appearing to indicate the main ideas about explanation and provisionality 
related to the framework in construction were registered. This was carried out still in a 
loose way, not exclusively tied to the constructs already defined. 
3. Non-verbal expressions observed in the taped interviews were registered: some 
revealing hesitation (hmm..., long pause), perplexity (long pause, oral intonation), 
firmness (oral intonation), or satisfaction for answering a triggering question (laugh) 
were also registered. 
A cross-analysis of the several ideas suggested by each student was then undertaken, 
trying to interpret the main concepts and attributes ascribed to them by testing some 
hypotheses about their responses. Main ideas were then summarized in order to find the 
major trends in responses given by each pupil. This prompted a process of reflection on 
the data which entailed asking questions about the meaning of each response and making 
comparisons among responses from different students. The "density" of the original 
conceptual framework was increased. The final version of this conceptual framework 
appeared as follows: 
Explanatory structure: (cluster S) 
Explanatory mode (construct M) 
Factorial weight (construct W) 
Explanatory consistency (relative scope and power) (cluster C) 
Evidential consistency (construct E) 
Use of information 
Evidence and explanation 
Logical consistency (construct L) 
Coherence 
Plausibility 
Objectivity and truth (cluster 0) 
Methodological detachment (construct D) 
Truth (construct 1) 
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It must be noticed that, within the construct evidential consistency, two sub-constructs, 
use of information, and evidence and explanation, were clarified as described in 
pp. 183-4. Several levels in each construct were tentatively traced. In order to avoid 
confusion between these levels in constructs and broad logical levels of progression, the 
former were named degrees of sophistication. This type of analysis combining open and 
axial coding was carried out in order to get informal reliability of degrees suggested in 
the light of the observed data. The final version of the whole conceptual map of students' 
ideas, showing the conceptual clusters and their main constructs analysed in several 
degrees, is shown and discussed later in this chapter (pp. 181-6). 
(c) Third-phase of analysis: categorization by level 
A selective coding was undertaken together with the open/axial coding described above. 
Responses showing a similar pattern, so far as conceptual clusters are concerned, were 
grouped within the same level; when responses showed proximate patterns to a given 
level they were classified in that level, and new attributes suggested by those examples 
were integrated in that level. Chapter 8 and Appendix I may exemplify this procedure in 
the following way: students' responses appearing close to the ones extensively discussed 
in each level were categorized in the same level and constituted a basis for the 
reformulation of the model generated after the pilot. When considering a range of 
patterns which did not fall immediately within the levels constructed, the model was then 
modified to integrate the several proximate patterns, as in the examples which are briefly 
discussed following the extensive analysis of one case in each level. Thus, the 
conceptualization of each level gained a wider scope. 
During this process, the selection of some constructs like those concerning explanatory 
consistency (E), thought of as relevant for purposes of building a logical progression in 
ideas about PHE, overshadowed other concepts initially emphasised, such as trends 
towards objectivism or relativism. Trends towards either objectivism or relativism 
appeared to run in parallel through a progression in ideas about PHE. The construction 
of levels, therefore, did not take into account an oscillation between these two trends. 
After a categorization based upon the analysis of the 32 responses, a categorization of the 
whole sample was tried by analysing the 119 written tasks. Some responses appeared to 
be easily categorized; others obliged slight adjustment in the formulation of dimensions 
in the constructs and thus, in the model of levels of progression. A few responses 
remained objects of perplexity due to paucity (scarcity of ideas produced) or ambiguity (a 
great oscillation in concepts) of the data. They were finally integrated in the level to 
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which they appeared most closely to approximate. An example which provoked some 
perplexity is discussed in Appendix 1, pp. 374-7. 
A conceptual map of students' ideas about PHE 
Students' ideas were thus analysed in the light of the theoretical framework formerly 
discussed. This analysis also took into account the previous research about children and 
adolescents' ideas of history and on personal constructs as discussed in chapter 1. 
From the pilot analysis (P1 to P4) to the analysis of the main data (F), a conceptual map 
on students' ideas was progressively elaborated, aiming to highlight specific levels and 
patterns of thinking. Level here means logical level of progression as discussed in 
chapter 1. Pattern means a type of thinking implying a set of constructs - it might equate a 
level, but it may exemplify some variation within each level. Degree (of sophistication) 
means level within each construct. 
The final conceptual map of students' ideas about PHE is given in Figure 7.7. 
Figure 7.7 Conceptual map of students' ideas about PHE 
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Figure continued 
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The first network set, related to S, was analysed in two main interrelated constructs: (a) 
the explanatory mode (construct M) underlying students' ideas, and (b) factorial weight 
(construct W) concerning the relative importance of factors assigned by students. Several 
degrees within those two constructs are suggested. 
Construct M may appear with different degrees expressed by the Bar: degree (1) involves 
a mere collection of fragmented statements lacking coherence; degree (2) relates to an 
account composed of a succession of steps, and to an implicit notion of a factor 
occasionally appearing as intentions in actions described;8 degree (3) conveys an 
incipient rational/causal explanation oscillating with description; degree (4) implies a clear 
explanatory level (the rational and causal modes appear combined); degree (5) involves a 
more elaborate explanation, a narrative with interlinked motives and external conditions 
being given (it might express long-term and short-term conditions). 
Accordingly, construct W may be categorized at different degrees too: degree (1) consists 
of the notion of facts seen per se, without a logical connection; degree (2) involves a 
focus on antecedent facts in a complete story; degree (3) implies an oscillation between 
fact and factor, factor being often incoherently stated; degree (4) relates to a set of 
conditions considered together, in a sum; degree (5) considers factors in a hierarchical 
scale between decisive and contributory conditions; degree (6) relates to a hierarchy of 
interlinked factors. 
The students' approaches to assessment of competing explanations, so far as relative 
scope and power is concerned, was analysed in two main constructs: evidential 
consistency (E) considered in terms of use of information, and evidence and explanation; 
logical consistency (L) considered in terms of notions of coherence, and plausibility. 
Notions of evidential and logical consistency are used in the sense discussed in this 
chapter (pp. 172-3). Evidential consistency (E) is the extent to which an explanation is 
accepted in the light of the evidence. Coherence is the extent to which an explanation 
does not contain internal contradictions. Plausibility is the extent to which an explanation 
is consistent with knowledge of real or imagined events in the real world. 
8This level suggests the model of the continuous series discussed by Dray (1964a), when "the course 
of events by which the occurrence came about" is traced (p. 68). A reference about this model was 
made in chapter 2, p. 46. 
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Within construct E, the notion use of information was generated as a result of a need to 
consider the general attitude towards the evidential scope on which explanatory 
hypotheses are based. An open-minded attitude leading to consider various information, 
the less familiar material included, is required to make adequate decisions about historical 
explanations. It is suggested that students may show such an attitude at different degrees 
of sophistication. Degree (1) involves a fragmented use of information revealing logical 
inconsistency, a meaningful discussion of hypotheses being not apparent; degree (2) 
implies the use of familiar information in a stereotyped or emphasised way (i.e., new 
information may be quoted, but is largely ignored in argumentative discussion); degree 
(3) involves the articulation of familiar information with fresh data, the latter being 
rejected or accepted as a consequence of some logical argumentation.9  
A crucial notion related to construct E (evidential consistency), that of evidence and 
explanation, may be considered along the following degrees: degree (1) when the referent 
fact is related to descriptions with no signs of being a basis for an explanation, or a 
preempted assertion is produced (i.e., statements concerning explanatory justification are 
tautological or meaningless); degree (2) when attention is concentrated on the distinction 
between proved/non-proved facts, yet tied to true descriptions; degree (3) when a 
discrimination between fact and factor, source and explanation, is apparent (although 
factors are still seen as the true factors); degree (4) when sources are seen as providing 
data for verifying explanations; degree (5) when emergent notions of confirmation and 
refutation occur, although remaining in conflict with the notion of a tight verification. 
Logical consistency may be discussed in terms of coherence and plausibility. The notion 
of coherence must be analysed through implicit assumptions in arguments rather than 
through overt expressions, which are rarely produced: (1) a restricted coherence is 
postulated when most of the arguments appear illogical in terms of explanatory 
connections; (2) an implicit coherence is postulated when a logical argumentation is 
assumed and, in some cases, argumentation explicitly makes use of a comparison of 
factors, in terms of the logic of actions.10 
9 The main constructs analysed in use of information were taken from the theory of personal constructs 
as discussed in chapter 1, pp. 32-4. 
10 Such an assumption about students' ideas coheres with Martin's analysis of historical arguments on 
logical grounds about competing explanations. See Martin, (1989), pp. 42-43. 
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Plausibility may appear at different degrees of sophistication: (1) tied to an attitude of 
perplexity about issues proposed; (2) in a preempted way, when factors seem to be 
selected in terms of a broad logic but not justified;11 (3) as everyday assumptions, if 
factors selected are justified in the light of common-sense statements; (4) in the historical 
context, if factors are discussed by recourse to concrete features of the past situation in 
which they are integrated; (5) by a comparison-situation, if argumentative discussion 
refers to other historical situations.12 Responses from the level of common-sense 
assumptions up to more sophisticated ideas may all integrate some forms of 
counterfactual reasoning. 
Notions of completeness may refer to evidential or logical consistency, and thus are also 
related to notions of relative scope and power in historical explanation (see theoretical 
discussion in chapter 3, and examples in chapter 8). 
Ideas concerning the issue of objectivity in historical explanation and access to truth in 
history are suggested by students in different degrees. This conceptual cluster was 
discriminated in two main constructs: methodological detachment, which was considered 
a crucial indicator of ideas about the validity of historical conclusions, and truth, seen as 
providing markers of objectivist versus relativist trends concerning historical knowledge. 
Methodological detachment was categorized along several degrees: (1) absence, when 
ideas are centred on description of substantive facts, often in a fragmented way and the 
issue of objectivity does not appear; (2) truth, when a concern for the truth begins to be 
related to explanation (a good explanation is the true explanation) and the notion of 
personal opinion may appear in a preempted form; (3) aggregationism, when the 
existence of different facts and different opinions is asserted and the sum of factors or 
explanations is advocated - a good explanation is a large explanation; (4) neutrality, when 
the major concern appears to be a neutral attitude in historical production, controlling for 
personal assumptions seen as negative interferences - a good explanation (if it exists) is a 
neutral or consensual explanation; (5) perspectiveful neutrality, when the notion of point 
of view is recognised within the idea of neutrality - although with oscillations between 
this idea and that of a perspectiveless neutrality. A good explanation tends to be more 
coherently a valid explanation. 
11  These degrees were inspired in the literature on pupils' ideas in history and in construct theory (see 
chapter 1). 
12This factual criterion defended by Martin and based on what he claims to be the basic idea of a 
"consensus account" (1989, p. 59) seemed to emerge in Filipa' s responses (see chapter 8, p. 243). 
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The construct truth is related to how the access to knowledge of the past is viewed. Two 
opposed trends are considered: (a) realism, which accepts an epistemic access to past 
reality; (b) scepticism, which tends to deny the possibility of knowing the past. Different 
degrees of sophistication may occur in each of these two trends: (1) naive, when both 
trends are simultaneously affirmed, but contradicting each other (e.g., "facts existed and 
they can be discovered", "past facts are gone forever, and only those who saw or lived 
them can know them"); critical, when a position is coherently defended on grounds of 
(2) a perspectiveless neutrality (positivism or subjectivism), or of (3) an emergent 
perspectiveful neutrality (objectivism or relativism). 
The conceptual map discussed above provided a basis for tracing a progression through 
five levels of clustered ideas in the light of students' responses. These will be given next. 
Levels of progression 
The interrelationship of specific degrees of the several constructs suggested by data 
analysis led to a main categorization of students' ideas about PHE by levels of 
progression. A straightforward summary of each level is given, followed by the 
conceptual map applied to that level. The relations between these levels of progression 
and previous research on pupils' ideas, are made explicit in the "Final reflections" on the 
main working hypothesis (see chapter 10). 
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Level 1 - THE STORY 
Explanations are mainly construed as the story to be narrated according to what 
happened, but a restricted explanatory mode may be apparent as well. A major concern 
for substantive information is suggested and any second-order reasoning, when it 
emerges, is related to description rather than to explanation. 
The overall pattern of responses in general is related to a descriptive mode, thinking 
being oriented towards what happened and how it happened. Antecedent steps are 
integrated in a story which can have a beginning, a development and a conclusion, and 
the logic of the why-type answer, when it emerges, is diluted; some tautologies and an 
absence of discrimination between cause and consequence may be observed. At one 
extreme pole of the responses, pieces of information are quoted as facts without a 
correspondence to causal relations, within a meaningless account. At the other pole, a 
restricted explanatory structure emerges implying an occasional and implicit notion of 
factor entangled in the story. 
Assessment of "explanations" in terms of consistency and objectivity may take two 
forms: when the explanation is understood as just a story, it is the factual description 
which is assessed - the focus for argumentation is on what happened, and only formal 
differences between them may be considered; when a restricted explanatory structure is 
suggested, explanations are assessed in a preempted way, and arguments about 
objectivity remain related to description.13  
A conceptual map corresponding to this level of ideas may be traced as follows in 
Figure 7.8. 
13The meaning of a preempted notion is borrowed from the theory of personal constructs, as described in 
chapter 1. 
Emphasised 
Articulated [ 
Figure 7.8 Conceptual map of Level 1 
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Level 2 - THE RIGHT EXPLANATION 
Explanations - or descriptions, as these concepts may be not clearly distinct - are 
considered right if proved by real facts. The major concern is about the most correct 
explanation instead of description of the story as in the previous level. Different historical 
explanations tend to be considered non-proved explanations by contrast with those 
produced by witnesses/agents, since the former are based on facts not directly 
experienced (by observation or memory).14 
The idea of explanation may be tentatively grasped, that is, with oscillations between a 
descriptive and an explanatory structure. Explanation may be constructed through a 
temporal step-by-step story (a continuous-series explanation) in which dispositions and 
motives are given, or through a set of a few, usually familiar factors, under a rational 
and/or a causal mode. Factors tend to be weighed in a tight mode, the discussion about 
them being centred on some specific condition.15 Thus, competing explanations are 
assessed according to the preference manifested towards some factors. Consistency with 
evidence is appealed to at the level of common-sense assumptions of "true facts" 
functioning as proofs, and some specific historical terms related to evidence are 
employed. Criteria of plausibility begin to be used in everyday terms. 
An oscillation between realism (there is a truth to be attained, thus there is a correct 
answer) and scepticism (the past is gone, a witness or agent would give the right 
explanation) is often observed. Competing historical explanations tend to be considered 
unproved explanations as they are based on facts not directly perceived. 
Figure 7.9 shows a conceptual map corresponding to these ideas. 
14Preliminary work of the "Chata Project" also suggests that many children test explanations by 
reference to the truth/falsity of components. 
15The meaning of tight versus loose is borrowed from the theory of personal constructs (see chapter 1, 
p. 32). 
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Level 3 - THE MORE FACTORS THE BETTER 
Students operate with the concept of explanation. Ideas of evidential consistency and 
plausibility are discussed as related to explanation, and the provisional nature of 
explanation emerges, mainly related to the notion of quantity of factors. 
Explanation may be construed under several modes (rational and causal, or narrative). 
Historical explanation integrates available evidence and previous knowledge by adding 
together various connections, which might correspond to a meaningful set of conditions, 
including counterfactuals, organized in a hierarchical order of importance. Antecedent 
steps may be added, and sometimes preferred to those conditions for explaining the 
occurrence. Although some confusion between fact and factor may appear, "real facts" 
are considered as factors of the occurrence. All factors are seen as necessary to explain 
the situation, as a mere sum, or as an interrelationship.16 In the assessment of several 
explanations criteria of consistency with evidence (sources are viewed as evidence for 
explanations) and plausibility (at everyday level) are applied. There is a tendency to 
overlap the notion of evidence for an explanation with different facts/factors to be 
discovered, or to be selected according to each point of view. Hence there can exist more 
or less complete explanations. 
Under this broad pattern, students' constructs oscillate between two trends, expressing a 
realist image of history growing up in quantity by adding all contributions but, at the 
same time, suggesting a sceptical concern for uncertainty about the past gone forever. 
The agent's perspective tends to be over-valued, revealing a persistence of the memory 
paradigm. 
Figure 7.10 shows a conceptual map corresponding to these ideas. 
16As the major focus of this model is provisionality in historical explanation, two different degrees of 
factorial weight - a sum or an interlinking of factors - may be observed within this level of progression. 
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Level 4 - A CONSENSUAL EXPLANATION? 
The concept of provisional explanation remains linked to the ideal of a multi-causal 
explanation to grasp the total past, and more elaborate ideas are developed in relation to 
the concept of neutrality. 
Historical explanation is construed in a causal or a narrative pattern integrating the 
familiar knowledge and evidence available. The understanding of a complex reality is 
concerned with bringing out several, interlinked causes: this approach emphasises the 
criterion of interlinked factors, and sometimes a distinction between quantity of mere 
facts (related to description) and factors (related to explanation) is not made clear. Factors 
can be selected under a causal hierarchy but their conjunction is preferred. Explanations 
are assessed under criteria of evidential consistency and plausibility. Consistency with 
evidence tends to be understood at the level of verification, that is, in terms of proofs. 
The existence of different explanations from different points of view is clearly 
recognised, but a perspectiveless neutrality is also emphasised as an ideal which can be 
fulfilled or not. 
Two trends emerge: 
1. Through a confident positivism, some students claim that factors must be discovered 
by applying an absolute neutrality. They tend to ignore or reject counterfactuals as mere 
hypotheses which did not really occur. The existing documentation explored by the 
addition of new techniques and new tools makes the historian's craft a worthy task when 
trying to explain (fully?) the past. With this assumption, memory and direct observation 
cease to be valued over recent historical work. Perspective is recognised but not admitted 
as a valid criterion for an historical explanation. As a consequence of this view, the 
search for a consensus is considered as a necessary and reachable aspiration in history. 
At the tightest pole of this spectrum, a definitive and final conclusion is defended as the 
explanation. 
2. Following a subjectivist line, some students stress that all the true factors cannot be 
reachable, since a point of view is inescapable, and limits ways of looking at reality. As 
historical explanations are relative to personal or cultural presuppositions, the direct 
observation paradigm may offer a better means of partially controlling for neutrality, and 
reducing subjective interference.17 Figure 7.11 shows the corresponding conceptual 
map. 
17The view of a consensual explanation appears in the line of a position assumed by some philosophers 
of history. Rubinoff (1991) advocated a point of view convergence as an ideal for historical objectivity, 
while Dray (1991), defended perspectivism. See chapter 3 in this study, p. 69. 
Figure 7.11 Conceptual map of Level 4 
Explanatory structure 
M -> Explanation [ Causal/Rational Narrative 
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Level 5 - PERSPECTIVE 
Historical explanations are considered under specific methodological criteria pointing to 
ideas connected with confirmation and refutation as well as plausibility in relation to the 
historical context. Such criteria are applied to assess the explanatory consistency of 
competing explanations. The idea of perspectiveful neutrality tentatively emerges, still 
conflicting with the idea of a perspectiveless neutrality. 
Historical explanation is coherently constructed in a causal or a narrative pattern, and 
grounded on a selection of previous knowledge and available evidence. Causal 
connections are hierarchically established but all conditions are frequently considered as 
necessary to explain the occurrence. Ideas of valuing more and interlinked factors 
remain. Explanations can be assessed by using criteria of evidential consistency and 
plausibility. Evidential consistency can be discussed under notions of confirmation and 
refutation, although a move to a tighter idea of verification occurs.18 By applying such 
methodological criteria, the idea of perspective begins to be recognised as an historical 
feature, although alternating with the ideal of perspectiveless neutrality. Perspective can 
also be related to ideas of contingency of knowledge. Those criteria bring a more critical 
and grounded view to the notion of objectivity than in previous levels, even when an 
oscillation between objectivism and relativism appears. 
Figure 7.12 shows a conceptual map corresponding to these ideas. 
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18As Figure 7.7 (p. 182) shows, it is assumed that notions of confirmation/refutation linked to 
explanatory consistency are of a higher degree than those of verification connected with an idea of 
evidential proof. 
Figure 7.12 Conceptual map of Level 5 
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Summary 
This chapter presented the model used in the analysis of students' ideas of provisional 
historical explanation. It functions as the main working hypothesis in this empirical 
study. Firstly, the main theoretical concepts were mapped in a system of conceptual 
clusters and constructs within them, in the light of a philosophical background discussed 
in chapters 2 and 3. Those concepts were: explanatory structure, in terms of explanatory 
mode and factorial weight; explanatory assessment, in terms of evidential and logical 
consistency (this conceptual cluster being tied to ideas of explanatory scope, power and 
completeness); and, objectivity and truth, in terms of methodological detachment and 
access to truth. Secondly, this chapter described the methodological framework used in 
the process of making sense of students' ideas about the constructs defined. Thirdly, 
students' ideas were traced in a conceptual map showing different degrees of 
sophistication within each construct. And, last, five levels of progression, (1) the story, 
(2) the right explanation, (3) the more factors the better, (4) a consensual explanation?, 
and (5) perspective, were presented in a descriptive summary, each one followed by a 
corresponding conceptual map of ideas. 
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8 Students' ideas about provisional historical explanation 
This chapter presents a qualitative analysis of data by illustrating each level of 
progression in ideas about PHE. For each level, an example of students' responses is 
discussed in detail. Following this analysis, the evolution of the model of students' ideas 
about PHE, from the pilots to the final study, is schematically presented. This model 
constitutes the main working hypothesis of the empirical study. 
Presentation of students' responses 
Students' responses were categorized through five levels of ideas about the concept of 
provisional historical explanation, according to the model described in the previous 
chapter. The conceptual map of students' ideas about PHE (see Figure 7.7, pp. 181-2), 
and the conceptual maps by level (see Figures 7.8 - 7.12, pp. 188-96) respectively, are 
intended to synthesize students' ideas in general, and to portray students' ideas about 
PHE, by level. A synthesis of the main characteristics of each level is given before the 
extensive analysis of one example illustrating each level of progression. Other examples, 
suggesting a range of patterns within each level of progression, are given in Appendix I. 
All the examples were taken from the subsample interviewed after the written task. The 
written responses and oral interviews were thus analysed in order to provide indicators of 
the following conceptual clusters and related constructs: 
Explanatory structure: (cluster S) 
Explanatory mode (M) 
Factorial weight (W) 
Explanatory consistency (scope and power) (cluster C) 
Evidential consistency (E): Use of information 
Evidence and explanation 
Logical consistency (L): Coherence 
Plausibility 
Objectivity and truth (cluster 0) 
Methodological detachment (D) 
Truth (T) 
The rules below were followed in the discussion of students' responses: 
1. The first item quoted from the written responses of each student corresponds to her or 
his own explanation to the question, "why did the Portuguese manage to establish a 
maritime empire in the Indian Ocean during the sixteenth century?". All the other 
quotations from written responses are given after the item number of the written task. 
2. Expressions underlined in students' work give indicators of the explanatory mode. 
Expressions in italics convey either (a) substantive factors or facts, when the explanatory 
structure (S) is under discussion, or (b) indicators of the degree of sophistication of 
constructs related to explanatory consistency (C), or objectivity and truth (0). A brief 
utterance considered highly significant as a whole is given in plain text. 
3. Passages of interviews begin by an abbreviated letter indicating the speaker: I means 
interviewer; any other letter corresponds to the subject interviewed. Complete protocols 
of two interviews whose excerpts were selected for the extensive analysis in this chapter 
may be read in full in Appendix H. 
4. Quotations from students' interviews are given in a simplified form. The symbol ... 
denotes a period of silence from the speaker. Repetitions and expressions showing 
hesitation (like hmm...) were eliminated in order to make them easier to read. When 
exceptions to this rule occur, they mean a longer moment of hesitation. The symbol [...] 
denotes that a sequence of speech has been removed. 
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Analysis of one example illustrating Level 11 
Level 1 - THE STORY 
Explanations are mainly construed as the story to be narrated according to what happened, but a restricted 
explanatory mode may be apparent as well. A major concern for substantive information is suggested and 
any second-order reasoning, when it emerges, is related to description rather than to explanation. 
The overall pattern of responses in general is related to a descriptive mode, thinking being oriented 
towards what happened and how it happened. Antecedent steps are integrated in a story which can have a 
beginning, a development and a conclusion, and the logic of the why-type answer, when it emerges, is 
diluted; some tautologies and an absence of discrimination between cause and consequence may be 
observed. At one extreme pole of the responses, pieces of information are quoted as facts without a 
correspondence to causal relations, within a meaningless account. At the other pole, a restricted 
explanatory structure emerges implying an occasional and implicit notion of factor entangled in the story. 
Assessment of "explanations" in terms of consistency and objectivity may take two forms: when the 
explanation is understood as just a story, it is the factual description which is assessed - the focus for 
argumentation is on what happened, and only formal differences between them may be considered; when a 
restricted explanatory structure is suggested, explanations are assessed in a preempted way, and arguments 
about objectivity remain related to description.  
Claudia, 12 years old, 7th grade: 
Explanatory structure 
(a) Explanatory mode 
Claudia constructs a story about the Portuguese domination of the Indian Ocean: 
In 1488 Bartolomeu Dias rounded the Cape of Good Hope giving the chance to Vasco da Gama 
to reach India through the Indian Ocean, they settled there controlling all the people who were 
their worst enemies, managing to settle there and conquering other people to trade in the Indian 
Ocean and also conquering the main ports where the spice trade was done thus 
 leaving the 
"door open" (to the Europeans) in the Indian Ocean. 
1The rules followed in the presentation of this analysis are given on the previous page. 
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She narrates rather than explains the occurrence by selecting some antecedent steps (the 
rounding of the Cape, the Vasco da Gama trip to India) and by describing some features 
of that event (settlement, conquest of people and ports related to the spice trade) in a 
coherent whole. The story can be seen as logically complete in the sense that it has a 
beginning (the rounding of the Cape), a development (actions linked to the domination) 
and a conclusion (thus leaving the "door open" to the Europeans).2 However, some 
tautological phrasing is used in connection with the idea of domination ("they settled 
there controlling all the people who were their worst enemies, managing to settle there 
and conquering other people"). Some elements of the versions given - conveying 
consequences of the occurrence too - are directly transferred to her story ("controlling the 
other people...conquering the main ports", from version D; "leaving the 'door open' to 
the Europeans", from version B). In the interview, she begins to narrate the same story, 
quoting her written response. At some point she is interrupted by the interviewer in order 
to clarify the meaning of "controlling the other people" and to assess whether that 
quotation was understood, or was just a preempted assertion taken from version D: 
I: You mentioned that they managed to control the other people who were their main enemies. 
Who were those people? 
C: They were the Moslems and the Turks and the Egyptians and the Indians... Then they 
settled there and they conquered the main ports where the spice trade was done and afterwards 
the Moslems "opened the doors" to the Europeans. 
The main features of the occurrence of the Portuguese domination seem to be grasped, 
although evidence about relations among different people in Asia appear to be 
misunderstood. Claudia's account of what happened and how it happened indicates a 
descriptive mode, showing logical coherence within that mode. 
2The construction of a story as an explanation can be considered as the model of the continuous series 
(discussed by Dray, and referred to in this study in chapter 2, p. 46) if it has a coherent set of antecedent 
steps (see also footnote 8 in chapter 7, p. 183 ). Shemilt (1983) also inspired this specific categorization 
(see chapter 1, pp. 25-6, in this study). At this level of progression, antecedent facts may present a 
restricted logical coherence with the explanandum. 
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(b) Factorial weight 
Claudia seems to operate at the level of description. She selects and reasons about facts 
rather than factors. Her written answers on differences between versions may illustrate 
this descriptive structure: 
2.1. In [version] A the Portuguese met their worst enemies and C describes the conquest of the 
Indian Empire in a short time. 
Version B describes the decision of the "open door" to the whole Indian Ocean and D 
[describes] the Portuguese arrival to India under the command of Vasco da Gama and the 
Portuguese controlling the spice route and forbidding the other people to trade. 
2.2. In B  they are enemies and in C they agree about the settlement of the Portuguese in their 
lands. 
Facts are picked up from versions available, their correspondence to meaningful factors 
not being made apparent. The central idea of description, quoting some facts from the 
different versions, appears again when she gives her preferred choice from the set of 
explanations offered: 
3.1. [Versions ranking] D - A - C: B 
3.2. [Version ranked 1st explains more than 2nd] Firstly, it describes the challenge openly 
[against?] the Moslem domain and fighting the Moslem faith. And secondly, the opening of 
lands to the Portuguese by people. 
Her reasoning is centred on facts selected from the versions given and isolated from the 
whole context. The notion of factor is not apparent. 
Explanatory consistency 
(a) Evidential consistency 
Use of information 
Claudia uses familiar knowledge and fresh evidence to give an account of the occurrence. 
Pieces of information are quoted with a coherent meaning, but sometimes those 
statements seem to be misinterpreted and picked up in a fragmented way, for example, 
when in her written answer she compares versions D and A, ranked first and second, 
respectively (see her previous responses to 3.2). Such vague or even meaningless 
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statements might be due to difficulties in written expression, since she managed to clarify 
this idea a little better in the interview, although continuing to apply a descriptive logic: 
I: In what respects do you consider version D better than A? Can you explain it better, because 
I didn't understand it very well... 
C: Version D says that the Portuguese were discovering the maritime route to India, 
conquering ... and in version A it was the Moslem challenge against the Portuguese, that is, 
against their main enemies, the Moslems. 
In this excerpt, she can summarize version D according to familiar knowledge (the 
maritime trip to India) but she reduces version A to an expression taken from version B 
(the Moslem challenge). Her several answers suggest that she inconsistently uses fresh 
information, sometimes logically quoted, sometimes in a fragmented way. 
Evidence and explanation: 
When Claudia is asked to justify her own version by reference to a set of statements 
related to the sources given (item 1.2), she selects the following:3  
OWN STORY 
Rounding of the Cape 
Trip to India 
Settlement/control of I. Ocean 
Conquest of spice ports 
"Door open" to the Europeans 
STATEMENTS SELECTED 
1. The Portuguese wished to fight the Moslems 
4. The Portuguese were morally superior 
5. The spice trade was very profitable 
7. Portuguese ships were well-armed 
The selected statements were those fitting her own version. A concern about the logic of 
her story seems to make her select a set of statements which might function as a 
justification in terms of dispositions and motives (statements 1, 4, 5), and an external 
condition of the events she described (statement 7). An incipient explanatory pattern 
might be implicit here, in terms of reasons for actions. In the interview, she justifies her 
selection with the traditional motives (Christians and spices) and conditions (equipment) 
of those actions which she integrates to produce her version, from the Cape to the control 
of the Indian Ocean: 
3Facts given in this scheme of Claudia's story were taken from her account. 
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C: [I chose these statements] because the Portuguese wished Christians to go there, to conquer 
spices because India was very rich, and they went well-armed because they had to do a long 
voyage, and the Portuguese were usually superior... 
I: And in what sense were the Portuguese superior to others? 
C: They liked to ... the kings liked to ... I can't explain this well ... they liked 
	 they liked 
I: To dominate? 
C: Yes, they do ... 
I: And why didn't you choose the other statements? 
C: Because they are also interesting but I found these more interesting. 
I: More interesting concerning what? 
C: Concerning my response. 
Here, in order to progress through the dialogue, the interviewer intervened in the 
clarification of ideas about the Portuguese superiority, perhaps invalidating the student's 
subsequent answer "yes, they do". The relationship that Claudia establishes between 
some statements and her story is classified as "interesting" - which appears as a vague 
notion. 
When asked if her favoured explanation (version D) is better justified, Claudia's answer 
suggests an idea of equating versions and sources given as if they were several accounts: 
3.3. No, because the sources narrate better how those historical events happened. 
She seems to grasp the notion of evidence as proof of an historical occurrence given by 
written books, when she deals with the question about the possibility of the existence of 
a complete explanation: 
4.3. I agree, because there are written books which prove this conquest of India by the 
Portuguese. 
A concern for evidence is shown again when she argues about her agreement with the 
statement "the author establishes relations among facts and justifies those relations": 
C: The author saw the reasons, what the event was [sic] and then she/he justified it with things 
proving those relations. 
This idea of justifying relations would suggest an elaborate piece of reasoning (a relation 
between reasons and actions?) if it were not just a quotation of a given statement, to be 
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analysed by her. Her justification is still vague ("things" proving), but not totally 
preempted. She seems to reason about evidence in terms of proofs for a factual 
description. 
(a) Logical consistency 
Coherence 
There is an inner coherence in the story given by Claudia about the Portuguese 
domination of the Indian Ocean, although some minor inconsistencies appear. A 
restricted logical coherence is suggested in other items, such as in 2.1 and 2.2 (see 
p. 202) when in the former she seems simply to give isolated pieces of information taken 
from the versions given, and in the latter she tries a descriptive and inaccurate summary 
of versions B and C. The logic of different factors conveyed by different versions seems 
not to be perceived. Logical contradictions between some of her responses occur. For 
example, in 4.3 (see previous page) she considers that a complete explanation already 
exists, since there are written proofs, but in 4.4 she selects the following words about a 
good explanation: "Impossible to know - Certain". In the interview, she notes that she 
did not understand that question very well and she changes her response for: "Possible -
Total - True". Such an oscillation may suggest that these ideas of second-order reasoning 
are still not firm enough, although it might mean that she has some verbal difficulties as 
well. In the interview she admits her perplexity when dealing with some statements given 
in question 5.1, as for example: 
C: I wrote "False" [some authors are not totally neutral]. I didn't manage to understand that 
question very well! 
Inconsistency in several responses suggests a restricted coherence. 
Plausibility 
The relative plausibility of different explanations appears difficult to tackle since her 
reasoning is centred on description. Her discussion about ranking explanations is not 
always conducted with the aim of assessing the logical consistency of versions, rather 
she prefers to reason directly on substantive grounds. When justifying the two versions 
ranked last (versions C and B) she focuses on the morality of past actions, blaming the 
Portuguese for their attitude instead of discussing the potential importance of such actions 
for the formation of the empire: 
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3.4. Versions B and C [were worst] because it was the Portuguese arrival to Indian lands. 
I: Why did you find B and C worst? 
C: They are worst because the Portuguese were somehow bad to the Moslems when these were 
good since they let the Portuguese settle there. 
When in the interview she is challenged to explain her answer in favour of version D 
(ranked first) against version A (ranked second), she avoids discussing it in terms of 
plausibility, and, again, she argues on substantive grounds, in terms of preference for the 
Portuguese success against Moslem intentions: 
I: You think that the issue of Moslems [in version A] is not so important; in what sense is it 
worse than version D? 
C: The Moslems wanted those lands, India, because it brought lots of profit due to spices and 
they did not want the Portuguese to go there to explore those lands, they wanted to keep India 
to sell those spices to Europe and other countries... 
I: And did they succeed or not? 
C: No, they didn't because the Portuguese managed to settle there. 
I: So you don't find that so important as version D? 
C: No, I don't, because D showed that the Portuguese were strong to settle there... 
By the end of this passage, under pressure from the interviewer, it seems that she is 
assessing the purposes of different agents (Moslems and Portuguese): she favours those 
which proved to be efficient ("D showed that the Portuguese were strong to settle 
down").4 These arguments in terms of efficiency of particular motives for actions which 
really occurred seem to follow a criterion more elaborate than that applied in the 
assessment of versions B and C, which were discussed in terms of moral judgement of 
the Portuguese action. Plausibility appears discussed so far as particular actions are 
concerned; a broader comparison of different versions is systematically avoided. 
4Claudia's arguments remind stage 1, dry bones and a sense of superiority, of Shemilt's categorization 
(1984), when focusing on a simple description of what happened, and avoiding to consider motives for 
actions. 
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Objectivity and truth 
Questions about objectivity are related to the story to be narrated. They are considered at 
the level of truth of facts which must be proven, according to her answer "there are 
written books which prove that conquest".5  
Differences among versions tend to be seen as different ways of telling the same thing. 
She states: 
2.3. [Different explanations exist] Because they are different writers and each one tells her/his 
own story about how they were told but everything leads to the same. 
2.4. No [no explanation can be considered better than others], because all of them said different 
things but after all they all refer to the same. 
In the interview she maintains and clarifies the idea about different ways of telling the 
same story: 
C: Writers have different ways of explaining an event, they told [sic] in different ways but 
everything was leading to the same... 
I: But do explanations differ from each other or are they the same? 
C: They are the same but they are told in different ways, by other words... 
Her last written statement suggests the ideal of direct observation in order to reach all the 
facts: 
5.2. c [a witness would explain better] because that man (or woman) would write all she/he 
saw at the time, how the Portuguese conquered that empire, how they dominated it, etc. 
A concern for giving a full account emerges here, within a naive realist approach. The 
direct observation paradigm is appealed to again when she argues in the interview: 
C: I liked c best because she/he as an eyewitness saw what happened; a Portuguese too 
because she/he lived it, but a witness who wrote on that is better grounded because a 
Portuguese who participated can add something when telling what happened, so I find c better. 
I: And why not a present-day author? 
5This answer seems to have some reminiscence of the authority stage analysed by Collingwood as an 
early pattern of thinking in history. It may be considered a preempted way of accepting important books 
or persons as the source of truth. 
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C: Because [an author] from that time knew what happened, while an author now sees, takes 
something from c but she/he does not tell so well as a witness from the time. 
Direct observation and memory are valued over the recent historical explanation, 
suggesting an attitude of naive realism. Direct observation is preferred over memory due 
to a concern for truth applied to historical description (a participant can add some fiction). 
This coheres with her concern for proofs, expressed in several passages of her work. 
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Analysis of one example illustrating Level 2 
Level 2 - THE RIGHT EXPLANATION 
Explanations - or descriptions, as these concepts may be not clearly distinct - are considered right if 
proved by real facts. The major concern is about the most correct explanation instead of description of the 
story as in the previous level. Different historical explanations tend to be considered non-proved 
explanations by contrast with those produced by witnesses/agents, since the former are based on facts not 
directly experienced (by observation or memory). 
The idea of explanation may be tentatively grasped, that is, with oscillations between a descriptive and an 
explanatory structure. Explanation may be constructed through a temporal step-by-step story (a 
continuous-series explanation) in which dispositions and motives are given, or through a set of a few, 
usually familiar factors, under a rational and/or a causal mode. Factors tend to be weighed in a tight mode, 
the discussion about them being centred on some specific condition. Thus, competing explanations are 
assessed according to the preference manifested towards some factors. Consistency with evidence is 
appealed to at the level of common-sense assumptions of "true facts" functioning as proofs, and some 
specific historical terms related to evidence are employed. Criteria of plausibility begin to be used in 
everyday terms. 
An oscillation between realism (there is a truth to be attained, thus there is a correct answer) and 
scepticism (the past is gone, a witness or agent would give the right explanation) is often observed. 
Competing historical explanations tend to be considered unproved explanations as they are based on facts 
not directly perceived. 
Herminio, 13 years old, 7th grade: 
Explanatory structure 
(a) Explanatory mode 
Herminio focuses on one explicit, but manifold factor in his own explanation : 
Because  King John had information about the Indian Ocean and about a strong spice trade 
existing there, which would give much help to the economy. 
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The information factor seems logically to imply a causal and a rational mode: it suggests a 
planned action as the cause of the occurrence, that plan being an outcome of a purpose 
(the search for spices), almost made explicit in his assertion on the economic meaning of 
that search. Throughout his work, however, Herminio practically forgets this 
"information" - he cites it just once more, at the beginning of his interview - and he puts a 
major emphasis on an economic reason. In the interview, he starts by asserting: 
H: The Portuguese needed money, or spices ... for their economy! Because their economy was 
not good enough, it was half-way..., 
and reasserts it several times, both in the written task and the interview: 
3.2. I chose Version D, because the Portuguese wouldn't go only fighting due to their great 
leaders' morale only, but also due to the spice route and trade. 
I: About questions 3.1 and 3.2: Do you want to say anything else? 
H: The Portuguese didn't go fighting without getting anything back, they needed to get profits. 
3.4. Because the Portuguese would not spend lots of nwney in challenging other more 
powerful people and in fighting them without taking anything back with them. 
Such answers seem to be related to the question "why did the Portuguese go to conquer 
the Indian Ocean?" instead of focusing on "why did the Portuguese manage to conquer 
the Indian Ocean?". This move towards a simpler why question produced an easier form 
of explanation with which he could cope.6 
(b) Factorial weight 
Herminio operates with the notion of factor when he constructs and discusses his own 
explanation and when he assesses the importance of competing versions (see the 
quotations above). However, notions of fact and factor seem not to be clearly 
discriminated when he tries to interpret the main differences among the four versions 
given (in items 2.1 and 2.2). Here, Hermit-1i° oscillates between a descriptive summary 
and a selection of factors: 
6 Compare Lee (1995) about similar strategies of conversion employed by pupils studied in the "Chata 
Project". As it was pointed out in chapter 7 (footnote 1, p. 170), the main historical question used in this 
study can be considered a kind of a why question, of a how-possible type. In this concrete case, it may 
involve a more complex reasoning than just a direct why question. 
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2.1. The difference between A and C is that in A the Portuguese fight  people from another 
religion and in C it explains that the Portuguese would only manage to conquer with weak 
resources. They won due to their great leaders' moral correctness. 
In version B it indicates or explains the why of the Chinese withdrawal and the naval 
challenge against the Moslems... 
2.2. Version B clashes with C when it says that the Portuguese defeated the weak 
Moslems. 
A descriptive mode is indicated in statements like "in A the Portuguese fight people from 
another religion" and "Version B clashes with C when it says that the Portuguese 
defeated the weak Moslems"; an explanatory mode is indicated in passages like "they 
won due to ...", or "it explains the why of the Chinese withdrawal". Explanatory 
answers like "it explains that the Portuguese would only manage to conquer with weak 
resources", or "it explains the why of the Chinese withdrawal", or the unexplained 
version D, suggest a restricted understanding of those factors conveyed by versions or 
some difficulty in clearly expressing them. 
Throughout his discussion of the relative importance of different factors, Herminio 
concentrates his selection especially on the economic purpose: in the written task, in 
answer 3.2 when he argues for his favoured explanation ("due to the spice route and 
trade"), and in answer 3.4 when he argues against versions A and B (see previous page). 
In the interview, this kind of reason is reasserted four times (see two of these occurrences 
on previous page) tending to function as the decisive cause of the Portuguese domination 
in the Indian Ocean. 
Although emphasising the economic reason, he concedes some room for two other 
factors: the information condition and the moral disposition, the former being asserted at 
the beginning of his written and oral answers and then forgotten, the latter being accepted 
with less weight than the economic reason. This is shown in answer 3.2 and in this 
passage of the interview: 
I: Thus, you think that this explanation: "fighting because of the moral correctness of the great 
leaders"... 
H: It was not sufficient! 
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It appears that Herminio argues against the moral disposition in terms of its non-
sufficiency in order to stress the relevance of the economic motivation.? This suggests a 
hierarchy of factors, discriminating between decisive and contributory conditions. 
Explanatory consistency 
(a) Evidential consistency 
Use of information 
Herminio's explanation might be constructed on grounds of familiar knowledge (with an 
emphasis on the economic purpose) or mainly inspired by some of the evidence given 
(information about the Indian Ocean and the spice trade, in item 1.2 and in source A). In 
his favoured explanations (versions D and C) he focuses on two factors traditionally 
cited: the search for spices and moral disposition. Less familiar facts (Moslem power and 
the Chinese withdrawal) seem to be broadly understood ("the Portuguese would not 
spend lots of money in challenging other more powerful people", "version D does not 
manage to explain why the Chinese withdrew from the Indian Ocean"), but such facts are 
ignored as possible factors worthy of being analysed. He assesses different explanations 
around a favoured factor (economic motive) against another (moral disposition) without 
considering several possibilities proposed by different versions. 
Evidence and explanation 
Statements chosen by Herminio as a justification for his explanation directly equate with 
the factors he had already selected. 
HIS EXPLANATION 	 STATEMENTS SELECTED 
Information on the Indian Ocean 	 King John had information 
Spice route/ help to the economy 	 The spice trade was very profitable 
7 Martin (1989, pp. 42-43) pointed out that this claim of non-sufficiency of factors might lead to an 
argumentative strategy common among historians showing that such factors are only partially 
explanatory and that another factor - the favoured explanation - must be added (see chapter 3, pp. 77-8, in 
this study). 
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This quotation raises the question whether explanation and evidence are discriminated or 
not. But evidence ("facts") and explanation are discriminated by Herminio in other 
passages of his work, for example: 
2.3. [There are different explanations] Because there are facts which prove those different 
explanations. 
I: Now [quoting question 3.3]: Is version D [ranked first] better justified by the sources given? 
H: Yes, it is. By records of those who navigated and who used to write about them. 
Thus, explanations are proved by different facts that existed out there and were recorded. 
Although no distinction between facts, sources or records appears, the last term indicates 
the recognition of a technical vocabulary concerning historical evidence. Evidential 
consistency is understood at the level of proofs provided by records for factors selected 
and tied to the direct observation paradigm. But the concept of proof sometimes suggests 
a more fruitful way of thinking, appealing to the historian's autonomy: 
I: How can we manage to get a history with proofs for one explanation and other proofs for 
another?... 
H: We'll know... we have to base ourselves on some facts and choose those which fit better 
into that time... 
An explanation implies a selection of facts which must "fit" that time. This fitness 
suggests some awareness about contextual evidence which might be also related to logical 
consistency. 
(b) Logical consistency 
Coherence 
The need for internal coherence in an historical explanation is not discussed by Herminio. 
But that coherence is evident (implicitly) in most of his constructions, and throughout his 
arguments for or against the different versions. 
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Plausibility 
Herminio reveals a concern for a plausible explanation through several answers (some of 
them already quoted) and he uses counterfactual argument to discuss the plausibility of 
competing explanations and to argue for his favoured factor; "the Portuguese wouldn't go 
to fight due to their great leaders' morale only", "the Portuguese would not spend lots of 
money in challenging...". This argument appears to centre on a specific idea, a common-
sense belief that people usually are motivated for money. The clarification of his idea, 
"some explanations are related to the way of life of that time", suggests that it is a strategy 
to emphasise his favoured factor: 
I: Do you want to explain this [idea] better? 
H: When the Portuguese went there, it was because they needed money, otherwise they 
wouldn't go there ... and because at the time they were turned towards the sea for ... 
conquering. 
Ideas expressed about the past way of life do not permit enlargement of the concept of 
"fitness" within time; we might hypothesize that this fitness is a concept related to 
everyday assumptions about the plausibility of need for money, but also implies some 
basic understanding of the specific historical context, made explicit once in his assertion 
"they were turned towards the sea". 
Objectivity and truth 
Criteria for choosing between several explanations emerge on the basis of the idea of 
factual proofs for explanations: "there are facts which prove those different 
explanations". Recent explanations are incomplete "because it is not known yet if 
explanations given are true" (item 4.3). This concern for truth coexists with a direct 
observation and memory ideal - to live and to see something is to know it: 
5.2. Only an eyewitness from that time and a Portuguese who participated in those events 
could explain them better, because they lived them and they saw what would really have 
happened. 
Memory is valued against historical knowledge: 
H: An author from this time? 
I: From nowadays. 
215 
H: They could be wrong on facts because she/he didn't live on that epoch and she/he doesn't 
know how it really was. 
I: Thus you think that the important thing in order to manage to explain well something is? 
H: It is to live it. 
Hermfnio makes a distinction between direct observation and memory, a witness being 
more trustworthy than an agent: 
I: In question 5.2 you chose c and d [a Portuguese participant and a witness]. Do you see any 
differences between an explanation given by a Portuguese and by a witness? 
H: A witness gives a more truthful explanation because she/he saw; the Portuguese could have 
lied or enlarged the story more. 
I: And why? 
H: Because they could have lied... 
I: And why? 
H: I don't know (smiling) 
I: What do you think or what reasons would lead them to lie? 
H: They used to tell stories when navigating in the caravels, but when they told stories they 
used to put more facts in those stories! 
Herminio makes that distinction on the basis of more or less access to truth, one of his 
key ideas. Direct observation, more than memory, would guarantee the required 
reliability, which can be considered a notion implying neutrality. This notion is emerging 
in everyday terms and Hermlnio recognises the word, when he equates it to truth: 
I: Why did you write true in statement 4 [only some authors manage to be neutral ]? 
H: Some authors are more ... are more ... they tell more the truth. 
As a consequence of subscription to the ideal of direct observation and memory, a naive 
historical scepticism (historians could be wrong about facts) coexists with a realist 
attitude. The sceptical attitude is reasserted in another passage of the interview, but here 
promising a more elaborate construct, with less tight contours: 
H: Those who wrote the sources could have lied about the facts they wrote. 
I: And is there any way of knowing that? 
H: No, I don't think there is. 
I: No? In that case, can we never know what is certain? 
H: It is more or less... 
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I: More or less... is this related to what you said in 4.4: [a good explanation] is incomplete, 
valid and probable? Why didn't you choose the others? 
H: Because if I did , we'd have to say that history is for sure, all history! 
"History is not for sure", historians cannot reach certainty, their knowledge is proximate, 
("more or less") and probable, but it is valid - in his selection of the words "Incomplete -
Valid - Probable", a sense of provisionality coexisting with realism is affirmed. 
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Analysis of one example illustrating Level 3 
Level 3 - THE MORE FACTORS THE BETTER 
Students operate with the concept of explanation. Ideas of evidential consistency and plausibility are 
discussed as related to explanation, and the provisional nature of explanation emerges, mainly related to 
the notion of quantity of factors. 
Explanation may be construed under several modes (rational and causal, or narrative). Historical 
explanation integrates available evidence and previous knowledge by adding together various connections, 
which might correspond to a meaningful set of conditions, including counterfactuals, organized in a 
hierarchical order of importance. Antecedent steps may be added, and sometimes preferred to those 
conditions for explaining the occurrence. Although some confusion between fact and factor may appear, 
"real facts" are considered as factors of the occurrence. All factors are seen as necessary to explain the 
situation, as a mere sum, or as an interrelationship. In the assessment of several explanations criteria of 
consistency with evidence (sources are viewed as evidence for explanations) and plausibility (at everyday 
level) are applied. There is a tendency to overlap the notion of evidence for an explanation with different 
facts/factors to be discovered, or to be selected according to each point of view. Hence there can exist 
more or less complete explanations. 
Under this broad pattern, students' constructs oscillate between two trends, expressing a realist image of 
history growing up in quantity by adding all contributions but, at the same time, suggesting a sceptical 
concern for uncertainty about the past gone forever. The agent's perspective tends to be over-valued, 
revealing a persistence of the memory paradigm.  
Carla, 13 years old, 7th grade: 
Explanatory structure 
(a) Explanatory mode 
Carla selects two main sets of factors in a short explanatory narrative: 
Great sacrifices were made by everyone participating in the action of confidently confronting the 
Moslems who were not a big obstacle  to be overcome after all.  
As the Chinese "gave up" the control of the Indian Ocean, it was even easy for the Portuguese to 
get control of the spice trade and to conquer the main essential ports. 
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The first set is itself an interconnection of dispositions (a disposition to "great sacrifices" 
and self-confidence) and an external condition (the Moslem issue, which was "not a big 
obstacle"). The second set points to another condition (the Chinese withdrawal) and to a 
purpose for conquest (control of the spice trade). In the interview, Carla clarifies the 
importance of these dispositions and external conditions - first, will-power (to confront 
obstacles, according to her written answer); and, in addition, some other conditions: 
C: They had a strong will-power. I think that it was very important. And also ... it was even 
easier for them because, as it is said here, the Moslems did not base their power on the sea and 
the Chinese gave up the Indian Ocean! 
I: "The Chinese gave up": what do you mean by that? 
C: They gave their turn to others. When they arrived there... 
I: They: who? 
C: The Portuguese. When they arrived there, as the Moslems did not fight at sea, it was quite 
easy to conquer that domain of the spice trade. And, according to what is said here too, the king 
had got some information about what was going on there! 
I: And how does this fact - the king having some information on the Indian Ocean - influence 
the issue? 
C: Well, I think that it does, because if not it would have been more difficult. So, if they knew 
something, they could be better prepared for what could happen. 
In this passage, Carla confirms her former explanatory mode. She rephrases dispositions 
as "will-power", emphasises the Moslem and the Chinese factors and she adds another 
factor, the previous information about the Indian Ocean (which is suggested by source 1 
and by question 1.2, in the written material). 
(b) Factorial weight 
In her explanation (in the written task and the interview) Carla operates with a clear 
notion of factor. When she compares differences between explanations (items 2.1 and 
2.2) she discriminates between most of the main factors conveyed by the rival versions: 
2.1. In version A [...] it is due to Moslems not considering the sea as a means to power, while 
in version C, the moral correctness of the Portuguese leaders and the sacrifices made by all the 
people are the answers to that question. 
In version B it is very explicit that the Chinese had withdrawn their fleets from the Indian 
Ocean, but in version D it does not give such a certainty. 
219 
2.2. In version B the Chinese withdrawal was an important factor in the Portuguese domination 
of the Indian Ocean. In version C such domination is only explained by the moral correctness of 
the great leaders, by the sacrifices made by all for the country. 
Conflicting factors between versions A and C, B and C are perceived, but versions B and 
D are treated as related to factual certainty. When comparing versions B and C, she refers 
to the Chinese withdrawal in factual terms; about version C, she seems to interpret its 
factors as if they were considered sufficient conditions by its author, as her expression "it 
is only explained by ..." allows to suggest. This negative attribution (she ranked version 
C last) might mean: (a) her disagreement with the sufficiency of such conditions tied to a 
paradigm of addition of factors, or (b) a devaluing of such conditions in terms of 
necessity against other more relevant conditions (like the Moslem and Chinese factors). 
Further responses suggest that the former idea (addition of factors) might underlie her 
implicitly negative evaluation of conditions given in version C. For example, an idea of 
valuing quantity of factors emerges more clearly in this answer: 
3.4. Version A is too summarized and it only narrates the enemies encountered by the 
Portuguese. Version C speaks only of the moral correctness and the sacrifices made. 
The relative weight among conditions seems to be somehow ambiguous. The apparent 
contradiction between "great sacrifices" explicitly valued as important, and an easy 
conquest suggested by expressions such as "Moslems were not a big obstacle ... after 
all" or "the conquest was even easier", suggests that despite the strong Portuguese 
motivation, the conquest did not require such exceptional efforts - "after all" - due to 
Moslem inefficiency and Chinese withdrawal. This seems to imply a hierarchy between 
background conditions (will-power and sacrifices) and an immediate condition (absence 
of great obstacles) which might be considered as the decisive cause. All these 
contradictory signs about the relative importance of dispositions and external conditions 
(will-power is "very important", but other factors like Moslem power and Chinese 
withdrawal are also necessary) may point to an idea of considering several (inter-related?) 
factors. In fact, the summing of several conditions along the lines already suggested, 
seems to be the central idea: 
I: Why did you write "only" in what concerns version C? 
C: I think that it is not enough: because they made sacrifices - that is not enough for explaining, 
more things are necessary. 
I: Like what? 
C: Like what is said in version D, for example: the Chinese gave up, the Moslems were not 
powerful at sea - this has to be taken into account, not only the former [statement]. 
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Her ranking of versions given (D-B-C-A) might cohere with the same idea of valuing a 
quantity of factors. Information in version D is considered with explanatory power, since 
it gives the "conditions" of the occurrence. Also antecedent steps are valued together with 
conditions: 
3.2. Version D explains better because it explains better the steps done by the Portuguese and 
conditions [...]. 
Thus, Carla seems to operate with the concept of causation understood as a set of steps 
and conditions in a hierarchy, to be added together, or maybe interlinked. 
Explanatory consistency 
(a) Evidential consistency 
Use of information 
Carla shows an open attitude towards considering a range of data, fresh information 
included, discussing them and proposing other possibilities, as when she observes that 
"how the other people reacted" was not explained by versions given (item 4.2). She can 
articulate familiar knowledge (like the search for spices) with new evidence represented 
by the Moslem and the Chinese factors, as is shown in several quotations from her work 
(see above). Also her second favourite explanation (B) deals with those two new factors 
valued as necessary conditions to be considered. 
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Evidence and explanation 
In justifying her own explanation Carla appears to establish close links between some 
factors of her own version and the statements she selects: 
HER EXPLANATION 
Great sacrifices 
Self-confidence 
Search for spices 
Moslem naval weakness 
Chinese withdrawal 
STATEMENTS SELECTED 
The Portuguese wished to fight the Moslems 
The Portuguese were morally superior 
The spice trade was very profitable 
Portuguese ships were well-armed 
The statements she selects were mainly those which directly cohere with dispositions and 
motives she had already given. A wider range of statements whose selection would 
require a more sophisticated distinction between evidence and explanation - like the 
statements related to Moslem land power and Chinese sea power, not presented as direct 
factors - are left aside; however, these statements are implied when, in the interview, she 
points to Moslem naval weakness and the Chinese withdrawal as conditions "to be taken 
into account". In another passage of the interview, the same position is defended, 
suggesting that such information is considered in terms of positive factors (Moslem naval 
weakness and Chinese withdrawal) of the explanandum (the conquest): 
C: I didn't mention them because - if it was easy for the Portuguese it was not because the 
Moslems or the Chinese had strong armies - that would be not so easy for them [the 
Portuguese]. 
I: But, in spite of that the Portuguese managed it. Why? 
C: Why?! Why? ... Because they had no strong armies [fleets] ! 
I: The Moslems? 
C: Yes! 
I: But they had armies! 
C: But armies! They were on land, not at sea! 
Awareness of consistency with evidence is shown at the level of a direct correspondence 
of facts to factors, but such notions appear to be clearly discriminated. About the 
explanation she had ranked first by her (version D), she writes: 
3.3. Yes [it is better justified by sources]. Because I think that it [version D] fits better with 
them. 
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C: [The historians] try to fit things together and justify... 
I: How? 
C: By documents she/he finds... 
A good explanation - it seems - must be justified by the information conveyed by 
documents. A recognition of the interpretative role of the historian might be suggested by 
her assertion that the historians "try to fit things together and justify". This might be 
related to a notion of data for an explanation, a less simplistic construct than "facts 
proving explanations", which is an idea typical of the previous level. 
Evidence supporting an explanation seems to be valued not only in terms of its 
correspondence to factors, but also in terms of quantity, since a better explanation must 
contain more information. When arguing about the possibility of considering an 
explanation better than others, she writes: 
2.4. I think that it can [a better explanation can exist], because it might include more 
information, be more complete, or explain facts in a clearer or more logical way. 
These questions suggest a concern about evidence (more evidence is needed) to make the 
explanation more complete. But this idea appears also to be connected with a criterion of 
logical completeness. 
(b) Logical consistency 
Coherence 
In the excerpt quoted above, Carla seems to be aware of a need for logical coherence in 
an explanation. She points out that a better explanation can exist "because it might ... 
explain facts in a clearer and more logical way". In the interview, she tries to disentangle 
her idea of "logic" by giving concrete examples of coherence between actions as effective 
conditions of the occurrence, and reasons for them: 
C: It has to be more logical because it can have more... it has to deal with logic, with what they 
did, with attitudes they took, if they were doing right and they did not take silly attitudes, so that 
they could not lead to something else than the domination of the Indian Ocean. 
These ideas appear mainly related to a required internal coherence between purposes and 
action (the logic of actions). 
Plausibility 
Concerns for plausibility seem to be also at stake when, for example, she discusses the 
validity of versions C and A in her written answer: 
C: That is not enough: that the Portuguese had to be superior to the others and that they made 
sacrifices! - it is not enough for explaining, more things are necessary ... 
Positive actions and motives were required, but other conditions, such as the Moslem 
naval weakness and the Chinese withdrawal, were also necessary to make possible the 
Portuguese domination of the Indian Ocean, as she claimed several times. Similar 
concerns about plausibility based on assumptions at everyday level, but also considering 
the specific historical context, might also be detected, for example, about item 4.2, when 
she tackles the difficult question on what has remained unexplained by the versions she 
selected for the best explanation (versions D and C). In the interview, she discusses the 
need for considering other powers at the time in order to explain fully the Portuguese 
control: 
C: I think that there were other people wanting to dominate the Indian Ocean. That is not well 
explained here, how the other people reacted, whether they kept quiet or tried to conquer the 
Portuguese domain. 
This concern for plausibility of the broad past situation may indicate that she is going 
beyond a common-sense approach. 
Notions of completeness seem to equate her notion of logical adequacy when she values a 
complete explanation in her written answer and in the interview: 
4.3. Maybe [a complete explanation already exists]. I think that some aspects can be missing 
but the main reason is already explained. 
C: I think that it is already explained because it is like that, they arrived there and they managed 
it. Something can be missing, like ... aspects that happened there ... of sailors' life 	 , but that 
does not influence much ... the main reason is known. 
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This idea of complete explanation is here clearly distinct from the notion of 
incompleteness of mere information. That is consistent with her assertion: 
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C: We never know everything, everything. 
People will never manage to get it. 
Carla seems to propose that a good explanation can be logically complete although factual 
knowledge about the situation can never be complete. 
Objectivity and truth 
The notion of perspective is initially stated beyond a preempted level since she does not 
limit her answer about different existing explanations to a question of personal opinions 
and facts: 
2.3. I think that there are [different explanations] because several people can have different 
opinions based on facts which those people might find important and others find them not 
important at all. 
She relates notions of fact and opinion in a realist pattern ("opinions based on facts") 
simultaneously showing some notion of perspective, although still vague, stated at a 
common-sense level (facts which "people might find important"). But, although in the 
written task her conception of author's perspective is stated in everyday terms, in the 
interview she clarifies it by reference to a notion of empathetic reconstruction: 
C: There are facts which seem to be very important to some authors and not to others... 
I: And why does this importance vary among different authors? 
C: Because I think that they must put themselves into the sailors' position and think of how 
they would take certain attitudes... 
Empathy seems to work as a strategy required to get the "real" explanation. This might be 
tied to the idea that the agent would have more explanatory power since she/he could 
know all the facts: if this is so, the concept might still be based only on the notion of the 
quantity of real facts. The same notion may be implied in her assertion about a "total 
opinion" (see her oral answer next). Or it is perhaps related to an idea of reconstruction of 
the situation, reasons for action included, which can only be entirely fulfilled by the 
agents themselves, as her later responses suggest: "a Portuguese living the situation could 
easily explain...". 
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In neither case do her responses take clearly into account notions of neutrality. This is 
shown in her tentative clarification of the statement given in the written task: "only some 
authors manage to be neutral": 
C: I don't know indeed...a neutral person? ... One who has a total opinion on facts ... which is 
total! I don't know... some are totally neutral, those who manage to have an opinion which is 
not ... I can't explain! 
Carla tries to get out of a mere preempted mode in her construct of neutral - a "totally 
neutral" author has a "total opinion" "which is not..." - here she gives up trying to 
produce a full meaning of neutrality. Her response seems to go in a direction of denying 
the subjective element underlying the very idea of opinion, which would contradict its 
tacit recognition in her earlier answers. But the hypothesis of no clear concern shown 
about problems of detachment is consistent with her last words, in the written task and in 
the interview. In these responses, memory is valued over direct observation and historical 
knowledge: 
5.2. I think that d [an agent could explain better], because a Portuguese who lived those events 
would be much more able to describe those events than anybody else. 
C: A witness could not be well inside the issue, but a Portuguese living the situation could 
easily explain why things happened like that. A historian might give an explanation because 
she/he thinks that it was like that, but the Portuguese might not, they know because they lived 
through it. 
Concerns about an empathetic reconstruction might imply the need for understanding 
reasons for action and an overlapping of description and explanation. This overlapping of 
description and explanation appears related to the memory ideal - the agent, who 
experienced the inside of the situation, will be "more able to describe" it. 
As shown in several passages, notions of several historical perspectives are not totally 
absent. When discussing the statement "each time and place explains in its own way" she 
points out a source of presuppositions through an example: 
C: Traditions have influence. For example, if there are some traditions in a place, if they are 
Christians, they will explain in a certain way... 
Such an assumption could be developed in a relativist trend - but there are no signs of 
contradiction between this sophisticated idea of the social production of knowledge, and 
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the realist position she also assumes. Notions of realism ("the main reason is known") 
and of perspective ("to put into the sailors' position", "traditions have influence") could 
provoke a cognitive conflict if she was disposed to deepen these two notions. She prefers 
rather to go on asserting that the truth can be known by historians, but partially ("we 
never know everything"). Her arguments for the attributes of a good explanation suggest 
this unconscious contradiction between real but somehow uncertain explanations. In the 
interview, in relation to her choices about a set of assumptions concerning objectivity and 
truth, Carla points out: 
C: Here it says [an explanation is] probable - but I know that it really happened. So I didn't 
write probable because it is already known. I preferred possible because certain would be nwre 
rigid, possible is not so rigid. 
[On true - valid explanations] I chose valid ... I could choose true, but I didn't do it, I don't know 
why, but I could put it ... I wrote valid because people accept it [the explanation] like that. 
Carla seems not to be aware of her oscillation in arguments - for a naive realism when she 
overlaps events and causal links ("I know that it really happened") and for a more 
sophisticated position about the possibility of historical explanation ("certain would be 
more rigid", "valid because people accept it like that"). 
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Analysis of one example illustrating Level 4 
Level 4 - A CONSENSUAL EXPLANATION? 
The concept of provisional explanation remains linked to the ideal of a multi-causal explanation to grasp 
the total past, and more elaborate ideas are developed in relation to the concept of neutrality. 
Historical explanation is construed in a causal or a narrative pattern integrating the familiar knowledge 
and evidence available. The understanding of a complex reality is concerned with bringing out several, 
interlinked causes: this approach emphasises the criterion of interlinked factors, and sometimes a 
distinction between quantity of mere facts (related to description) and factors (related to explanation) is not 
made clear. Factors can be selected under a causal hierarchy but their conjunction is preferred. 
Explanations are assessed under criteria of evidential consistency and plausibility. Consistency with 
evidence tends to be understood at the level of verification, that is, in terms of proofs. The existence of 
different explanations from different points of view is clearly recognised, but a perspectiveless neutrality 
is also emphasised as an ideal which can be fulfilled or not. 
Two trends emerge: 
1. Through a confident positivism, some students claim that factors must be discovered by applying an 
absolute neutrality. They tend to ignore or reject counterfactuals as mere hypotheses which did not really 
occur. The existing documentation explored by the addition of new techniques and new tools makes the 
historian's craft a worthy task when trying to explain (fully?) the past. With this assumption, memory 
and direct observation cease to be valued over recent historical work. Perspective is recognised but not 
admitted as a valid criterion for an historical explanation. As a consequence of this view, the search for a 
consensus is considered as a necessary and reachable aspiration in history. At the tightest pole of this 
spectrum, a definitive and final conclusion is defended as the explanation. 
2. Following a subjectivist line, some students stress that all the true factors cannot be reachable, since a 
point of view is inescapable, and limits ways of looking at reality. As historical explanations are relative 
to personal or cultural presuppositions, the direct observation paradigm may offer a better means of 
partially controlling for neutrality, and reducing subjective interference.  
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Rui, 17 years old, 9th grade: 
Explanatory structure 
(a) Explanatory mode 
Rui constructs his written explanation by giving a list of factors: 
One of the reasons is due to the fact of the Portuguese not having met any resistance from 
people who used to trade on spices before. 
Another reason was that the Portuguese were technically advanced at the time, as far as their 
naval equipment is concerned. 
I also think that their morale was boosted due to that very profitable trade. 
Rui includes external conditions (non-resistance of other people and technical advance) 
and the economic motivation linked to the spice trade in a whole set. In the interview he 
lists the same conditions in a hierarchical order: 
R: I think that the main reason was that they [the Portuguese] did not have any resistance from 
the people trading with spices. I think that those people would have all the motives for 
keeping that trade! Secondly, I think that the Portuguese were advanced, that is, it would be 
easier for the Portuguese, it would be cheaper, it would be profitable for the Portuguese to get 
that trade. And that boosted their morale a lot! I find that these are the major reasons  ... 
Rui applies a causal mode in his explanation, calling all conditions mentioned "reasons". 
(b) Factorial weight 
The notion of factor appears clearly grasped through his work. When comparing versions 
given, he asserts: 
2.1. [Differences between versions A and C are due to] The existence of different factors.  
2.2. The explanation given by B asserts that such a domination was due to 
 the Moslems not 
having efficient naval equipment while version C points to the fact that such a domination was 
due to the Portuguese moral correctness and their spirit of sacrifice. 
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Rui can deal with different factors although ignoring the main factor conveyed by version 
B (the Chinese withdrawal.) He constructs his own explanation by selecting a set of 
conditions and can argue about them as factors. In spite of using a factorial ranking in his 
oral explanation ("the main reason", "secondly") he values reasons in a sum more than in 
a hierarchy; he apparently contradicts his former ranking when he chooses version D and 
argues for it: 
3.2. [Version D] narrates a whole set of facts better such as the rounding of the Cape of Good 
Hope and the systematic discovery of lands providing a launch pad for the expeditions which 
brought about this domination. 
Version D is here valued for featuring a set of antecedent facts which would provide an 
explanation of a continuous-series type. In this decision Rui makes an occasional 
regression from a causal mode underlying most of his answers to a sum of antecedent 
steps not discriminated from "reasons". But, the interlinking of factors seems to function 
as the explanatory paradigm defended by Rui. In the interview he claims: 
R: We aren't immediately allowed to think: that's because of those people there; first we have 
to see what made possible the creation of such an empire. The Portuguese had a really advanced 
technology, will-power, so all these factors contributed to the empire which we possessed in 
the Indian Ocean. 
This response seems to follow a structurist approach, valuing several conditions. The 
same pattern of valuing a set of conditions in conjunction, rather than one single cause, is 
shown when he explains why he ranked versions A and B last: 
3.4. They always deal with the same issue, the fact of the formation of this domain being due 
to the Moslems not having an efficient naval capacity, among other factors. 
R: The explanation they give is always the same, they are always playing the same key, the 
reason is this and this... but I think that there were many other reasons ... it was not only due 
to the Moslems not having capacity enough but a set of factors ... 
His arguments for several factors is accompanied by an emphasis on the "morale" factor. 
This might be a strategy to stress his favoured condition. Rui explicitly asserts: 
R: At the time the Portuguese got a will-power which was admirable! So, all those deeds of 
maritime discoveries were an admirable thing ... to dominate all that trade was something which 
interested them, so they went forward, they achieved it! 
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It may be worth noting that Rui, like some other students (see Carla, p. 218), attributes 
the meaning morale to the "moral correctness" of Portuguese leaders stressed in version 
C. This specific conversion appears as a strategy of attributing a familiar meaning (morale 
in terms of will-power) to an alien value (a nationalistic morality). 
Explanatory consistency 
(a) Evidential consistency 
Use of information: 
Rui can articulate familiar knowledge with fresh evidence, as his concern about 
discussing Moslem non-resistance suggests. Nonetheless he values the traditional moral 
factor conveyed by version C, and the relevant factor elicited by version B is 
systematically ignored even when he is challenged by the interviewer: 
I: And about this statement "the Chinese ships were bigger and stronger"? 
R: Also it isn't a thing with a ground for my explanation. 
New information - especially the Moslem factor - is discussed narrowly, based on the 
idea that a good explanation should be constituted by a sum of factors which should offer 
certainty. 
Evidence and explanation 
Rui justifies his own explanation by means of these statements which cohered with the 
factors he had selected: 
HIS EXPLANATION 	 STATEMENTS SELECTED 
Moslem non-resistance 	 The Portuguese were morally superior 
Technical advance 	 Portuguese ships were well-armed 
Search for spices 	 The spice trade was very profitable 
Statements which were supposed to be summaries of sources given are considered as 
better or worse explanations, some of them being broadly criticized on evidential 
grounds: 
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R: And on the armies [Moslem armies were superior] I think that it doesn't have a ground, it is 
not a grounded explanation. 
Statements are sometimes seen as explanations but they are also seen as a potential basis 
for his explanation, as when he rejected the statement about the Chinese naval power (see 
previous page). 
The notion of consistency with evidence appears clear in his written work when he 
justifies his favoured explanation, distinguishing sources from explanation: 
3.3. Yes they [the sources] support in some way what is written in version D. 
As has already been suggested, he values an explanation which takes into account the 
total past ("all facts"): 
R: Some explanations are more credible because they are based on all facts. 
Thus, an explanation which must be consistent with evidence about the total past (an 
explanation of a wider scope?) seems to be a central preoccupation to Rui. Since there is a 
scarcity of sources, different opinions on the real past might appear, thus the real 
facts/factors must be discovered ("dug up") in order to turn explanatory hypotheses into 
final conclusions: 
R: I think that it [the question raised] should deserve more thorough study from those authors, 
they don't "dig up" [gestures indicate quotation marks] enough as they should ... I admit that it 
is difficult because I think that there are not many documents on which those authors could 
base themselves to shape an opinion, so that's why different authors give different 
explanations, they pay more attention to one fact than to another, then one thinks that this 
happened because of this, and not that... 
...I think that such a study should be done to teach real things, not mere hypotheses ... a more 
serious thing! 
Evidential consistency is conceptualized at the level of verification, assuming tight 
contours since it must give rise to a final explanation. This tight attitude is coherently 
maintained through his responses: 
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4.3. I disagree [that a complete explanation already exists] because I think that a study has not 
yet been made with the objective of giving a definitive explanation. Because as we can see 
there are several explanations differing from each other in a certain way. 
I think that all these explanations should be joined together and after being conveniently 
analysed and proven a final explanation would be formulated. 
A complete explanation seems to equate to a definitive answer in the sense that it must 
include all proved facts. 
(b) Logical consistency 
Coherence and plausibility 
Coherence and plausibility seem to be criteria implicitly used to assess explanations, as in 
this passage of the interview: 
I: So, you have considered versions A and B worst. Why? 
R: I think there were many more reasons than these for managing to form that empire ... it 
was not only the fact of Moslems not having capacity enough, but a set of factors to which I 
have referred ... as technological tools enough for making an empire, so I find that they are 
both unsatisfactory explanations for me. 
The superiority of the Portuguese - itself represented by a set of factors (technological 
tools, made explicit here, will-power or morale, stressed in other passages) is viewed as 
essential to get a satisfactory (plausible) explanation. Also, when discussing statements 
which could be used to justify his own explanation, he explicitly uses the concept of 
plausibility: 
R: [The Portuguese wished to fight the Moslems] I find that it is not a very plausible 
explanation ... I find that I don't know of any people enjoying to be at war by mere ... hmm 
I: Wish? 
R: Wish to fight! I find that it is not a plausible reason. 
Plausibility is overtly discussed at the level of everyday - and emotional - assumptions 
("wish to fight"). 
Objectivity and truth 
Rui seems to equate objectivity with certainty. He assumes a tight attitude towards 
reaching a true explanation, devaluing different explanatory hypotheses, since they do 
not attain certainty. Truth or certainty in historical explanation can be reached through the 
collection of all factors under a strict neutrality, by "authorities" whose skills are 
appreciated, so far as knowledge and impartiality are concerned. He claims: 
R: I think that a study should be done that would join authoritative people with sufficient 
knowledge for analysing existing facts thus having the possibility of finding a complete 
opinion, something that is impartial, some who could be neutral, and after analysing the facts 
they really would reach a conclusion - the reasons are these! 
A real, serious study should be done - I'm not saying that these studies are not serious, they are 
hard - but now, let us think of including all the existing facts, even the smallest things, to 
reach the truth, something which is true ... 
4.4. [A good explanation must be] Total - True - Certain. 
The notion of perspectiveless neutrality tends to be defended as an ideal required to get a 
definitive explanation, which should be "total, true, certain"; but at some point the 
recognition of a "complete opinion" seems to mean rather a convergence of perspectives. 
This is overtly suggested in another passage of the interview: 
R: It would be interesting to join authoritative, real teachers ... 
I: Historians? 
R: Historians from different cultures to really get a consensus: "the real explanation to the 
empire formation is this, because ..." and to justify that with enough ... ... 
Perspective is most of the time seen negatively as personal interference preventing the 
author from searching for the "the real explanation" to be discovered: 
2.3. Each person thinks in his/her own way forming his/her own opinions, thus different 
explanations appear. 
R: Well, it is not exactly the opinion - or it is - ... there aren't so many documents on which 
those authors can base themselves, so that's why they can give different explanations, because 
they pay more attention to one fact than to another. 
233 
234 
A naive realism seems to imply an overlapping of description of "all the existing facts" 
and an explanation about why the situation occurred. Historians form divergent opinions 
because they think in different ways or because there is a scarcity of documents. His 
negative attribution to perspective, does not appear in a preempted mode. He can attribute 
a context to the notion of personal assumptions - nationalism is one source of them: 
R: There should be a serious research, for example: a short time ago there was a discussion, 
not in this case, but it shows what I mean: the Spanish said that it was them who reached 
America first, the Portuguese said it was them. I think that it should be done by some people 
who could keep neutrality, that is, neither Spanish nor Portuguese ... for grasping some 
conclusion: look, it was this and not that! 
However, the notion of opinion is formulated under two different meanings: as personal 
assumptions leading to divergent answers, thus devalued (as above); or as formed on the 
basis of evidence, thus being objective (as below): 
2.4. Yes [one explanation can be considered better] because there are opinions of people who 
always have dealt with this kind of issue thus being more able to formulate more reasonable 
and concrete explanations. 
A concern for methodological neutrality appears as a central preoccupation. This leads 
Rui to choose a neutral person, equated with an authority in the matter, as the best author 
for an historical explanation: 
5.2. I think that the best person for explaining this domain would be an important author 
because I find that he would analyse a whole set of factors which others certainly would leave 
aside, because they are not able enough to explain them or because they don't give the 
importance that those facts deserve. 
In a positivist approach, perspectiveless neutrality and complete information appear to be 
the central ideas valued by Rui as criteria for a good explanation. 
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Analysis of one example illustrating Level 5 
Level 5 - PERSPECTIVE 
Historical explanations are considered under specific methodological criteria pointing to ideas connected 
with confirmation and refutation as well as plausibility in relation to the historical context. Such criteria 
are applied to assess the explanatory consistency of competing explanations. The idea of perspectiveful 
neutrality tentatively emerges, still conflicting with the idea of a perspectiveless neutrality. 
Historical explanation is coherently constructed in a causal or a narrative pattern, and grounded on a 
selection of previous knowledge and available evidence. Causal connections are hierarchically established, 
but all conditions are frequently considered as necessary to explain the occurrence. Ideas of valuing more 
and interlinked factors remain. Explanations can be assessed by using criteria of evidential consistency and 
plausibility. Evidential consistency can be discussed under notions of confirmation and refutation, 
although a move to a tighter idea of verification occurs. By applying such methodological criteria, the 
idea of perspective begins to be recognised as an historical feature, although alternating with the ideal of 
perspectiveless neutrality. Perspective can also be related to ideas of contingency of knowledge. Those 
criteria bring a more critical and grounded view to the notion of objectivity than in previous levels, even 
when an oscillation between objectivism and relativism appears. 
Filipa, 16 years old, 11th grade: 
Explanatory structure 
(a) Explanatory mode 
Filipa construes her explanation under a narrative pattern, in the sense that causes are 
intertwined within an account, instead of being merely listed: 
Since the fifteenth century naval techniques and equipment had been improved which permitted 
a better knowledge and development for the country. Thus during the sixteenth century the 
Portuguese set sail into unknown lands which supplied a wide and profitable trade that would 
enrich the country, enlarging the Portuguese domains. 
We can conclude that with the help of the Portuguese strong resources (with strong fleets) the 
unknown lands were dominated. 
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A web of long-term conditions are presented in first place - "naval techniques", 
permitting "knowledge and development" leading to trips "into unknown lands" (an 
antecedent step), in order to get "a wide and profitable trade" - the last of these factors 
implicitly appearing as a purpose ("that would enrich the country"). Such an account 
seems to function as the context for the factor featured in her last statement - "strong 
resources" - an immediate factor being itself the logical consequence of those long-term 
conditions already stated. In the interview, the same conditions are given but they are 
rephrased and rearranged in two different causal sets - the former, integrating new 
techniques and a better knowledge, the latter, listing the resources factor and the trade 
purpose: 
Because of the new techniques and equipment they used, which permitted them ...a better 
knowledge and development, and thus they managed ... to conquer the lands in India, also 
because those people were weak in those resources and also ... the Portuguese were interested 
in the trade because it was rather profitable and ... that is why it was easier to get into the 
conquest. 
The whole pattern might suggest that the student construes an explanatory narrative close 
to the structural model: although short-term conditions are considered, the long-term ones 
seem to be considered as decisive to the occurrence. 
(b) Factorial weight 
Filipa operates with the notion of factor in her own explanation. This notion appears fully 
established although a few inconsistencies can sometimes be found. In her written task 
she states: 
2.1. While version A argues that the Portuguese people were gifted with great naval power and 
resources, version C, on the contrary, gives us the idea that the Portuguese had no power or 
resources at sea. 
In version B the Moslems were those who challenged the Portuguese by sea, version D in turn 
is opposed to this explanation arguing that who "attacked" first were the Portuguese against the 
Moslems. 
2.2. They [versions B and C] disagree concerning the way the Portuguese conquered the Indian 
Ocean. 
Different factors are selected here, there being some contradictions detected among the 
several versions. However, if the notion of factor seems to be implicit in her first 
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comparison (naval power versus no power on sea), in the second comparison, between 
versions B and D, she asserts only differences about a descriptive fact (who attacked 
first: the Moslems or the Portuguese?) and avoids the Chinese factor. In her last 
comparison (between versions B and C) she also avoids speaking of the Chinese, 
considering disagreements in terms only of a vague "way of conquest". Here, it is not 
explicit, again, whether she is thinking in an explanatory mode or just in terms of a 
descriptive pattern, as the expression "way of conquest" suggests. As the Chinese factor 
is never quoted through her written and oral responses, such ambiguities related to 
version B might mean (a) a difficulty of interpreting - or expressing - the information 
given by Pacey, or (b) a non-discrimination of the notion of factor or, (c) an 
unwillingness to cope with a counterfactual statement . The first hypothesis seems to be 
consistent with most passages of her work, since in the interview Filipa refers to the 
Chinese as "being weak in resources", and explicitly refers to "factors" (which 
contradicts hypothesis b). She implicitly uses counterfactual reasoning in connection with 
the Moslem factor, which contradicts hypothesis c: 
I: And don't you think that version A partially shows something about that [why did the other 
people fail]? 
F: Yes, I do, because it speaks of the Moslem people ... not having their power based on the 
sea, which really helped the Portuguese to conquer those lands ... 
The resources factor, originally stated in a positive mode (the Portuguese had strong 
resources), is later presented by comparison with other people - those people (in India) 
who "were weak in those resources", Moslems without "power based on the sea". In all 
these accounts it appears as a facilitating condition ("with the help", "why it was easier", 
"which really helped"). Throughout her work, Filipa selects some long-term conditions 
and motives and values them as in this passage of the interview: 
F: In version D they give us a goal ... - the goal of the Portuguese - and several situations 
which really explain  that Portugal was well-armed and that she had an interest in the trade in 
the Indian Ocean ... there are data that really are logical ... 
A single-factor explanation is not given high value. Factors must be linked to each other 
in order to form a complete, good explanation, such an idea being expressed several 
times. For example, she claims in the interview: 
F: I think that one factor must be also linked to others, because there is not just one factor 
only, several factors must exist complementing each other! 
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I: And confronted with one explanation with several factors seen as not very important, and 
another with only one, but a strong factor, which of them would you consider to have more 
weight, how would you decide on the importance of those explanations? 
F: Maybe for the stronger factor ... because in general if ... well, I don't know, maybe several 
factors, even in their simplicity, can give a better explanation than only one! Because I think 
that, in this case, only one factor - that the Portuguese were well-armed - there are also other 
data, for example, the Portuguese spice trade, I think that it is quite important, while other 
data, or versions, don't give that, they speak of fleets, that's' all. I really think that a 
complementarily must exist! 
Complementary factors are thus stressed by Filipa as an ingredient of a good explanation. 
But her argument also suggests a common strategy: to criticize a non-favoured factor 
(about "fleets") in order to give room to her favoured long-term conditions and motives. 
Explanatory consistency 
(a) Evidential consistency 
Use of information 
Her explanation appears mainly grounded on familiar knowledge (naval techniques and 
the search for spices). Some fresh data taken from the given versions and sources are 
integrated in her account, when she refers to military resources ("Portuguese strong 
fleets" or other people's naval weakness - "Moslem, African or Chinese". Her assertion 
about the Chinese naval weakness contradicts the evidence given in version B and the 
sources. With regard to version B (ranked second by Filipa) only the Moslem factor is 
discussed, and its relevant information about the Chinese is ignored ("the Moslems were 
those who challenged the Portuguese at sea"). Also, in the interview, when discussing 
the different versions, only the Moslems seem to be referred to: 
I: You wrote: "while version B explains only the conquest". This "only" means that version B 
lacks ... 
F: Yes, it lacks something. It just gives us one datum [on the Moslems?], while the others 
don't, they give us more data which we can use for understanding! 
The Chinese factor is completely left aside in all her responses. The interviewer should 
have explored this ambiguity, but failed to do this. Whatever reasons Filipa might have, 
data suggest, at least, some difficulty in coping with this evidence, which does not 
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facilitate an open attitude to the various evidence available required for giving an 
historical explanation. 
Evidence and explanation 
Filipa expresses a concern for basing explanations on data on several occasions. For 
example: 
I: And what is the reason for that, for different presuppositions? Do they base themselves on 
something, or not? 
F: Yes! They must base themselves on data, mustn't they? 
However, when asked to justify her own explanation she makes a restricted selection of 
evidential statements taken from the list given: 
HER EXPLANATION 	 STATEMENTS SELECTED 
Naval equipment 
Better knowledge 
Naval trips 
Profitable trade 
Strong fleets 
The spice trade was very profitable 
Portuguese ships were well-armed 
In the interview, she justifies her choice, showing a concern for evidential confirmation 
by applying the expression "verification" as a requirement not only to a material factor 
(Portuguese resources), but also to a purpose (the goal of conquest): 
I: Why didn't you choose the others [statements]? 
F: These two statements explain better because the Portuguese superiority in relation to the 
other people and the goal of the conquest can be verified. 
In her written response on the evidential justification of the best explanation (she chooses 
version D), she agrees on a similar justification, showing a concern to relate several 
factual statements too: 
3.3. Yes, it [version DJ confirms all sources, telling us about the Portuguese strong fleets, 
their superiority over the Moslem trade ships and their goals - the trade, essentially, which was 
very profitable at the time. 
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Version D seems to be selected for reasons of providing more and relevant data for a 
better explanation. Confirmation, which might be regarded as a more elaborate referent 
for evidential consistency than verification, is beginning to be applied, although some 
confusion on explanations confirming or being confirmed by sources is apparent - and 
this should be clarified in the interview. That confusion might be due just to language 
problems since the assumption that explanations must be grounded on data is clearly 
asserted several times. Evidential statements are valued - and emphasised throughout the 
interview - as grounds for an explanation, which should be confirmed by "data" or 
"proofs". "Data" is the most frequent word related to evidence, which suggests a clear 
differentiation between an unobservable past and observable sources in order to construct 
an explanation. But the meaning for data oscillates - sometimes meaning factual proofs, 
sometimes in a looser form, covering facts and opinions. Used in the latter sense, they 
are considered as not explanatory: 
F: There are different versions and different authors' opinions and so they present a given 
explanation but like...opinions, those are data which don't help us to explain what happened! 
The term proof begins to be used at the moment of discussing the idea of a complete 
explanation: 
4.3. Maybe. Nowadays, with the proofs found and with the several studies and research, a 
complete explanation of the issue exists already. 
In these responses there is a tendency to see the completeness of explanations as tied to a 
sense of exact data to be searched. In the interview, she claims: 
F: I think that nowadays with the several existing proofs, with data, historians are already able 
to explain a question. 
She seems to point to explanatory power, either in terms of evidential and logical 
adequacy. She tries a distinction between a hypothesis and a certain explanation: 
I: So explanations are not always... 
F: They are not always quite correct, there are data which give some indicators on something, 
but they are only indicators, now, a proof! These proofs really give a certain explanation ... 
Such a response can be seen as falling into a positivist pattern: an explanation is true 
when it is "proved" by noncontroversial data, not just indicators of the past. It must also 
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be "universally valid" according to the same view, but her arguments might also suggest 
some more sophisticated reasoning related to an idea of non-refutation: 
I: Why didn't you select total or incomplete as attributes of a good explanation? 
F: I think that it is valid because - if it is universally valid - when something is explained in 
history we are not capable of doubting it, since there are really some data there are explanations 
and as I mention here, a good historical explanation will be put under research... 
I: And do you think that it is never put into question? 
F: It can be put into question by other historical authors! 
This implicit idea of a possible refutation has still some positivist contours (non refuted 
explanations are certain) and the idea of confirmation continues to be expressed at the 
level of exact proof: 
I: So, does it [historical explanation] continue to be "universally valid"? 
F: [Smiling] ... it depends on whether it really happens or not - if it does, it is not so valid as 
a good explanation which is really certain; in the case where some doubts exist, and when 
some authors - as in this case - put some uncertainties, I think that it is not valid, is it? 
I: Thus, does that mean that you consider two kinds of historical explanations: those being 
certain... 
F: Certain! 
I: And accepted by everyone... 
F: Exactly, but they are those on which there are exact proofs, now the others without proofs, 
with some uncertainty, maybe ... 
Although ideas of refutation seem to emerge, she attributes certainty to an explanation 
based on non-refuted facts, leaping over a distinction between confirmed facts and an 
explanation consistent with evidence. 
In the light of these responses, Filipa seems to try to reconcile notions of verification 
("with the several existing proofs, with data", "They are already able to explain a 
question") and of explanations open to refutation ( "It can be put into question by other 
historical authors!"). 
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(b) Logical consistency 
Coherence and plausibility 
Different data conveying different factors are selected in terms of their logic. In the 
written task, when agreeing in considering an explanation better than others, she points 
out: 
2.4. Yes, because some data are more important and more logical in order to explain why the 
Portuguese came to dominate the Indian Ocean. 
In the interview, she tries to tackle the meaning conveyed by the referent logical. She 
seeks to come out of a preempted mode by giving substantive examples of logical data: 
I: So, what makes some data more important and more logical than others? 
F: I think that ... those data are perhaps more logical ... for example, in version D, which I 
chose, they give us a goal, the goal of the Portuguese and several situations which really 
explain ... 
A logic of data seems to imply a coherent explanatory link (intelligible in terms of 
practical reason) between some statements conveying evidence for an explanans ("they 
give us a goal") and the explanandum ("which really explain..."). Here, explanatory 
power seems to be entangled with evidential grounds; explanatory power might suggest a 
concern for internal coherence (in terms of rationality of actions), and plausibility, when 
asserting that several conditions would make Portuguese resources and purposes more 
"logical". The relevance of a rational explanation is also implied when she argues for the 
explanatory power of version D, in terms of making reasons explicit: 
3.2. The version ranked first - version D - explains better the reasons that led the Portuguese to 
explore and to dominate Oriental lands, while version B only explains the Portuguese conquest 
in India without transmitting to us any Portuguese goal concerning the Indian seas. 
The contextual situation of the conquest is considered when, in her written answer about 
what remains unexplained in versions chosen, Filipa argues: 
4.2. That historical explanation [versions A and D] doesn't manage to explain the why of the 
other people's failure .... 
This idea might express concerns for either (a) coherence: considering what reasons did 
those people have to let the Portuguese dominate, or/and (b) plausibility: considering why 
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other people let the Portuguese dominate that area would permit us to understand more 
clearly the plausibility of the resources factor. The interviewer tried to explore this idea: 
I: And do you think this explanation [A] quite satisfactory in relation to the "why" of others 
people's failure? 
F: No, I don't, because they might have no power at sea, but when the Portuguese reached the 
land, they [the Portuguese] surely had power on land ... if they [the Portuguese] had power at 
sea it's probable that they had it on land too! 
Moslem land power seems to be assessed here so far as its importance as a negative 
factor to the Portuguese empire is concerned: if the Moslems were so powerful on land 
why could the Portuguese establish their control in some lands, too? As Filipa refers to 
the Portuguese conquest of some Indian lands, she seems to take into account the specific 
historical context of the situation. She might have given here an argument at the level of a 
comparison-situation, concerning a comparison between what had occurred in the Indian 
ocean and on the Indian land.8  
Objectivity and truth 
Filipa shows an explicit concern for an objective explanation under criteria of evidential 
consistency, thus making possible a distinction between a better and a worse explanation. 
She recognises bias in version C: 
F: I think that the author Matoso is more subjective. The others give more proofs, more data, 
this one doesn't, he speaks more of subjective aspects, the mentality varies, of course ... 
Filipa's ideas express a need for a detached attitude and she can relate this criterion of 
objectivity - as contrasted with subjectivity - to criteria of evidential consistency ("more 
proofs, more data") for discriminating what counts as an objective explanation. But this 
contrast of objective versus subjective seems to be still related to the old paradigm of the 
natural sciences. There are two kinds of explanation: objective explanations must be 
value-free and thus "universally valid"; subjective explanations are value-laden, due to 
"different interests existing in some of them" or "mentalities". Filipa tends to include a 
good historical explanation in the former set. 
8 The two opposing policies concerning the Portuguese oriental empire - naval supremacy versus land 
domination - are currently taught in school. Appendix C shows such an approach. 
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A positivist approach underlying her ideas about methodological detachment provokes an 
oscillation in the kind of attribution she assigns to personal assumptions: sometimes she 
seems to give a negative attribution to authors' opinions, sometimes she seems to accept 
it as a natural feature in an historical explanation: "there are authors who explain in one 
way, others in another". Such an oscillation may also be seen when she reconsiders her 
response about the contingency of knowledge and she discusses that in the interview: 
I: So far as the statement ... "Each time and place explains in its own way" is concerned, why 
did you consider it as false? 
F: I think that if there are data ... oh, but here it speaks of time as well, and each time has its 
own mentality, and the place as well ... Here, maybe it is true, because in a place people can 
have a mentality which they wouldn't have in another place, they are capable of accepting 
something that the others are not. 
She exposes an idea about the social production of knowledge by relating authors' 
presuppositions to different mentalities. She exemplifies those different mentalities by 
identifying the context in which the nationalistic version C was produced. It must be 
emphasised that Filipa discusses the moral factor in its genuine context, that is, she 
manages to think of it in terms of morality: 
F: For example, here in version C [quoting]: I think that this is an explanation precisely based 
on the nationalistic mentality of a Portuguese author. And here it speaks of the great 
Portuguese leaders' morality. So this can exemplify well the differences in place and time. 
I: And to which time and place does this version refer? 
F: I think that it really speaks of those who conquered, that mentality of love for the country, 
that morality which the leaders had! To conquer for enlarging the country! 
I: But the others don't speak of that, why? Why don't the other versions speak of that issue? 
F: I think that the others want to be more objective, maybe, this is somewhat subjective. 
This idea of contingency of knowledge is far from being constructed under a relativist 
view: it conveys contrasted notions of a biased (equated to subjective) versus a detached 
(equated to objective) attitude. ("The author Matoso is more subjective. The others give 
more proofs, more data"). Such a pattern (a biased versus a detached attitude) at some 
point seems to coexist with the recognition of a perspectiveful objectivity: 
I: And in relation to statement 4 ["only some authors manage to be totally neutral"] you put 
this statement as false, why? 
F: I think that each author can draw a good explanation, it can vary, but I think that they have 
always a ... well, they are critical ... 
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Conflicting with the positivist model, some distinction between notions of perspectiveless 
and perspectiveful neutrality seems to emerge. She tries to disentangle these notions, 
under pressure from the interviewer: 
I: And how can neutrality cope with the personal point of view? 
F: ... She/he is neutral, she/he is going... [smiling] This is difficult! I think that after her/his 
own point of view and the others, she/he can go to neutrality ... 
I: So you consider that neutrality is an arrival point and not a starting point. 
F: Or maybe a starting point, because she/he can start with neutrality too and go to an 
objective explanation. I think that we can see two ways there, she/he can be neutral and go to 
the explanation, to the study, but she/he can also move away from neutrality, because really 
with so many opinions, she/he can't draw a neutral opinion! 
Here she clarifies her notion of methodological neutrality, meaning a detached ("she/he 
can be neutral and go to the study") and a balanced ("after her/his own point of view and 
others") attitude. She tries to distinguish the notion of personal perspective ("really with 
so many opinions, she/he can't draw a neutral opinion"). She goes on trying to 
disentangle these ideas of neutrality with and without perspective and argues, although in 
not very clear terms: 
F: Each author can have her/his own opinion, but neutrality is not exactly that, because 
neutrality is not tied to her/his opinion, but well, she/he is not neutral about the other 
opinions 
These assumptions (on the way of distinguishing a perspectiveless from a perspectiveful 
neutrality) might strengthen her objectivist view. In this position, she discusses her last 
written answer: 
5.2. For me, a recent author would be the person who could explain the Portuguese domination 
of the Indian Ocean better, because she/he can compare facts, having a larger number of proofs, 
better resources, with deeper studies on the several issues. 
Such an answer may suggest that a recent author can produce a more powerful 
explanation, with a greater scope. An idea of provisional explanation under an objectivist 
approach seems to be expressed here. 
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Truth equates both certainty and validity of knowledge: in her written task, she attributes 
the adjectives "true" and "valid" to a good explanation. In the interview, she considers an 
historical explanation as "universally valid" but also agrees that it can be refuted ("a good 
historical explanation will be put under research"). Also, she prefers to reason on "certain 
data", (equated with "proofs") rather than speaking, as many subjects do, of "true facts". 
These ideas might imply a more elaborate notion about truth in an explanation than just 
assertions about the truth of facts, in the ontological sense. We might see a realist 
position here, going beyond a naive level. But awareness in discriminating certainty from 
explanatory validity, with regard to data, is too hard a task for Filipa, at the moment of 
the interview. She tries to assess certainty in terms of consistency with existing more or 
less (observable) data: 
I: And to what is this due? Some explanations with exact proofs and others less certain? 
F: I think that with some of them there are less relics ... 
I: Now, we are talking about explanations, about why. Is it possible to find relics about why? 
F: No, but ... 
I: Do the reasons have relics? 
F: No! I think that it is when no doubts are offered! Those data, those sources ... Now, when 
doubts are offered there we must doubt ... 
An explanation well-confirmed by evidence ("those data, those sources") is worthy of 
being trusted - so Filipa seems to suggest.. Thus a confident attitude - sometimes a bit 
dogmatic ("when no doubts are offered!") towards scientific knowledge is reasserted, 
under an objectivist approach. 
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The model of students' ideas about PHE 
An empirical model of students' ideas about PHE constitutes the main working 
hypothesis in the present study. The model was progressively constructed through the 
analysis of several sets of data, that is, from the first explorations (see chapter 4) and the 
pilots (see chapter 6), to the final study as it was described along this chapter. Figure 8.1 
shows the evolution of the model, from the last pilot (P4) to the final study (F), in its 
main features. 
Figure 8.1 Evolution of the model of students' ideas about PHE9  
AFTER P4 	 AFTER F 
LEVEL 1 - INCONSISTENCY 
Descriptive or restricted expl. mode 
Second-order reasoning related to inf., 
or perplexity 
LEVEL 2 - STEREOTYPES 
Explanatory mode 
Common-sense criteria in expl. assessment 
Right/wrong explanations 
Exp. from primary sources often valued 
THE STORY 
Descriptive or restricted expl. mode 
Second-order reasoning related to inf., 
or preempted explanation 
THE RIGHT EXPLANATION 
Restricted/full, rational/causal expl. mode 
Common-sense criteria in expl. assessment 
Right/wrong explanations 
Direct observation valued 
Naive realism and scepticism 
LEVEL 3 - CONVENTIONAL POSITIVISM 
Explanatory mode 
Hist. exp. accepted if based on reliable evidence 
Sum of factors 
Personal opinion plainly accepted 
Exp. from primary sources often valued 
THE MORE FACTORS THE BE I 1ER 
Restricted/full expl. mode 
Evidence considered as sources for exp. 
Aggregation (sum or interlinked factors) 
Common-sense criteria in expl. assessment 
Memory and understanding valued 
Naive realism and scepticism 
(To be continued) 
9Abbreviations: expl. = explanatory; inf. = information; exp. = explanation; hist. = historical; d. obs. = 
direct observation. 
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Figure continued 
LEVEL 4 - SCIENTIFIC DOGMATISM 
Expl. mode, often an historical narrative 
Hist. exp. accepted if based on reliable evidence 
Aggregationist criteria in expl. assessment 
Perspectiveless neutrality valued 
LEVEL 5 - PERSPECTIVE 
Explanatory mode 
Concern for neutrality as a tentative balance 
Perspective (tentatively) recognised as legitimate 
A CONSENSUAL EXPLANATION? 
Causal/rational or narrative mode 
Interlinking of factors valued 
Evidence as verification for exp. 
Perspectiveless neutrality valued 
Consensus or d. obs. ideal 
Objectivism or relativism 
PERSPECTIVE 
Causal/rational or narrative mode 
Interlinking of factors valued 
Evidence as confirmation/refutation of exp. 
Emergence of perspectiveful neutrality 
Objectivism or relativism 
In Level 1 the focus moved from a pattern related to fragmented information 
(inconsistency) towards one centred on the story. In Level 2, a concern for stereotypes 
moved to an emphasis put on the right explanation. A discrimination of direct observation 
from memory, both formerly treated as primary sources, was then done, and trends about 
access to truth began to be considered. Level 3 (formerly, conventional positivism) was 
rethought in terms of aggregation of factors (the more factors the better). Criteria for 
explanatory consistency - in terms of evidence, coherence and plausibility - were better 
discriminated. Memory was identified as distinct from a direct observation paradigm. 
Level 4 evolved from a scientific dogmatism concerning the ideal of perspectiveless 
neutrality, towards "a consensual explanation?" pointing to different attitudes towards 
knowledge and truth. A positivist consensus, or a subjectivist view valuing direct 
observation, were suggested as outcomes of such an ideal of neutrality. An interlinking 
of factors, and more elaborate degrees of explanatory consistency, were features 
discriminated at this level. Level 5 maintained the same focus on perspective, but 
identified different degrees of explanatory modes and factorial weight, within explanatory 
structure; it also clarified degrees of explanatory consistency. Trends in attitudes about 
knowledge and truth were better explored. 
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Summary 
This chapter presented a qualitative analysis of students' ideas, suggesting a model of 
levels of progression about PHE. One example of each level was extensively discussed. 
These examples were analysed according to the main constructs concerning the 
conceptual framework discussed in chapter 7. In Level 1, students' ideas appear mainly 
related to the story; in Level 2, there is a special focus on the right explanation; in Level 
3, students' concerns appear to be aggregation of factors (the more factors the better); in 
Level 4, there is a special preoccupation about a perspectiveless neutrality, leading 
students to wonder if a consensual explanation is possible; in Level 5, perspective in 
explanation begins to be recognised as legitimate, although in oscillation with ideas of a 
perspectiveless neutrality. The evolution of the model, from the last pilot to the final 
study, was schematically analysed. 
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9 Statistical analysis of students' ideas about provisional historical 
explanation 
An in-depth, qualitative analysis in order to generate the empirical grounds for a model 
of students' ideas about provisional historical explanation was carried out. After this, a 
statistical analysis of the whole sample was viewed as desirable to illuminate some 
possible major trends in the population studied. Responses to the written task were 
coded in order to analyse: (a) frequency distribution of levels and differences in levels 
by grade, age and sex, (b) main tendencies in responses to some subtasks which were 
thought to be partial indicators of the conceptual clusters explored,1 (c) relationships 
between levels of progression and grade, age, sex, and some subtasks related to 
objectivity and truth, and (d) attitudes towards the possibility of deciding on a better 
explanation, that is, trends towards objectivism versus relativism entangled in the notion 
of provisionality. These trends were considered to parallel the levels of progression in 
ideas related to explanatory structure, explanatory consistency, and objectivity and 
truth. A comment on the major findings of the statistical analysis is given. 
Levels of progression in ideas about PHE 
Responses from the whole sample (N=119) on the written task were categorized by 
levels of progression in ideas about PHE, according to the model devised. The 
frequency distribution of PHE levels of progression and differences by grade, age and 
sex were then analysed. 
1  These three conceptual clusters (explanatory structure, explanatory consistency, and objectivity and 
truth) formed the theoretical framework for the empirical analysis, and had no relations to the cluster 
analysis used in statistics. 
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Frequency distribution of PHE levels of progression 
Table 9.1 shows the frequency distribution of levels of progression in the sample 
analysed. 
Table 9.1 Frequency distribution of levels of progression 
Level Frequency Percent 
1 23 19.3 
2 25 21.0 
3 55 46.2 
4 12 10.1 
5 4 3.4 
119 	 100.0 
The mode (N=55) was Level 3, which means that about 46% of responses followed a 
pattern of ideas characterized by a major concern about quantity of factors. Patterns 
conveying less elaborate ideas (levels 2 and 1) were the next most frequent, with about 
21% and 19%, respectively. The most elaborate levels (levels 4 and 5) were the least 
frequent, with about 10% and 4%, respectively. The low frequency of responses in 
Level 5 suggests that only a restricted number of students showed a paradigm 
challenging the idea of perspectiveless neutrality, by oscillating between this notion and 
the recognition of a genuine point of view entangled in the notion of methodological 
neutrality. The overall ranking of patterns of ideas about provisional historical 
explanation was as follows: 
Rank 1 	 Level 3 - The more factors the better 
Rank 2 	 Level 2 - The right explanation 
Rank 3 
	
Level 1 - The story 
Rank 4 	 Level 4 - A consensual explanation? 
Rank 5 
	 Level 5 - Perspective 
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PHE levels of progression by grade 
The sample was drawn up from two schools, stratified by grade (7th, 9th and 11th 
grade), and classrooms were randomly selected within each grade, in each school. The 
distribution of levels of progression by the three grades is shown in Table 9.2. 
Table 9.2 PHE levels of progression by grade 
Level 
7 
Grade 
9 11 Total 
1 20 3 23 (19.3) 
2 12 10 3 25 (21.0) 
3 17 23 15 55 (46.2) 
4 1 5 6 12 (10.1) 
5 4 4 ( 3.4) 
50 41 28 119 
chi-square = 44.18, df = 8, * p < 0.05 
A chi-square was used to statistically test for differences in levels by grade and a 
significant difference was found at the 5% level. The general pattern suggests that there 
is a progression from the 7th to the 11th grade. Level 1 (related to a descriptive pattern) 
was observed in the 7th and 9th grades, only. Level 2 (suggesting a concern for the right 
explanation) was observed in the three grades with only a few pupils in the 11th grade. 
Level 3 (related to a concern about quantity of factors) was the most observed level in 
the three grades, but at different rates (7th, 34%; 9th, 56%; and 11th, 54%). About half 
of the 9th-graders and 11th-graders suggested ideas typical of Level 3. 
Level 4 (concerning a perspectiveless neutrality and an ideal of consensus) was more 
frequently achieved by the 11th-graders (11th, 21%; 9th, 12%; 7th, 2 %). Level 5 
(related to emergent ideas of a perspectiveful neutrality) was achieved by the 1 1 th-
graders only, at a low rate (14%). 
The mode of frequency and rates observed in grades 9 and 11 indicate that ideas about 
provisional explanation linked to a major concern for a quantity of factors remains the 
most popular pattern across the last two grades, that is, from the 9th grade (the last year 
in compulsory schooling, with history included in the core curriculum) to the 11th grade 
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(which is now part of post-compulsory schooling, with pupils studying history as one of 
their choices). 
PHE levels of progression by age 
The sample ranged from 12 years, 1 month to 20 years, 8 months, and was grouped by 
months, in six categories. The distribution of levels of progression by age is shown in 
Table 9.3 in four categories. The initial categories 4, 5 and 6 were regrouped in a single 
one, category 4, due to its small frequency.2 These four categories are: 
- category 1 = 145 to 168 months (12 years, 1 month to 14 years) 
- category 2 = 169 to 198 months (14 years, 1 month to 16 years, 6 months) 
- category 3 = 199 to 228 months (16 years, 7 months to 19 years) 
- category 4 = 229 to 250 months (19 years, 1 month to 20 years, 8 months) 
Table 9.3 PHE levels of progression by age 
Level 
12-14 14-16 
Age 
16-19 19-20 Total 
1 12 11 - 23 (19.3) 
2 10 10 4 25 (21.0) 
3 14 24 14 3 55 (46.2) 
4 2 2 6 2 12 (10.1) 
5 - 4 4 (3.4) 
38 47 28 6 119 
chi-square = 31.46, df = 15, * p < 0.05 
The chi-square test revealed that there were significant differences among the age-
groups at the 5% level. An overall progression from the 12-14 to the 16-19 age-group 
may be suggested. The number in the 19-20 age-group might be too restricted to be 
considered in a major trend about progression. The 12-14 age-group mainly suggested 
2 This age-group (19+ to 20+) may be seen as a consequence of retention which has been practised in 
Portuguese schools. Its initial three categories presented the following boundaries and frequencies: 
category 4 = 229 to 234 months (19y. lm. to 19y. 6m) - 0 students 
category 5 = 235 to 240 months (19y. 7m. to 20y.) -1 student 
category 6 = 241 to 250 months (20y. lm. to 20y. 8m.) - 5 students. 
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ideas typical of levels 1, 2, 3, that is, their responses ranged from a descriptive pattern to 
a concern for the right explanation and for a quantity of factors; two pupils of this age-
group suggested more elaborate ideas related to neutrality (Level 4). The 14-16 age-
group also ranged mainly through levels 1, 2 and 3, but their responses were 
concentrated (15%) around Level 3. As in the former age-group, two pupils suggested 
more elaborate ideas at Level 4. The 16-19 age-group appeared to show the most 
sophisticated ideas: no overall responses were categorized at Level 1, only a few pupils 
suggested Level 2, some (the highest frequency, by age-group) suggested ideas of Level 
4, and it provided the only responses (N=4) at Level 5. Fifty per cent of this age-group 
appeared to give responses at Level 3. The small 19-20 group ranged between Level 2 
and Level 4. 
As progression of age and grade appear broadly to mirror one another, a closer analysis 
of distribution of levels by grade in each age-group might illuminate some interactions 
of age and grade. All students except one within the youngest age-group (12 to 14-year-
olds) attended the 7th grade. Table 9.4 shows that among the youngest students, 
attending the lowest grade of schooling surveyed, a distribution of levels of progression 
from Level 1 to Level 4 may be observed. 
Table 9.4 Levels of progression by grade in the 12-14 age-group 
Level Grade 
7 9 Total 
1 12 12 (31.6) 
2 10 10 (26.3) 
3 14 14 (36.8) 
4 1 1 2 ( 5.3) 
5 
37 1 38 (100.0) 
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The 14-16 age-group presents more heterogeneity as far as grade is concerned. The 
majority of students (51%) attended the 9th grade and appears to follow the pattern of 
quantity of factors (Level 3). A sizeable minority suggested ideas of levels 1 and 2, and 
a few fell into Level 4 (see Table 9.5). 
Table 9.5 Levels of progression by grade in the 14-16 age-group 
Level 
7 
Grade 
9 11 Total 
1 8 3 11 (23.4) 
2 2 8 10 (21.3) 
3 3 20 1 24 (51.1) 
4 2 2 (4.3) 
5 
13 33 1 47 (100.0) 
The table above suggests that, in this age range, there is a positive correlation of grade 
and level since the 7th-graders appear to cluster around a descriptive pattern whilst the 
9th-graders appear to progress towards an explanatory level. A few suggested more 
sophisticated ideas of perspectiveless neutrality (Level 4). Within this age-group, grade 
seems to be related to level of progression.3  
The majority of the 16-19 age-group attended the 11th grade and appeared to cluster 
around the most popular pattern of ideas, related to quantity of factors. Elaborate ideas 
of perspectiveless neutrality (Level 4) and perspectiveful neutrality (Level 5) were 
suggested within this age-group and grade (see Table 9.6). 
3 Grade and level may be both hypothesized as effects of other factors related to cultural and individual 
conditions. 
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Table 9.6 Levels of progression by grade in the 16-19 age-group 
Level 
9 
Grade 
11 Total 
1 
2 2 2 4 (14.3) 
3 2 12 14 (50.0) 
4 2 4 6 (21.4) 
5 4 4 (14.3) 
6 22 28 (100.0) 
The 19-20 age-group included a small number of students and all except one attended 
the 11th grade. They suggested ideas of the intermediate levels ( 2, 3 and 4) as shown in 
Table 9.7). 
Table 9.7 Levels of progression by grade in the 19-20 age-group 
Level Grade 
9 11 Total 
1 
2 1 1 (16.6) 
3 1 2 3(50.0) 
4 2 2 (21.4) 
5 - (33.3) 
1 5 6 (100.0) 
The analysis above suggests that in the 14-16 and 16-19 age-groups higher grades 
would correlate with a progression towards more elaborate patterns. Nonetheless, the 
majority of ideas, even at higher grades, seem to remain related to an aggregationist 
concept of explanation (the more factors the better). 
PHE levels of progression by sex 
The sample included 54 boys (45.4%) and 65 girls (54.6%). Table 9.8 shows the 
distribution of boys and girls by the three grades of schooling. 
Table 9.8. Frequency distribution of boys and girls by grade 
Sex Grade Total 
7 9 11 
Boy 23 20 11 
Girl 27 21 17 
Total 50 41 28 119 
chi-square = 0.62, df = 2, n.s.. 
The sample was not initially stratified by sex since the null hypothesis, as far as levels 
of progression are concerned, was put. The a posteriori analysis of data by using the 
chi-square test confirmed that no significant differences between boys and girls exist 
among grades. Therefore, for statistical purposes, the sample can be considered 
randomly selected. Table 9.9 shows levels of progression categorized by sex: 
Table 9.9 Levels of progression by sex 
Level Sex 
B G N 
1 6 17 
2 16 9 
3 25 30 
4 5 7 
5 2 2 
Total 54 65 119 
chi-square = 7.05, df = 4, n.s. 
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A chi-square test showed that no statistically significant differences in levels of 
progression were found between boys and girls. Nonetheless, as far as the two lower 
levels are concerned, it was observed that girls tended to show a descriptive pattern 
whilst boys clustered at the level of the right explanation. 
Statistical analysis of some subtasks 
The written task questionnaire (given in Appendix F) permitted the highlighting of 
ideas relevant to the overall concept of PHE in a qualitative approach as described in 
chapter 8. However, the majority of items appeared difficult to treat statistically in 
isolation: they should be combined in order to clarify and deepen their meaning, and the 
same answers to specific items could be related to different constructs. The main 
concrete features of such variability were: 
- Item 1.1 provided indicators of factorial weight, but this was inferred through a cross 
analysis with other items (such as 2.1, 2.2, 3.2 to 3.4).4 
- Items 2.3, 2.4, which were devised to suggest notions of objectivity and truth, could 
provide indicators of explanatory consistency, and the same ambivalence appeared 
further in item 4.3.5  
- Items 3.1, 4.1 indicated concrete decisions about explanations, but the cross analysis 
suggested several interpretations for the same choices.6  
- Items 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 provided indicators of explanatory consistency in terms of evidence 
and/or internal/external logic.? 
- Item 4.2 appeared to be difficult to grasp, and only part of the sample gave coherent 
answers. 
- Items 4.1 and 5.1 appeared to provide ambiguous answers in the written task and in 
the interview since the meaning of statements given seemed grasped in different ways.8  
4 Example: Carla in her explanation gave two sets of factors (Portuguese sacrifices and Chinese 
withdrawal) perhaps implying a hierarchy between them. In her subsequent work, e.g., in 3.2 and 3.4, she 
appeared to value a sum of factors and minimize those versions conveying the factors selected for her 
own explanation (see pp. 217-20) 
5 As examples, on 2.4 (about the possibility of one explanation being considered better) see Sofia's 
answer in Appendix I, p. 385. It implies an aggregationist pattern as far as evidential consistency is 
concerned; a subjectivist approach is more explicit in 4.3, 5.2 (ibid.). On 4.3 (about the existence of a 
complete explanation, today) see Rui's response in p. 232. It suggests an aggregationist-verificationist 
pattern in terms of evidential consistency, and implies a concern for absolute neutrality, also defended in 
other passages. 
6 Examples of different meanings (made explicit in item 3.2) of ranking version D first, may be observed 
in answers given by Claudia, Herminio and Rui (see pp. 202, 210, 229, respectively). 
7 Answers to 3.2, cited in the previous footnote, suggest notions mainly related to logical consistency, in 
Herminio's response, and to evidential consistency, in Rui's response. 
8 Responses to item 4.1 were not considered in the analysis. Responses to item 5.1 were statistically 
treated in a factorial analysis (see pp. 274-6). 
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- Item 5.2 indicated notions of objectivity and truth (and in some cases of explanatory 
consistency too) but it should be combined with other items providing indicators of the 
same kind (items 2.3, 2.4, 4.3)9  
Deciding among historical versions 
A few items could be directly counted in terms of frequency of responses, having the 
limitations stated above in mind. Item 3.1, which asked the pupils to rank the four 
historical versions given, was one of them. It was considered a relevant question since it 
propelled the arguments about reasons in terms of explanatory consistency for concrete 
decisions (conceptual cluster C). However, the ranking attributed by students to the four 
versions (table 9.10) does not reveal the variation in ideas suggested in the arguments 
for their choices. 
Table 9.10 Frequency distribution of historical versions ranking 
First rank Second rank Third rank Fourth rank 
Version A 8 28 51 32 
Version B 7 46 24 41 
Version C 9 33 36 40 
Version D 94 11 7 5 
Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance W=0.345, n.s. 
Kendall's coefficient of concordance (Siegel, 1951) was used to see whether the 
students ranked the versions as having the same popularity. The coefficient obtained 
showed that there was not a significant concordance about the ranking of the four 
versions: Version D was ranked quite differently from the other three, and no two 
versions were given the same ranking. The major consistency was that versions A, B 
and C were consistently all ranked fourth. 10 For convenience of analysis, the four 
versions may be seen in two groups: the most popular (chosen as first and second 
choice) and the least popular (the two ranked last). The descriptive version D proved to 
be clearly the most popular (79% of pupils ranked it first), whilst all the other three 
versions obtained small acceptance as a first choice. Moreover, version D was placed 
9 For example, Cidalia chose a recent author as the best able to explain the situation, but that appears to 
be related to an idea of total information, and conflicts with a sceptical attitude revealed in responses to 
other items (see Appendix I, p. 372.) 
10 Through the qualitative analysis, levels of progression were generated by taking into account the 
several arguments given by students about their practical choices in these particular items. 
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last by five pupils only. The most popular second choice was version B, an explanatory 
hypothesis, which might be seen as innovative (as far as the speculation about the 
Chinese is concerned), and critical about the Portuguese naval supremacy. However, it 
was much less enthusiastically accepted than version D: versions C and A together 
exceeded it, and it was ranked last practically ex aequo with version C. The third rank, 
which might mean one of the least popular versions, was most frequently given to 
version A. It was hypothesized that this version would convey information about the 
Moslem factor not completely new to the students, but stated in a fresh approach 
(stressing Moslem land power against its naval inefficiency). Although versions C and 
B, together, exceeded it in the third rank, it consistently took the third place for the first, 
second and fourth choice. That suggests an attribution of a mild negative sign to it. The 
last rank, representing the least popular version among pupils, was attributed to version 
C, conveying a nationalistic view about the Portuguese empire, and to version B which 
might be seen as an innovative, but also critical approach about Portuguese naval 
supremacy. These two opposed views seemed to be those against which pupils reacted 
most. 
The ranking of the four historical versions was analysed by grade and level. Tables 9.11 
and 9.12 show the distribution of the most popular versions (first rank), by grade and 
level, respectively. 
Table 9.11 The most popular version by grade 
Version 
7 
Grade 
9 11 Total 
A 3 3 2 8 (6.7%) 
B 4 1 2 7 (5.9) 
C 1 5 3 9 (7.6) 
D 41 32 21 94 (79.0) 
NR, 1 1 	 (0.8) 
50 41 28 119 (100) 
Chi-square = 6.23, df = 6, n.s. 
The chi-square test revealed that no significant differences among grades were found. 
Version D clearly appeared the most popular version across grades, the other versions 
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being quite distant from the former. This version was massively chosen first: 82% of the 
7th-graders, 78% of the 9th-graders and 75% of the 11th-graders selected it. 
The frequency distribution of the first rank for historical versions through PHE levels of 
progression revealed a similar consistency, as shown in table 9.12. 
Table 9.12 The most popular version by level 
Version 
1 2 
Level 
3 4 5 Total 
A 1 1 5 1 8 (6.7) 
B 2 1 3 1 7 (5.9) 
C 1 1 4 3 9 (7.6) 
D 18 22 43 8 3 94 (79.0) 
NR. 1 1 (0.8) 
23 25 55 12 4 119(100) 
Chi-square = 7.86, df = 9, n.s.11  
The chi-square test showed no significant differences in choice across levels. Frequency 
of version D as first choice corresponds to high percentages in all levels. Through the 
qualitative analysis, version D appeared treated as a story, or as an explanatory account, 
and its information was frequently selected in terms of factors, namely, technological 
advance (naval equipment and knowledge), economic motivation (the trade spice), 
organized explorations (systematic trips through the African coast).12 A strategy of 
converting information into factors was observed.13 Accordingly, this ranking might 
reveal an overall aggregationist pattern of ideas concerned about quantity of 
information in a good story, or about a valid "total" explanation of a past situation. 
These ideas may coexist with elaborate notions of consistency with evidence (asserting 
that sources given corroborate, and do not refute, factors implicitly selected in version 
D) and with historical objectivity (related to a concern about neutrality, with or without 
recognition of perspective). 
11 
 Levels 4 and 5 were collapsed for the chi-square test and the single no-response was ignored. 
12 The qualitative analysis in chapter 8 provides some examples of how students viewed information in 
version D. 
13 The same strategy of conversion may be found in the "Chata Project" (Lee, 1995) 
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For the second choice, a distribution across versions A, B, C, D by PHE levels of 
progression appeared as shown in Table 9.13. 
Table 9.13 The second most popular version by level 
Version 
1 2 
Level 
3 4 5 Total 
A 6 6 11 4 1 28 (23.5) 
B 11 9 21 3 2 46 (38.7) 
C 4 7 18 3 1 33 (27.7) 
D 1 3 5 2 3 11 (9.2) 
NR. 1 1 (0.8) 
23 25 55 12 4 119 (100) 
Chi-square = 3.97, df = 9, n.s.14 
The chi-square test revealed that no significant differences in this choice exist across 
levels. Since 48% of responses categorized in Level 1 (story-based and relying mostly 
on substantive information) opted for version B, it appears (from the qualitative 
analysis) that this second option was probably due to pick-up information for a story 
rather than being seen in terms of explanatory fruitfulness. At Level 3, version B 
followed by version C were the most chosen. At other levels, students distributed their 
preferences through the different versions. Thus, the different versions might be 
favoured as a second-choice according to more or less critical criteria. 
The last choice across grades and levels of progression is shown in tables 9.14 and 9.15 
and, in a similar way to the choices made for the most favoured explanations, raises the 
same paradox. 
14 Levels 4 and 5 were collapsed for the chi-square test. 
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Table 9.14 The least popular version by grade 
Version 
7 
Grade 
9 11 Total 
A 12 10 10 32 (26.9) 
B 14 17 10 41 (34.5) 
C 22 11 7 40 (33.6) 
D 4 3 1 5 (4.2) 
NR. 1 1 	 (0.8) 
50 41 28 119 (100) 
Chi-square test = 1.29, df = 6, n.s. 
The chi-square test revealed that no significant differences across grades were found. 
Nonetheless, the frequency mode across grades shows some variation concerning the 
least favoured version. It corresponds to version C at the 7th grade, version B at the 9th 
grade, and versions A and B, ex aequo, at the 1 1 th grade. Clustering the most valid 
versions with respect to historical grounds (versions A and B) against the less valid 
(versions C and D), the frequency distribution shows that 50% of the 7th-graders, 66% 
of the 9th-graders and 71% of the 1 1 th-graders reacted against the most valid 
explanations. A negative correlation between an historically-valid decision and grade 
seems apparent. In order to reflect further on this contradiction, the frequency 
distribution of the last choice by level is discussed next (Table 9.15). 
Table 9.15. The least popular version by level 
Version Level 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
A 7 7 13 3 2 32 (26.9) 
B 8 8 19 6 41 (34.5) 
C 7 10 18 3 2 40 (33.6) 
D 5 5 (4.2) 
NR. 1 1 	 (0.8) 
23 25 55 12 4 119 (100) 
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Chi-square = 1.20, df = 6, n.s.15 	 table continued 
The chi-square test showed that there were no significant differences across levels for 
the last choice. Clustering, again, the more valid versions (A and B) against the less 
valid (C and D), the frequency distribution shows that 65% of students at Level 1, 60% 
at Level 2, 58% at Level 3, 75% at Level 4, and 50% at Level 5 reacted against the most 
valid explanations. This finding conflicts, again, with the hypothesis of a progression 
through levels according to the model generated. Although a progression in historical 
criteria for the assessment of explanations was suggested (and that constituted some of 
the indicators for a categorization by levels) students' practical choices did not appear to 
be made accordingly. 
We might hypothesize either that: 
1. Students are not much used to applying critical criteria to their practical choices, even 
when they can thoroughly reason about them. Choices made by students at higher levels 
seemed to follow standards, such as clarity of information, description of antecedent 
steps, quantity of factors, or in terms of personal assumptions such as the positive image 
of the Portuguese, rather than criteria suggested by their arguments. Or, 
2. Other historically-valid criteria might be in action when the students make concrete 
decisions: the relative weight attributed to different conditions (and discussed in terms 
of plausibility and/or consistency with prior evidence, as explanations) might be 
relevant to decide among versions.16 In connection with version D, some conditions 
were inferred by students, turning a descriptive version into an explanatory one; in 
version C, the original morality factor was interpreted in terms of values from today 
(the morale factor) and its nationalistic context rarely seemed to be grasped. The 
phenomenon of conversion already mentioned appears to be a common strategy for 
coping with historical information. 
Selecting historical conditions 
Students were asked to construct their own explanations (item 1.1) on the question 
"why did the Portuguese manage to establish an empire in the Indian Ocean during the 
sixteenth-century?". This task provided a major basis for assessing the explanatory 
structure underlying students' ideas (conceptual cluster S) in terms of explanatory mode 
and factorial weight, but this was complemented with responses to some other items 
15 Levels 4 and 5 were collapsed for the chi-square test. 
16Both hypotheses are raised in the qualitative analysis. See one example of the first in Sofia's responses, 
and of the second in Carolina's responses (Appendix I, pp. 381-2). 
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(namely, 2.1, 2.2, 3.2, 3.4). Six students gave a completely fragmented response or did 
not respond at all. In all the other cases, from a story to a narrative, motives, 
dispositions and external conditions were coded in the categories as follows, in order to 
see what type of factors were selected by students: 
(a) Temporal priority: the first (European) people to arrive in India 
(b) Steps: antecedent Portuguese trips (African coast, Cape, India) 
(c) Morale: dispositions such as will power, sacrifice, patriotism 
(d) Religion - motivation to fight for faith 
(e) Economy - motivation to trade spices 
(f) Technology - naval equipment 
(g) Organization - planned trips and prior information about India 
(h) Military correlation: naval correlation with Turks, Egyptians, Arabs and Chinese 
(i) Long-term conditions - geographical, economic, socio-political 
Category 2 corresponds to a series of facts treated as steps of a story, in a model which 
might be seen as proximate to the continuous-series explanation. Categories 3 to 5 
corresponds to internal motives and dispositions (reasons for action). Category 1 and 
categories 6 to 9 correspond to external factors of the occurrence (causes). 
The majority of students (N=93) gave more than one condition of the occurrence. The 
first condition given in the explanation constructed by each student will be considered 
to shed some light on the type of factors selected. However, that must be understood in 
the following context: as several students showed a story pattern (at lower levels) or a 
narrative pattern (at higher levels), in these cases the first condition might not signify 
explanatory weight, rather a chronological priority; moreover, some students suggesting 
a causal mode presented a first condition in their explanation and later argued against its 
relevancy, favouring another condition.17  
Table 9.16 shows the frequency distribution of types of conditions given first by 
students in their own explanations. 
17 See Herminio and Rui's responses, pp. 209-12 and 228-9, respectively. 
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Table 9.16 Frequency distribution of the first historical condition given 
Condition 	 Frequency 	 Percent 
Temporal 	 2 	 1.7 
Steps 	 20 	 16.8 
Moral 	 22 	 18.5 
Religious 
	
4 	 3.4 
Economic 	 11 	 9.2 
Tech 	 20 	 16.8 
Organizational 	 2 	 1.7 
Military 
	
28 	 23.5 
Long-term 	 4 	 3.4 
NR (no response) 
	 6 	 5.0 
119 	 100.0 
Military correlation followed by morale, antecedent steps and technological advance 
were the conditions most students mentioned in the first position. These conditions had 
been launched for discussion through the material available. The most cited condition 
was a causal factor - military correlation - and it had been pointed out in versions A and 
B, sources B to G, implicitly accepted by version D, and negated by version C. The 
second most cited condition was a reason - moral motivation - and it was conveyed by 
version C (although originally in terms of morality rather than of morale), and 
suggested by version D and sources A and C. Antecedent steps were given in version D, 
which also gave information about technological advance; item 1.2 also provided a 
summary related to these and other conditions.18 Table 9.17 shows the frequency 
distribution of types of conditions cited first, by grade. 
18 This item gave the following statements: 
The Portuguese wished to fight the Moslems 	 The spice trade was very profitable 
The Moslem armies were strong 	 The Chinese ships were bigger and stronger 
King John had some information about the I. Ocean The Portuguese ships were well-armed 
The Portuguese had moral superiority 
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Table 9.17 The first historical condition given, by grade 
Condition 
7 
Grade 
9 11 N (%) 
Temporal 2 2 (1.7) 
Steps 10 4 6 20 (16.8) 
Moral 6 10 6 22 (18.5) 
Religious 2 2 4 (3.4) 
Economic 6 3 2 11 (9.2) 
Tech 8 9 3 20 (16.8) 
Organizational 1 1 2 (1.7) 
Military 13 9 6 28 (23.5) 
Long-term 2 2 4 (3.4) 
NR 4 2 6 (5.0) 
50 41 28 119 
Seventh-graders focused on military correlation (a cause) followed by antecedent steps, 
9th-graders focused on morale, and technological advance/military correlation next (a 
reason and causes), 11th-graders focused on antecedent steps, morale and military 
correlation (the two latter being a reason and a cause). The military cause presented a 
relative focus in all grades, and the moral motive was stressed from the 9th to 1 1 th 
grade only. Antecedent steps were favoured at the 7th and 11th grades, and long-term 
conditions were mentioned at the 9th and 11th grades only. If a focus on antecedent 
steps in the 7th grade might suggest a descriptive pattern, the apparent regression to 
antecedent steps in the 1 1 th grade might signify a concern about a complete 
explanation, thus starting to explain by giving the historical context in a chronological 
order (a narrativist pattern) rather than the maintenance of the continuous-series model 
of explanation.19 To illuminate these features further, types of conditions cited first, by 
level, are shown in Table 9.18. 
19 The model of a continuous-series explanation was discussed in chapter 2, p. 46, and several examples 
of students' responses were given in chapter 8. 
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Table 9.18 The first historical condition given, by level 
Condition Level 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Temporal 2 2 (1.7) 
Steps 5 6 8 1 20 (16.8) 
Moral 3 3 15 1 22 (18.5) 
Religious 1 3 4 (3.4) 
Economic 5 2 2 2 11 (9.2) 
Tech 1 5 12 1 1 20 (16.8) 
Organizational 1 1 2 (1.7) 
Military 2 8 13 3 2 28 (23.5) 
Long-term 3 1 4 (3.4) 
NR 6 6 (5.0) 
23 25 55 12 4 119 (100) 
Seventeen percent of students gave antecedent steps first, at Level 1 up to Level 3 
mainly (one occurrence in Level 4). A structural narrativist pattern may be suggested in 
responses referring to long-term conditions (geographical, economic or socio-political) 
given by a few students whose tasks were categorized at levels 4 and 5. The variety of 
conditions cited in levels 1, 2 and 4, and the restricted number of responses at Level 5, 
give a low frequency to the mode in these levels. At Level 1, reasons (the spices motive, 
mainly) were given more frequently than causes - according to the building-up of the 
categorization itself; at Level 2, an emphasis on causal factors appeared and was 
maintained through up to Level 5. At Level 3, responses clustered around three factors: 
the moral motivation and "military - tech" causes (corresponding to the main factors 
discussed in the competing versions given). 
A priority of selection does not necessarily entail explanatory weight, rather it might 
contribute to trace some distinctive features between descriptive/causal/narrativist 
patterns. An antecedent step or a long-term condition cited first might mean just a 
chronological order, and other conditions coming next might appear as more important. 
Thus, in order to highlight those conditions other than steps or long-term factors, the 
whole set of conditions given by each student was analysed. Table 9.19 shows the 
historical conditions given, by level of progression, and aims to highlight three clusters: 
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(a) steps, (b) reasons, and (c) causes.213 The no-response and temporal categories are 
residual. 
Table 9.19 Historical conditions by level 
Condition 
1 
(23) 
2 
(25) 
Level 
3 
(55) 
4 
(12) 
5 
(4) N 
NR 6 - - 6 
Temporal - - 3 1 - 4 
a) Steps 
b) Reasons/motives 
9 9 15 1 - 34 
Moral 4 12 36 9 2 63 
Religious 1 2 8 2 - 13 
Economic 
c) Causes/conditions 
7 8 20 6 3 44 
Tech 3 12 24 10 3 52 
Organizational - 2 8 1 1 12 
Military 4 11 36 9 2 62 
Long-term 1 3 1 5 
Reasons and causes were considered in all levels. Causes were most frequent in all 
levels but for Level 1, where antecedent steps were still the mode, although restricted in 
frequency. From Level 2 up to Level 5, causes (tech and military) and reasons (moral 
and economic motives ) were the most cited conditions. Long-term conditions, which 
were supposed to be taught in class, were only cited from levels 3 up to 5, but with a 
restricted frequency. 
It appears that students at different levels integrated in their own explanations 
conditions of different kinds and inspired by different sources. Despite their high 
preference for version D (see Table 9.12, p. 261) they pointed out conditions favoured 
by other versions, included those against which they reacted most (versions A and B). 
20 Steps, reasons and causes were implied in the model of levels of progression. A discrimination 
between them in a statistical analysis was inspired by Lee (in press). 
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Their arguments about the weight of those different conditions (moral, military, 
technological and economic) permitted discrimination of different degrees of constructs 
related to explanatory structure and explanatory consistency. Moreover, the high 
frequency of conditions as morale (conveyed mainly by version C), technological 
advance and economic motivation (conveyed mainly by version D) give some support 
to the hypothesis b put in p. 264, concerning criteria used by students in deciding 
among competing historical versions (the relative weight attributed to different 
substantive conditions, and discussed in terms of plausibility and/or consistency with 
prior evidence, might be one criterion relevant for the selection of one version among 
others). 
A concern for assigning several conditions to an historical situation may also be 
suggested, by observing the number of conditions given by level of progression (Table 
9.20). 
Table 9.20 Number of conditions given, by level 
Conditions Level 
1 2 3 4 5 
N (23) (25) (55) (12) (4) 
0 6 
1 10 7 3 
2 4 6 19 4 1 
3 1 11 26 1 1 
4 2 1 7 7 2 
From Level 3 to Level 5, the majority of students gave two or more conditions in the 
explanations they constructed. Linking different factors together in order to give a good 
explanation, appears to be a major criterion underlying students' ideas, and that is 
suggested across levels, as it was already stated. This criterion coheres with the aim of a 
total history. 
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The best author for an explanation 
The last written subtask was devised to indicate some students' ideas about historical 
objectivity (conceptual cluster 0) by proposing the selection of the best author for an 
explanation among the following categories: 
(a) a witness 
(b) an agent 
(c) an important and neutral author 
(d) a recent author 
The "witness" choice was thought of as an indicator of the direct observation paradigm; 
the "agent" was intended to stress memory, connected with a rational reconstruction of 
direct experience; "an important and neutral author" would convey the image of the 
perspectiveless neutral historian; "a recent author" was thought as related to a 
perspectiveful neutrality and being able to give an answer of a wider scope. These 
attributes were suggested in justificatory statements following the presentation of each 
option (see Appendix F). Table 9.21 shows the frequency distribution of responses to 
the best author question. The second category shown in this table clustered answers 
stating "witness" "witness or agent", or "agent" when the justification given put a focus 
on direct observation. 
Table 9.21 Frequency distribution of the best author 
Level 
	
Frequency 	 Percent 
NR 	 7 	 5.9 
Witness/agent 	 29 	 24.4 
Agent 
	
72 	 60.5 
Neutral 	 3 	 2.5 
Recent 	 8 	 6.7 
119 	 100.0 
A preference for the agent as being able to give the best explanation is clear. The 
preference for a witness or an agent as direct observers comes next, although quite 
distant in frequency from the former. Here, a phenomenon similar to what occurred 
with the ranking of several versions appears: students' responses overtly clustered 
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around the idea of an agent as a major choice, such as happened with the selection of 
version D. The recent author option, which could be a more elaborate choice as far as a 
fruitful explanation is concerned, obtained little support. Table 9.22 shows responses on 
the best author by grade. 
Table 9.22 The best author by grade 
Author 
7 
Grade 
9 11 Total 
NR. 6 1 7 (5.9) 
Witness/Agent 13 8 8 29 (24.4) 
Agent 28 29 15 72 (60.5) 
Neutral. 1 2 3 (2.5) 
Recent 2 1 5 8 (6.7) 
50 41 28 119 (100) 
Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance W=0.806, * p < 0.05 
The W value obtained in Kendall's test shows that a consensual pattern persisted 
through grades. In all grades the mode was agent and the witness/agent option 
consistently took the second rank. The recent author choice, even though residual in 
frequency, was distributed across the three grades. Table 9.23 shows the frequency 
distribution of the best author by age. 
Table 9.23 The best author by age 
Author 
12-14 14-16 
Age 
16-19 19-20 Total 
NR 4 3 7 (5.9) 
Witness/Agent. 9 12 7 1 29 (24.4) 
Agent 21 32 16 3 72 (60.5) 
Neutral 1 1 1 3 (2.5) 
Recent 3 4 1 8 (6.7) 
38 47 28 6 119 
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chi-square = 14.80, df = 9, n.s. 	 table continued 
The chi-square test showed no statistical differences in choices about the best author 
through age-groups. The mode was agent across ages, followed by witness/agent. The 
most elaborate categories were not chosen by the 14-16 age-group. The distribution of 
responses by level might be more illuminating. Table 9.24 shows the frequency of the 
best author by level of progression. 
Table 9.24. The best author by level 
Author 
1 
Level 
2 3 4 5 Total 
NR 5 1 1 7 (5.9) 
Witness/Agent 7 14 4 3 1 29 (24.4) 
Agent 11 9 48 4 72 (60.5) 
Neutral 1 2 3 (2.5) 
Recent 1 1 3 3 8 (6.7) 
23 25 55 12 4 119(100) 
chi-square = 76.11, df = 9, * p < 0.05 
The chi-square test revealed significant differences at 5%, in the choice of the best 
author by level. Some different trends may be stressed. At Level 1, students who 
responded focused on ideas of memory/understanding (agent) and direct observation 
(witness/agent, "because she/he saw"). At Level 2, students revealed a higher 
preference for the direct observation paradigm. At Level 3, the highest focus was put on 
memory and direct experience (agent, "because she/he lived it"). At Level 4, students 
oscillated among the several categories, and they might suggest trends of either 
subjectivism (attributing to witnesses or agents the best position to explain) or 
positivism (attributing to a neutral or a recent author the possibility of reaching a 
neutral, or consensual explanation). At Level 5, students tended to consider a recent 
author as the best author for an explanation. 
Levels and objectivity and truth (a factor analysis) 
A factor analysis was used to explore relationships between the overall levels of 
progression of ideas about provisional historical explanation (PHE) and two item-scores 
from the written task (items 5.1 and 5.2) which were both devised to give indicators of 
objectivity and truth (conceptual cluster 0). Item 5.1 presented a categorical response 
mode, a set of eight true/false statements with a residual "don't know" category, about 
the reasons of variance among explanations. These statements are given below (each 
one being labelled in tables as indicated in round brackets). 
1. They [versions given] only vary in the way of telling (Form) 
2. It always depends on the author's personal opinion (Opinion) 
3. It is necessary to discover and sum up the real facts (Sum) 
4. Only some authors manage to be totally neutral (Neutrality) 
5. Each author finds out different real facts (Factual difference) 
6. Each time and place explains in its own way (Contingency) 
7. The author establishes some relations among facts and justifies those relations. 
(Perspective) 
8. No one can give the certain explanation (Uncertainty) 
This item was not fully explored in the qualitative analysis of data due to its 
complexity.21  Item 5.2 analysed in the former section, on the contrary, was considered a 
valuable indicator of the cluster 0 in the qualitative approach, and the statistical 
differences found across levels are consistent with such an approach. 
The factorial analysis would also permit a better description of the group studied by 
looking for correlation between variables representing characteristics of the sample 
(age, grade, sex) and some task scores (levels of progression and sub-tasks 5.1 and 5.2). 
After an initial Principle Components analysis, the factor matrix was rotated by using 
the Varimax method of Kaiser. Table 9.25 shows the Varimax analysis of the derived 
matrix. 
21 
 A variance in the meaning of some statements was suggested in students' responses. For example, an 
affirmative response to statement 1 might cohere with ideas of level 1, or be justified as being referred to 
the same historical event, but allowing for different explanations of it. 
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Table 9.25 Varimax matrix for level and 0 subtasks 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Sex .02738 -.16268 -.00743 .69163 .07841 
Age .88737 .01401 -.02033 .07207 -.05464 
Grade .92724 -.01981 .06502 .05064 -.05922 
Level .61903 .05273 .24498 -.13255 .44582 
0 subtasks: 
Best author .13202 .02313 .59224 .01271 .61632 
Reasons for differences in explanations: 
Form -.17800 -.43726 -.30080 .05203 .49971 
Opinion .11149 .32258 -.10712 .06349 .64022 
Sum .01635 .48687 .32409 .43839 -.06201 
Neutrality .00864 -.13215 .78048 .04940 -.10069 
Factual dif. -.00239 .72950 -.15476 -.06039 .13182 
Contingency .00641 .50642 .01386 -.01520 .04724 
Perspective .29964 .17340 .35834 -.19299 .01871 
Uncertainty -.00603 .14974 -.04633 .76119 -.01703 
Significant loadings in bold (0.35) 
After rotation, the first common factor is essentially identified with grade, age and level 
of progression. This shows that there is a strong correlation between those variables. 
Factor 2 loads on ideas about factual difference, contingency and sum of real facts, and 
correlates negatively with formal difference. Thus this factor appears as a bi-polar 
factor which might be thought of as conveying the recognition of explanatory diversity 
due to a diversity of facts, their sum, and the contingency of knowledge, and 
simultaneously denying ideas of merely formal differences between explanations. 
Factor 3 loads on neutrality, the best author and perspective, which is consonant with 
the association of these three ideas entangled in the categorization (the best author is 
also significant under Factor 5). Factor 4 loads significantly on sex, sum of facts and 
uncertainty about historical explanation. Although the associated chi-square tests show 
no significant difference between boys and girls on the single variables, the overall 
analysis indicates some association between these variables. This may be indicated in 
that sum of facts occurred with a greater frequency for girls at Level 1, and uncertainty 
or concern for a right explanation was more prevalent among boys at Level 2. Factor 5 
associates level of progression with ideas on the best author, the existence of just formal 
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differences in explanations and the role of personal opinion, although level loads on the 
first factor more heavily. The positive correlation between author and opinion may be 
thought as indicator of naive scepticism (since the historical agent was mostly 
considered as the best author). However, an association of these two notions with form 
brings out some questions about the meanings which might have been assigned to this 
statement, as has already been discussed during the qualitative analysis of data. 
Therefore, from the derived analysis on the common factors for PHE levels of 
progression, sample characteristics and objectivity subtasks, grade and age appear 
significantly associated with levels of progression. Other group factors indicating ideas 
related to objectivity and truth (conveyed by items 5.1 and 5.2) are not associated with 
the former group, except for a fifth factor (which accounts for 9% of variance). This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that item 5.1 was not reliable enough to contribute to 
assigning a level to written responses. Item 5.2 might be useful provided the meaning of 
choices made about the best author were illuminated by the analysis of justifications 
given. 
Can we decide if one explanation is better than another? 
Answers to the question "can one explanation be considered better than the others?" 
(item 2.4) were analysed as one of the indicators of different degrees of the constructs 
about objectivity and truth. These constructs might appear within two conflicting 
trends: a realist/objectivist approach, affirming the possibility of deciding for one 
explanation and a sceptical/relativist approach denying that possibility, with several 
degrees (levels) in each one. As the question demanded a yes/no categorical response, 
answers were first coded in the following categories: yes, no, not sure, yes and no, no 
response. Table 9.26 shows the frequency distribution concerning "a better 
explanation". 
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Table 9.26 Frequency distribution of a better explanation 
Category 	 Frequency 	 Percent 
NR 	 14 	 11.8 
No 	 40 	 33.6 
Yes 	 55 	 6.2 
Not Sure 	 9 	 7.6 
Yes+No 
	
1 	 .8 
119 	 100.0 	 Table continued 
The major percentage of students affirmed the possibility of deciding for one 
explanation, although all of them had assigned a rank to the four versions given (in item 
3.1), and only a few argued that one might be preferred without being better than the 
others.22 Table 9.27 shows the frequency of these responses by age. The chi-square test 
showed that there were significant differences across the age-groups at the 5% level. 
Table 9.27 A better explanation by age 
Category 
12-14 14-16 
Age 
16-19 19-20 Total 
NR 8 5 1 14 (11.8) 
No 9 18 9 4 40 (33.6) 
Yes 14 22 17 2 55 (46.2) 
Not Sure 7 2 9 ( 7.6) 
Yes+No 1 1 ( 	 .8) 
38 47 28 6 119 
chi-square = 14.85, df = 6, * p < 0.05 
22 Sofia's response in Appendix I, p. 381, is an example of this position. 
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Students tended to appear more assertive (Yes or No) across age. Proportionally, the 16-
19 age-group seemed the most confident in affirming the possibility of a better 
explanation: about 60% in this group against about 36% in each of the two younger 
groups. The analysis of these responses by level also reveals a difference amongst levels 
(Table 9.28). 
Table 9.28 A better explanation by level 
Category 
1 
Level 
2 3 4a) Total 
NR 8 3 2 1 14 
No 1 10 22 7 40 
Yes 10 10 28 7 55 
Others 4 2 3 1 10 
23 25 55 16 119(100) 
a) Levels 4/5 were collapsed. 
chi-square = 27.03, df = 9, n.s. 
The chi-square test showed no statistical differences between affirmative and negative 
statements (and two neutral categories, i.e., no-response and others), about the 
possibility of finding a better historical explanation. However, it is possible to observe 
that responses (versus no response) increased across levels, and that the variance 
between the affirmative and negative responses occurred mainly in Level 1: at this 
level, students who responded were more positive than negative, whilst in the other 
levels affirmative and negative answers were evenly divided. This trend might mean a 
move from a less to a more critical attitude to assessing explanations. 
Students gave different reasons for their assertions. The analysis of these reasons leads 
to a slight move between positive and negative answers, since some negative answers 
such as "No, the sum of them is better" or, "No, they must be interlinked" may be seen 
as positive (in an objectivist trend, while answers such as "Yes, within each point of 
view" may be seen as negative (in a relativist trend). Table 9.29 shows the distribution 
of reasons for the negative answer. Within this category, the reasons given were coded 
according to the following ideas: 
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1 = Explanations are all the same (Same) 
2 = We don't know which is true (Doubt) 
3 = There is not enough data (No data) 
4 = All explanations are important (All important) 
5 = The sum/interlinking of them is better (Sum/interlinking) 
6 = It depends on the point of view (Point of view) 
Table 9.29 Frequency distribution of reasons against a better explanation 
Category 	 Frequency 	 Percent 
1. Same 	 2 	 5.0 
2. Doubt 	 14 	 35.0 
3. No data 	 3 	 7.5 
4. All important 	 12 	 30.0 
5. Sum/interlinking 	 6 	 15.0 
6. Point of view 	 3 	 7.5 
40 	 100.0 
Reasons coded in category 1 and 5 appear in an objectivist direction, in different 
degrees: the former plainly accepting all versions, the latter concerned with the 
interlinking of factors. Together, these responses represent 20% of the negative answer. 
The other four categories may suggest signs of relativism. Table 9.30 shows the 
distribution of reasons for the positive answer. The reasons given for it were coded as 
follows: 
1 = One explanation is more concrete (Concrete) 
2 = One explanation is more correct (Correct) 
3 = One explanation has more data (Data) 
4 = One explanation is more logical/more confirmed (Consistent) 
5 = But the sum of them would be better (Sum) 
6 = The most recent, the most skilled author is better (Recent) 
7 = Within each point of view (Point of view) 
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Table 9.30. Frequency distribution of reasons for a better explanation 
Category 	 Frequency 	 Percent 
0 	 2 	 3.6 
1. Concrete 	 11 	 20.0 
2. Correct 	 1 	 1.8 
3. Data 	 13 	 23.6 
4. Consistent 	 14 	 25.5 
5. Sum 	 4 	 7.3 
6. Recent 	 5 	 9.1 
7. Point of view 	 5 	 9.1 
55 	 100.0 
Most of the reasons given appear to express confidence about the possibility of finding 
an explanation better than others, on more or less elaborate grounds. The last category, 
however, seems relativist. 
In order to get a brief insight into objectivist versus relativist trends, objectivist reasons 
for the negative answer (sub-categories 1 and 5) may join the positive answer, as 
relativist reasons for the "Yes" (category 7) may join the "No" answer. The final result 
will lean slightly more towards objectivism: 37 negative against 58 positive answers. 
Thus, ideas favouring objectivism or favouring relativism emerged in these responses, 
the objectivist view appearing more popular than the relativist. Nonetheless, these signs 
must not be taken for granted as students might give some contradicting arguments in 
other items, appearing to convey some oscillation between realism/objectivism and 
scepticism/relativism. 
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Major findings 
The most popular pattern of ideas about provisional historical explanation, amongst a 
population of students between the age of 12 and 20, attending the 7th, 9th and 11th 
grades, was related to a concern for quantity of factors. PHE levels of progression were 
distributed in the following ranking: 
Rank 1 
Rank 2 
Rank 3 
Rank 4 
Rank 5 
Level 3 - The more factors the better 
Level 2 - The right explanation 
Level 1 - The story 
Level 4 - A consensual explanation? 
Level 5 - Perspective 
The chi-square test revealed significant differences in PHE levels across grade and age: 
students' responses tended to progress in levels along grades and age-groups. The factor 
analysis confirmed this trend by showing a relationship among PHE levels, grade and 
age. Level 1, focusing on description, was observed in the responses of the 7th and 9th-
graders aged between 12 and 16. Level 2, suggesting a concern for the right 
explanation, was mainly observed in the responses from the same range of students. 
Level 3, related to a concern for quantity of factors, appeared to be the mode in all 
grades and age-groups. Level 4, involving an idea of perspectiveless neutrality, was 
mainly suggested in responses of the 9th and 11th-graders, in all age-groups, and at a 
small rate. Level 5, involving some ideas of perspectiveful neutrality, appeared only in 
the responses of 1 1 th-graders aged between 16 and 19. Taking into account the 
distribution by grade and age of levels 4 and 5, focusing on ideas of a perspectiveless or 
a perspectiveful neutrality, the former notion seems to emerge earlier, and more 
frequently, amongst Portuguese students. 
Concerning the assessment of the four historical versions given, the descriptive version 
D appeared as the most popular. Version B, speculating about the Chinese power in the 
Indian Ocean, appeared as the most popular second choice, although versions A and C 
together had exceeded it in frequency. Version B and version C (a nationalistic appeal 
to morality - or morale) took more frequently the last rank. Version A (an innovative 
approach about the Moslem power) seemed to have a mild negative sign. This raises the 
hypothesis that different criteria may underlie similar practical choices. These criteria 
might reveal a more critical view when taking into account: (a) the relative plausibility 
of a substantive factor conveyed by versions chosen, or/and (b) the consistency with 
evidence recognised in versions chosen. They might mean a less critical view when the 
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focus is put on (c) formal clarity of versions independent of their content or, (d) 
emotional preference for a given factor, independently of the historical validity assigned 
to the corresponding version. 
Therefore, especially in cases (a), (c), (d) above, a preference for particular substantive 
conditions might have been one main criterion for choosing the versions which 
emphasised such conditions. The substantive conditions selected by students were 
analysed in terms of frequency. As some students presented as a first condition a 
chronological step in a story, or a long-term condition in a narrative, this choice 
indicates the underlying explanatory structure rather than the most relevant condition 
(the cause) of the Portuguese empire. For this reason, all conditions given by students in 
their written explanations were counted. The moral and military factors, followed by the 
technological factor, were the most frequently cited conditions. Which versions might 
constitute evidential basis for this factorial selection? The most popular version, version 
D, in spite of being intended as a description, seemed to implicitly provide clues for 
conditions such as morality/morale, military correlation, technological advance and 
economic motivation. A strategy of conversion, as was already noticed, appeared 
associated with the choice of version D, when integrated in an explanatory pattern. The 
other three versions also seemed to inspire the explanations constructed by students: 
versions A and B focused on a military correlation between the Portuguese, on the one 
hand, and the Moslems, the Turks or the Chinese, on the other; version C emphasised 
the Portuguese morality, often re-elaborated by students as morale. 
Most students elected an historical agent (related to an ideal of memory/understanding) 
as the best author to explain the past situation. The second most popular choice was a 
witness or agent tied to an ideal of direct observation. The chi-square test revealed a 
significant difference in choices amongst levels, which points to reliability of this item 
as one indicator of the overall categorization. 
General trends towards objectivism or relativism were also analysed, and the chi-square 
test revealed significant differences by age. The youngest students showed more 
frequently hesitation about the possibility of finding an explanation better than others, 
whilst the more mature students affirmed or denied that possibility. Affirmative 
answers, viewed as indicating an objectivist trend, appeared to be slightly more frequent 
than the negative ones, these seen as an indicator of a relativist trend. However, an 
oscillation in these signs must be taken into account, since conflicting ideas in the 
arguments of some students across the several tasks were observed. 
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Summary 
This chapter presented the statistical analysis of the main empirical data (F). It 
discussed the frequency distribution of levels of progression and differences in levels by 
grade, age and sex. It analysed responses to some tasks treated as partial indicators of 
the conceptual clusters built into the model of categorization. These tasks were: (1) 
deciding among historical versions (cluster C); (2) selecting historical conditions 
(cluster S); and (3) the best author for an explanation (cluster 0). Relationships between 
levels of progression, grade, age, sex, and some subtasks related to objectivity and truth 
were interpreted through a factor analysis. Attitudes towards objectivism or relativism 
were also analysed. The major findings of each section were given in a brief synthesis. 
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10 Final reflections 
This final chapter reflects on (a) the main working hypothesis (its theoretical 
background, the model constructed, dilemmas and decisions during its construction), (b) 
some perplexities felt about specific meanings of students' answers and the 
corresponding steps to resolve these perplexities (particular findings), (c) the main 
limitations of the study, and (d) a provisional answer to the initial question stated, and 
its implications for history education in Portugal and further research. 
The main working hypothesis 
The aim of this study was to explore the meanings that adolescent students assign to 
provisional historical explanation. The a priori hypothesis formulated in terms of a 
model of categorization of students' ideas envisaged a progression through three main 
levels, from a focus on the truth of the explanation to the recognition of a balanced and 
perspectiveful explanation. The analysis of the empirical data, collected through several 
phases, suggested a much more complex and rather different set of patterns of thinking, 
in the light of a theoretical framework progressively clarified. 
The theoretical framework 
The philosophical reflection on concepts of historical explanation and provisionality 
highlighted, first of all, the complexity of these ideas. Four main explanatory models 
(nomological-deductive, rational, narrative, structural) were identified. The working 
definition of historical explanation, in encompassing different kinds of answers to a 
why question, took into account those different views. Beyond a discussion of 
approaches about objectivity in history, criteria for explanatory assessment (explanatory 
consistency in terms of evidence and plausibility) were identified on the basis of current 
philosophy of history. These criteria integrated the working definition of provisional 
historical explanatioh, which functioned as a theoretical hypothesis. 
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The philosophical background provided a framework for analysing students' ideas 
about provisional historical explanation in terms of three main notions, named 
conceptual clusters in this study: 
Explanatory structure (S) - explanatory mode and factorial weight 
Explanatory consistency (C) - evidential and logical consistency 
Objectivity and truth (0) - methodological detachment and truth 
Accordingly, the major purpose was rethought in the following terms: 
- What explanatory models underlie adolescent students' explanations? 
- To what extent do they operate with a notion of provisionality in historical explanation 
and, when they employ a notion of this kind, what meanings do they assign to it? 
- What specific criteria do they use for deciding among different possible explanations? 
The empirical model 
An empirically-based model of students' ideas about provisional historical explanation 
was progressively generated. The "final" version gives a categorization of students' 
ideas about the three conceptual clusters (S, C, 0) through five levels of progression. 
Level 1 (the story) is a descriptive level progressively constructed during the work 
following the exploratory studies, in order to integrate ideas focusing on information. It 
includes a descriptive mode and second-order ideas about facts, or a restricted 
explanatory mode and preempted second-order ideas. This category was formulated in 
accordance with relevant aspects of the work of Peel (1971), Booth (1978), Shemilt 
(1983), Cooper (1991), and an early paper from the "Chata Project" (Lee, Dickinson 
and Ashby, 1992). 
Level 2 (the right explanation) is an explanatory level concerned mainly with the truth 
of the explanation. It is a refinement of the first level in the a priori model, and 
theoretically grounded on the three conceptual clusters referred to above (S, C, 0). 
Students at this level tend to discuss and select factors in terms of everyday 
assumptions. They argue for "the most correct explanation", but a strict right/wrong 
dichotomy, initially hypothesized, was not observed. This category was inspired by 
Shemilt (1983, 1984), Byrnes and Overton (1986), Ashby and Lee (1987), Lee, 
Dickinson and Ashby (1992). 
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Level 3 (the more factors the better) is an explanatory level with a focus on quantity of 
factors. Like Level 1, it was a category progressively constructed following the 
exploratory studies to integrate empirically observed ideas of aggregation. In this 
pattern, a sense of provisionality emerges tied to the idea that explanatory power may 
increase with addition of new factors; or, in a more sophisticated way, the aim of a total 
explanation is assumed, and pursued through the interlinking of explanations. This last 
pattern appears related to the structural paradigm of total history. The construct of 
accumulation of information as defined by Kelly (1980), the work of Shemilt (1980, 
1983), Samson (1987), Lee (1994), as well as presuppositions related to structural 
approaches, helped in the formulation of this category. 
Level 4 (a consensual explanation?) conveys a more elaborate pattern related to the 
paradigm of a perspectiveless neutrality - seen as a necessary criterion to reach a 
consensual explanation, or as an unreachable ideal which makes the historical 
explanation always relative. The aggregationist pattern is maintained as far as the 
interlinking of explanations is valued, and the historical context may be taken into 
account. This category was progressively refined following the exploratory studies. The 
work of Shemilt (1980, 1983), Booth (1978) Ashby and Lee (1987) contributed to its 
formulation. 
Level 5 (perspective) is an explanatory level where the notion of perspectiveful 
neutrality seems to emerge. Notions of confirmation and refutation appear associated 
but they may conflict with a "verificationist" pattern simultaneously observed. This 
category is a progressively refined version of level 2 in the a priori model, and 
discriminates ideas related to the conceptual clusters S, C and 0. Its construction (as 
opposed to the previous level) was inspired by several studies described in chapter 1, 
namely Peel (1967a, 1971), Rees (1986), Dickinson and Lee (1978b, 1984), Shemilt 
(1980, 1983, 1987), Booth (1978), Medley (1986), Wineburg (1991). It integrates 
philosophical assumptions on perspective and objectivism mainly derived from Dray 
(1964a, 1991), Popper (1972, 1980), McCullagh (1984), Martin (1989). 
Dilemmas and decisions 
During the construction of the model, several dilemmas were posed. They were, mainly, 
about (a) which conceptual strands to select and emphasise, and (b) which 
representations might underlie ambiguous responses of adolescents. Resolutions of the 
former were crucial to the model itself, and are described below. Dilemmas of the latter 
kind were specifically discussed alongside the qualitative analysis (chapter 8). 
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(a) On categorization 
One decision made during the process of categorization of ideas about PHE concerned 
the focus of analysis. Three conceptual clusters were considered in the construction of 
the model. It was observed that the degree of sophistication within the cluster 
explanatory structure could differ considerably from the other two (explanatory 
consistency and objectivity and truth), that is, two students operating at a similar 
explanatory level might show different degrees of explanatory consistency and 
methodological detachment. Moreover, some students operated within a descriptive 
pattern. It was therefore decided that explanatory consistency and objectivity and truth, 
thought of as related to the idea of provisionality in historical explanation, would be the 
two conceptual clusters under focus, whilst explanatory structure was seen as the 
"natural environment" where such ideas were apparent. This decision provided the 
resolution of some dilemmas about the categorization of some constructs, the two most 
problematic being, specifically: 
1. How to categorize (by level) two different patterns of explanatory mode: one 
showing a clear descriptive mode, revealing concerns about justification of the story, 
one showing a restricted explanatory mode, with preempted notions about 
provisionality? 
The decision was to consider both patterns running in parallel at Level 1, related to a 
focus on information. 
2. How to categorize (by level) two different degrees of factorial weight - one valuing a 
sum of factors, one valuing the interlinking of factors - and in neither case showing a 
concern about methodological detachment? 
Although the latter appears of a higher degree of sophistication (resembling an elaborate 
scissors and paste model) as far as explanatory structure is concerned, the decision was 
to consider both patterns under the major idea of aggregation (Level 3), if no other 
criterion of methodological detachment was made explicit. 
(b) On trends about truth 
The early version of the empirical model presupposed a progression of ideas from 
noncriticism toward an informed doubt. Relativism and objectivism were not 
theoretically discriminated, and concrete criteria applied to explanatory assessment 
were not made explicit. The progressive reformulation of the model grounded on two 
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main conceptual clusters (viz., explanatory consistency and objectivity and truth) 
highlighted a different picture of progression of ideas. Trends towards objectivism or 
relativism appeared to run in parallel through several degrees of ideas about explanatory 
consistency and methodological detachment. An oscillation was observed between 
patterns (realism/scepticism) across several responses of each subject. Nonetheless, a 
greater stability of ideas (relativism or objectivism) seemed to emerge in the two most 
elaborate levels. These notions of oscillation or stability as applied to the construct truth 
were inspired by Ashby and Lee (1987) and Lee (1994). 
Perplexities and particular findings 
During the process of data analysis some unexpected observations provoked 
perplexities which led to the formulation of several hypotheses. One of these 
perplexities concerned the popularity among all the sample studied, of version D, 
thought of as being non-explanatory. It was observed that such a choice occurred within 
patterns suggesting various levels of ideas. Moreover, version C, conveying a biased 
explanation, was ranked second by several subjects revealing more or less elaborate 
ideas. Therefore, the categorization by level did not take into account the ranking of the 
four versions. But the perplexity remained: why did students with different levels of 
ideas about PHE show a consensus on the versions given? Several hypotheses about 
these reasons were raised. Students might: 
(a) follow a criterion of selection based on substantive grounds; 
(b) make uncritical practical choices even within an elaborate reasoning about PHE; 
(c) employ a strategy of conversion of information, that is, assign different meanings to 
the messages given by the historical material. 
The three hypotheses seem to be partially confirmed. This is consistent with the 
research of Donaldson (1978) and subsequent studies like Butterworth (1992), who 
pointed out a word of caution about the meanings to be assigned to pupils' outcomes. 
There are grounds for arguing that all three hypotheses stand up: 
1. Students may decide among versions on substantive grounds for and against a given 
factor (hypothesis a). The factorial selection seems to be made on the basis of personal 
preferences, or the plausibility of the concrete situation. For example, will-power (or 
morality), military power and technology were the most cited factors: the first and the 
third of these factors were probably suggested by versions D and/or C, which proved to 
be popular in all levels of ideas, in spite of their weaknesses as explanations. The 
several versions were mainly discussed on the basis of their relative factorial weight. 
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2. Students may eventually assume practical choices less critical than their arguments 
about PHE (hypothesis b), which may be seen as a consequence of the previous 
criterion. This particular observation is not consonant with the suggestion that concrete 
decisions usually are made at a more sophisticated level than in an abstract reasoning 
context (e.g., Johnson-Laird and Wason, 1977; Booth, 1978; Shemilt, 1980; 
Butterworth and Light, 1992). In the current study, some signs of elaborate arguments 
about PHE appear together with practical choices taken independently of critical 
standards. A strategy of "hostility" (Bannister and Fransella, 1986, described in 
chapter 1, p. 33) may be operating here. Or it might be worth comparing this 
observation about elaborate criteria versus uncritical decisions with a Kohlberg's 
quotation concerning moral judgement versus moral action (1975), (although not 
accepting his defence of cognitive stages in an invariant sequence): 
One can reason in terms of principles and not live up to these principles. As an example... only 
15% of students showing some principled thinking cheated as compared to 55% of 
conventional subjects and 70% of preconventional subjects. Nevertheless, 15% of the 
principled subjects did cheat, suggesting that factors additional to moral judgement are 
necessary for principled moral reasoning to be translated into "moral action". (p. 672) 
We might hypothesize that factors other than a stable set of ideas about PHE might 
contribute to this oscillation between theoretical criteria and practical decisions. The 
emotional commitment to the past, as Booth (1978) noticed, the value-laden nature of 
historical knowledge, as Dray has claimed, or the material interests and social relations 
on which people's views are largely based (rather than rational alternatives), as Ashby 
and Lee (1987) pointed out, provide some sources for understanding these 
inconsistencies. 
3. Students frequently make sense of data by converting them into an operational 
structure (hypothesis c). Conversion was specifically observed in two situations: (a) 
Students attributed explanatory power to descriptive facts which they selected as factors 
(e.g., when converting information in version D), and (b) they assigned a familiar 
meaning to what might be alien values (e.g., the nationalistic morality conveyed by 
version C was converted into morale or will-power). This phenomenon of conversion 
appears to be a common strategy for dealing with historical material, and was also 
suggested by the "Chata Project" (Lee, in press). 
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Limitations of this study 
The model described constitutes simultaneously the main working hypothesis and the 
central "theory" built up in this study. This theory - about ideas of Portuguese 
adolescent students concerning the provisional nature of historical explanation - must be 
regarded as still itself provisional. Cognition remains an unknown "world". Its 
complexities make research in this domain a hard, however fascinating, task. It involves 
qualitative approaches in data analysis, with no definitive rules to guarantee similar 
conclusions from different studies. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the methods of this 
study are sufficiently delineated to allow others to follow up the findings in further 
research. Furthermore, the reliability of coding data would be strengthened by 
agreement among Portuguese judges. Once there is a tradition of research methodology 
of this kind in Portugal, extra reliability studies concerning the model proposed in this 
study will become possible, and are clearly desirable. 
A provisional answer and new questions 
The initial question about the handling of the concept of provisional explanation by 
adolescent students asked whether some of these students reveal a critical, balanced 
attitude beyond everyday assumptions. This question evolved into the formulation of 
the central problem focusing on the tacit meanings of PHE. The research instruments 
were designed so as to provoke student reasoning around particular historical questions 
of substantive and second-order types, through the analysis of several versions and a 
variety of sources. 
The model of categorization of students' responses is a tentative answer to the problem 
formulated. The frequency distribution by level suggests that a positive, but cautious 
answer may be given to that question. A majority of adolescents might have an idea of 
provisionality of explanations tied to aggregation of information. Some other students, 
however, seem still to concentrate their attention on the information, or the logic, of the 
story; or on the right explanation tied to a major concern with the truth of facts. A few 
(in the 9th and 11th grade mainly, and in all age-groups) appear to defend more 
elaborate views and apply criteria concerning notions of verification, plausibility within 
historical context and perspectiveless neutrality. The frequency of responses at this 
level was less than expected a priori. Notions of confirmation/nonrefutation, 
comparison-situation, and perspectiveful neutrality were observed among a restricted 
number of responses, in the 16-19 year, 11th-graders. 
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Implications for history education in Portugal 
The findings of the current study may have thrown some light on ideas of Portuguese 
adolescent students about provisional historical explanation. In coherence with them, 
the following suggestions for history education in Portugal may be useful. 
1. Adolescents may be encouraged to think about several explanations of the past rather 
than following a question-and-answer routine about the historical explanation provided 
by their textbook. The informal process of education in a pluralist society, where 
controversial issues are publicly discussed (e.g., on tv), probably makes the handling of 
alternative views not very alien from experience of young people. Only students 
focusing on information may find it too confusing. A gradual implementation of this 
approach is therefore required. 
2. The previous argument concerning specific cases of students focusing on information 
provides a basis for caution: teachers may be tempted to ask pupils for an explanation 
irrespective of their conceptual levels. To diagnose how they resolve why-type 
questions must be the first step before launching "explanation" tasks. Pupils' 
assessment must be developed in coherence with this process. 
3. Students can argue for and against different versions or competing explanations, on 
grounds of criteria such as explanatory consistency, and objectivity and truth. However, 
it is important to emphasise that any approach to the development of a critical reasoning 
must be progressively carried out in accordance with the conceptual levels observed: 
(a) With students at Level 1, the teacher should foster a shift from a focus on 
facts (what and how it happened) towards factors (why it happened). Sophisticated 
arguments about explanations will be meaningless at this level of ideas. 
(b) With students at Level 2, teachers should stress a distinction between true 
facts and factors justified by sources. To ask these students for elaborate notions such as 
neutrality might be useless or even a source of the idea that "it all depends on one's 
point of view" (which appears as common-sense based as the search for the true 
explanation). 
(c) With students at Level 3, teachers should concentrate attention on comparing 
different explanations in the light of varied evidence, so that students can assess them 
by employing criteria of neutrality and explanatory consistency (evidential justification 
and plausibility within the historical context). 
(d) With students at levels 4 and 5, teachers should foster a progressive 
distinction between perspectiveless and perspectiveful neutrality, evidential verification 
and confirmation/refutation (since the most elaborate degrees of these notions seem not 
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to occur at Level 4, and to tentatively emerge at Level 5). Arguments concerning 
plausibility should be developed either in terms of historical context or by recourse to 
comparison-situations. 
This programme involves not only a careful selection of sources (textbooks often give 
relevant material which must be employed, but that may be not sufficient) as well as 
specifically designed activities. 
4. Adolescent students tend to reason in history - it appears - on substantive grounds, 
according to everyday assumptions, and they convert substantive information in an 
operational scheme which is often misunderstood by the teacher. As examples taken 
from this study: 
(a) Nationalistic ideas (such as "the moral correctness of the Portuguese leaders" 
in Antonio Matoso's version) may at a first glance appear popular among young people; 
an in-depth analysis showed that such values were re-elaborated by several students in 
terms of mere everyday assumptions (morale or will-power). 
(b) Students may take concrete decisions which appear to indicate a not very 
elaborate reasoning in history (at all levels they ranked first a descriptive version, as an 
explanation); the in-depth analysis revealed that there were different reasons, and more 
or less sophisticated arguments, for this ranking. To explore - even informally - the 
students' tacit meanings of whatever is at issue in class may be crucial to understanding 
how they reason and to help them progress beyond their initial conceptual levels. 
5. It is worthwhile to point out that, at university, history and social sciences students 
should develop some skills and attitudes in connection with historical enquiry, and a 
philosophical reflection concerning the nature of historical and social knowledge, to 
facilitate their future role as teachers. 
Questions for further research 
The hypotheses raised in this study are pertinent to the understanding of students' ideas 
in history, and to general research concerning cognition and situated learning. 
Specifically related to the problem of provisionality of historical explanation, further 
studies to explore ideas about explanatory assessment might be relevant, at a time when 
critical relativism and objectivism appear at the core of philosophical debates. In respect 
to ideas in history, we might imagine that when an adolescent gives a concrete answer, 
different criteria for practical decisions, different strategies for making sense of data, 
different meanings assigned to words, are at work. To progress on the understanding of 
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these criteria, strategies and concrete meanings employed by students might be a crucial 
path to explore. Comparison studies across different cultural settings and countries in 
this field of research are required. And developing our understanding in this area will be 
an important contribution not only to history education, but to the general field of 
research on cognition. 
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Appendix A 
First exploratory study 
Group-task 
A inclusdo de Israel na actual Guerra do Golfo (atacada pet() Iraque mas nao 
devendo atacar) tem razoes histaricas. 
PROPOS-SE QUE 0 VOSSO GRUPO : 
DISCLTA OS MATERIAIS QUE FORAM SELECCIONADOS E APRESENTE UMA 
EXPLICACAO DO CONFLITO ISRAELO-ARABE. 
Para chegarem as vossas conclusaes, podem tentar responder a questOes como 
estas: 
. Quern foram os habitantes da regiao ao longo dos tempos? 
. Quando - e porque - se iniciaram as conflitos entre os Arabes e judeus ? 
Que razOes haver para o estabelecimento do estado de Israel em 1948? 
. 0 que aconteceu a populacdo palestiniana com a criacdo de Israel? 
. Como se tem processado as relacoes entre Israelitas e Arabes? 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
Historical kit (first exploratory study) 
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CRONOLOGIA 
70 - Fim do estado judeu da Palestina 
apps a revolta contra os Romanos 
637 - Inicio da religiao de Maome. 
Formacdo do imperio arabe 
1480-1492 - Perseguicdo dos judeus na 
Peninsula Iberica 
1881 - Pogroms (ataques contra os 
Judeus) na Russia czarista 
1881-1914 - 3 milhOes de Judeus fogem 
da Europa Oriental devido as 
perseguicOes 
1917 - Declaracao Balfour 
1933-1945 - Perseguicao dos Judeus na 
Alemanha 
1948 - Fundacao do estado de Israel 
1967 - Guerra israelo-drabe dos Seis 
Dias (Israel ataca o Egipto). Resolucao 
242 das Nacbes Unidas sobre os 
territorios ocupadcs por Israel. 
1973 - Guerra israelo-arabe de Yom 
Kippur !Egipto e Siria atacam Israel) 
1974 - Reconhecinaento da O.L.P. como 
representante do povo palestiniano, por 
todos os estados arabes. 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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be e 
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IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
312 
In Grandes Acontecimentos da Historia (1973, Dezembro) n°7. S. Paulo: Editora Tres 
NOTE: The appendix contains the first page of the four-page account which was given to the students. 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
Sartre, J. P. (1968). Dossier do Conflito Israelo-Arabe. Porto: Inova. 
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NOTE: These explanations (given by Jews and Palestinians) are two of six examples which were 
presented to the students.  
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
Students' file 
FICHA TECNICA 
NOME• 	 ANO 	 TURMA 	  
DATA DE NASCIMENTO 	 / 	 / 
PROFISSAO DO PAI 	  
PROFISSAO DA MAE 
	  
FICHA TECNICA 
NOME• 	ANO 	 TURMA 	  
DATA DE NASCIMENTO 	 / 	 /  
PROFISSAO DO PAI 
	  
PROFISSAO DA MAE 	  
FICHA TECNICA 
NOME• 	 ANO 	 TURMA 
	  
DATA DE NASCIMENTO 
	
/ /  
PROFISSAO DO PAI 
	  
PROFISSAO DA MAE 	  
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Appendix B 
Second exploratory study 
Group-task 
Os actuais acontecimentos da Jugoslavia fazem-nos recordar alguns aspectos do 
infcio da I Guerra Mundial. Nessa altura, havia grande poldmica em torno da seguinte 
questao: 
Recorrendo ao vosso livro de Historia e aos materiais apresentados, procurem explicar: 
- como comecou a I Guerra? 
- porque ocorreu esse conflito mundial? 
		
• 
• 
Historical kit (second exploratory study) 
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IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
APELO AS NAcOES CIVILIZADAS? 
Na qualidade de representantes da cienci a c da arte alcmas, 	 nos, abaixo 
assinados, protestamos solenemente perante o mundo civilizado contra as 
mentiras e calUnias corn que os nossos inimigos tentam denegrir a justa e boa 
causa da Alemanha na terrivel luta que nos foi imposta e que ameaga a nossa 
existencia.... 
E contra estas maquinacoes que nos protestamos cm voz alta: e esta voz é a voz 
da verdade. 
Nao é verdade que a Alemanha tenha provocado esta guerra. Nem o povo, 
nem o governo, nem o imperador alemao a quiseram.Ate ao Ultimo momento, 
ate aos limiter do possivel, a Alemanha lutou pcla manutencao da paz.... 
Nao e verdade que nos facamos a guerra corn desprezo pclos direitos dos 
povos. Os nossos soldados nao cometem nem actos de indisciplina nem de 
crueldade.... Os que se aliam aos Russos e aos Sdrvios, e que nao receiam 
excitar os mongois e os negros contra a raga Branca, oferecendo assim ao 
mundo civilizado o espectaculo mais vergonhoso que se possa imaginar, sao 
certamente os tiltimos corn direito ao papcl de defensores da civilizacao 
europeia. 
Nao é verdade que a luta contra o que se chama nosso militarismo seja 
dirigido contra a nossa cultura....Sem o nosso militarismo, a nossa civilizacao 
teria sido aniquilada ha muito tempo... 0 exdrcito alemao e o povo alemao 
fundem-se num so corpo.... 
DOCUMENTOS DO QUARTEL GENERAL AI FIvLk0 
Memoria de Dezembro de 1912 
O conflito armado entre duas das grandes potencias militares da Europa 
desencadeard uma guerra europeia geral: tal sera a consequencia forcada dos 
tratados entre as diferentes partes.... 
Tal como a Triplice, a Tripla Entente apresenta-se sob a forma de urn acordo 
defensivo. Mas enquanto que a ideia defensiva domina expressamente o 
tratado da Tripla Alianca, o da Tripla Entente apresenta fortes tendencias 
o fen s i v as... 
A Russia tern o desejo compreensiv el de esmagar a Austria para impor a 
hegemonia eslava na Europa e, por meio da Servia, chegar ao Adriatic°. a 
Austria tern apenas urn interesse defensivo em opor-se.... 
A Inglaterra tenta desembaracar-se, corn a ajuda dos Aliados, do problema do 
poderio maritimo alemao. A Alemanha ndo pensa na destruicao da frota 
inglesa: al tambem apenas pretende defender-se. 
DOCUMENTO DO CORPO DE COMANDO AUSTRO-HUNGARO 
Direccdes para a conduta face a populacao sdrvia 
A guerra leva-nos a urn pais corn uma populacdo animada por urn odio 
fanaticocontra nos, num pais onde o assassinato, como o dem onstrou a 
catastrofe de Sarajevo, d admitido como licit° pelas classes superiores, que o 
glorificam como acto de hcroismo. 
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RESPOSTA AO APELO F—"=0 AO MUNDO CIVILIZADO PELOS HOMENS DE =R AS 
ALEMAES 
Po r 
S. H. Church 
Presidente dc Carnegie Institute (U.S.A.) 
Mcu caro Doutor Schapper: 
Com suas saudac6es e aut6grafo recebi =a carta impressa dirigida "Ao 
mundo civilizado", e assinada por noventa c tres dos nomcs mais distintos nas 
arses, ciencia c literatura da Alemanha e entre cies o de V. Ex'.... 
Diz V. Ex'.ena sua carta quc sous inirnizos com mentiras c calf nias "estao 
procurando macular a honra da Alcmanha ern sua ardua luta ..." 
Creio, mcu caro Dr. Schapper, que o jufzo sobre esta questao suprenaa acha-se 
formado.Essc jufzo nao c baseado sobre as mentiras e caltinias dos inimigos da 
Alemanha, nem sabre as publicacOcs levianas dos jornais,, mas sim sobre urn 
estudo profundo da correspondEncia official acerca da questao.... 
Foi esta guerra imposta sabre a Alemanha?0 que c que provam os documentes 
o fi ciais?... 
A Austria imediatamcnte tomou a si o tornar a SCrvia responsavel por este 
assassinato 	 kpesar disso,a Servia cedeu a tudo excepto, em pane, quanta ao 
artizo n2 6 	  
Nestas condig5es a Se.rvia manifcstou uma disposicao para a reparacao e para 
a paz gut o mundo civilizado ha anos vcm procurado incutir nas relacOes 
estrangeiras de todas as potEncias.... 
Durante todo este tempo a Franca, a Russia c Italia estavam fazendo ingentes 
esforcos para dissuadir a Austriade dar comeco a um conflito gut todos 
sabilm.como o sabia 	 a Alemanhaviria destruir a paz mundial. Todas instaram 
por novas conferEncias mas a Austria mos-Jou-se obstinada apoiada coma se 
achava na sua atitude irreconcili pela Alemanha e em 28 de Julho cornecou a 
zucrra contra a S6rvia.... 
QUEM QLZS A GLTEZ.R.A? 
No prefacio do Livro Branco, o Govern() Alenaao reconhecia as intencoes 
pacificas da Inzlaterra 
	  
A atitude da RUssia nao foi memos pacifica que a da Inglaterra e da Franca... 
Pesad, ao contrario, foi a responsabilidade da Austria. Foi ela clue desencadeou 
o cataclismo... 
Mas tudo o que diminua a responsabilidade da Austria faz aumentare a da 
Alernanha.. Foi a Alemanhe que prometendo a sua aliada um apoio integral a 
encorajou a provocar a SCrvia... 
E. Durkheim, 1915 
REGB/ENTO DE LNFANLARLk DA BOSNIA 
Quando o rezimento chegou a zvornik havia prisioneiros civic 
mulheres e criancas.X deu-lhes pao c um chefe viu-o e arnarrou-o a =a 
1:-vore.Quando as rnulheres chegavam a povoacao, os solaados croatas 
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Reiss.R.A. ,1915 (suico) 
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Launay, J. de (1966). As grandes controversias da Historia Moderna. 
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Note: The appendix contains the first of the seven pages of the account, which were given to the students. 
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Appendix C 
The Portuguese oriental empire in a textbook 
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Appendix D 
Pilot study 1 
Written task-set 
FICHA DE TRABALHO N° 1 
Explica por palavras tuas porque é que os Portugueses 
conseguiram estabelecer urn imperio maritimo no Oceano 
indico, ao longo do sec. XVI. 
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FICHA DE TRABALHO N° 2 
Coloca por ordem decrescente de preferencia as explicacoes 
historicas apresentadas para a questao em analise (incluindo a 
que foi escrita por ti, que sera considerada Explicacao D): 
la 	  
Porque? 
2a 	  
3a 
4a 	  
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Porque? 
FICHA DE TRABALHO N° 3 
Escolhe, entre estas frases, uma (pelo menos), em cada 
grupo, corn que mais concordes (rodeando o n° respectivo corn 
um circulo): 
GRUPO A 
1. As tres explicacOes sao praticamente iguais porque todas contam 
o que aconteceu no sec. XVI. 
2. Cada uma das explicacOes é diferente das outras porque a 
Hist6ria é uma interpretacao do passado: ela é sempre influenciada 
pela opinido pessoal do historiador. 
3. Algumas das explicacOes sao diferentes so porque nao se baseiam 
nos factos reais: distorcem-nos. 
4. Cada uma das explicacoes é diferente das outras porque o 
historiador é sempre influenciado pela propria epoca, cultura e pais 
em que vive. 
GRUPO B 
5. Todas as explicacOes historicas lidas sao boas: elas contam quase 
a mesma coisa. 
6. Todas as explicacoes historicas lidas sao boas, porque se baseiam 
em fontes historicas. 
7. Uma das explicacoes lidas é melhor porque é mais equilibrada no 
use de fontes hist6ricas variadas. 
8. Uma das explicacoes lidas é melhor porque se limita a transmitir 
os factos passados; nas outras ve-se que o autor conta as coisas a 
sua maneira. 
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GRUPO C 
9. S6 uma das explicacoes é que é verdadeiramente historica: ela é a 
soma das informacoes contidas em fontes correctas. 
10. S6 uma das explicacoes é que é verdadeiramente hist6rica: ela 
esta de acordo corn o que aprendemos na escola. 
11. Podem aceitar-se explicacOes historicas diferentes sobre a 
mesma situacao, embora uma ou outra seja melhor quando o autor 
reve os factos, incluindo os que foram exagerados ou omitidos. 
12. Podem aceitar-se explicacoes historicas diferentes sobre a 
mesma situacao, mas preferimos uma ou outra de acordo corn a 
nossa pr6pria opinido. 
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Historical kit (pilot study 1) 
0 IMPERIO PORTUGUES DO ORIENTE 
Em 1488 Bartolomeu Dias dobrou o Cabo da Boa Esperanca, mostrando 
a possibilidade de chegar a India, rodeando a Africa por mar. 
Em 1498 uma armada comandada por Vasco da Gama chega a Calecut, 
na India. 
Durante o sec. XVI, os Portugueses sao os senhores de toda a 
navegacao no Oceano indico, dominando o comercio das especiarias. 
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COMO SE EXPLICA ESTE DOMINI° DOS PORTUGUESES NO OCEANO 
INDICO? 
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IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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FONTES HISTORICAS 
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VI 0 
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Appendix E 
Final study (historical kit) 
English translation and original version 
THE PORTUGUESE ORIENTAL EMPIRE 
MAP 1 
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CHRONOLOGY 
During the first half of the 15th century the spices trade by land was dominated by the 
Turks (Moslems). 
In 1488 Bartolomeu Dias passed round the Cape of Good Hope, opening the possibility of 
reaching India through rounding Africa by sea. 
In 1498 a fleet commanded by Vasco da Gama reached Calicut, in India. 
During the 16th century the Portuguese controlled all the navigation in the Indian Ocean, 
and the spices trade. 
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HOW CAN THE PORTUGUESE DOMINATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 
BE EXPLAINED? 
VERSION A 
Openly defying the Moslem domain and combating the Moslem faith, the Portuguese had to 
meet as their main enemies in Asia the Egyptians and the Turks. It helped the Portuguese 
considerably that none of these major Moslem countries based its power upon the sea." 
OLIVEIRA MARQUES (Portuguese historian), H. de Portugal, 1980 
VERSION B 
The Islamic naval challenge to the Portuguese, when it came, was ineffective ... 
Had the Chinese still been present in the Indian Ocean when the Portuguese arrived, one can 
only speculate what might have happened. The decision to withdraw the Chinese fleet 60 
years before was a momentous one, leaving the "door left open" (to the Europeans) into the 
Indian Ocean. 
A. PACEY (English researcher), Technology in World Civilization, 1990 
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VERSION C 
This large domain quickly conquered with a few human and financial resources can only 
be explained by the moral correctness of the Portuguese great leaders, by the sacrifices for 
the country made by all the people. 
A. MATOSO (author of History school books), Compendio de Historia Universal, 
1946 
VERSION D 
The sailors of Prince Henry were those who took the first and most difficult steps into the 
unknown lands for the Europeans ... The western African coast was progressively 
explored. The Portuguese caravels brought back gold, spices, furs, ivory and slaves from 
those regions. 
Meanwhile, between 1405 and 1433, the emperors of China sent seven expeditions to 
explore the Indian Ocean, commanded by Cheng Ho, bringing back to China spices and 
unusual animals, including lions and giraffes. 
Upon Bartolomeu Dias having rounded the Cape of Good Hope, a new expedition, 
commanded by Vasco da Gama, arrived in India, in 1498. After that, the Portuguese 
quickly took control of the lucrative spice trade, for almost a century by forbidding other 
people to trade in the Indian Ocean and seizing the main ports through which the spice 
route passed. 
Based on Explorers, 1991 and Exploration & Empire, 1990 
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HISTORICAL SOURCES 
Source A 
"I, called Vasco da Gama, who shall go to discover the seas and lands by Your 
order, my high and very powerful King, my Lord, I swear by this sign of the Cross 
where I put my hands, that I shall keep it high and not bent in front of Moors, ... and all 
kind of people I shall meet..." 
This being done, he received the flag and a rule about what to do during the trip, 
and some letters to princes ... and to the king of Calicut, with all the information that King 
John had got on those regions... 
BARROS, J., Asia, Decada I, 1552 
Source B 
Moslem ship according to a Portuguese painting in 16th century 
Source C 
The recognised superiority of the relatively well armed Portuguese ships over the non-
armed Moslem trading ships was reinforced by the strong determination of the European 
intruders, which was lacking in their Asian enemies. 
BOXER, C., The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1969 
Source D 
Turkish guns from the 15th century 
337 
Source E 
The Moslem armies had always revealed an unquestioned superiority in open field to their 
enemies. Their advantage remained in the great number of their forces, a better discipline 
and superior tactics based on their light cavalry. 
CIPOLLA, C., Guns and Sails, 1965 
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Source F 
During the first half of the 15th century the Portuguese were creeping down the west coast 
of Africa while the Chinese were examining the east coast at least as far as south as 
Mozambique; during the second half the Portuguese found their way round into the Indian 
Ocean to meet no one but Arabs and Africans, because rich landowners thought they were 
a waste of money. 
The most obvious difference which would have struck everyone if the vessels of da Gama 
met those of Cheng Ho lay in the much greater size of the Grand Fleet for many of these 
were of 1,500 tons if not considerably more, while none of Vasco's were over 300 tons. 
J. NEEDHAM, WANG-LING & GWEI-DJEN, Science and Civilization in 
China, 1971 
Source G 
Fifteenth-century ships from China and Europe 
O IMPERIO PORTUGUES 
DO ORIENTE 
MAPA 1 
CRONOLOGIA 
Em meados do sec. XV, a rota terrestre das especiarias era 
controlada pelos Turcos (Muculmanos). 
Em 1488, Bartolomeu Dias dobrou o Cabo da Boa Esperanca, 
mostrando a possibilidade de chegar a India rodeando a Africa 
por mar. 
Em 1498, uma armada comandada por Vasco da Gama chega a 
Calecut, na India. 
Durante o sec. XVI, os Portugueses controlam toda a navegacao 
no Oceano Indico, dominando o comercio das especiarias. 
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COMO SE EXPLICA ESTE DOMINIO DOS PORTUGUESES 
NO OCEANO iNDICO? 
VERSA() A 
Desafiando abertamente o dominio musulmano e combatendo a fe 
mugulmana, os Portugueses encontraram, como seus maiores inimigos 
na Asia, os Egfpcios e os Turcos. Muito ajudou os Portugueses o facto de 
nenhum destes grandes estados mugulmanos basear a sua forga no 
mar. 
OLIVEIRA MARQUES (historiador portugues), H. de 
Portugal, 1980 
VERSA() B 
0 desafio naval dos Mugulmanos contra os Portugueses nao se mostrou 
eficaz... 
Podera perguntar-se o que teria acontecido se os Chineses ainda 
estivessem presentes no Oceano Indico quando os Portugueses of 
chegaram. A decisdo de retirar dal a armada chinesa (60 anon antes) 
fora uma questa() de momentos, deixando entao (aos Europeus) 'a 
porta aberta' para o Oceano Indico. 
A. PACEY (investigador ingles), Technology in World 
Civilization, 1990 
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 VERSAO C 
Este vastissimo dominio, conquistado em pouco tempo e corn fracos 
recursos de homens e dinheiro, so se explica pela rectidao moral dos 
grandes chefes portugueses, pelos sacrificios em prol da patria 
realizados por todos... 
A. MATOSO (autor de livros de Historia para o ensino 
secundario), Compendio de Historia Universal, 1946 
 
VERSAO D 
Foram os marinheiros do Infante D. Henrique que deram os primeiros 
e mais dificeis passos em direccao as terras entao desconhe cidas para 
os Europeus... 
A costa ocidental africana foi sendo progressivamente explorada. 
Dessas regiOes, as caravelas portugueses traziam ouro, malagueta, 
peles, marfim e escravos. 
Entretanto, entre 1405 e 1433, os imperadores da China enviaram 
grandes armadas para explorar o Oceano Indico, comandadas por 
Cheng Ho, e que regressavam a China corn especiarias e animais 
exoticos, incluindo leOes e girafas. 
Depois da ultrapassagem do Cabo da Boa Esperanca por Bartolomeu 
Dias, uma nova expedicao, comandada por Vasco da Gama, chegou a 
India em 1498. 
A partir daf, os Portugueses rapidamente passaram a controlar, 
durante quase urn seculo, o lucrativo comercio das especiarias, 
proibindo os outros povos de comerciar no Indico e conquistando os 
principais porton por onde a rota das especiarias passava. 
Corn base em The Usborne Book of Explorers, 1991 e 
Exploration & Empire, 1990 
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Appendix F 
Final study (written task-set) 
English translation and original version 
TASK 1 
1. Explain in your own words why the Portuguese managed to establish a 
maritime empire in the Indian Ocean during the sixteenth century. 
2. The statements below are based on the materials you have been given. 
Check which of them can justify your own explanation (Link the statements 
chosen and your version with an arrow ): 
The Portuguese wished to fight the Moslems 
The Moslem armies were strong 
King John had some information on the Indian Ocean 
The Portuguese had moral superiority 
The spice trade was very profitable 
The Chinese ships were bigger and stronger 
The Portuguese ships were well armed 
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VERSION E 
TASK 2 
1. Read versions A, B, C and D carefully .What differences do you notice: 
* between versions A and C? 
* between versions B and D? 
2. Versions B and C disagree on what? 
3. Why are there different explanations about the Portuguese domination of the Indian 
Ocean? 
4. Do you think that one of the explanations can be considered better than any 
other? Justify your answer. 
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TASK 3 
1. Rank the four versions given in order of importance as an historical explanation: 
1st: Version 	  
2nd: Version 	  
3rd: Version 	  
4th: Version 
2. In what respects do you consider the first better than the second in explaining 
why the Portuguese managed to control the Indian Ocean? 
3. Do you consider the first version better justified by the sources? 
Why? 
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4. Justify your last two choices (versions ranked 3 and 4): 
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TASK 4 
1. The best historical explanation of the Portuguese domination of the Indian Ocean 
must include the following versions (circle those you choose): 
Versions 	 A-B-C-D-E 
2. What does the best historical explanation not manage to explain about the 
Portuguese domination of the Indian Ocean? 
3. It is clear that nowadays a complete explanation about the question discussed here 
already exists (circle your choice): 
I AGREE 	 MAYBE 	 I DISAGREE 
Justify your choice: 
4. A good historical explanation always is ... 
(underline a word in each line) 
TOTAL 
TRUE 
INCOMPLETE 
VALID 
    
CERTAIN - PROBABLE - POSSIBLE - IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW 
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TASK 5 
1. Past events happened only once. However, there are several explanations of them. 
Why? 
Write T (true); DK (don't know); F (false) following each statement: 
1.They only vary in the way of telling 
2. It always depends on the author's personal opinion 
3. It's necessary to discover and sum up the real facts 
4. Only some authors manage to be totally neutral 
5. Each author finds out different real facts 
6. Each time and place explains in its own way 
7. The author establishes relations among facts and justifies those relations. 
8. No one can give the certain explanation 
2. Who would explain the Portuguese domination in the Indian Ocean better? 
a) A recent author, because he/she can compare different points of view, 
b) an important author, because he/she has a neutral point of view? 
c) A witness at that time because he/she saw what really happened? 
d) A Portuguese participating in those events, because s/he lived them 
Justify your answer. 
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NOME 	  
DATA DE NASCIMENTO 
MORADA 
  
	  ANO 	 T 	  
  
   
FICHA DE TRABALHO N° 1 
1. Explica por palavras tuas porque a que os Portugueses 
conseguiram estabelecer um imperio maritimo no Oceano 
Indico, ao longo do sec. XVI. 
2. As frases abaixo baseiam-se nos materiais aqui apresentados. 
Quais delas servem para justificar a tua explicacao? (Liga coin 
uma seta as frases escolhidas e a tua propria versa() - a versa() E). 
Os Portugueses queriam com-
bater os Muculmanos 
Os exercitos muculmanos 
eram fortes 
D. Joao II tinha informacOes 
sobre o Indico 
Os Portugueses eram moral-
mente superiores 
VERSA0 O comercio das especiarias 
era muito lucrativo 
E Os barcos chineses cram 
maiores e mais fortes 
1--- Os barcos portugueses esta-
vam beet armados  
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FICHA DE TRABALHO N° 2 
Le corn atencao as versoes A, B, C e D . 
1. Que diferencas notas: 
*entre as versoes A e C? 
*entre as versoes B e D? 
2. Em que é que discordam as versoes B e C? 
3. Porque é que ha explicac5es diferentes sobre o dominio dos 
Portugueses no Oceano Indico? 
4. Achas que urna das explicacaes pode ser considerada melhor 
do que qualquer outra? Justifica a tua resposta. 
F1CHA DE TRABALHO N° 3 
1. Ord'ena as versOes por ordem de importancia como explicac5o 
historica: 
1a: Versdo  
2a: Versa° 
3a: Versdo 
4a: Versa()  
2. 0 gue é que a la versa() (a que escreveste em 1° lugar) explica 
melhor do que a 2' em relacao ao dornInio do Oceano Indico pelos 
Portugueses? 
3. Consideras a la versao melhor justificada pelas fontes? 
Porque? 
4. Em que é que consideras pior do que as outras, as versoes que 
colocaste nos dois tiltimos lugares ? 
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FICHA DE TRABALHO N° 4 
I. A melhor explicacao historica sobre o dominio portugues no  
Indico deve englobar as versoes: 	 (circula as que escolheres) 
A-B-C-D-E 
2. 0 que é que essa explicacao historica nib 	 consegue explicar 
em relacao a questao levantada (porque e que os Portugueses 
conseguiram dominar o Oceano Indico no sec. XVI)? 
Podemos considerar que actualmente ja existe explicacao 
corn Leta •ara a uestdo levantada. 
(Qual a tua opiniao sobre esta frase?) 
CONCORDO 
	
TALVEZ 
	
DISCORD° 
justifica: 
4. Uma boa explicacao historica é sempre... 
(Sublinha uma palavra em cada linha): 
total 	 incompleta 
verdadeira 	 valida 
certa - provavel - possivel - impossivel saber 
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FICHA DE TRABALHO N° 5 
1.  
Os acontecimentos passados sucederam apenas uma vez. 
No entanto, existem sobre eles varias explicaciies.  
Porque? 
Coloca V (verdadeiro), N/S (rid() sei) ou F (falso) a frente de cada frase 
1. S6 variam na rnaneira de contar 	  
2. Depende sempre da opiniiio pessoal do autor 	  
3. E preciso descohrir e somar os factos reais 	  
4. S6 alguns autores conseguem ser totalmente neutros 	  
5. Cada autor encontra factos reais diferentes 	  
6. Cada epoca e lugar explica a sua maneira 	  
7. 0 autor estabelece relacOes entre factos e justifica 	  
8. A explicacdo certa ninguem a pode dar 	  q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
 
2. Quem poderia explicar melhor o dorninio do Oceano indico pelos 
Portugueses? 
a. um autor recente, porque pode comparar pontos de vista mais variados? 
b. urn autor importante, porque tem uma visao neutral? 
c. uma testemunha da epoca, porque viu o que realmente aconteceu '? 
d. urn Portugues que participou nesses acontecimentos, porque os viveu? 
Justifica a tua escoiha: 
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0 Presidente do 1 3: to de E-ducagao c
Manuel Joaquim Cuiga Sequeir 
(Prof.Catedratico) 
Appendix G 
Final study administration 
Example of covering letters 
UNIVERSIDADE DO MINHO 
INSTITUTO DE EDUCAcA0 
Exma Senhora 
Presidente do Conselho Directivo da 
Escola Secundaria Alberto Sampaio 
Av. Porfirio da Silva 
4700 BRAGA 
L 
Sua refcrClc:a 	 Sua Comunicacio 	 Nossa referincia 	 Data 
I E-227/93 
	
1993.Maio.31 
Ass.z.ito 
A Dr=. Maria Isabel Games Barca de Oliveira é assistente do Institute de Educacao 
e encontra-se a preparar o seu doutoramento no Institute de Educagao da Universidade de 
Londres. Nesse contexto necessita da colaboracao dessa escola conforme oficio anexo que 
dirige a V. Exa. 
Em name do Institute de Educagao da Universidade do Minho desde ja agradego toda 
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Appendix H 
Protocols of two interviews 
Herminio (13 years old, 7th grade) 
ITEM 1.1 
I: Can you explain again, in your own words, why the Portuguese managed to control the 
Indian ocean? 
H: Can I read it? 
I: It would be better to speak ... 
H: The Portuguese needed money, or spices...... for their economy! Because their economy 
was not good enough, it was half-way ... 
ITEM 1.2 
I: Concerning your explanation: you chose two statements [quoting statement 3 and 5]. Why 
did you select these statements? 
H: Because King John had to get information on the track and how it was in India in order to 
go there! 
I: And why didn't you select the others? 
H: Because they didn't fit much into my answer! 
I: Right. .. But do you agree or not with them so far as the sources are concerned, that is, 
their relation with some sources? 
H: Yes, I do, but some of them don't fit well ... 
I: Like what? Which of them fits less? 
H: The Portuguese wouldn't go to the Indian Ocean just for fighting the Moslems! They had 
to get something to bring back...... or for fighting ... they wouldn't go fighting without 
having nothing to conquer! 
ITEMS 2.2, 2.3 
I: And in relation to items 2.1/2.2, you wrote the differences between the several versions. 
Why did you write in 2.3 [there are different explanations] Because there are facts which 
prove those different explanations? 
H: ... Through sources ... 
I: How can we manage to get a history with proofs for one explanation and other proofs for 
another? ... 
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H: We'll know ... we have to base ourselves on some facts and choose those which fit better 
into that time ... 
I: And about the other facts, those which don't fit well: what do we do with them? 
H: They don't go to history ... they lay outside! 
ITEM 2.4 
I: Now, in what concerns 2.4 [quoting his answer] ... that's what you have said now; some 
explanations are related with the way of life of the time. Do you want to explain this [idea] 
better? 
H: ... When the Portuguese went there, it was because they needed money, otherwise they 
wouldn't go there ... ... and because at the time they were turned towards the sea for ... 
conquering. 
I: Thus, these explanations are those related with the way of life of that time? 
H: Yes, they are. 
ITEMS 3.1, 3.2 
I: Going forward items 3.1, 3.2 [quoting answers]. Do you want to say anything else? 
H: The Portuguese didn't go fighting without getting anything back, they needed to get 
profits. 
I: Thus, you think that this explanation "fighting because of the moral correctness of the great 
leaders" ... 
H: It was not sufficient! 
I: It was not sufficient! 
ITEM 3.3 
I: Now [quoting answer 3.3]. In relation to these sources here, this version - version D - is it 
justified, is it supported? 
H: Yes, it is. By records of those who navigated and who used to write about them. 
ITEM 3.4 
I: And on 3.4 ... in what aspects do you consider version A worse than B? 
H: They wouldn't leave to waste money for fighting, but for getting profits! 
ITEMS 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 
I: Now [quoting item 4.1, 4.2]? 
H: The Portuguese wanted but didn't go! 
I: They didn't go earlier. So you think this fact as missing in version D. And [quoting answer 
4.3]. Why? 
H: Because they can; when reading the sources, those who wrote the sources could have lied 
about the facts they wrote ... 
I: And is there any way of knowing that? 
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H: No, I don't think there is. 
I: No? In that case can we never know what is certain? 
H: It is more or less ... 
I: More or less ... is this related to what you said in 4.4: [a good explanation] is incomplete, 
valid and probable - is that so? Why didn't you choose the others? 
H: Because if we did, we'd have to say that history is for sure, all history ...! 
ITEM 5.1 
I: And now on 5.1. You said [statement] 3 - true; [statement] 4- true. Why did you write true 
statement 4 [only some authors manage to be neutral]? 
H: Because some authors are more ... are more ... they tell more the truth ... 
I: And [statement] 6. - true? 
H: Because in each period, they don't give the same explanations! 
I: Each period explains in its own way, but some authors are neutral, others are not ... how 
does this cohere? 
H: I don't know! 
I: (smiling) - Now: [statement] 8 - true. Why did you consider [statement] 7 as false? 
H: There are no right explanations, only some bits of them. 
I: And here, about this issue, what do you think? 
H: In order to make some parts they have to give explanations. 
ITEM 5.2 
I: In question 5.2 you chose c and d [quoting]. Do you see any differences between an 
explanation given by a Portuguese and by a witness? 
H: A witness gives a more truthful one because s/he saw; the Portuguese could have lied or 
enlarged the story more. 
I: And why? 
H: Because they could have lied ... 
I: And why? 
H: I don't know (smiling). 
I: What do you think or what reasons would lead them to lie? 
H: They used to tell stories when navigating in the caravels, but when they told stories they 
used to put more facts in those stories! 
I: And in what an author from today is concerned, why couldn't s/he explain better this 
question? 
H: An author from this time? 
I: From nowadays. 
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H: They could be wrong on facts because she/he didn't live on that epoch and she/he doesn't 
know how it really was. 
I: Thus you think that the important thing in order to manage to explain well something 
is ... 
H: It is to live it. 
Filipa, 16 years old, 11 th grade 
ITEM 1.1 
I: We can start by seing briefly, why the Portuguese [quoting item 1.1]? 
F: Because of the new techniques and equipment they used, which permitted them ... hmm 
... hmm ... a better knowledge and development, and thus they managed ... hmm ... to 
conquer the lands in India, also because those ... those people were weak in those resources 
and ... also ... the Portuguese were interested in the trade because it was rather profitable and 
... that is why it was easier to get into the conquest ... 
I: And those people ... you said "those people" - who were they? 
F: The western, India, the ... hmm ... the ... 
I: You have the map here, it can help ... 
F: Exactly: Here the Africans, the passage through Africa ... and even the Chinese, Macao 
and those lands ... 
ITEM 1.2 
I: You made a link between your version and the following statements about the sources 
given [quoting answer 1.2]. Why didn't you choose the others [statements]? 
F: ... I think that these two explain better because they are ... so, the Portuguese superiority 
in relation to the other people and the goal of conquest can be verified. 
ITEMS 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 
I: And now we come to 2.1 [quoting answers 2.1, 2.2]. Let's come to 2.3 [quoting question 
and answer]. Why? 
F: Because ... (smiling) I think that there are different versions and different 
authors'opinions and so they give us a certain ... a certain explanation, but like ... opinions, 
those are data which don't help us to explain ... that's it ... what happened! There are 
different authors, some of them ... pressuppose that we were well-armed and the other 
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people weren't, but for eg., here, I think that there is a version here, version C, which 
contradicts it. Thus there are authors who explain in one way, others in another ... 
I: And what is the reason for that, for different presuppositions? Do they base themselves on 
something, or not? 
F: Yes! They must base themselves on data, mustn't they? 
I: So what: How can be explained that there are different explanations, all of them being 
based on data? 
F: Maybe because they have also different opinions and maybe because they analyse under 
different ways ... and I find also that there must be different interests in some of them ... I 
don't know ... 
I: So, those are the several reasons you put forward for explanations varying ... 
ITEM 2.4 
And here: They vary but [quoting answer 2.4]1. So, what makes some data more important 
and more logical than others? 
F: I think that ... those data are perhaps more logical ... there is a certain ... for eg, in version 
D, which I chose, didn't I?, there is ... hmm ... they give us a goal ... the goal of the 
Portuguese and ... several ... and several situations which really explain that Portugal was 
well-armed and that she had interest on the trade in the Indian Ocean ... and I think that's like 
that ... there are data that really are logical ... 
I: And the fact of the authors having different opinions couldn't make some data be more 
important for some authors and less important for others? 
F: Hence, it's that, too: It depends also on the authors' opinions, because some consider a 
side as more important, they speak of fleets, others of goals and fleets ... I think that ... 
ITEM 3.1 
I: So, in relation to the ranking of versions, you put D, B, C, A. The first explains better 
[quoting answer]. So it's something like you've now ... 
F: Exactly, what I've just said. 
ITEM 3.2 
I: Right. But ... "while version B explains only the conquest" [answer 3.2]: Thus ... this 
"only" means that it lacks ... 
F: Yes, it lacks something. It just give us one datum, while the others don't, they give us 
more data which we can use for understanding! 
I: For understanding ... 
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ITEM 3.3, 3.4 
And now, you consider that Version D is more justified because it confirms all sources, it 
speaks about the strong Portuguses fleets ... ... and in what respects is C worse than A ? 
F: They are based on one factor, which is ... the fleets, that's what I have quoted, they only 
spoke of fleets, while the others didn't, Version D didn't , it spoke of other issues too. 
I: So, you think that for an explanation to be good, it must point out more than one factor? 
F: Yes, I think that one factor must be also linked to others, because there is not just one 
factor only, is there? - several factors must exist complementing each other! 
I: And confronted with one explanation with several factors seen as not very important, and 
another with only one, but a strong factor, which of them would you consider to have more 
weight, how would you decide on the importance of those explanations? 
F: Maybe for the stronger factor ... because in general if ... well, I don't know, maybe 
several factors, even in their simplicity, can give a better explanation than only one! Because 
I think that ... there! In this case; only one factor - that the Portuguese were well-armed, I 
think that there are also other data, i. e., the Portuguese spice trade, I think that it is quite 
important, while other data, or versions, don't give that, they speak of fleets, that's all. I 
really think that a complementarity must exist! 
ITEM 4.1, 4.2 
I: You didn't finish answer 4.1 [quoting the question]. 
F: Version D. 
I: You can choose D only, but you can refer to others ... 
F: Maybe versions A and D! 
I: So, versions A and D. And what this explanation wouldn't manage to explain? [quoting 
answer 4.2]. You think that it is also important to explain the "why" of the failure ... 
F: Yes, I do. 
I: And don't you think that version A partially shows something on that? 
F: ... Yes, because it speaks of the Moslem people ... hmm ... not having their power based 
on sea, which really helped the Portuguese to conquer the lands ... 
I: And do you think this explanation quite satisfactory in relation to the "why" of other 
people's failure? 
F: No, I don't, because they [Moslems] might have no power at sea, but when the 
Portuguese reached the land, they [the Portuguese] surely, had power on land ... if they [the 
Portuguese] had power at sea it's probable that they had it on land too! 
I: So is this lacking in the explanation? 
F: Yes, it is. 
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ITEM 4.3 
I: And in relation to 4.3 [quoting the question]. If a complete explanation already exists, why 
did you write "maybe" and not "I agree"? 
F: (Smiling) Hmm ... I'm not sure, but I think that nowadays with the several existing 
proofs, with data, I think that historians ... there! They are already able to explain ... a... a 
question, aren't they? ... I think that ... 
I: So explanations are not always ... 
F: They are not always quite correct, there are data which give some indicators on some 
thing, but I think that they are only indicators, now ... a proof! I think that these proofs give 
indeed a certain explanation ... 
ITEM 4.4 
I: And [quoting answer] - Why didn't you select total or incomplete as attributes of a good 
explanation? 
F: ... So, I think that it is valid because ... if it is universally valid ... when something is 
explained in history ... there is always ... we are not capable of doubting it, since there are 
really some data, there are explanations and as I mentioned here, a good historical 
explanation will be put under research... 
I: And do you think that it is never put into question? 
F: It can be put into question by other historical authors! 
I: So does it continue to be "universally valid"? 
F: (Smiling) - It depends also on ... it depends on whether it really happens [to be 
questioned] or not ... if it does, it is not so valid as a good explanation which is really certain; 
in the case where some doubts exist, and when some authors - as in this case - put some 
uncertainties, I think that it is not valid, is it? 
F: Thus, does that r_ ;an that you consider two kinds of historical explanations: those being 
certain ... 
F: Certain! 
I: And accepted by everyone ... 
F: Exactly, but they are those on which there are exact proofs, now the others without 
proofs, with some uncertainty, I think that maybe ... hmm... 
I: And to what is this due? Some explanations with exact proofs and others less certain? 
F: I think that with some of them there are some ... there are less relics... 
I: Now, we are talking about explanations, about "why". Is it possible to find relics about 
why? 
F: No, but ... ... 
I: Do the reasons have relics? 
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F: No! I think that is when no doubts are offered! Those data, those sources ... Now, when 
doubts are offered there we must doubt ... 
ITEM 5.1 
I: Now, concerning 5.1. How do you fit your answer [statement] 8 - true with 5 - true? 
F: Well, I think that really, it is possible that an explanation be certain, because if there are 
real facts the author - there - can give a good explanation, the explanation can be certain. I 
should put False [in stetement 8] here! 
I: And why do you consider 1 False? 
F: Because that can not be a basis for considering really different explanations, I really think 
that the explanations are different because there are different opinions from authors... 
I: So, you consider 2 as opposed to 1? 
F: Yes, I do. 
I: And in relation to statement 4, you put this statement as "False", why? 
F: I think that each author can draw a good explanation, it can vary, but I think that they have 
always a ... well, they are critical, I think ... 
I: But do you consider totally neutral some authors only, all of them neutral, or none is 
neutral? From these three, what do you ... 
F: Maybe some! 
I: Some? So in 4, it is not False, it should be True ... 
F: It should be True ... (smiling) 
I: Now, so far as the statement 6 [quoting] is concerned, why did you consider it as false? 
F: I think that if there are data ... oh, but here it speaks of time as well, and each time has 
its own mentality ... It can be or not ... And the place as well ... Here, maybe it is "True", 
because ... in a place people can have a mentality which they wouldn't have in another place, 
they are capable of accepting something that the others are not. 
I: And can that be exemplified with the sources shown here? About time and place? 
F: ... For example, here, in version C [quoting]. I think that this is an explanation precisely 
based on the nationalistic mentality of a Portuguese author. And here it speaks of the great 
Portuguese leaders' morality. So this can exemplify well the differences in place and time. 
I: And to which time and place is this version referred? 
F: I think that it really speaks of those who conquered, that mentality of love for the country 
... that morality which the leaders had! To conquer for enlarging the country! 
I: But the others don't speak of that, why? Why don't the other versions speak of that issue? 
F: I think that the others want to be more objective, maybe, this is somewhat subjective. 
I: And which one is more objective? 
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F: I think that the author Matoso is more subjective. The others give more proofs, more data, 
this one doesn't, he speaks more of subjective aspects, the mentality varies, of course ... 
ITEM 5.2 
I: And to finish, [quoting answer 5.2]. There were some students who chose the agent ... 
F: No, because the Portuguese were capable of ... well, one has her/his own opinion, hasn't 
he? And he is capable of seeing things as he wants to. I think that we presuppose that he is 
very subjective, because each of them really will have his own opinion. Now, a recent author 
has several opinions, several proofs, I think that with those proofs s/he can compare and 
from there s/he can draw her/his own explanation. 
I: And why a recent author can compare different views, and an important author cannot? 
Why did you choose a and not b? 
F: Maybe, because an important author ... I think that s/he bases himself on her/his 
individuality and so ... on her/his subjectivity and not on several existing opinions ... 
I: So that is in contradiction with this word - neutrality. - and why? 
F: Because ... I think that a recent author ... there are several proofs, they might have studied 
important authors too! And s/he can be neutral too, s/he can study those authors and base 
himself on his personal point of view! 
I: And how can neutrality cope with the personal point of view? 
F: Hmm I think that... s/he is neutral, she/he is going ... (smiling) This is difficult! I think 
that after her/his own point of view and the others, she/he can go to neutrality ...I: So you 
consider that neutrality is an arrival point and not a starting point. 
F: Or maybe a starting point, because s/he can start with neutrality too and go to an objective 
explanation. I think that we can see two ways there, s/he can be neutral and go to the 
explanation, to the study, but s/he can also move away from neutrality, because really with 
so many opinions, s/he can't draw her/his own neutral opinion! 
I: And does it have any influence on your answer? 
F: I think it does, each author can have her/his own opinion, but neutrality is not exactly that, 
because neutrality is not tied to her/his opinion, but well, s/he is not neutral about the other 
opinions ... 
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Appendix I 
Examples suggesting a range of patterns within each level of progression' 
Level 1  
(a) Explanatory structure (M and W) 
Ana, 13 years old, 7th grade: 
The Portuguese wanted to fight the Moslems. 
Cheng Ho consisted of a much larger size [sic] of the great Chinese fleet. The Chinese junks 
were 1500 tons heavy, at least, while none of Gama's were more than 300 tons heavy. 
The Moslem armies had large forces, better discipline and superior tactics based on the great 
mobility of light cavalry. 
Wealthy landlords demanded the end of maritime explorations, viewed as non profitable. 
2.1. In A the Portuguese wanted to fight the Moslems. In C a vast domain was conquered in a 
short time with a few human and financial resources. 
[Version] B tells the Moslem naval challenge against the Portuguese. D tells the first and most 
difficult steps towards lands unknown to the Europeans. 
Paulo, 14 years old, 9th grade: 
The Portuguese managed to establish a maritime empire in the Indian Ocean, during the 
sixteenth-century, they had a lot of will-power to discover through rounding Africa by sea, it 
was since then that the Portuguese started to conquer lands, in the middle of the fifteenth 
century the land route was controlled by the Moslems, in 1488 Bartolomeu Dias rounded the 
Cape of Good Hope, in 1498 Vasco da Gama's fleet arrives in India, in the sixteenth century 
the Portuguese dominated the spice route already . 
2.1. [In version A] Openly defying the Moslem domain the Portuguese met their main enemies 
and in C the author says that [it was] conquered in short time, with a few human and financial 
resources. 
[In version B] The Moslem naval challenge against the Portuguese was not efficient. In D the 
author explains how the Portuguese conquered African lands. 
2.2. [no response] 
1A11 the pupils whose responses are given here were interviewed but one (Lurdes, 11th-grader), who could 
not be present. Her written response is briefly discussed on pp. 387-91. 
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Ana gives a fragmented version constructed from the material available, historical sources 
mainly. A fragmented descriptive mode seems to be apparent here. A descriptive mode 
might be also suggested by her responses to item 2.1: she extracts some passages of the 
material given, presenting some meaningful statements about each version in terms of 
what they tell rather than of factors they might favour. 
Paulo constructs his explanation, firstly, by ascribing to the Portuguese a disposition 
(will-power) to discoveries leading to the rounding of Africa - this might function as the 
initial motive for the empire ("it was since then that the Portuguese started to conquer 
lands"); secondly, by listing a series of factual steps which might have been picked up 
from information given (in the chronology). Will-power, traditionally quoted as a general 
factor for conquests and discoveries, is explicit. Antecedent steps are given by 
chronological order: land route controlled by Moslems - rounding of the Cape - arrival in 
India - sea route controlled by the Portuguese; a relationship between steps and causes is 
not apparent. A model of a continuous-series explanation may be suggested here, as in 
Claudia's story. His responses might also suggest a restricted explanatory structure 
emerging ("will-power" is stated as a motive and in item 2.1 the passage quoted from 
version B might implicitly convey a notion of factor). However, most of the distinctions 
among the different versions made by Paulo are presented in terms of excerpts conveying 
descriptive facts. 
Responses like those given above may indicate ideas revealing a pattern ranging from a 
descriptive to a restricted explanatory mode. Factorial weighting is not apparent since 
reasoning focuses on facts. The notion of implicit factor may emerge. 
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(b) Explanatory consistency (E and L) 
Ana: 
3.2. Version D [ranked 1st] explains more how discoveries were made. 
3.3. [no response] 
3.4. Version C [ranked 3rd] only explains that a vast domain was conquered with a few human and 
financial resources. Version A [ranked 4th] says that the Portuguese fought the Moslems. 
Paulo: 
Item 3.2. Because the first [version D] explains the domination of the Indian Ocean better, while B only 
explains a part of that domination. 
3.3. I do [consider] because as I had already stated, the domination of the Indian Ocean is better explained 
[in version D] than in the others. 
3.4. Because I think that it [version C] only explains one part of that issue. 
Ana chooses version D, producing some justification statements relating to description 
("how discoveries were") rather than to explanation. Evidence seems to be treated at the 
level of facts in each version. Information is mainly quoted, which indicates a restricted 
logical coherence in her constructions. Arguments are given in factual terms and the 
relative plausibility of versions is not discussed. 
Paulo chooses version D first. He argues for it, and against versions B, A and C, with a 
vague assertion conveying maybe an idea of quantity of facts, or of comprehensiveness 
of account (better versus a part). As his idea of explanation appears to overlap 
description, his assessment of the different versions and his vague concern about a better 
"explanation" may be related to mere information. Logical consistency of explanations 
(coherence and plausibility) is discussed in a preempted way ("better/worse", "only a 
part"). 
Both sets of responses quoted above may indicate a pattern centred on substantive ideas. 
It ranges from notions tied to fragmented information, with a restricted logical coherence 
and revealing perplexity in terms of a second-order reasoning, to more coherent ideas 
about evidence related to description, but still indicating preempted notions of 
plausibility. 
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(c) Objectivity and truth (D and T) 
Ma: 
2.3. [Different explanations exist] Because it depends on the author's personal opinion, and no 
one can give a certain explanation. 
2.4. Yes [an explanation can be considered better], the second [version B], because what 
happened is not very well known, so there are several versions. 
5.2. The Portuguese [would explain the situation better], because if someone lived those events 
we would know them better. 
Paulo: 
2.3. Because each one has a way of explaining an event. 
2.4. I think it does, because each one has a way of explaining better he has more capacity than 
the other who explains worse. 
5.2. A witness from that time because she/he really saw what happened; it is much easier to 
explain, while the person who studied it might not understand some aspects. 
Ana gives responses suggesting the emergence of ideas about variance of historical 
descriptions: personal opinion is stated in a preempted way and the basis for this seems 
to be a lack of certainty about what happened in the past. A naive realism is implicit ("if 
someone lived the events we would know them better") coexisting with a naive historical 
scepticism since she prefers an historical agent for "knowing" the situation. She seems to 
reason about provisional descriptions in terms of uncertain facts (but with a restricted 
coherence) rather than about explanations. 
Paulo appears to concentrate on preempted differences among versions - each "way of 
explaining" an event may be "better or worse". Explanation, for him, might mean a 
description, and "a way of explaining better" might be linked to an idea of clarity in that 
description, tied to knowledge by direct acquaintance - events happened, and the closer 
we are to them the easier it will be to understand them. In this context, the witness seems 
to assume a position of authority to describe the situation better.2 This idea suggests a 
naive scepticism, although Paulo also suggests a naive realism in his concern about what 
really happened. 
The responses above suggest some incipient ideas about objectivity and truth related to 
description, showing an oscillation between a naive realism and scepticism, while 
choosing a witness or an agent for knowing the events. 
2 Herminio's answers (see p. 215) about the value of direct observation might also remind us of the 
authority stage, but now clearly related to explanation. 
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Level 2 
(a) Explanatory structure (M and W) 
Luis, 14 years old, 9th grade: 
Since Bartolomeu Dias rounded the Cape of Good Hope, the Portuguese began to envy the 
spice trade. It,was then that a fleet commanded by Vasco da Gama arrives in India (Calicut) 
since then the Portuguese started to dominate this trade. 
2.1. In version A, it refers to the Portuguese enemies and it gives importance to their non-
intervention in [Portuguese] domination, in C it speaks of the difficulties felt by Portugal. 
They [versions B and D] are the two most correct versions, in my opinion, because they value 
the meaning of the Portuguese will. 
Cidalia, 12 years old, 7th grade: 
The Portuguese managed to establish a maritime empire in the Indian Ocean because: The 
Moslems did not manage to fight against the Portuguese, b  the Portuguese prestige and power 
in relation to the other people. 
2.1. Because in A it says that the Portuguese had trouble in defeating the other people and in C 
it says the opposite. 
It is said in B that the Portuguese were defeated by the Moslems [sic] and in D it says that 
King Afonso Henriques took the first steps. 
2.2. They [versions B and C] disagree about the power and victory of Portugal. 
Luis constructs an account as a continuous-series in which the temporal steps are the 
Cape and India, interlinked with the trade spice motivation. The Portuguese domination 
appears as a natural conclusion to the story. Although this version points mainly to a 
descriptive mode, a broad motive for the maritime explorations (the spice trade) is 
suggested, thus it can be considered under a restricted explanatory pattern. In 2.1, he 
also suggests a notion of factor, the importance of the "non intervention" of Portuguese 
enemies and will-power for the Portuguese empire. Throughout his answers to other 
items (see 3.3, 3.4, next), he clearly operates with the notion of factor, establishing a 
hierarchy among them (the economic motive appears as decisive). 
Cidalia explicitly gives an answer in a causal mode asserting, as a single factor, the 
Portuguese power compared to other people's. It might be said that she presents an 
elaborate statement, since it is given in a negative form ("the Moslems did not manage 
to...") followed by a coherent argument (Portuguese power in relation to other people). 
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Distinctions among versions (items 2.1, 2.2), although mainly stated in descriptive terms 
("it says that..."), convey a notion of factor ("trouble in defeating the other people", "the 
power [...] of Portugal"). However, this notion appears less clear, or overlapping the 
idea of fact, when she discusses the several versions given (items 3.2 to 3.4, discussed 
next) focusing on "the first steps" or disagreeing with version A, maybe on factual 
grounds only. 
These two responses represent explanatory structures ranging from constructions in a 
restricted to a clearly explanatory mode; the notion of factor, although appearing to 
oscillate with that of mere fact, implies a hierarchy between decisive and contributory 
conditions. 
(b) Explanatory consistency (E and L) 
Luis: 
3.2. The importance of the first version [B, ranked 1st] in relation to the second [D] is that, the 
trade was made by sea and thus a deep knowledge concerning navigation on oceans was 
necessarily required. 
3.3. No [version ranked first is not better justified by sources]. Because I think that the 
Portuguese domination is not due to the cause of rivalries with other people but is due to the 
wish to get rich. 
3.4. [A and C are worst] In the sense of wishing war with other people. 
3.2. Because in B it [the question] is not so clearly explained as in D. 
3.3. [Version ranked first is better justified by the sources] Because in that epoch there were 
almost no resources and even being like that the Prince Afonso Henriques took the most 
difficult steps. 
3.4. Because I think that in A the Portuguese had not so much trouble in defeating Asia [sic], 
the Egyptians and Turks. 
Luis chooses version B first, and an explanatory mode clearly underlies his responses 
here. He argues for his favoured explanation (B) against his second best (D) in terms of 
the plausibility of one familiar factor (naval advance), although this factor is more overtly 
conveyed by version D than by version B, and it is forgotten in other arguments. Item 
3.3, which asked for evidential justification, is answered in terms of everyday 
plausibility - economic motivation is valued over military motives - although it seems that 
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he is aware that the sources focus on a military power. The same disagreement with 
military motives is shown against versions A and C. Thus, it appears that he concentrates 
his arguments on the confrontation of plausibility of two motives - economic versus 
military.3 In item 2.1 (further above), he shows the same preference for versions B and 
D claiming that they are "the two most correct versions because they value the meaning of 
the Portuguese will". This assertion "the two most correct versions" suggest a concern 
for evidential consistency in terms of true facts overlapping true factors (but based on an 
emotional choice, it appears). In item 2.3 (given next) a similar concern about the truth of 
facts ("only through documents can we prove something") is apparent. 
Cidalia chooses version D first, preferring it to version B in terms of clarity of 
explanation - which is still a hazy or preempted idea of explanatory consistency. When 
asked about evidential justification, she argues in substantive terms for version D by 
valuing the action of the Portuguese Prince Henry (misunderstood as Afonso Henriques, 
the first Portuguese king) at the beginning of the discoveries and the morale factor may 
be implicit here (difficulties were overcome even without resources). She criticizes 
version A, producing an ambiguous argument about the military correlation between the 
Portuguese and the Moslems: she undervalues the Egyptian and Turkish power in 
relation to the Portuguese ("they had not so much trouble in defeating Asia"). It is not 
explicit whether she is arguing against the importance of that factor in terms of factual 
evidence or in terms of plausibility. A strategy to give importance to her preferred 
condition (will-power) by de-valuing other conditions (although in a preempted 
argument) might be operating here. In items 2.3, 2.4 and 4.3 (discussed next) evidence 
seems to be treated as proofs ("several proofs", "no concrete proof') for an explanation. 
These two sets of responses may indicate emergent ideas about evidential consistency 
tied to the idea of facts as proofs for an explanation, and based on plausibility at everyday 
level. A tendency to argue, although still in vague terms or based on everyday (and 
emotional) assumptions, for one familiar factor against others as the correct answer, is 
observed at this level. 
3 This position is similar to that defended by Herminio about the economic motivation versus moral 
disposition (see pp. 211 and 214). 
372 
(c) Objectivity and truth (D and T) 
Luis: 
2.3. [There are different explanations] Because those are facts which happened a long time ago, 
therefore only through documents can we prove something. 
2.4. No [An explanation cannot be considered better], because these versions vary, it is like 
Medicine. 
5.2. [A Portuguese participant can explain] Because nobody but an eyewitness, for example, a 
navigator, is better to justify these or other facts. 
2.3. Because there are several proofs making us think one thing or another. 
2.4. No, because they all have to be considered the best because we don't know for sure which 
are true. 
4.4. [An explanation can be considered already complete] I disagree, because there is actually no 
concrete prooj demonstrating that what is said in history is true. 
5.2. Only a recent author can compare more valid points of view because he is better informed 
about everything that happened and can compare them with others. 
Luis is concerned about certainty in explanation. He appears to oscillate between a 
sceptical idea concerning knowledge of the past ("facts which happened a long time ago", 
"versions vary") thus opting for direct observation to get a better explanation ("nobody is 
better to justify ... facts than a witness") and a realist position ("through documents we 
can prove something"). These ideas might suggest a non-discrimination between 
description and explanation. His statement "versions vary, it is like Medicine" although 
quite sceptical, appears more elaborate, if it is personal; it is an analogy which may 
suggest that he is operating at the level of explanatory hypotheses rather than at a mere 
interpretation of facts. 
Cidalia seems also concerned about certainty, the true explanation. She produces two sets 
of ideas: (a) "several proofs", thus, "no concrete proof" about the past, and 
consequently, (b) uncertainty in historical knowledge since "we don't know for sure 
which of them are true". This simple view is challenged, however, when she opts for a 
recent author to give a better explanation: "he is better informed about everything that 
happened and can compare them [points of view?] with others". Considering her 
responses as a whole, the suggestion that her choice means a concern for explanatory 
scope might be too risky. Her assertion "he is informed of everything" might convey an 
ideal of total information. In any case, her last argument quoted from the corresponding 
question ("a recent author can compare more valid points of view") conflicts with a 
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sceptical attitude revealed in preceding responses, thus suggesting an oscillation between 
realism and scepticism. 
These responses may indicate emerging ideas about provisionality loosely related to 
historical explanation, that is, an overlapping of ideas of objectivity in explanation or 
truth in description. An emphasis is put on proofs to get a certain or true explanation. An 
oscillation between contradicting trends about historical knowledge - realist versus 
sceptical positions - is observed. 
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Level 3  
(a) Explanatory structure (M and W) 
Maria, 12 years old, 7th grade:4 
The Portuguese began by exploring the western African coast and came back full of spices. 
After that, Bartolomeu Dias passed (rounded) the Cape of Good Hope thus managing to arrive 
in China [sic]. The Moslems did not manage to defeat the Portuguese and the Chinese fleet had 
already withdrawn, leaving the way open to the Portuguese. These, in turn, quickly got to 
control that trade, forbidding the other people from doing it. 
2.1. In version A, the Moslems have lot of power and in version C there are a few human and 
financial resources. 
In version B, the Moslems were not efficient, and the Chinese were not present in the Indian 
Ocean. In version D the Chinese were exploring the Indian Ocean. 
2.2. In version B the Portuguese did not have much difficulty in fighting the Moslems. And in 
version C they had no difficulty in conquering as a result of the Portuguese great leaders' moral 
correctness and through the sacrifices for the country made by all. 
Teresa, 17 years old, 11th grade: 
We might say that the Portuguese managed to establish a maritime empire because, on the one 
hand, the African people had not enough power to fight the European people (guns). The 
Portuguese felt a need for getting spices and a larger empire too, they also wanted to spread 
their faith. On the other hand, they managed as the most powerful groups living there based 
their power on the land trade, the sea was not seen as very important for them and, besides that, 
their equipment was not superior to the Europeans'. This effort in order to get the empire is due 
to the morality of the Portuguese great leaders and to the sacrifices made by the people to 
defend their country. 
2.1. Version A says that the Portuguese wanted, mainly, to fight the Moslem faith. While 
version C says that the Portuguese managed to conquer the empire due to their moral 
correctness. 
2.2. These versions [B and C] disagree as one (B) says that the Portuguese managed only as the 
Chinese fleet had withdrawn, the other (C) says that they managed due to their leaders' morality 
and to the people's fight for the country. 
4Maria's work was considered as an example of responses which provoked some perplexity in arriving at 
a categorization, as enunciated in chapter 7, pp. 179-80. Thus it represents an extreme example of 
Level 3. 
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Maria constructs an account in a continuous-series model, but implicitly conveying a 
restricted explanatory mode: in her story ("began ... after that"), the spice motive and 
some external factors (Moslem inefficiency and Chinese withdrawal) are selected. 
Antecedent steps and conditions appear in chronological order. Distinctions made 
between versions may suggest a restricted notion of factor: differences between versions 
A and C, B and D, are stated mainly at a descriptive level, appearing as mere quotations 
in most cases ("a few human and financial resources", "Moslems were not efficient", 
"the Chinese ..."), but implicitly functioning as factors. In item 2.2, the notion of factor 
becomes more explicit ("no difficulty in conquering as a result of their great leaders' 
moral correctness"). In items 3.2 and 3.4 (given next), she values a plain sum of facts. 
Teresa constructs an explanatory narrative pointing out several factors and aligning them 
in two main sets: (1) Portuguese military power compared to African's, and commercial, 
political and religious motivation; (2) military correlation between "the most powerful 
groups" living in India and the Portuguese. Another factor - the morale of Portuguese 
leaders and people - seems to be added just as if she does not wish to leave any factor 
aside in her account. The notion of factor seems also to be well grasped when she 
distinguishes between versions A and C (item 2.1) and versions B and C (item 2.2). She 
expresses a concern for "various factors" (item 3.3, given next) and discriminates among 
them a decisive cause ("economic needs", in item 3.2) and merely contributory 
conditions ("not so important", in item 3.4). 
Both responses suggest an explanatory mode ranging from a restricted to a full 
explanation. Quantity of factors is valued. They may be aggregated as a sum of facts or, 
in a greater degree of sophistication, they are viewed as interlinked. 
(b) Explanatory consistency (E and L) 
Maria: 
3.2. Because the first version [D, ranked first] explains how everything happened from the 
beginning, thus being more complete. It says who managed to round the Cape of Good Hope, 
and much more. The second version [B] is not complete, not telling dates and everything from 
the beginning. 
3.3. Yes [Version ranked first is better justified by sources], because the sources complete the 
first version even more. Like that, it becomes complete. 
3.4. They [versions ranked last] don't tell much about the people, dates of many important 
historical facts and they don't speak about those historical facts. 
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Teresa: 
3.2. The first version [DI explains better as it shows the steps taken by the Portuguese and as 
it says what the Portuguese really went to take due to economic needs at the time. 
3.3. Yes, I think that it shows well the various factors in which the Portuguese were superior 
to the Moslems. 
3.4. In relation to version C, I don't think that morality and leaders' correctness were 
important, and in relation to version B, I think that the question about the Chinese being or 
not being in the Ocean is not very important. 
Maria chooses version D first, arguing for it in terms of quantity of information and 
detail. Although a full description appears to be her ideal of historical knowledge, 
sometimes she can discuss versions on explanatory grounds (items 2.1, 2.2, e.g. "they 
had no difficulty in conquering..."). Sources are treated as complementary information to 
the version selected but in the interview she refers to sources as a justification to version 
D: "D... speaks about facts which are given in some sources, thus it is better justified". 
Arguments against versions B, A and C focus on quantity of information and detail, 
again. There is an internal coherence of her constructions and arguments, but the relative 
plausibility of versions is not discussed. 
Teresa chooses version D, arguing for it in terms of steps and relevant factors. She 
integrates familiar knowledge and evidence available into her argumentation. She justifies 
the evidential consistency of version D by referring to the Portuguese superiority in 
relation to the Moslems (this superiority being ambiguously treated as "various factors") 
conveyed by several sources. This shows a clear discrimination of sources and 
explanation. Furthermore, in item 5.2 (given next) she makes a distinction between 
evidence and facts "they [agents] could give us precise data about the facts". In 3.4, 
versions B and C, undervalued by her, are discussed by weighing, in terms of everyday 
plausibility, the relative explanatory power of factors given. 
These answers may indicate a pattern of valuing aggregation, specifically, the idea of 
quantity of factors in an explanation. This pattern might range from less elaborate ideas 
meaning an overlapping between quantity of facts and factors, when the notion of factor 
appears to be established in a restricted form, to clear ideas about evidential and logical 
consistency; in the former case, ideas of consistency with evidence, or of plausibility may 
not be clarified. 
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(c) Objectivity and truth (D and T) 
Maria: 
2.3. [There are different explanations] Because not all versions are based on the same facts and 
the authors are distinct, thinking and having different opinions. 
2.4. Yes [one explanation can be considered better], version D. Because version D explains 
how everything happened from the beginning and the other versions are incomplete. 
4.3. [Nowadays, an explanation can be considered as complete] I agree, because today there are 
many ways of knowing all of that. Because there are several tools and progress. 
5.2. [A Portuguese participant would explain better] Because she/he participated, knowing 
everything. 
Teresa: 
2.3. Firstly, because each author faces questions in a different way, and then, there are 
diversified factors which are more important to one author than to another. 
2.4. No, because each answer has always something, even small, which is right and means that 
it cannot be rejected. 
4.3. We cannot say yes or no, as it depends on the way of each one facing the issue. 
5.2. For me, a Portuguese who participated could explain better, as only he could give us 
precise data about the facts which really happened. 
Maria justifies differences in explanations due to different facts selected according to 
different opinions ("not all ... based on the same facts"). She discusses completeness in 
terms of telling the whole story ("how everything happened from the beginning"), which 
is consistent with a descriptive structure overlapping explanation. She shows 
contradictory ideas about the possibilities of historical knowledge: on the one hand, she 
suggests a realist attitude to historical work to know the past ("there are many ways of 
knowing", "several tools and progress"); on the other hand, she suggests some 
scepticism when valuing memory for explaining the situation ("she/he participated, 
knowing everything"). Here, again, there is a concern for quantity related to the idea of 
total knowledge linked to direct experience. 
Teresa produces more elaborate ideas suggesting a selective point of view in explanation 
("each author faces questions in a different way") and simultaneously assuming a realist 
position ("there are diversified factors", "the facts which really happened"). Each version 
is seen as valid as it always contains some truth: here, a scissors and paste model, with a 
concern for taking each ("even small") bit of truth from every version, is suggested. She 
oscillates between a realist view, affirmed in quotations above, and some scepticism 
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when she puts as a limit to explanatory completeness the existence of different 
perspectives ("it depends on the way of each one facing the issue"). Possible conflicts 
between those two clusters of ideas seem to be solved by attributing a better position to 
agents as explanation-producers, since "they could give us precise data about the facts". 
These responses may indicate an aggregationist pattern ranging from ideas considering 
quantity of facts and different opinions in explanations to a more elaborate notion viewing 
explanations made un of interlinked factors according to different points of view. In this 
last pattern the ideal is the grasping of a total past, and concerns for neutrality are not 
explicit. An oscillation between naive realism and scepticism is observed. 
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Level 4 
(a) Explanatory structure (M and W) 
Mario , 13 years old, 7th grade: 
Because, although having weaker armies on land, the Portuguese managed to dominate the 
Indian Ocean because the Moslems had no great armed fleets. Another reason was that the 
Portuguese were the first Europeans to arrive in India, and that permitted them to conquer the 
main ports and to dominate the spice route which was very profitable. 
2.1. Version A gives a logical and synthetic explanation, while version C gives an explanation 
made to convey pride in the Portuguese by having a lot of patriotism and moral correctness. 
Version B says that the Moslems might not be the biggest problem but the Chinese, who had 
withdrawn from the Indian Ocean 60 years before. D shows that, although the Chinese had 
been in the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese were not affected by that. 
2.2. Version B says that the Portuguese had "luck" because the Moslems had no naval power 
but C says that the domination was got only due to Portuguese patriotism and to their religion 
being "better" than the Moslems'. 
Sofia, 15 years old, 9th grade 
In my point of view, after reading the documents and sources given and based on history 
classes too, I think that the Portuguese managed to establish a vast maritime empire in the 
Indian Ocean thanks to their geographical situation and also to will-power, naval equipment 
and technical knowledge. In spite of the Moslems having won preceding battles, the 
Portuguese armies managed to defeat them; but it was especially in the early middle of the 
fifteenth-century, when the Chinese tried to explore the western African coast, that the 
Portuguese managed their passage to the Indian Ocean, as it was practically without guard-
watch, and they met there only Arabs and Africans, who had no sophisticated war or naval 
equipment. 
2.1. In version A, the Portuguese domination in the Indian Ocean is explained as the Moslems 
did not based their power on sea and in version C, A. Matoso explains that the Portuguese 
managed to overcome all the obstacles due to the great leaders' moral correctness, and the 
sacrifices made by all for the country. 
Version B shows the author's lack of confidence in Portuguese power and says that the fact of 
the Portuguese domination of the Indian Ocean is due to the Chinese absence and Version D 
considers that the Portuguese domination is due to Prince Henry. 
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Mario gives an explanation in a causal mode, in a hierarchy of conditions: the military 
balance between the Moslems and the Portuguese is presented in an elaborate form 
(Moslem land power versus naval weakness) as the first factor to be pointed out; the fact 
of the Portuguese being the first Europeans to arrive in India (which might suggest the 
elimination of another source of difficulties) comes next. Factorial distinctions between 
pairs of versions are, mostly, stated at a sophisticated level: versions A and C are 
compared in terms of standards met by each of them (a logical versus a biased 
explanation), and factors favoured in version B are well synthesized in item 2.1. Version 
D seems to be treated as a description but its information is employed in terms of 
explanatory logic, by comparison to version B (the Chinese were there but they did not 
affect the occurrence).5  
Sofia constructs an overtly explanatory narrative which might suggest a structurist model 
in combining long and short-term conditions and motives: geographical situation, naval 
technology and will-power, in the first set; the Moslem inefficiency (stated in a negative 
mode) and the Chinese withdrawal (misinterpreted in their temporal occurrence), in the 
second. This might be considered as short-term conditions if compared to the first causal 
set. When distinguishing between pairs of versions, she overtly applies causal notions by 
isolating, in explanatory statements, the main factors conveyed by versions A, B and C. 
But the descriptive version D appears as another explanation - she attributes to its first 
statement (Prince Henry's explorations) the cause conveyed by that version, although in 
item 3.4 she argues against its lack of explanatory power.6 She tends to show a 
preference for one factor (the Portuguese will, in item 3.2, next page), although 
admitting that such a preference is made on subjective grounds. 
These responses suggest an explanatory mode ranging from a causal hierarchy to an 
explanatory narrative. The notion of factor appears well grasped, and the relative weight 
of different factors can be discussed. The descriptive version (D) may be identified as a 
description, and its information is selected in terms of explanatory power. 
5A strategy of converting descriptive facts into factors is observed here. Data from the "Chata Project" 
suggests the same strategy of conversion. 
6Here again, the same strategy of conversion is observed. 
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(b) Explanatory consistency (E and L) 
Mario : 
3.2. [D is better] Because it speaks of the different steps taken by the Portuguese for the 
domination of Africa and the Indian Ocean, while version B only speaks about what would 
have happened if... 
3.3. Yes, it gives a more synthetic and brief version of the historical explanation. 
3.4. They [A and C] only speak of one fact about the Portuguese domination in the Indian 
Ocean. 
4.2. Why did the Chinese or other European people not try to conquer the spice trade when 
they realized that it was so profitable to the Portuguese? 
Sofia: 
3.2. The first version [C] shows the confidence in the Portuguese army and the second version 
[B] shows another point of view saying that the Moslem naval challenge was not efficient 
enough against the Portuguese. 
3.3. No, but it is the one which presents more confidence in the Portuguese than any other and 
as I am a Portuguese, I don't show impartiality, I take my side. 
3.4. I don't consider them as worse, but version A is very subjective and version D doesn't 
explain the main motives which led the Portuguese to dominate the Indian Ocean. 
Mario chooses version D, appearing to value a set of real factors (the several antecedent 
steps of the empire) over a counterfactual speculation given by version B; he gives a low 
value to explanations A and C using the criterion of interlinked factors, which may also 
underlie his first choice. The notion of evidential consistency might seem still vague, 
with no explicit distinction between facts and sources for an explanation, but he ranked 
version C last, criticizing it as a biased explanation (in items 2.1./2.2), thus suggesting 
that he coherently applies criteria for distinguishing better and worse-grounded 
explanations. Facts/factors are interlinked, and a logical explanation must reflect such 
interrelationship, as he claims in the interview: "A neutral author should write the facts 
intertwined, with logic". Thus, logical consistency appears to be another criterion for 
assessing explanations, as is suggested above and in his answer 2.1 when he defined in 
version A as a "logical explanation"). However, his answer about evidential support for 
the favoured explanation, in item 3.3, appears somehow incoherent: what does he mean 
by a "more synthetic version", concerning the longer version D? As far as plausibility is 
concerned, the issue he posed in 4.2 suggests notions focusing on the specific historical 
context of the Portuguese oriental empire (the Chinese and European powers, at the 
time). 
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Sofia seems to grasp elaborate ideas of evidential consistency (she recognises that 
version C is not justified by sources given), and of logical consistency (she criticizes 
version D in terms of lack of explanatory power). In spite of that, she does not apply 
such criteria in the assessment of concrete explanations - she chooses version C first, 
opting for applying practical principles of nationalism rather than historical criteria, 
assuming the relativism of human decisions. Her argumentation might suggest that: 
- explanations may be plausible, and all valid under different points of view, even if more 
subjective (item 3.2, 3.4); 
- explanations may be well-grounded on evidence, or not, (item 3.3); 
- selection among different versions will depend on personal presuppositions rather than 
on evidential grounds (item 3.3). 
Thus, personal and emotional assumptions seem to be the main criterion for her practical 
decisions about explanations of the past, notwithstanding awareness of specific historical 
criteria. This might reveal a tight, but conscious attitude, so far as methodological criteria 
are concerned, seeking in subjectivism a basis for a less critical choice. 
Another example of an elaborate pattern suggesting awareness about criteria of evidential 
and logical consistency, in an objectivist trend, may be observed in Carolina's responses. 
Carolina, 15 years old, 9th grade: 
3.2. The first version D explains better because it considers all the historical background of 
that event. 
3.3. No, because the version I chose includes a set of sources not possible to give here. 
3.4. Because the latter two [A and B] are not so well-grounded in their historical perspective as 
the former two. 
Carolina expresses awareness of the evidential basis in terms of several sources required 
for a good explanation, pointing to a wider scope for justifying her favoured explanation. 
A similar focus is shown in the interview, showing concerns for a large evidential basis 
("I would try to give an explanation based on all the facts available"). She appears to 
value an explanation in terms of totality of facts for the comprehensiveness of the 
situation ("all the facts available", "all the historical background"). This seems to entail a 
concern for plausibility in terms of the specific historical context - the most plausible 
explanation implicitly appears to be that which tries to seize the past in its total context. 
The same idea appears when she argues against versions A and B, claiming that they are 
"not so well-grounded in their historical perspective"; in the interview she explains what 
she means by that: 
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C: It is relating all the past, not just one fact, but seeing all of them in perspective, not only 
some facts but several. To get several sources, not formulate a reasoning based on just one 
source, not just on one fact, but several, to relate all of them. 
This statement seems to convey a notion of factors to be interlinked, as in Rui and 
Mario's responses: all factors must be taken into account in order to actually explain the 
past. 
These responses may indicate notions of evidential consistency at the level of interlinked 
factors conveyed by several sources; logical consistency in terms of implicit appreciation 
of internal coherence, and plausibility at everyday level, or considering the specific 
historical context. 
(c) Objectivity and truth (D and T) 
Mario: 
2.3. Because each historian only shows the factual side in which she/he is interested, some 
wanting to show that the Portuguese were not so good as they looked, some saying the 
opposite. 
2.4. No, because each one speaks only about what she/he finds more important, not speaking 
about all the facts. 
4.3. Maybe [a complete explanation already exists]. Because in the materials available they 
[explanations] are not complete because there might exist more explanations about questions 
like those I presented above [item 4.2.]. 
5.2. A neutral author, because the text will miss a lot (version C) without being neutral, 
because the facts are made up in a way showing always that something is superior or inferior 
to another. 
Carolina: 
2.3. There are different explanations because there are also different mentalities. 
2.4. No, each historian has her/his own point of view and it cannot be said that one is wrong 
and the other is right. 
4.3. I disagree because each man has his own way of thinking and we cannot generalize by 
creating just one explanation. 
5.2. I would choose the chart, then I would see what was in common and what was different 
and then I would work out an explanation. 
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Mario shows a special preoccupation about the problem of bias not only related to 
practical interests (as he indicates in relation to version C) but also in terms of personal 
assumptions underlying each point of view; in his discussion he "deconstructs" historical 
production in the light of cultural presuppositions which underlie it, apparently assuming 
a relativist position. However, maybe due to his main concern about detachment, he 
chooses a neutral author to give a better explanation, and this might be seen as 
contradicting his former deconstruction. In the interview, he makes clear how to 
"control" for neutrality: 
I: So, you think that no historian can... 
M: No, I don't! A Portuguese, or a Moslem historian will never write a book with the right 
story about discoveries! But some from other countries not directly influenced by discoveries -
neither Spanish nor English - could do it! 
In his responses, an idea of provisionality due to existing different perspectives ("each 
one speaks only about what she/he finds more important", "there might exist more 
explanations about questions like those I presented above") is suggested. However, in a 
positivist approach, Mario states that an absolute neutrality can be attained by eliminating 
direct involvement in the situation to be explained, thus denying his arguments about 
perspective. 
Carolina appears to recognise the notion of point of view beyond a stereotyped idea of 
personal opinion ("different mentalities") and seems to give a positive attribution to it , 
when she suggests that there are no right/wrong answers, or that there is not a single 
answer ("we cannot generalize"). These responses might suggest a relativist view, since 
she avoids assigning a different validity to different explanations. In the interview, 
Carolina begins by asserting the existing different presuppositions when a selection 
among different facts is made: 
C: Each one puts more... more relevance on what she/he thinks it happened! Like me, I'm 
speaking of facts that can be totally different to another person! 
However, signs of realism progressively appear during the interview. She states some 
basic criteria for serious research to reach an explanation: 
C: They [historians] have to be inside the real issue, they cannot speak of one thing and then 
speak of another issue! They have to know what they are speaking about! 
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History has been made because new data are found, not because of the way of thinking! 
Something considered as right now can be seen as incomplete within a few years. If some new 
facts are known it can turn this explanation false! 
These responses may indicate ideas about perspective beyond a common-sense level, 
integrating notions of bias and/or different cultural presuppositions. However, these 
ideas appear in contradiction with principles of an absolute neutrality, seen as essential to 
a valid explanation. This main pattern may present different views: some more positivist, 
opt for affirming a perspectiveless neutrality, as in cases above. Within this trend, Rui' s 
responses suggest the tightest attitude. 
Sofia's responses suggest a more subjectivist trend: when facing a logical conflict 
between perspective and neutrality, some students assume that the real past cannot be 
grasped due to a lack of a perspectiveless neutrality. Sofia writes: 
2.3. It is due to the way each person sees the issue, the observed "angle" and the different 
historical sources. 
2.4. No, as for me the union of all versions is the best, but even that is not the most perfect as 
it can always he completed by something else, which we don't know. 
4.3. No matter how the human being tries to improve the facts, there is always something 
slipping, something obvious which is far away from our eyes. 
5.2. The witness would really be the best but even she/he is not totally reliable as there is 
always a tendency to opt for a party or a different point of view. 
Sofia shows an awareness of a subjective explanation due to different perspectives and, 
firstly, she prefers to sum them up to get the best explanation. Simultaneously, it appears 
that she implicitly affirms a reality out there. She tries to solve this dilemma by attributing 
to a witness the best position to explain a situation (and she stresses this solution during 
the interview). The direct observation paradigm might function as an expedient to achieve 
neutrality and reduce the interference of human perspective, seen as a source of 
unreliability. However, she appears to realize that a completely reliable explanation is not 
possible - and finally she opts for the importance of point of view over the possibility of a 
perspectiveless neutrality when explaining a human situation. 
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These several responses show a range of notions tied to an ideal of perspectiveless 
neutrality. They may vary between an objectivist trend considering the possibility of 
attaining an absolutely neutral explanation whether by an authority or through consensus, 
and a relativist trend assuming that, as such a neutrality cannot be attained, explanations 
are relative to a given perspective. 
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Level 5 
(a) Explanatory structure (M and W) 
Manuel, 18 years old, 11th grade: 
Essentially, because we were in half-way through an economic crisis rising from the fourteenth 
century which was the Black Death crisis, during which a lot of people had died. We turned 
away from land domination and we turned over to maritime expansion, towards the spice trade 
which was more profitable. These were well-planned, well led trips, with well-armed ships, but 
inferior to the Chinese ships. It was after the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope, with 
Bartolomeu Dias, that we saw our work made easier. We assumed the maritime empire in the 
Indian Ocean pushing away the Chinese from there. It was all profit. 
It was necessary to seize that imperial domination in order to solve our economic problems. 
2.1. Version A says about the power that the Asians and Moslems had on land, that is, on the 
land conquest issue, and on the contrary, the Portuguese had a great maritime power. 
Version C states, as in the saying, the unity makes power, that what happened was with few 
resources of men and money - it is better few and good than a lot and bad. 
Lurdes, 17 years old, 1 1 th grade: 
The Portuguese established an empire in the Indian Ocean due to some factors or favouring 
conditions such as: the withdrawal of a possible great obstacle, that is, the very powerful (at 
the time), Chinese fleet; the confrontation with the Moslems without great difficulties as these 
latter based their power on land; our leaders were determined and patriotic, as they fought with 
conviction; this conquest was not immediate, it was the outcome of a progressive exploration 
achieving a civilization based on trade routes and a profitable trade. In spite of those conditions 
the merit goes to the Portuguese. 
2.1. The first [A] is more realist, it is based on concrete facts, while the second [C] bears on a 
spiritual power, the open and adventurous Portuguese spirit. 
Version B questions our empire in case of the non-withdrawal of Chinese forces, D doesn't 
give much importance to that, rather it describes the steps taken for the conquest as it had been 
preconceived. 
2.2. Version B asserts that our empire is the result of coincidence while C elevates the 
Portuguese caracities. 
Manuel presents an explanatory narrative interlinking long-term conditions (the rise of the 
maritime expansion due to economic problems, and the systematic organization of that 
expansion) and the Chinese factor (although inaccurately stated - "pushing away the 
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Chinese from there"), the rounding of the Cape, and the implicit spice motive. He comes 
to a conclusion in terms of the goal achieved (the control of the spice trade as a solution 
to economic problems). When distinguishing between two versions, in items 2.1 and 
2.2, Manuel implicitly points out their main factors: the military correlation stressed in 
version A, and the morale factor stressed in version C. During the interview, he outlines 
the rounding of the Cape as the decisive factor: "I think that no obstacle as this Cape, or 
similar, appeared", "after rounding the Cape they got such a morale that they would win 
whatever people they could meet". The Portuguese will (or, morale) was also treated as a 
decisive factor of the Portuguese empire.? Thus, Manuel construes an explanation 
intertwining steps, dispositions, motives and external conditions, and discusses their 
relative weight. 
Lurdes begins her explanation with a set of factors explicitly recognised as such or as 
conditions. In a first set, she mentions the Chinese withdrawal (as a counterfactual: "a 
possible obstacle"), the military correlation with the Moslems, the morale factor, and 
(maybe) a web of long-term conditions and motives, synthesized in her statement "this 
conquest was not immediate, it was the outcome of a progressive exploration ... based 
on trade routes... ". At this point, her explanation assumes some contours of a narrative. 
She finishes by stressing "the Portuguese merit", which might suggest to point to the 
morale factor as the decisive condition among others. However, in 3.4 she makes this 
"merit" more explicit: she argues against the importance of the Portuguese will (not a 
"tangible reason") as being decisive, and what might have counted was the material 
resource. In items 2.1 and 2.2, distinctions between versions are made at a sophisticated 
level: she opposes versions A and C in terms of realism (as "based on concrete facts") 
versus subjectivism (version C "bears on a spiritual power"); version B is considered as 
a counterfactual speculation ("it questions our empire in case of ...") and version D is 
recognised as a description, not as an explanation ("it describes the steps"). 
These responses suggest an explanatory structure proximate to a narrative mode, which 
might be considered the mode frequently practised by historians (which is familiar to 
Portuguese history classes). A hierarchy between decisive and other contributory 
conditions is applied. 
?Manuel interprets the morality factor in terms of morale, as several other students do. This might be 
seen as a strategy of conversion, as previously referred to. Filipa's discussion of the leaders' morality 
represents one example of exceptions to this kind of conversion (see p. 244). 
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(b) Explanatory consistency (E and L) 
Manuel: 
3.2. Because I see that [D, ranked first] is the most concrete and it conveys important points 
about this domination. 
3.3. D [Version ranked first is better justified by sources], because the sources picture 
important and very concrete aspects of this domination. 
3.4. They [A and B, ranked last] are those which, to my view, lead me to less profitable 
conclusions, in their approach. 
Lurdes: 
2.4. Yes, [an explanation can be considered better than others] if it is more explicit in a way to 
beat the other arguments. 
3.2. Because it [A, ranked 1st] does not speculate, it only refers to why we defeated the 
Moslems; the second [B] refers to an aspect which might be very important but, in spite of 
everything, does not really happen. 
3.3. Yes [version D is better justified by sources], because when describing the Moslem fleet 
they explain our victory as these [Moslems] reinforced their land army at the expense of the 
maritime army, and thus we took advantage of that. 
3.4. They [C and D] do not present "tangible" reasons, the Portuguese might be very 
determined but the enemies could defeat us with their material resources; beside that, in the last 
case, it only describes the events by order and not why and how they happened. 
4.3. Maybe [nowadays, an explanation can be considered as complete], because there are no 
definitive truths and nothing guarantees that that explanation might not be put into question. 
Manuel chooses version D assessing its value in terms of its concreteness and factual 
importance. This could mean he values a more descriptive, or a more consistent with 
evidence, or a more plausible version: in the interview he considers version D as better 
justified by sources and argues for each statement in terms of its explanatory power. 
Factors are discussed as interrelated in the specific historical context. A distinction 
between explanation and sources is explicit in 3.1 ("the sources picture important and 
very concrete aspects"), and in the interview he explicitly cites sources C and E. His 
metaphor "picture" might suggest a naive idea about evidence, but through the interview 
he relates evidential consistency to a notion of confirmation, although using the term 
proof (an explanation may be "discussed in the light of its proofs, its facts". He 
considers versions ranked last as less fruitful; in the interview, Manuel affirms that all of 
them are worthy to be considered, and justifies their rank in terms of explanatory power. 
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Lurdes prefers version A over version B, as the former conveys a factor which "really 
happened", while the latter presents a mere speculation. Thus, an explanation based on a 
counterfactual possibility is considered important by Lurdes, but not so much as one 
based on "real" factors. When arguing for evidential justification of version A, she might 
be confirming this version by evidence conveyed by sources B, C, D and E when she 
refers to "describing the Moslem fleet they explain our victory, as these [Moslems] 
reinforced their land army". An idea of explanations open to refutation appears in 4.3. 
One explanation can win over others through argumentation ("in a way to beat the other 
arguments"). This argument, in conjunction with her discussion for and against the 
several versions given, seems to take into account elaborate criteria of explanatory 
power, on grounds of evidential and logical consistency. 
These responses may indicate some emerging ideas of (a) confirmation and refutation, 
although these ideas may oscillate to a simpler idea of exact proofs, and/or of (b) 
plausibility, in terms of everyday assumptions or appealing to the historical context. 
(c) Objectivity and truth (D and T) 
Manuel: 
2.3. [There are different explanations because] History is rumoured by the historians. 
2.4. Maybe [an explanation can be considered better than others], version D because the Cape 
of Good Hope is the crucial point in this Portuguese domination of the Indian Ocean. 
4.3. Maybe [nowadays, an explanation can be considered as complete], if there really is a 
complete explanation it is because they found the real facts for drawing a conclusion. 
5.2. The recent author [would explain better], because he has more points, more facts, more 
suggestions in order to compare, analyse and see better the facts, because she/he can deal with 
more material to analyse. 
Lurdes: 
2.3. Because nothing is definitive, there are always several ways of seeing something. 
Everything is relative when as in this case there are no proofs to clarify and establish a single 
interpretation. 
2.4. Yes, if it is more explicit in a way to beat the other arguments. 
5.2. [A witness] Because it is not influenced by principles like patriotism and in this case 
she/he saw what really happened and doesn't make suppositions and speculations about whether 
it happened or how it could be. 
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Manuel appears to be aware of a notion of perspective when he states that the existence of 
different explanations is due to the rumour of historians, that an explanation is 
constructed and based on facts, and that a recent author "has more suggestions ... see 
better the facts". This notion appears more explicit in the interview when he claims that "a 
historian will explain in a personal way... and that doesn't happen on this issue only ... 
there is never a 100% right explanation". Manuel prefers a recent author to an agent's 
explanation since this "is good because it is something they leave written and it is true, 
but the recent author will discuss it and will have more varied points of view". Thus, 
Manuel expresses an objectivist view and seems to take into account ideas of explanatory 
scope. 
Lurdes makes her ideas about provisionality of knowledge explicit ("there are no 
definitive truths") and assuming that several points of view lead to several answers. 
However, she seems to oscillate between this idea of recognition of point of view and 
that of applying perspective to controversial explanations only, in those cases when no 
proofs exist "to permit a single interpretation". She opts for a witness as the best 
explanation-producer, maybe due to a concern for certainty. Thus she seems to oscillate 
between a belief in certainty opposed to bias ("influenced by principles like patriotism") 
and a more elaborate objectivism integrating the notion of perspective. 
These responses may indicate a pattern in which the notion of perspective already appears 
entangled in criteria of methodological detachment and explanatory consistency. Although 
a genuine point of view is beginning to be accepted in an historical explanation, such a 
notion is still tentative, in the sense that it may coexist with an ideal of a single truth to be 
attained through a perspectiveless neutrality. 
